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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis explores the manner in which political-economic forces born of 
democratisation have shaped media developments in Zambia, affected the welfare of 
journalists and the viability of the state owned press epitomised by the Times 
Newspapers.  The aim is to inform the privatisation policy discourse. 
 
Using a political economy analysis, the thesis unveils the historical intimacy between 
nationalist administrations and multinational business elites and how these forces - often 
working in collusion - influenced patterns of media ownership, inhibited labour rights and 
controlled communicative activity – indicative of how the state and markets can 
constrain freedom of expression and association, despite democratisation.  
 
The thesis contends that the uncertainty of neo-patrimonial conditions that characterised 
the post colonial era has not dissipated to a great extent and continues to undermine 
media and institutional reform in today’s liberally inclined Zambia. 
 
Pervasive clientelism has also compromised popular perceptions of state media 
systems, subverting competitiveness and the propagandist function of the Times 
Newspapers in the liberalised market, a point empirically illustrated through the analysis 
of market and public opinion data.  
 
Inadvertently, the impact of labour market liberalisation, a hallmark of democratisation, 
has been to catalyse the unionisation of journalism, which has demonstrably improved 
the economic welfare of state media workers. Therefore, while transitional insecurities 
have moved ruling elites to limit freedom of expression within state media systems as a 
response to the perceived hostility of the private press, the strange paradox wrought by 
democratisation has been the unintended expansion of group rights, as journalists claim 
their constitutional entitlement to freedom of association. Collective action, hence, has 
conversely led to positive judicial and legislative outcomes.  
x 
 
The thesis cautions, however, that due to enduring patronage tendencies unbridled 
privatisation of state media systems in Zambia would likely consign institutions such as 
the Times to supporters of the state, promoting an illusory sense of independence and 
subjecting the entities to further – albeit – indirect political controls. Proposing a 
communal alternative, the thesis concludes that the complete reform of state media 
systems cannot possibly be divorced from the overall need for institutional 
transformation in Zambia. Methodologically, the thesis employs historical analysis and 
participant observation. 
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Zambia 
 
1. Demographics: 
 
Population: 13,460,305 
Population growth rate: 3.118% (2010 est.) 
Birth rate: 44.63 births/1,000 population (2010 est.) 
Death rate: 12.84 deaths/1,000 population (July 2010 est.) 
Urbanisation: 35% of total population (2008)  
 
2. Political System: 
 
Government type: republic 
Capital: Lusaka 
Administrative Divisions: 9 provinces; Central, Copperbelt, 
Eastern, Luapula, Lusaka, Northern, North-Western, 
Southern, Western 
Independence: 24 October 1964 (from the UK) 
Constitution: 24 August 1991; amended in 1996 to establish 
presidential term limits 
Legal system: based on English common law and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in an ad hoc 
constitutional council; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction 
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal 
 
2a. Executive Branch:  
 
Head of government: President Rupiah BANDA (since 19 August 2008); Vice President George KUNDA (since 14 
November 2008) 
Cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the president from among the members of the National Assembly 
 
Elections: president elected by popular vote for a five-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 30 
October 2008 (next to be held in 2011 
 
Legislative Branch: Unicameral National Assembly (158 seats; 150 members are elected by popular vote, 8 members 
appointed by the president, to serve five-year terms) 
 
3. Economic strength: 
 
GDP: $18.44 billion (2009 est.) 
GDP growth rate: 6.3% (2009 est.) 
GDP per capita (PPP): $1,400 (2009 est.) 
GDP – composition by sector; agriculture: 19.7%, industry: 32.4%, services: 47.9% 2009 est.) 
Labour force: 5.416 million (2009 est.) 
Labour force by occupation: agriculture: 85%, industry: 6%, services: 9% (2004) 
Unemployment rate: 50% (2000 est.) 
Population below the poverty line: 68% (2007)1 
Gini index: 50.8 (2004) 
Budget: revenues: $2.49 billion, expenditures: $2.955 billion (2009 est.) 
Public debt: 25.9% of GDP (2009 est.) 
Consumer inflation rate: 13.4% (2009 est.) 
 
Source: The World Factbook (2010).
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis employs participant observation and historical analysis to explore the 
impact of political change on state media systems in Zambia as experienced by 
the Times Newspapers, one of the largest entities in print journalism in this 
southern African country. 
 
The concept of political change is largely informed by modernisation theory, which 
is steeped in the much - criticised notion, suggesting that less developed societies 
only progress by adopting political, economic and social systems characteristic of 
highly industrialised western democracies (Smith, 1996:64).  
 
Although modernisation is not the equivalent of democratisation, some studies 
have shown a positive correlation between the two. These conclusions have been 
based on statistical relationships drawn between income levels as key indicators of 
modernisation and democracy (Randall & Theobald, 1998:43). Similarly, media 
density and urbanisation have also been viewed as important variables that 
correlate with democratisation and economic growth (Berger, 2004: 46). 
 
This thesis discusses political change in the context of democratisation - the 
process by which democracy may be achieved (Parry & Moran, 1994:1). It 
explores the ways in which macro level political economic forces born of 
democratisation may have shaped the structure, editorial policy, labour rights, 
public participation and the economic determination of the state media systems -
epitomised by the Times Newspapers. The impact of democratisation will hence 
be inferred and explained from the response of the Times and of labour to policy 
reforms and interventions undertaken by state elites during the periods of 
transition. 
 
 2 
Often, democratisation is intimately linked to political and economic liberalisation. 
Liberalisation refers to a loosening of restrictions and the expansion of individual 
and group rights, the consequence of which would manifest usually in both the 
political and economic arena. In most cases, the extension of political rights and 
freedoms; and reforms in the social and economic spheres has been based on the 
principles of liberal democracy (Keller, 1996: 204).  
 
In the past 45 years, Zambia has at least once experienced what Huntington 
(1991: 15) would term, a ‘reverse wave’ to its democratisation process: 
Independent in 1964 from British rule, Zambia was led by Kenneth Kaunda under 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP) for 27 years during which the 
country regressed from liberal democracy (1964-1972) to a one party state (1973-
1990).  
 
Under pressure from pro-democracy activists, Kaunda repealed Article 4 of the 
constitution of Zambia to reintroduce plural politics in 1990. Against a background 
of futile nationalisation policies, he lost power to the market orientated-Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by Frederick Chiluba in the plural elections of 
October 31, 1991(Simutanyi, 2008: 4). 
 
Chiluba’s 10 years in office were characterised by political tensions with opposition 
and labour, as his liberal philosophy caused wide spread job losses (Global Policy 
Network, 2001) and acute poverty (Banda, 2004: 7-10).   
 
His presidency ended with failed attempts to extend his rule in 2001. Levy 
Mwanawasa succeeded him as MMD and republican president after elections in 
2001 but succumbed prematurely to mortality in 2008, following which his vice 
President Rupiah Banda ascended to the presidency. Through these transitions, 
state policies and actions have caused persistent concerns about the place of 
media under this emerging democracy. 
 
Using a political economy theoretical framework, which considers historical, socio-
economic and political imperatives, including matters of control, ownership and 
 3 
labour relations (Boyd-Barret & Newbold, 1995: 186), the thesis therefore broadly 
investigates the manner in which reforms undertaken during three distinct period of 
change, have affected state media systems in Zambia in general and the Times 
Newspapers in particular.  
 
Consistent with the ambitions of liberal democracy, freedom of expression and 
freedom of association 2 will be fore-grounded. Here, the thesis is interested in 
how political and economic forces produce, sustain and apportion privilege, 
including the distribution of rights within state media establishments. Montemayor 
(2008: 143) explains that just as citizens of a country possess specific moral rights, 
workers are also entitled to similar rights within their organisation by virtue of their 
participation in it.  Edwards (1993: 35) elaborates on this, asserting that worker 
rights are not only drawn from constitutional rights but also from conditions of 
service and ‘implied promises’ granted by the employer. He calls these rights 
enterprise rights. 
 
Without struggle however, Nord (1993: 341) cautions, constitutional rights cannot 
be translated into tangible rights. Nord is instructive in this regard when he 
differentiates between stated rights and concrete rights. Hence trade unionism - in 
this case media unionism - forms a central part of the thesis.  
 
It is noteworthy that the political and economic reform imperatives of 
democratisation as they relate to Africa are clouded in much scholarly tension.  
 
On the one hand, a new consensus among aid bureaucrats and policy makers 
emerging in the 1990s supported the argument that strengthening the democratic 
process, along with corporatist arrangements between political elites and interest 
groups would secure the economic reform process on the continent (Rakner, 
                                                 
2
 Relating the notion of freedom to communicative rights is evidently inspired by communication theorist 
Jurgen Harbermas (1989 & 1974) through his seminal works on the concept of the public sphere. The 
public sphere is discussed at length in Chapter Three, sections 3.1 and 3.2.8. In this regard, Beetham 
(1981: 192) notes that ‘without freedom to express and communicate opinions, to assemble and 
associate, democracy would simply not exist’. Denis McQuail (1996: 70-71) also makes the point that in 
the realm of civil society, freedom has been defined in terms of communicative rights: of belief, speech, 
movement, assembly, association and access to information. This is generally how this thesis interprets 
this concept. 
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2001: 509-512). On the other hand, radical African positions denounced the dual 
reform process imposed on the continent as being more about western interests of 
control and exploitation than democracy. They continue to associate privatisation 
and liberalisation with the incapacitation of the state, a loss of sovereignty, 
disempowerment of workers through de-unionisation and retrenchments 
(Mkandawire, 1999: 337). Unfortunately these empirical realities of Africa have 
been ignored in the wider academic project (Rakner, 2001: 512).  
 
The idea of a minimal state certainly projects a sense of powerlessness on the part 
of African governments, suggesting that all development, including media 
development, is to be externally dictated. 
 
However, the remarkable characteristic of the works of scholars such as 
Mkandawire (1999, 2001) is that it defies the prescriptive advances of neo-liberal 
orthodoxy on institutional transformation in Africa. Implicitly, his arguments 
challenge us to re-think how we view and understand neo-liberal principles as they 
relate to the media. They further raise the concern that some of democracy’s 
supposed sacred values, such as freedom of association and expression, might be 
largely subordinated to the financial interests of global capital despite 
democratisation.  
 
These freedoms - which are closely inter-related - render it possible for people, 
journalists included, to express their own ideas, form associations, trade unions 
and other societies to defend and promote their own interests (Chanda & 
Liswaniso, 1999: 1).  
 
In Zambia, freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly 
and association are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution’s Article 
20(1), Article 20(2) and Article 21(1), respectively. Legal experts hold that these 
freedoms, in any modern democracy, are not absolute and may be subject to 
legitimate limitations in their exercise. However, there are some concerns about 
the wide ranging nature of the derogations sections in the Zambian Constitution’s 
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clause 20(3) and the abstract disposition of restrictions relating to public safety, 
public order and defence, in particular (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 1). 3 
 
 
Given these perspectives, the overall purpose of thesis is to contribute to the 
protracted policy discourse on merits and demerits of a fully liberalized and 
privatised media industry as opposed to state ownership in the Zambian political 
environment.  
 
For the purposes of the thesis, democracy will imply liberal democracy - the official 
trajectory of the MMD government - which would encompass regular elections of 
leadership through a secret ballot, an orderly succession, openness of society, 
universal adult suffrage; independent judiciary, freedom of association, freedom of 
the press and freedom of ownership, institutional pluralism and fundamental 
human rights (Obasanjo, 1989: 34). 4Because of demands on openness that 
underpin this model of democracy, the relevance of state owned media is a matter 
requiring evidence-based debates owing to the seeming lack of political 
commitment by successive Zambian administrations to reforms.  The Objectives of 
the thesis hence are: 
 
                                                 
3
 This thesis avoids an over elaboration on the legal and constitutional imperatives relating to freedom of 
expression and of the media firstly because this is not the focus of the study. Secondly, it is an area that 
has received extensive attention by scholars over the years (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: Matibini, 2006; 
Chirwa, 1997, CPU, 1997) in a very general sense and has largely been associated with threats posed by 
legislation to the existence of the private press rather than on the law’s micro level influences in the 
institutional realm of the state owned media. The thesis exercises caution in generalising the limitations of 
law to the state media mainly because it recognises that state sanctions against journalists in the SOEs 
can be masked by administrative actions. It is argued that such nuances are likely better investigated 
through the methods, among others, proposed by this thesis. 
4
 Although democracy remains a highly contested idea, there is some level of consensus between 
scholars and politicians (as reflected in most modern constitutions) in regard to what its key elements are. 
Bello (2011: 52) for instance, identifies them as: equality, sovereignty of the people; respect for human 
life; the rule of law and liberty of the individual. Held (1993) extends the cluster to include: elected 
government, free and fair elections in which every citizen’s vote has an equal weight, a suffrage which 
embraces all citizens irrespective of race, religion, class, sex, among other things: freedom of conscience, 
information and expression on all public matters; the right of all adults to oppose their government and 
contest political office; the right to form associations, including social movements, interest groups and 
political parties. Similar articulations of democracy are reflected in section 1.1.3 of this chapter through the 
works of Mafeje (1995), and in section 2.3.1 of Chapter Two where the thesis discusses measurement 
tools for democracy informed by Kekic (2007), Almond and Verba (1963), Landman (2005), Zakaria 
(2003), Mattes (2003) and Lolojih (2005). 
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 To explore the influence of democratisation on state media systems in 
Zambia.5 
 To investigate how political change may have affected decision making 
structures on the Times Newspapers and what it portends for public 
participation and political conflict over communication resources in a 
pluralist society. 
 To examine the ways in which democratisation has affected labour 
rights among media professionals in the state sector, and in particular, 
on the Times Newspapers. 
 To contribute to evidence-based proposals on privatisation and their 
implications for job security for media professionals in Zambia 
 To explore the impact of privatisation and liberalisation on the 
commercial aspects of the Times Newspapers6.  
 
It is, perhaps relevant, at this juncture to categorically state that this is not a 
comparative study. It does not therefore seek to draw analogies between the 
Zambian model of state media, which, as will be explained in sections 3.2.8 of 
Chapter Three and 4.3.6 of Chapter Four, escapes easy categorisation within 
Siebert, Petersen and Schramm’s (1956) four theories of the press 7or the typology 
                                                 
5
 The interest of this thesis is to explore and explain how democratisation, particularly, the four key 
characteristics of liberal democracy that constitute the independent variables – freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, liberalisation and privatisation – have influenced changes to oversight 
frameworks, structure, labour relations and rights, public participation; and the Times Newspapers’ 
commercial disposition over time. The researcher recognises that there are other factors that could inhibit 
press freedom and commercial innovation, including managerial incompetence, a lack of personal 
integrity, cheque book journalism, poor training and preferences for non traditional media by publics, 
among others. While some of these could still be linked to the imperatives of a democratising society, the 
thesis draws the line specifically around institutional and labour related matters affecting the Times 
through the three distinct periods of political change. In the same vein, the thesis does not seek to analyse 
the content of state media as this is quite well exposed. Instead, through historical analysis and participant 
observation, it aims to unravel how power and wealth have interacted to influence communicative space 
within the organisational setting of the Times Newspapers. This is done in order to postulate the potential 
threat of states and markets to initiatives for privatisation. 
6
 The research questions, which are closely linked to these objectives, are elaborated in section 1.3.1 of 
this chapter. Structurally, this thesis seeks to first map the relationship between theories anchored in the 
disciplines of political economy, political science and communication science in order to arrive at a 
conceptual coherency ahead of the explication of the problem statement, research questions and methods 
to be employed. In this sense, it deliberately departs from a standard format of the introductory chapter. 
7
 The four theories of the press, first advanced by Siebert, Peterson and Scram, (1956) were initially the 
dominant paradigm in analysing global media systems and assessing press freedom across the world: 
The authoritarian theory suggests that media are designed to support and advance the policies of 
government, regardless of ownership; the libertarian theory held that man was rational and an end in 
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advanced by Article 19 (Article 19, 2006: 37). The thesis is, first and foremost, 
theoretical, and its main purpose is to test certain basic tenets of Critical Political 
Economy (CPE), including the positioning of labour in the media industry, framed 
against the dual influences of market and state on freedom of expression and 
association. 
 
The methods for exploring these phenomena will be discussed in detail in section 
1.4 of this Chapter. Detailed discussions on Zambia’s history, its political trajectory 
and the emergence of organised media will follow in Chapter Two. A successive 
engagement on the concepts of democratisation, political economy and the public 
sphere is presented in Chapter Three. Chapter Four interrogates the influence of 
political and business elites on the Times Newspapers’ capacity for free 
expression. It examines oversight frameworks and multiparty conflict over access 
to state media systems with a view to understanding what model of media would 
best support Zambia’s democratic project. Chapter Five will analyse the manner in 
which democratisation - particularly labour market liberalisation - facilitated or 
impeded media unionism at various stages of Zambia’s history. It will focus on the 
conditions that led to the rise of professional unions in the media sector; their 
response to the influence of the powerful; and their role - if any - in enabling better 
working environments for journalists in the state sector, and more specifically on 
the Times.  The influence of liberalisation and privatisation on commercial 
strategies on the Times Newspapers will be discussed in Chapter Six. The thesis 
shall conclude with a summary and recommendations in Chapter Seven. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
himself and therefore laid emphasis on individual rights to communicate freely; the social responsibility 
theory was a creature of the libertarian model and underlined the social responsibility role of the media; 
lastly the Soviet communist theory, based on Marxist ideology, was anchored on the unity of the working 
class and fore grounded congruence of opinion, or only one truth (Yin, 2008: 6-7). The fast changing 
media context globally, has generally rendered the theories obsolete. For instance, critics argue that the 
theories were based on pro-capitalist bias and were products of the Cold War era; that they ignored the 
phenomenon of media concentration and its implications, characteristic of the libertarian media (Yin, 2008: 
6-15). Others, like Ostini & Fung (2002: 42-46) decry the prescriptive nature of the theories – their failure 
to describe social phenomena by using an empirical basis for inquiry. The rapidly changing global context 
also annuls the theories’ explanatory power, Ostini and Fung argue. Lastly, Obonyo, (2009: 1-10), in 
addition, posits that the theories do not adequately explain the structure and conduct of media in Africa. 
This thesis makes further reference to the theories in section 3.2.3 of Chapter Three. 
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1.1.1 Rationale 
 
Historically, the media in Zambia seem to have been caught in ideological tensions 
between powerful neo-Marxian interests that subscribe to a 
developmental/propagandist media model, where responsibilities toward national 
unity and development are emphasised over rights; and Libertarian persuasions, 
driven by free market ambitions.  
 
In this regard, McQuail (1994: 127) is instructive in noting that societies in 
transition from colonialism lack the human and infrastructural resources to develop 
media systems outside of state support and will hence be structured toward 
propping up new democracies, accounting for the continuance of dominant media 
models. 
 
For Bruce Baker (2000:11), the fundamental problem inhibiting reform in 
transitional states lies in structural continuities which are also related to the 
practice of recycling leadership at all levels of the state and the media. Recycled 
leaders tend to maintain the old social order, limiting the momentum for significant 
institutional transformation, he posits. 
 
In similar vein, Charles Okigbo (1995: 189) observes that press freedom in Africa 
will not be attained simply by the replacement of one party regimes with popularly 
elected government. The unique contexts of various African countries suggest that 
long-standing political habits, public expectations and appreciation of new found 
freedoms; varied levels of journalistic training and the economic environment 
would ultimately determine the type of media that eventually develops.  
 
Conceivably, it may be argued that democratic societies can evolve different 
profiles of the media and no distinct matrix of press development can be deemed 
necessary for a democratisation project (Price & Krug, 2002: 3). Price and Krug 
contend that various conceptions of democracy may demand different functions of 
the press. The notions of democracy that emphasise citizen participation would 
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underscore the need for that type of media; while more elitist societies would 
foreground the provision of adequate information for participants in the public 
sphere to make informed decisions and act as watchdogs. Other concepts of 
democracy prioritise the inculcation and dissemination of ‘proper values’ (Price & 
Krug, 2002: 3-4). . 
 
As Price and Krug have noted further, history has few lessons regarding the media 
model that best advances democratisation. Three principal regulatory forms have 
been identified over time: the first is the state monopoly ownership and media 
control which permits alternative voices only with consent from the state 
authorities; the second is the public or public service monopoly which is associated 
more with broadcasting systems and exhibits sufficient autonomy from the state; 
the third is private ownership, which comes with varying levels of state regulation. 
Increasingly, the three systems have been known to combine or present 
themselves in diverse blends as states go through different transitions (Price & 
Krug, 2002: 3). 
 
As alluded to earlier, Zambia experienced an 18 year post colonial period of 
pluralism(the First Republic: 1964-1972), followed by a phase of one party 
government (the Second Republic: 1973-1990) before the regime succumbed to a 
new post cold war wave of democratisation in 1991, leading up to the current 
period of  political pluralism and economic liberalisation (the Third Republic).  
 
The reversal from liberal democracy to one party state in 1973 is not unique to 
Zambia. Huntington (1991: 15) observes that history is not unidirectional: some of 
the countries that democratised have experienced a reversal to non - democratic 
rule. The factors causing this cyclic phenomenon are multifarious and therefore 
predicting at one point transitions occur is elusive, he posits. Throughout Zambia’s 
three republics, the independence of the media has been at the centre of the 
country’s democracy discourse (Makayi, 1997:17). Although efforts at controlling 
formerly foreign owned media such as the Times Newspapers eventually 
succeeded in 1982, the debate on privatisation intensified with the advent of the 
second wave of multiparty politics in 1991.  
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Generally, the First and Second Republics were characterised by the expansion of 
state interests in the media sector, which culminated in all electronic and print 
media - except the church owned National Mirror - being absorbed into a state 
corporate structure. While it has been relatively straightforward to establish a 
newspaper under the Printed Publications Act in the Third Republic, high costs of 
newsprint, declining per capita incomes of Zambians and therefore low newspaper 
sales, inhibit the growth and sustenance of print media (Zambia, 1996: 14)8  
Hence, the flurry of publications that characterised the enunciation of the 
multiparty era in 1990, collapsed within a ten year period, except for the Post 
Newspapers (Banda, 2003: 30). 
 
The promise of change has been further undermined by the state’s failure to 
privatise some or all of the media systems it controls; and to sufficiently reform the 
colonial legal architecture which is adjudged to pose impediments to free 
expression (XIX/Article 19, 2006:1). 
 
Efforts at media reforms have been anchored by the understanding that a 
liberalised and privatised media sector would lubricate democratic citizenship and 
increase popular participation.   
 
Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to engender a consensus on how 
the country’s communication systems should be shaped, in this regard.  
 
The Media Reform Committee (MRC) was one of the first of such initiatives and 
comprised media associations and senior journalists working with the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS). However, state enthusiasm 
inexplicably petered out by 1994, leaving the initiative to civil society organisations 
and professional associations such as the Commonwealth Press Union (CPU), the 
Press Association of Zambia (PAZA); the Zambia Independent Media Association 
                                                 
8
 According the Printed Publications Act Cap. 161, the following steps are necessary for establishing a 
newspaper: 1) provide full names, addresses of every individual involved in the entity; proprietor, printer or 
publisher 2) a description of the location of the newspaper, to the Director of the National Archives 
(Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 12). 
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(ZIMA), which formed the informal Media Liaison Committee (MLC). During the 
same period, recommendations by the 1993 Mwanakatwe Constitution Review 
Commission for the enhancement of free speech were ignored by government 
(Makayi, 1997: 23).   
 
In 2005, proposals by yet another Constitution Review Commission to enable 
freedom of information legislation and editorial leeway for all electronic and print 
media were again thrown out (XIX/Article 19, 2006:2). 
 
And despite a much touted media liberalisation exercise, critics argue that the 
process has been selectively applied over the years (Kasoma, 2002:287). Banda 
(2006: 461) for instance notes that  Zambia undertook ‘cautious’ deregulation of 
the media sector in 1993, with broadcast licenses being issued to Christian 
applicants, presumably because the government of Frederick Chiluba  proclaimed 
the country a Christian nation, inclined in evangelical mode.   
 
Foreign investors in the broadcasting industry were allowed in, largely on the 
state’s terms and could therefore not be seen to be entirely free, Banda observes.  
 
The Freedom of Expression Institute and Article 19 also note that despite the 
enactment of the Independent Broadcast Authority (IBA) and the Zambia National 
Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) Acts in 2003, apparently aimed at creating 
independent boards, the broadcast and print media facilities remain under the 
strict control and influence of the minister of information and broadcasting 
services. The existence of independent media in Zambia, the XIX/Article 19, 
laments, is as a result negated by ‘government use of the powerful state owned 
media…’ (XIX/Article 19, 2006: 3). 
 
Although media and legal activists continue their efforts to hold the MMD 
government accountable to its promise of an independent media sector, the 
impetus for change appears to constantly need evidence - based advocacy to 
allow for an informed engagement with the state and non state actors on the 
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absolute necessity to respect the rights of workers in the media and of citizens to 
the greater access to information.  
 
For supporters of the liberal paradigm of the media, it is of course tempting to 
conclude that a country as diversely ethnic as Zambia; with a 71 % adult literacy 
rate (UNICEF, 2008) encumbered by a complex mix of maladies ranging from 68 
% poverty(ZHDR, 2007: 68-70) to under development,  requires to utilize all 
necessary safety valves and promote a discursive, consensus based politics: That 
equal or equitable access to communication resources by political contestants may 
be central to these politics and to political stability in general given the highly 
competitive nature of Zambia’s multiparty system exhibited in the last six years. 
Needless to say, access to the media and communication systems often 
constitutes a key element in determining a levelled playing field in democratic 
contests - a debate that has punctuated Zambian elections since 1991 (FODEP, 
2001: 26). 
 
It must however be noted that the tendency to argue for liberalised and privatised 
media systems has lately come under more scrutiny, with some scholars arguing 
that the complexion of the nation-state needs to be taken into account when 
structuring cultural institutions.  Linz and Stepan (2001:105) for example hold that 
multicultural and multinational societies increase their chances of consolidating 
their democracies by allowing a variety of communal institutions - including media, 
multi-lingual schools, symbolic recognition of cultural diversity, and political 
tolerance for political parties representing different communities. In short, publicly 
funded media systems should not be seen to be inconsistent with democracy in a 
universal sense. 
 
In this context, the thesis considers that despite pursuing policies and processes of 
privatisation and liberalisation, the Zambian government still owns the Zambia 
National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), the National Agricultural Information 
Service (NAIS), the Zambia Information and News Services (ZANIS), the Zambia 
Daily Mail, the Sunday Mail and Zambia Publishing Company; the Times of 
Zambia and Sunday Times of Zambia (i.e. TimesPrintpak (Zambia) Limited).   
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The Times Newspapers are hence an integral part of state media systems in 
Zambia, ostensibly accountable to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 
Services (MIBS). 
 
The state owned print media employs not less than 300 journalists who subscribe 
to professional bodies such as the PAZA and the Zambia Union of Journalists 
(ZUJ). This conservative estimate does not include journalists employed by the 
ZNBC, ZIS or the NAIS. It does also not include cameramen, technicians, anchors 
and other media personnel who are not involved in field assignments (Phiri, 2008). 
9The state is consequently, the largest employer of journalists in Zambia. 
 
This form of state control, as O’Neil (1998:10) notes, creates a dependent 
relationship for journalists in terms of their livelihood, and for the public, in respect 
of their information needs.  
 
The thesis also observes that by comparison, the emergent private media are 
relatively small, underdeveloped and unstable; that they are politically vulnerable 
to a wide array of existing legislation inherited from British colonialism; that they 
operate in an economic environment that is inhibiting with high costs of news print, 
limited printing capacities and commercial advertising opportunities (Chanda & 
Liswaniso, 1999: Banda, 2004: Makungu, 2004).  
 
This point also raises the possibility of an unintended consequence of media 
reform processes: That the wholesale privatisation of state media systems could 
paradoxically portend ill for employment opportunities for journalists in Zambia, 
given the high death rates of the independent press in an environment 
characterised by declining revenues and acute poverty levels (Banda, 2004: 8). 
 
There is another underlying factor to media privatisation that has yet to receive 
substantial attention from scholars; the prospect that powerful transnational 
                                                 
9
 Unpublished, face-to-face interview: full text in appendix one of this thesis. 
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companies might colonise media space, should privatisation take root in this 
sector, given that citizens of countries such as Zambia may not have the economic 
means to operate viable businesses of their own in this very challenging industry. 
With the influence of transnational firms very much a source of concern in regard 
to the independence of the African state, the prospect of surrendering media 
space could well be a major reason for procrastination by political leaders.  
 
Inevitably it has to be assumed that the monopolisation of the major media by 
either the state or market may result in the decline of the public sphere - which 
McQuail (1987: 83) describes as, ‘an open space for rational political discourse 
between economy and state.’  Similarly, other scholars such as McKenna (1995: 
329); Curran (1996:82); and Mosco (2000: 135) understand Jurgen Harbermas’s 
concept of a public sphere as such, with close association to modern 
communication systems. 
 
The approach suggested by this thesis promises some new insights into 
discussions around the dichotomous nature of media institutions in emerging 
African democracies and the western models they are often expected to emulate. 
Past studies have often paid more attention to historical analysis, legal and 
constitutional frameworks and their impact on the media or the commercial aspects 
of the private press. 
 
Kasoma (1986) presented a historical discussion of media development in Zambia 
tinged with a narrative on press freedom. Chirwa (1996) was pre-occupied with 
matters of press freedom in the Third Republic; Matibini (2006) analysed the 
various legal developments regarding freedom of expression and of the press; 
while Banda (1996) addressed media’s coverage of elections in Zambia. Makungu 
(2004) is a historical account of press freedom not dissimilar to Kasoma (1986) 
before him. Investigations on the commercialisation and sustainability of the media 
have tended to concentrate on the privately owned media based on the 
assumption - rather than on empirical evidence - that all state media are state 
funded and therefore not deserving of inquiry. Certainly Banda (2004:1) does 
allude to this. However, the more implicit reason seems to be that researchers 
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have not had easy access to state media systems of the type that would unravel 
new perspectives on either political or economic aspects.  
 
1.1.2 Choice of the Times Newspapers as a case study 
 
The choice of the Times Newspapers for this study is strategic in historical terms.  
Before it became an integral part of a state owned system of communication, the 
Times made the transition from a privately owned entity under the British 
Conglomerate - the London Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (Lonrho) - to a 
fully state owned enterprise in 1982. The newspapers therefore epitomize the 
changing state-media relations through Zambia’s three republics.  
Secondly, because the company is still part of a centrally supervised 
communication system, it provides a microcosm of state media systems in Zambia.  
Historically, the Times Newspapers (Zambia) Limited and its sister printing 
company, Printpak (Zambia) limited, had a dual management system falling under 
the oversight of Lonrho.  
A general manager oversaw the financial aspects of the companies while the 
editor-in-chief, answerable to the presidency, was editorially superior. This was 
while the company was under an unusual state - Lonrho joint over sight framework 
(1968 - 1982). When the TimesPrintpak were consigned to the National Media 
Corporation (NAMECO) a state owned print media conglomerate established by 
the presidency in 1989, the structure of the company was radically altered. The 
Times Newspapers and Printpak each had its own chief executive appointed. The 
circulation department was transformed into the Newspaper Distributors Limited 
(NDL), headed by a general manager. All three chief executive officers reported to 
the managing director of NAMECO, who in turn was accountable to a director 
general located in the presidency - essentially - the special advisor to Zambia’s 
founding president, Kenneth Kaunda (Firms in new hands, 1989:3).  
Two years after the MMD won the 1991 multiparty elections, the state dissolved 
NAMECO (state dissolves Nameco, 1993:1). Times/Printpak was hence 
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consolidated with NDL reverting to a department within the structure. The position 
of managing director was created as the overall chief executive.  
At the time of the study, the Times/printmaker employed 280 staff complemented 
by 76 casual workers. Its main activities continue to be located in the Zambian 
capital Lusaka, and Ndola, situated in the country’s industrial hub (Times/Printpak 
Strategic Plan, 2009-2012: 5).  
For the purposes of the study, the composite entity shall be referred to simply as 
the Times Newspapers. The Times Newspapers are the case study and the thesis 
will hence focus on the organisation’s qualities constituting editorial policy, 
structure, lines of authority, commercial strategies, labour relations and 
mechanisms for public participation. 
The key political and economic characteristics of liberal democracy, that is, 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, liberalisation and privatisation 10will 
constitute the independent variables; while the state media (Times Newspapers), 
                                                 
10
 According to Chiluba (1995: 126-130), the purpose of the liberal democratic model championed by the 
MMD was to restore civil and political liberties constrained under one party rule. The envisaged free flow 
of information under liberal democracy, he argues, was necessary for a successful market economy as 
citizens would have the avenues to challenge government policy and be guaranteed property rights. 
However, this libertarian notion has been challenged on the basis that unregulated markets, anchored by 
private property rights in the means of production, distribution and exchange, result in discrepancies in 
wealth and hierarchical relationships, aggravating inequalities of power and influence that in turn, 
constrain the range of democratic control (Bellamy, 1992: 260). In elucidating the MMD manifesto, Chiluba 
does infact hint that denationalisation would lead to painful but necessary job losses but promises that the 
transfer of state assets into private or even foreign hands would have beneficial effects in the long term 
(Chiluba, 1995: 133). However, he underlines that not all SOEs would be surrendered by the state.  
Liberal democracy, he asserts, thrives best in a market oriented economy and that this may be a key 
element in the sustenance of democracy. Declaring that: ‘The economic philosophy of the MMD 
government rests on the simple but incontrovertible belief that wealth must be created before it can be 
consumed’, Chiluba summarises the hallmark of MMD’s liberalisation and privatisation policies as follows: 
1)Privatising State Owned Enterprises (SOEs); 2) reducing the enormous fiscal burden of the subsidy on 
maize 3) diversification away from mining 5) liberalisation of prices in the agricultural sector to catalyse the 
600,000 traditional farmer’s capacity (who were, at the time, providing 60% of the country’s maize crop); 
(6)stabilisation of the exchange rate and sustained reduction in inflation to spur investment in 
manufacturing 7) enabling a shift in the incidence of tax away from production to consumption and 
improving tax collection (with the formation of the Zambia Revenue Authority); (8) increasing people 
participation in the wealth creation process of the formal sector with the promise of credit facilities and 
legal status for the 370,000 - 485,000 formal sector workers who might wish to establish businesses.  He 
adds: ‘Where people are not dependent on the state for their livelihood and where they have economic 
security or financial and economic resources that can be employed in defence of their liberty, then the 
power of the state is limited and checked’ (Chiluba, 1995: 134).The effects of MMD’s policies of 
liberalisation and privatisation on the workforce, including media workers, will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter Five; while their impact on the Times Newspapers is critically analysed in Chapter Six. 
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the dependent variable. The study provides for an intervening variable in trade 
unionism.11 
 
1.1.3 Theoretical perspectives 
In analysing political change, the elements of which might have varied impacts on 
media development, this project elects to unpack the three inter-linked concepts 
that will inform the discussion: 
 
 Democratisation.  
 Political Economy. 
 Public Sphere.  
Scholars conceive of democratisation as a process that embraces democracy as a 
moral good but admit that the latter concept is understood differently across 
various cultures (Parry & Moran; 1994: Landman; 2005; Alvandi & Shalala, 2007: 
Pretorius; 2008).  In addition, there is some measure of tension in regard to how 
democracy should be realized (Alvandi & Hakala, 2007: 5).  
Parry and Moran (1994:1) argue that both the meanings of democracy and 
democratisation are problematic, and in some cases inter-linked. Neither is a 
condition that has been accomplished. As a result, both concepts pose difficulties 
for scholars and practitioners in terms of explanation, realisation and interpretation. 
Mafeje (1995:5) reflects that three concepts of democracy have characterized 
European theoretical and political discourse: liberal, social and socialist 
democracy.  
 
Each materialised as a critique of pre-existing forms of rule and wealth distribution. 
They co-existed beyond World War I and largely represented two competing 
                                                 
11
 Specifically, media unionism. 
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systems of political and economic organisation. The social definitions emphasise 
socio-economic rights and full participation of citizens in collective decision-
making. The socialist tradition also embraces popular power with majority rule 
prevailing. The liberal tradition on the other hand underlines open election of 
representatives accompanied by a range of democratic rights (Williams; 1993: 21). 
Liberal democracy is said to be the oldest and most widely promoted with its 
elements of freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press, rule 
of law and respect for individual rights (Mafeje, 1995: 7). Because of the size and 
complexity of modern democracies the notion of representation at all levels of 
political life is promoted by proponents of this system. Elected representatives in 
turn extend participation in decision making to varied constituencies (Green, 1993: 
257). The reality remains however, that whether one discusses democracy or 
democratisation, the anticipated result seems to be utopian. 
Huntington (1991; 35) attempts to apply some clarity to the concepts by reiterating 
that democratisation has three phases: 1) the end of an authoritarian regime; (2) 
installing a democratic regime; and (3) consolidating the new regime.  
Each of these developments is caused by different factors, he cautions.  Therefore 
analysing the independent variable, the possible causes of democratisation 
presents problems. 
Based purely on the understanding of this plethora of literature, Zambia could be 
said to still be in a slow process of consolidation in its continuum toward this form 
of political change. The concept of consolidation has not only been related to a 
strengthening of political institutions beyond reversal; but also to the attainment of 
an economic threshold of Gross National Product (GNP) per capita of between 
$6001 - $7000, where the life expectancy of a democracy is on average at 125 
years (Mattes, 2003: 79). 
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1.1.4 Media’s link to democracy 
 
But if understanding democratisation and democracy is an elusive under taking, 
the linkage between these two concepts and the media is itself vexing.  The 
discourse around media and democracy is replete with conflicting views not only 
about media power but also their role in enabling change or responding to change. 
Earlier idealistic views informed by modernisation theory that extolled media as 
agents of change, have since yielded face to more radical positions which view the 
press as a means for capitalist oppression and control (Martin, 1998:63).  
O’Neil (1998:1), Baker (2007: 7), Curran (2002: 4) and Graber (1984:1) all take 
note of some of these debates concerning the supposed connection between 
mass communications and democracy with varied analyses of how the two are 
inter-linked.  
The most enduring line of argument appears to be in the liberal mode.  That is, the 
assumption that democratisation may translate into a freer form of social 
interaction through, among other means, the mass media. James Curran (2002: 4) 
for example explains Britain’s experience of the liberal narrative as one that 
advances the notion that the development of mass media immensely strengthened 
the democratisation process. As print and electronic media broke free of state 
controls, they also expanded public discourse and contributed to the growth of the 
political community.  
In the same vein, Baker (2007:7) argues that for people to be self governing, they, 
among other things, require the means to form public opinion which in turn may 
influence legislation and policy.  
Baker further suggests that media are critical for ‘public will formation’ as they 
mediate between public and government. He argues that a country ‘is democratic 
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only to the extent that the media, as well as elections, are structurally egalitarian 
and politically salient’ (Baker, 2007: 7).   
However, as O’Neil (1998:1) and Raboy and Dagenais (1992: 9-10) concede, the 
relationship between media and democracy is not a straightforward one. For 
Raboy and Dagenais, the inter-linkage between the two is best understood by 
interrogating the notion of crisis.  
They explore several views of crisis, which can range from radical change 
(disruption of social order) to the policy making process, where the integrity of a 
system is challenged by non state actors. They define democracy as a value, not a 
system - an on going struggle for equality, social justice and for popular 
participation in decision making processes.   
Because crisis is a key characteristic of modern democracies, they posit, media 
will be the agents of social communication through which the crisis is made public 
and logically galvanize sentiments for change.  
Crisis exposes state attempts at censorship or media’s accession to self control, 
they explain. Raboy and Dagenais assert that the function of the media would 
therefore be to render choices on what constitutes a crisis and how this might be 
presented in the public sphere.  But the scholars also concede that the labelling of 
a crisis is itself an exercise motivated by ideological and political proclivities.  
The crisis framework pre-supposes that there must be a general loss of confidence 
in the established authorities; and that those in power are consequently resigned 
to coercive means of control. It also seems to suggest a rather romantic 
interpretation of media independence; particularly subscribing to the watchdog role 
which is increasingly in tension with the more contemporary assessments of how 
media are prone to the influence of political and economic power (Gibson, 
2004:11). 
In addition, crisis is itself not a straight forward concept. It does seem to imply a 
constellation of concepts; from a disruption, real or perceived, of social order to 
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uncertainty in politics, security or commerce of a nation (Raboy & Dagenais, 1992: 
9).  
From an African perspective, Raboy and Dagenais’ arguments may perhaps be 
born out by other scholars who seem lately to increasingly realise that the 
challenge of democratisation and nation building on the continent is radically 
different from that of Europe.  
Poku and Sandkjaer (2007:10), for example, assert that one of the key frailties of 
the African state is the manner in which the nations were fused, an assertion that 
seems to speak to the inherent persistence of crises. Whilst in some parts of 
Europe nation builders substituted the empires of old with a more deliberate mix of 
cultural, linguistic and patriotic harmony, the state in Africa was carved out of 
fractured, multi-ethnic societies by colonial powers.  
Poverty and under-development in addition, seem to undermine efforts at building 
democratic institutions as these factors may either cause withdrawal of the poor 
from political activity or generate heightened disenchantment, threatening stability 
(Simon, 2002:1).  
Against a background of poverty and under-development, the prioritisation of unity 
and national development by political leaders on the continent over rapid political 
liberalisation may perhaps be understood as a sensible means of sustaining highly 
fragile democracies.  
Similarly, the assignment of nation-building roles to the mass media in Africa might 
partly be explained by these histories as Martin (1998: 68), seems to imply.  
In fact, some criticisms of modernisation theory in this regard suggest that what 
might be interpreted as slow progress by African states toward change by western 
theorists, could very well be prudent, well meaning political calculations on the part 
of African elites wary of compromising stability (Smith, 1992: 80).   
For Patrick H. O’Neil (1998: 6) the media’s link to democracy and their role in 
society, particularly in transitional processes, is blurred by the lack of empirical 
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evidence and inadequate conceptual frameworks in both political and 
communication sciences to investigate the phenomena.  
O’Neil observes that studies in this regard are framed in normative terms and will 
often not account for the media’s role in moulding transitional processes and how 
this involvement might in future impede an easy transformation of communication 
systems to meet the expectations of democracy. O’Neil holds that transitions and 
societies in which they occur may appear to change but they carry over structures 
that might resist transformation, constraining forms of social action.  
In addition, O’Neil (1998:1) notes that while the media are viewed as a crucial link 
between state and society, it should not always be assumed that democratic 
systems of government will necessarily facilitate the dispersal of power and public 
access to it. In his reflections on democratic theory, he notes that such systems 
‘can be easily corrupted thereby undermining participation and voice.’  
Simply transplanting western models into foreign societies without due 
consideration of legacies of social order might not guarantee the sort of 
institutional transformation that is associated with modern democracies, alludes 
O’Neil. O’Neil is instructive in that he underlines the perils of enumerating the 
dividends of democracy by merely reflecting on liberalisation of the media sector 
for example. Media entities may be privately owned but the owners might be state 
- run or allied to the state leading to collusion with those in power in terms of the 
flavour of public communication or even the participation of alternative voices in 
the media. This scenario, it might be argued, presents an illusory sense of media 
freedom.  
The line of discussion raises a third possibility: That states in transition may allow 
for the existence of a carefully managed private press while retaining a broader 
arsenal of state controlled media to extend a regime’s endurance. 
For Price and Krug (2002: 14) transitions are moments for reflection on how to 
design media that suit a particular conception and experience of democracy: 
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“It is characteristic of most transitions that each step is a movement from one 
set of media structures to another.  These windows of opportunity are 
moments to think through what kind of media the society needs” (Price & 
Krug, 2002: 14). 
 
In summary, democracy can be understood to have many variants which could 
yield media unique to a specific environment. As we assess liberal democracy 
and media developments, it should not be assumed that privatisation and 
liberation necessarily lead to emancipation from state controls or the influence of 
the market. From a labour point of view, privatisation and liberalisation of the 
media sector should be assessed in terms of how they affect worker welfare. In 
this case, reforms should be interrogated also in terms of the capacity of 
journalists to claim their right to freedom of association and therefore form unions. 
Perhaps, what may be gleaned from this preliminary discussion is that there are 
complex scenarios - often of a political, economic, social nature - brought about 
by changes in the social order that could influence the evolution of media 
systems. These are not usually comprehensively articulated, rendering a limited 
understanding of media development and behaviour in different cultural contexts. 
 
1.1.5 Political economy  
As stated earlier, this thesis does not seek to investigate the role of media in 
fostering political change though the discussion will be tinged by some of these 
aspects from time to time.   
The thesis rather attempts to understand how a changing political economic 
context may have affected the profile of a leading state media entity in editorial 
and commercial terms; as well as in respect of its contribution to the much 
envisioned improved public participation in the affairs of this emerging 
democracy.  
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Taking the fore-going into account therefore, the thesis embraces a political 
economy analysis of the media which will likely provide more holistic insights that 
encompass political, economic and social aspects of change and how they affect 
communication systems (Mosco, 1995: Boyd-Barret & Newbold, 1995, Golding & 
Murdock,1995).  
In a plethora of literature, political economy is related to the mutual influence of 
political and economic forces on wider spheres of human activity. Mosco (1995: 
142) asserts that the political economist poses the question: “How are power and 
wealth related? How do these influence our systems of mass media, information, 
and entertainment?”  
From a communication perspective, political economy would consider matters of 
control, ownership and complex relationships between media, industry and 
political and social elites (Boyd-Barret & Newbold; 1995: 186). In this regard, 
Vincent Mosco (1995: 140); Golding & Murdock (1996:11) and Boyd Barrett 
(1995:186) are instructive in articulating the four critical characteristics of political 
economy which will be of relevance to this study: 
 
 That political economy places a pre-eminence on social change and 
historical transformation.  
 Political economy seeks to interrogate the totality of social relations which 
comprise economic, political, social and cultural fields. 
 It is interested in moral philosophy; social values and moral principles.  
 Political economy considers the balance between capitalist enterprise and 
public intervention. 
Expanding on this understanding, Golding and Murdock (1996:16) identify four 
historical processes which are central to a critical political economy of culture: the 
growth of the media; the extension of corporate reach; commodification; and the 
changing role of state and government intervention. At a more practical level, 
Mosco (1995: 152) maps three entry processes to analysing the political economy 
of communication: Commodification, spatialisation and structuration:- 
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Commodification is the term used to denote the process of transforming goods 
which are valued for their use, into commodities valued for their worth on the 
market (Golding & Murdock, 1996:16). Mosco (1995, 152) argues that there is a 
connection between the type of media product, the structure of corporate control, 
and the nature of the labour process. This line of thought is particularly relevant to 
this thesis as it seeks to interrogate issues surrounding labour rights as they relate 
to workers’ contribution to the public good, via their product (newspaper). The 
conduct of the ZUJ in the context of Zambia is hence extremely useful. 
Spatialisation: is defined by Mosco (1995: 155) as the process of overcoming the 
constraints of time and space in social life. Technological advances facilitate the 
swift movement of goods, services and people across enormous distances. 
Related phenomena such as globalisation and industrial restructuring are viewed 
as impacting on state activity in four ways: 
 Commercialisation: the state will be catalysed to transform institutions 
into revenue generating entities or along business principles 
 Privatisation: state entities are sold to private interests 
 Liberalisation: the state opens markets to competition 
 Internationalisation: links are established between states with 
economic and political authority being transferred to supranational bodies. 
Structuration: Mosco (1995: 158) explains structuration as having to do, in part, 
with connections between capital and labour; particularly, in terms of how labour 
organises and positions itself as an autonomous force within the relationship. Of 
great interest to this study is Mosco (1995: 160)’s analysis of the hegemonic 
process of individuation, which he defines as ‘the process of social actors, capital 
and labour, particularly as individual subjects whose value is connected to 
individual rights, individual expression, the individual exercise of political 
responsibility of voting and the individual freedom of consumption.’ 
Elucidating the political economic tradition further, Mosco (1995: 140) discusses 
two definitions of the concept. The first he defines as ‘the study of control and 
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survival in social life’. In this definition, control speaks to matters of internal 
organisation of social group members and the process of adapting to change.  
He emphasises that control processes are broadly political which embrace social 
alignment of relationships within communities while survival processes are 
economic given their relationship to production and reproduction. Although the 
definition is all embracing of all human activity it lacks, what he terms, human 
political economy or human consciousness and awareness. Presumably, the 
definition is shorn of the recognition of the potency of human agency in fostering 
change and connotes subservience by communities to those who would seemingly 
control their destinies. 
The second definition he examines is perhaps better suited to the undertaking of 
this thesis: ‘…the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations that 
influence the production, distribution and consumption or resources, including 
communication resources’ (Mosco, 1995: 140).  
 
While extolling the practical nature of this definition given that it focuses on how 
businesses function by establishing linkages between primary producers, 
wholesalers, retailers and consumers, Mosco warns of its ambiguity in failing to 
define these terms distinctly.  
 
But political economy is evidently a broad discipline with a range of approaches, 
as the scholar notes. Mosco illuminates a variety of traditions in political economic 
studies; the conservative approach which seeks to supplant individualism with 
collective authority; the utopian socialist approach places community above 
market; the neo-conservative tradition aims at expanding individual freedoms; neo-
Marxian scholars foreground the eminence of labour while feminist political 
economy tends toward interrogating patriarchy in labour markets.  
 
Environmental political economy foregrounds the relationship between social 
behaviour and the broader organic environment. Finally, the institutionalists 
contend that institutional and technological limitations shape markets paving way 
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for corporations and governments to colonise them (institutional political 
economy).  According to Mosco (1995: 147) communication studies draw largely 
from institutional and Marxian traditions of political economy.  In his other work, 
Mosco (2000: 104) explains that the notion of political economy not only studies 
the role of power in production, distribution and exchange of mediated 
communication, but also includes the conflicts that arise as a result of who benefits 
from control over communication resources. 
 
This thesis has concerns about conflict over communication resources in Zambia 
and more specifically about labour; the workers’ rights to organise and to agitate 
for economic rewards and for communicative rights. Controls will be understood as 
both emanating from the state (political) and the market (economic).  
 
Though it exudes shades of the neo-conservativism (individual freedoms of 
journalists to communicate and public to participate), to a very large extent, this 
study could be described as conforming to the Institutional and Marxian traditions 
of political economy.   
 
In this sense, using a combination of Employee Rights Theory (ERT) and Labour 
Process Theory (LPT), the thesis will draw inspiration from the scholarly discourse 
on how conditions of work interface with the macro contexts in which organisations 
operate (Nord & Doherty, 1996: 206).  
 
ERT is ranged at using cooperation with capital as the main tool for improving 
worker welfare and has claimed important victories in advancing free speech, due 
process and freedom to organise in the workplace in this regard. LPT on the other 
hand, is inherently hostile to capitalism and promotes collective action, equal 
distribution of resources and conflict to subdue workplace barriers.  
 
While, ERT, a product of liberal democratic society (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 173-
174), and a LPT, a creature of Marxian political economy (Ackyroyd, 2009: 264) 
lack congruence, they may be integrated to potentially good effect (Nord & 
Doherty, 1996: 206), especially, one might add, in an age when democracy 
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appears to have prioritised the interests of capital over the concerns of labour 
(Global Policy Network, 2001).  
  
1.1.6 Political economy and the public sphere notion 
 
Recent approaches to political economy have interrogated the condition of Jurgen 
Habermas’ public sphere notion. This is supposedly an autonomous arena for 
public debate brought into being by modern capitalism, as noted by McKenna 
(1995: 329); Curran (1996:82); and Mosco (2000: 135). Habermas aggregated the 
dividends of capitalism as comprising economic independence enabled by private 
property, critical reflection exemplified by novels, letters, coffee shop and salon 
discussions and mainly the materialisation of a market driven press, all of which 
fostered critical political discussion and moulded a reason-based consensus that 
influenced the state.   
The state is not the only entity that could limit this space: Advertisers dislike the 
public sphere because of the controversy generated by its small audiences which 
are not ideal for selling goods (Herman & Chomsky, 2002: xviii).  
 
In their discussion of the Habermasan public sphere, Golding and Murdock (1997: 
xiv) underline the linkage between modern citizenship and a diverse and open 
communications system, which emerged with a democratizing Europe. While the 
system of democracy, they note, relied on popular legitimacy institutionalised in 
national and local assemblies, there was additional need to engender discursive 
representation arranged through public cultural institutions and subsequently the 
idea of media as institutions of the public sphere gained currency.  
 
The concept of public sphere - which is the second theoretical consideration in this 
thesis - is hence closely related to both classical political economy and democracy 
in regard to the ambition to expand citizen opportunities for political discourse and 
free expression. Both theoretical concepts of political economy and public sphere 
will be discussed in great detail in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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1.2. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT 
 
It is argued from the fore-going that the political economy of the state media in 
Zambia will best be understood by extensively interrogating the practices of the 
colonial, post colonial and the multiparty establishments over a 45 year period of 
independence. In this regard, it can be noted that the state or settlers aligned to 
the colonial administration had played a central role in conditioning public 
communication in this former British Protectorate, well before it attained 
independence in 1964 as observed by Makayi (1997: 17), Kasoma (1986, 21-79) 
and Matibini (2006: 3).  
 
As most newly independent African states, Zambia constructed presidential 
systems which centralised power, revolving around charismatic personal rule, 
authoritarianism and the denigration of parliament (Pettman, 1974: 35). Although 
the space for private ownership of the media existed, the state was generally 
hostile and unaccommodating as exemplified by its steps to take over the Times 
Newspapers which began with a negotiated political truce with Lonrho allowing the 
republican president to appoint the editor-in-chief. Lonrho continued to control the 
commercial aspect of the Times until a formal, complete acquisition was achieved 
by the state in 1982 (Makayi, 1997: 23).   
 
An economic downturn in the late 1970s and early 1980s saw Zambia begin to 
experience repeated industrial action with attempted coups in 1988 and June 
1990. These events coincided with the unlocking of civic power and the 
emergence of the MMD toward the close of 1990 (Phiri [sa]: 56).   
 
The challenge to the one party constitution led to the rendering of Zambia as a 
pluralist state by Kaunda in 1990 through the repeal of Article 4 of the Constitution 
(Matibini, 2006:6). However, while initially the political environment and actions by 
the MMD catalysed the establishment of private media, tensions began to emerge 
between the new government, journalists and the opposition that led to the state 
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reneging on earlier indications of media reform. In addition, the liberalised 
economic environment did not attract the kind of investment that would generate 
competitive advertising to sustain the private press as envisaged (Phiri [sa]:57).  
 
It is also notable that institutions of the First and Second Republics, such as the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS), continued to exist. 
Some scholars, such as Baker (2000: 2), O’Neil (1998: 10) and Pitts (2000: 284), 
attribute this failure to reform institutions to recycled leadership who continue with 
the old ways of doing things. To fully appreciate this discussion, the following 
section hence, contextualises the problem under six key themes: 
 
 Structural continuities and recycled leadership. 
 Undefined editorial relations between state and the Times.  
 Shortcomings of the Information and Media Policy of 1996. 
 State ownership and commercialisation. 
 Labour rights and professional practices. 
 Lack of public confidence, participation and access to state media. 
 
1.2.1 Structural continuities and recycled leadership 
In general, the euphoria of change in Zambia seems to have been partly 
undermined by the lack of substantial reform in regard to the media sector and the 
legislation governing it. Zambia inherited a state of emergency which was 
maintained for 27 years (Matibini, 2006: 3). This facilitated detention without trial 
under the Preservation of Public Security Regulations Act 106 of the laws of 
Zambia (presently held in Chapter 112, section 3 (2a) (Makungu, 2004: 29).  
 
Inherent in the legal framework to the present time, are pieces of legislation that 
relate to censorship; defamation; national security; sedition; public interest or 
official secrets; obscenity; racism, among others. The State Security Act, passed in 
1969, replaced the Official Secrets Act of 1967 which was based on British 
statues.  
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Section 3 of the Act covers publishing along with other offences and carries a 
minimum punishment of 25 years imprisonment (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 74). 
Although Zambia has provided for freedom of expression in the constitution, there 
are still many restrictions held in repressive laws from the colonial era which 
successive governments have not repealed despite democratisation (Matibini, 
2006: 4).12 
  
“The dawn of political pluralism in 1991 has not led to the repeal of the 
repressive legislation. This has been made possible by the wide derogation 
clause contained in the Constitution and the lack of political commitment to 
individual rights on the part of government leaders,” (Chanda & Liswaniso, 
1999: 8). 
 
Purportedly because of the desire to maintain unity and foster nationalism, the 
successive administrations in Zambia have opted to control major media 
apparatus and seem to have employed varied forms of oversight frameworks 
along with the colonial legal architecture to ensure success.  
 
The emergence of the MMD in 1990 clearly generated a need for new forms of 
popular expression. Incessant political pressure edged Kaunda to establish a 
Constitutional Review Commission on 24 September, 1991 headed by law 
professor, Patrick Mvunga.  
 
Based on the commission’s final submissions, Article 20 (2) in the constitution of 
Zambia was amended to include the wording: “subject to the provisions of this 
constitution no law shall make any provision that derogates from freedom of the 
press” (Matibini, 2006: 6).  
 
                                                 
12
 For example, Section 69 of the Penal Code aims to protect the reputation of the president and dignity of 
office. It however leaves the discretion of determining what constitutes an insulting matter to the police. 
Similarly no clarity exists in section 177 (1) of the Penal Code regarding what constitutes obscenity or 
‘security’ under the National Security Act of 1969 as rightly noted by Chanda and Liswaniso (1999: 64 -
79).  
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Legal experts interpreted this as an important step toward the realisation of 
freedom of expression and of the media.   
 
Price and Krug (2002: 5) warn however that media law reform must be viewed as 
assisting to constitute a media - sensitive society and evaluated in the manner 
they contribute to this process. In other words, informed citizen action is necessary 
to ensure that laws indeed lead to desired change. The presence of laws by 
themselves does not guarantee freedom.  
 
Kaunda subsequently lost the presidential elections of October 1991 to Frederick 
Chiluba. The MMD won 125 seats of 150 elective seats in the National Assembly, 
signifying an overwhelming majority (SARDC, 1999:3).   
 
As a result, Zambia entered the Third Republic with a dominant party structure, a 
factor that appears to have undermined the democratisation process in some 
ways. Matlosa and Karume (2004: 1) describe the dominant party system as one 
in which a single party assumes dominance over the political system and is firmly 
in control of state power for fairly long periods, despite the presence of a multiparty 
system. With a two thirds majority, dominant parties would render decisions 
without serious reference to the opposition. Brooks (2004:2) suggests that in Africa 
dominant party systems are often associated with concerns of the re-emergence of 
autocratic regimes and the one party state.  
 
Hence it might not be entirely surprising that 19 years into multiparty democracy, 
Zambia is still caught in debates around democratic reforms in general and media 
transformation in particular, with perhaps, less than expected progress. 
 
Baker (2000: 2), O’Neil (1998: 10) and Pitts (2000: 284) explain these legacies as 
a colonial inheritance that remains consistent with the behaviour of political elites 
toward media freedom in the present day: the structural continuities from the 
previous social order can be closely linked to the recycling of leaders from the First 
and Second Republics. Leaders from this era were accustomed, it might seem, to 
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media being a developmental tool and therefore closely linked to the aspirations of 
the state. 
 
In a study he undertook in Zambia, Gregory Pitts (2000: 270) concludes that 
negative attitudes toward media freedom amongst Members of Parliament (MPs) 
were carried over from colonial traditions and Kaunda’s Philosophy of Humanism 
which valued community over individual and defined the press as an instrument of 
national development. His survey of Zambia’s multiparty parliament in 2000 asked 
MPs about their level of support for the media; their attitudes toward media 
regulation and their support for increased press freedom.  
 
The results suggested that MPs, while supportive of press freedom were also wary 
of it: they favoured a media regulated by a press council. Pitts’ arguments seem to 
hold some credence as it is observable today that ministers who served in the First 
and Second Republics still are still in power in the Third Republic.  
 
This line of argument is strengthened by the observance of behaviours of political 
elites in regard to both liberalisation and privatisation processes: For instance, the 
establishment of private radio and television was not tabled before parliament in 
the first five years of the MMD reign. Instead, on 26 January, 1993 the then Vice 
President Levy Mwanawasa announced that the government would not privatise 
the ZNBC, the Zambia Daily Mail or the Times Newspapers (Makungu, 2004: 38). 
This meant that to a large extent, the major media apparatus would still be state 
controlled in the Third Republic.   
 
The most prolific of the alternative newspapers formed during the transition to 
multiparty politics was the Weekly Post, owned by private business men from 
various political persuasions.  
 
In total, at least 25 new newspapers and three magazines were registered with the 
National Archives of Zambia during the first five years of MMD government 
(Zambia, 1996:6).  
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On the strength of the numbers of new publications, the state could quite easily 
have argued that the process of democratisation had indeed offered Zambians 
options in regard to their engagement with the political public sphere, the 
economic impediments of prohibitive tax regimes and duty on newsprint 
notwithstanding.  The reality seems to be that only the Weekly Post, the Chronicle 
and later the Monitor, were of any significance. The last two, as with many others, 
went into decline and oblivion within a 5 to 10 year period which coincides with an 
economic downturn during the same period. The Government of the Republic of 
Zambia (GRZ)’s Media Policy Document (1996) indicated that none of the three 
dailies circulated more than 20,000 copies by 1996. The Times of Zambia 
circulated 20, 000 copies daily; the Zambia Daily Mail, 12, 000; the Post, 20,000. 
An independent market survey on the other hand, estimates the circulation of the 
daily newspapers in 2008 stood at a total of 57,000. Of this total, the Post 
circulated 30,000, the Times of Zambia, 15,000 and the Zambia Daily Mail, 12,000 
daily (Africa Media Ventures/OSISA, 2008: 45). 
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Table 1: Media ownership in Zambia, 1996 (Zambia, 1996:6) 
MEDIA STATUS 
 
MEDIA OWNERSHIP 
Dailies - Times of Zambia 
- Zambia Daily Mail 
- the post 
Government 
-//- 
Private 
Weeklies - Sunday times 
- Sunday mail 
- Business mail 
- National mirror 
- Weekly express 
- Zambia crime news 
- The Chronicle 
- The Sun 
- Sport on Monday 
Government 
-//- 
-//- 
Private 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
Monthlies (vernacular) 
 
- Ichengelo 
- Tsopano (eastern) 
- Imbila (northern, Luapula 
and Copperbelt) 
- Ngoma (southern) 
- Lseli (western) 
- Lukanga (central) 
- Intanda (north western) 
Church 
Government 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
Electronic media - Zambia national 
broadcasting corporation 
(one TV and 3 radio 
channels) 
- Christian voice (radio 
station) 
- Multichoice TV 
- Radio phoenix 
- Ichengelo radio 
Government 
 
 
 
 
Private 
 
-//- 
-//- 
-//- 
News agencies - Zambia news agency 
- Palesa news agency 
- Africa media services 
Government 
 
Private 
-//- 
Information services - Zambia information services 
 
Government 
 
Magazines - Profit 
- search 
- ‘Z’ Magazine 
Private 
Government 
Government 
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By the state’s own admission, all print media in Zambia are constrained by poor 
capitalisation; declining purchasing power of the readership; illiteracy; inflation, 
falling per capita income rendering products unaffordable; poor communication 
infrastructure which impedes wider distribution; high cost of newsprint and radio 
and television receivers (Zambia, 1996: 14).  
 
Not surprisingly, all six privately owned weeklies had collapsed by the turn of the 
century; both independent news agencies had ceased; Of the state sector media; 
Search and ‘Z’ Magazine experienced financial problems and did not continue 
while local, language newspapers were inconsistently published.  
 
The only growth area by 2001 was community radio. By the time the MMD 
entered its third term in office under president Levy Mwanawasa, there were 
three community radio stations and four church owned stations. Mazabuka 
Community Radio station, Radio Lyambai and Radio Chikaya were designated 
community radio stations. Radio Yatsani, Radio Christian Voice, Radio Chikuni, 
Radio Maria, Radio Incengel, were church owned. There a few more waiting to be 
registered in the same year (Kasoma, 2002: 18-22).  Kasoma (2002:20) observes 
that most radio licences were being granted to Christian radio stations. A possible 
explanation for this would that Zambia, under Chiluba, had been declared a 
Christian nation which was evidently averse to other religions. There was hence 
no Islamic radio station for instance. 
 
In short, on a national scale, the state owned media remain the principal conduit 
of information to Zambians; information that could be heavily flavoured with 
government bias. The matter of state - media relations and the nature and 
structure of editorial policy making, hence, remain at the core of the argument for 
a reformed state media system. 
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1.2.2 Undefined editorial relations between the state and the Times Newspapers 
 
On the surface, the analyses of the post colonial state and the multiparty state of 
the Third Republic suggests that the forms of editorial policing may have changed 
for the worse due to the competing pressures of democratisation. That is, the 
emergence of a small but evidently critical privately owned media, may have 
cowed the state into not only retaining control of the Times Newspapers and 
other state media but also into devising more nuanced oversight frameworks to 
ensure complete compliance without overtly jeopardising their espoused 
democratic credentials.  
 
In this regard, Okigbo (1995:203) posits that governments struggling with under 
development, poverty, disease, ignorance and poor service delivery may be wary 
of an independent media and would therefore seek to control the sector, despite 
apparent efforts at democratisation in other sphere of development.  Over-
bearing state controls have had a tendency to generate practices of self 
censorship, he posits.  
 
However, the extent of these practices is poorly documented in the Zambian 
context.  
 
The more noticeable phenomenon has been the post-colonial oversight 
framework practiced by the Kenneth Kaunda government based on an 
understanding with Lonrho, which conforms to what O’Neil (1998:9) describes as 
the pre-censorship approach.  
 
Pre-censorship, he posits, is the extent to which the authoritarian system allows 
for the expression of alternative viewpoints and discourses. This framework 
denotes prior restraint.  
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A post-censorship framework is less direct on the other hand. In this approach, 
states tend to employ socialisation, harassment, economic sanctions, revocation 
of licenses, torture and murder against publications and their owners to achieve 
acquiescence. Keane (1992:23) highlights an even wider range of censorship 
tools used by states in transition and authoritarian regimes: emergency powers, 
post publication censorship, armed secrecy or use of covert security agents and 
the art of political lying or defactualisation.  
 
Under state-Lonrho oversight, the Times Newspapers’ general approach to 
reporting was to be critical of the ruling party, UNIP, but not to directly attack 
President Kaunda (Kasoma, 1986: 93), or for that matter the chairman of Lonrho, 
Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland. Academic inquiry into the nature of the relationship 
between Kaunda and Rowland and its influence on political, economic and media 
development has been cursory or naught. And yet in the view of this researcher, 
the state-Lonrho over sight framework forms a basis for understanding how 
business and political elites can have similar influences on freedom of expression 
even in contemporary Zambia. Certainly today’s Zambia conforms to the 
minimalist state paradigm inspired by neo-liberalism analogous to the post 
independence phase. In these conditions, multinationals have been known to 
have immense influence on the distribution of resources - and rights - in 
developing nations, working as allies of the state (LaPalombara & Blank, 1984: 
16).  
 
Preliminary inquiries with the Times of Zambia, suggested that the oversight 
frameworks of the Second Republic were substantially different from those of the 
Third. While in the First and Second Republics, the Kaunda government did make 
pronouncements which indicated ‘what one could or could not do’, the Third 
Republican government has no clear parameters. Further more instructions in the 
one party regime were issued by the Ministry of Information whereas today, 
interference emanates from ministers or deputy ministers in other line ministries 
as well (Phiri, 2008). 
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This anecdote, perhaps underlines a significant shift from previously documented 
practices amongst editors in the state sector of the media industry. There is 
seemingly a changing relationship between the Times Newspapers and the state 
in regard to reporting lines and editorial direction.  
 
Paradoxically, the sum effect of these practices, it would seem on the outset, 
would be to potentially further limit the public sphere of communication, despite 
democratisation. Commercially, this might derail the systematic production of 
news that can be valued for its worth on the market. 
 
 
1.2.3 Short comings of the media policy of 1996 
 
To its credit, the MMD government reformed the policy making process by 
establishing a more professional Policy Analysis and Coordination (PAC) division 
to improve the quality of proposals to cabinet, which was apparently meant to be 
a move away from centralised, bureaucratic, rule-driven government (Garnett, 
Koenen & Rielly,1997: 2) 
 
However, evidence reflecting significant public involvement in policy processes 
and proposals is lacking. 
 
Certainly, the Media and Information Policy published in 1996 is contradictory at 
best: On the one hand, it advances the idea of a centrally supervised public 
communication superstructure, while on the other; it proposes the independence 
of state media. The ZNBC, ZIS, ZANA13, the Zambia Daily Mail and Zambia 
Publishing Company and the Times of Zambia and Sunday Times of Zambia 
(Times Newspapers and Printpak limited), NAIS would all continue to report to the 
MIBS under this policy.   
 
                                                 
13
 The Zambia News Agency (ZANA) and the Zambia Information Services (ZIS) have since been merged 
to form the Zambia News and Information Services (ZANIS) 
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Despite this, the then Minister Amussa Mwanamwambwa stated that the 
document was consistent with the MMD manifesto and the vision of a democratic 
Zambia. Its aims were to ‘ensure a free flow of information, vital for the 
development of the country’ (Zambia: 1996: iv). 
 
The policy addresses three key areas: 
 
 Increasing media outreach and access to all, particularly the rural areas. 
 Legal reforms to enhance rights to information, freedom of the press and 
freedom of expression, and; 
 Encouraging private investment in the media and media support industries. 
 
A set of programmatic interventions were set out to achieve these goals: 
 
 A comprehensive, country-wide human and materials development 
programme. 
 The setting up of community-based media, and; 
 Amending or repealing laws that hinder the enjoyment of the fundamental 
freedoms of the media, and promotion of private investment in the media 
sector. 
 
The MIBS blueprint is divided into an information policy and a media policy. 
Among its goals, the information policy aims to decentralise printing of vernacular 
newspapers; provision of community radio; and utilise an enhanced 
communication infrastructure for development purposes. The media policy further 
sought to, inter alia; establish provincial printing presses by the year 2000 as a 
first step toward setting up community-based media.  
 
Perhaps significantly, the media policy claimed to: “grant editorial independence 
to the Times of Zambia and the Zambia Daily Mail while maintaining government 
ownership of the two newspapers” (Zambia, 1996:19).  
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While pronouncing an editorially free state owned newspaper industry, it is worth 
noting that the MIBS does not define what it means by ‘editorial’ independence. 
Secondly, the functions of these entities are prescribed. According to the 
Information and Media Policy the following were the roles of the various state 
media outlets: 
 
 The Times and the Daily Mail should play educational, informational and 
entertainment roles.  
 ZIS was to be a public relations wing of government;  
 ZANA was to operate as a statutory body and gather and distribute local 
and foreign news around the country;  
 The Zambia Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM) would train 
journalists as an independent trust;  
 ZNBC would be an instrument for mass education and information.  
 
The MIBS conceived its role as a coordinating mechanism of this information 
superstructure. In that arrangement, the media formations such as the ZUJ and 
the PAZA would reinforce the notion of an enhanced, state driven media system. 
A revised version of the policy released for discussion in 1999 included the 
primacy of community radio development and the transformation of the ZNBC 
into a public broadcaster. The Times Newspapers and the Zambia Daily Mail 
were to be rendered public institutions not accountable to the state (Banda, 2004: 
28-29).  None of these proposals have been implemented. Banda (2004: 31) 
rightly criticises the ‘state-centric’ nature of the two frameworks, which leave 
minimal space for citizen initiative. The oversight structure likely contributes to a 
lack of confidence in the state owned media 
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1.2.4 Lack of public confidence, participation and access to the state media 
 
In fact, public opinion data suggests that trust in state media is comparatively low. 
There is less of it in the newspapers than in the ZNBC Television and Radio 
(Lolojih, 2005:29). 
 
According to the Afrobarometer’s 2005 survey, 38 % of Zambians have “no or 
“little trust” in the Times of Zambia or the Zambia Daily Mail. 21 % said they 
“somewhat” trusted them; 22% either “did not hear of them enough” or ‘simply did 
not know’ how to gauge them; while only 19 % indicated they had “a lot of trust” in 
the newspapers.  
 
Ratings were higher for the ZNBC television and radio with 29 % of respondents 
expressing trust; and 24% having “some trust”. But the levels of distrust were 
equally high at 31% (‘just a little’) and 7% (‘not at all’).  
 
On the other hand, 36 % of respondents indicated they had “a lot” of trust in the 
privately owned Post Newspapers. 18% had moderate levels of trust; a similar 
number had “just a little” trust and only 4 % had “no trust at all” (Lolojih; 2005: 
29). 
 
State control and the question of participation in state media or lack of it, could 
explain some of these negative public sentiments directed at the Times and the 
Daily Mail. The ZNBC did show higher confidence levels presumably because of 
its outreach and opportunities for telephonic contributions. In a narrow sense, 
participation can be defined as the proportion of the total population purchasing 
newspapers, owning radios and attending cinemas (Berger, 2004: 46). 
 
In the case of this thesis participation will include opportunities for contributions to 
the content of the Times Newspapers and to interactive discussions on the 
internet, in addition to purchasing the Times. 
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It should be noted here that participation by the opposition in Zambia has been 
legally stipulated following pressure from activists ahead of the 1991 multiparty 
elections. Because of concerns that the ruling party might exclude competing 
voices, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) drafts rules for direct access 
to state media systems by contesting political parties, thereby enhancing 
participation by alternative voices. However, the full application of these rules 
should be doubted given that evaluations by non state actors suggest that editors 
of the state media have been part and parcel of the ruling party campaign 
committees (FODEP, 2002: 25).  
 
The state media’s position during the transition to the Third Republic came under 
intense scrutiny just before the 1991 elections. Consequently opposition parties 
campaigned for equal access to the apparatus.  
 
The ECZ working with state media agencies has had to draw up revised 
regulations to enable equal and equitable access to the state media by all actors 
through the elections beginning with the 1991 polls. Equal and equitable access 
to the state media is considered by electoral experts and donors as one of the 
means of levelling the playing field which implies that election rules and 
regulations apply fairly to all political parties and candidates (Zambia, 2000:13-
19).  
 
Possibly due to a fear of continued donor sanctions, the government did accede 
to the principles of equal access to the media prior to the 2001 elections. The 
National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in Zambia 
acknowledged the continued complaints by opposition about bias by the State 
media. The Government hence committed itself to: 
 
 Ensuring that both the ZNBC and other public media (state owned media), 
as well as the Electoral Commission and other agencies of the Executive, 
enforce the provision of the Electoral (Conduct) Regulations of 1996; 
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 Reviewing the Electoral (Conduct) Regulations to provide for deterrent 
penalties for any breach of such regulations (Zambia, 2000:13-19). 
 
The actions by government were roundly welcomed by donors, civil society and 
media associations. However, reports by election - based NGOs indicate that the 
state media, including the Times of Zambia and Sunday Times, were still used as 
a campaigning apparatus for the ruling MMD during the 2001 polls, as noted by 
the Foundation for Democratic Processes (FODEP, 2001: 27) and Henriot 
(2001:44).   
 
Developments in the broader political arena in 2001 seem to have had some 
direct impact on the press freedom architecture in Zambia eventually.  
 
Research commissioned by European donors (Chirambo, Nel & Erasmus, 2003: 
1) indicates that Zambia for the first time in its history had a working parliament 
with a dominant opposition presence for the first few months after the 2001 
presidential, parliamentary and local government elections. MMD won 81 seats 
(including eight nominees); the opposition: United Party for Democracy (UPND) - 
47; UNIP - 13; Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) - 12; Heritage 
Party (HP) - 2; Zambia Republican Party (ZRP) - 1; Patriotic Front (PF) -1 and 
one independent. This development apparently facilitated stronger challenges on 
the constitution in terms of its democratic make-up. 
 
Not surprisingly, Matibini (2006:44) also observes increased pressure from media 
associations, PAZA, ZUJ and the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA), 
for the introduction of a Freedom of Information Bill, an Independent Broadcasting 
Authority (IBA) and a Broadcasting Bill after this period.  
 
The period after 2001 also saw the formation of the Media Ethics Council of 
Zambia (MECOZ), which aims to professionalize journalism. Finally, it is critical to 
mention that following the 2006 elections, the MMD began to grow in stature once 
again, as it won most of the by-elections arising from deaths, resignations, and 
dismissals of opposition MPs (Chirambo, 2008:35).  
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It might not be too far fetched to assume that the party’s reluctance to fulfil 
promises on media reform in the recent past, may - again - be closely related to 
the lack of an imminent threat to its power base. For the state media, the 
proliferation of controls raises not just ethical questions but also concerns about 
the condition of labour. 
 
 
1.2.5 Liberalisation, labour rights and professional practices 
 
Without doubt, one of the most commendable outcomes of democratisation has 
been the materialisation of the ZUJ ranged at improving working conditions. This 
union has arisen as a direct result of market and labour liberalisation, even 
though the intension of both the one party establishment of Kaunda and the 
Chiluba administrations in amending the Industrial Relations Act (1990) and the 
Industrial Relations Act (1997) respectively was, apparently, to fracture a 
powerful Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) by distributing rights to 
various partisan interest groups within the mother body (Fashoyin, 2008: 5-11).  
 
Essentially, the impact of market and labour liberalisation on the media sector 
can be gleaned from stated rights in constitutional and statutory provisions and 
from enterprise rights (conditions of service), earned from collective action and 
bargaining (Edwards, 1993: 33-37).  
 
The down side of labour liberalisation is that it could in turn fracture the 
journalistic community with various interest groups subscribing to unions with 
narrow or sectarian values. The main interest of this thesis, of course, is the 
influence ZUJ wields within the organisational structures of the Times 
Newspapers and state media in general, relating to the welfare of media workers 
and their communicative freedoms.   
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Understanding the impact of ZUJ on the welfare of media professionals could 
possibly also explain the nature of the relationship between the state and the 
media professionals it employs, that is, whether it is one of willing participant or of 
coercion.  
 
A definition of this relationship would indicate the potential for civil society to forge 
a consensus with journalists and work hand-in-hand with Journalists in fostering 
change in state media systems. 
 
The formation of PAZA aimed at promoting professional practices is also of some 
significance. Certainly, the impact of PAZA, working with ZUJ, on state media 
systems is ill defined and poorly categorised by media historians. 14A deeper 
understanding of how protection of journalists might possibly embolden bolder 
journalistic practices now or in future within the state media systems in general 
and in the Times in particular, will be essential to any recommendation that seeks 
to propose alternative beneficial arrangements for media professionals. 
 
 
1.2.6 Liberalisation, privatisation and commercialisation 
 
Finally, it has been noted that Times Newspapers have transitioned through three 
republics, each signifying distinct features. While the tendency in research on the 
media has been to focus on the political dimensions of democracy, more 
specifically on freedom of expression, this thesis underlines the importance of 
relating the actions of political elites to the consequences of their decisions on the 
economics of the press. The results of liberalisation and privatisation in the Third 
                                                 
14
 It must be noted that the Societies Act, enacted in 1957, under which PAZA is registered, vests 
discretionary powers of de-registration and prohibition in the registrar and the Minister. Historically, this 
instrument has been used to harass opposition, including the banning of churches and the Zambia African 
National Congress (ZANC) by the colonial administration. In the post independence era, UNIP used it to 
ban the opposition United Progressive Party (UPP), while the MMD government have deployed it to 
proscribe the Islamic Youth Party and the Zambia Alliance for Progress (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 20). 
PAZA, as other professional bodies, civil society organisations and political parties, are also prone to 
these instruments in the present day. Despite provisions on freedom of association contained in the 
constitution therefore, it can be argued that structures carried over from the colonial era have not been 
aligned to suit democratic standards and hence undermine democratisation. 
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Republic should hence inevitably form a central part of this inquiry in an attempt 
to fully understand the influences of a changing political context. 
 
The question of whether the take over of the Times has rendered it unsustainable 
is not one that is supported by empirical evidence. In addition, it is crucial to 
understand the ways in which changes in economic policy have affected the state 
media and what propositions present themselves for potential viability.  
 
While the literature review suggests that the pressures of globalisation would 
force the state to privatise or commercialise the enterprises it owns, there is little 
evidence of this in regard to the media industry in Zambia thus far.  
 
Obviously, the most logical albeit unpopular option for the state would be to 
subsidise its media operations to protect them from private competition.  Banda 
(2004: 1) speculates about this but provides no empirical evidence of the extent 
to which state media systems, particularly the newspapers, are financed by the 
state, if at all. He does however advance a reasoned argument indicating the 
indebtedness of the Zambia Daily Mail to its newsprint suppliers in 2002. 
According to Banda, the Mail owed South African suppliers Van De Ghinste 
Exports Limited US $ 327,335.91 and local companies up to US $29,000 in the 
1990s. This was in addition to unpaid taxes to the Zambia Revenue Authority 
(ZRA). 
 
“In the absence of special state favours, such debts can easily cripple any 
newspaper into operational numbness” (Banda, 2004: 1). 
 
State financing is obvious for the electronic media, particularly, the ZNBC, ZANIS 
and NAIS because they are either integral parts of government departments, or 
are supported by legislation to under-score that support.  
 
In fact, the history of the print media suggests extensive commercial experience 
and little evidence of direct state funding. Certainly the Times Newspapers do 
emanate from a background of private ownership. Hence, official advertising in 
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the printed media would probably be the most plausible means of support from 
the state, it would seem. 
 
In general, commercialisation of state media entities is a prudent step if indeed 
the ultimate goal of democratisation as promoted by the MMD, is to engender a 
diversity anchored by fair rules. In this context, it is reasonable to assume that 
emergence of the private media should challenge the state media to devise 
competitive strategies in terms of advertising and distribution to survive.  
 
If however, the suspicion remains that direct state financing is the sole or major 
contributor to the Times Newspapers and the Zambia Daily Mail it is likely that 
conflict might crystallise around the use of tax payers’ resources to support a 
media system that essentially serves the interests of a ruling elite. 
 
 
1.2.7 Conclusion to the exposition of the problem statement  
 
In summary, it can be noted that despite democratisation, the state of public 
communication in Zambia is inconsistent with democratic ideals set by the ruling 
MMD party.  
 
Because the majority of Zambian journalists depend on the state for their 
livelihood, it is inevitable to interrogate the consequences this might continue to 
have on the ability of media activists and other non state actors to galvanize a 
consensus around a more viable alternative to state owned media systems. 
 
While Zambia from time to time exhibits signs of progress on some fronts, such 
as the expansion of community and commercial radio stations; permissions seem 
to be granted selectively to applicants, with the bulk of licenses directed at 
applicants of Evangelical Christian persuasions, perhaps further limiting the 
participation of alternative religions and voices in the political public sphere. 
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This thesis notes that Zambia’s elections are closely contested: That while there 
are opportunities for non state actors to hold sway at critical moments in the 
country’s political trajectory, this energy has not yet translated into political 
commitment by the state to reforming the legal framework in any meaningful way; 
or to accede to proposals for a privatized state media sector as an essential 
conduit of public information and forum for discussion. 
 
The Times Newspapers are in the unique position of having transitioned with the 
nation through three periods of one party and multiparty politics; and changed 
ownership in the process. However, the foot print left by state control on this 
entity, as with other state media enterprises, is one that has to be understood in 
political and economic terms to determine what form a transformed state media 
sector might assume, going forward. 
 
The thesis concedes that the factors affecting the media as a result of political 
change extend far beyond the sector itself. The question of a dominant party 
structure and its impact on the continuity of old social orders is central to this 
discussion. The practice of recycling leadership through three republics lends 
itself to examination in relation to this topic, particularly, in regard to inherited 
political practices that seemingly continue to conceive of media as a 
developmental or propagandist tool. The question of whether public resources 
are used to support newspapers such as the Times Newspapers might continue 
to fuel tensions as Zambia’s political contests become more competitive, 
particularly since opportunities for participation by alternative voices might be 
limited. These factors, along with key elements of under-development, could pose 
greater challenges to political stability. 
 
The argument for reform, should however, not be restricted to political 
imperatives alone as the economic and labour perspectives may also provide an 
added impetus for launching stronger justifications for a complete or partial 
reform of state media systems in Zambia. In Chapters Five of this thesis, an in-
depth discussion will be presented on these aspects of reform. 
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1.3. TYPE OF STUDY 
 
Against this background, this thesis is constructed as an exploratory exercise. 
Mouton and Marais (1996: 121) and Babbie and Mouton; (2008: 79) explain that 
such studies are deployed when investigating areas that have previously not been 
investigated. Similarly, Wimmer and Dominick (2000: 255) note that exploratory 
research is not only used in investigating areas that have been marginally studied 
or un-researched; but is also ranged at searching for data indications rather than 
establishing causality. Babbie and Mouton (2008: 80) posit that exploration is also 
useful for studying persistent phenomena or in other instances to set ground for 
larger studies or simply to develop hypothesis. Similarly, Mouton and Marais 
(2008: 81), assert that the aims of exploratory undertakings may vary. The 
limitations of exploratory studies might include their inability to produce satisfactory 
answers. According to Mouton and Marais (1996:121) and Babbie and Mouton 
(2008:80), some of the key reasons for exploration are: 
 
 To gain new insight into the phenomenon. 
 To under-take a preliminary investigation ahead of a more structured study 
of the phenomenon. 
 To explicate the central constructs and concepts. 
 To determine priorities for future research. 
 To develop a new hypothesis. 
 To satisfy a researcher’s curiosity and quest for better understanding of 
phenomena. 
 
Mouton and Marais (1996: 42-44) are instructive in noting that not only does 
exploratory research survey people who have a practical experience of the 
problem, it also examines relevant literature and engages in the analysis of an in-
depth nature. The important research design considerations that are 
recommended are flexible research strategies; and methods such as literature 
reviews, interviews, case studies, and informants who would provide the 
necessary insight and comprehension of the problem.  
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1.3.1 Research questions contextualised  
 
In undertaking this exploratory exercise, one needs to reflect once again on the 
complex nature of the problem and its basic assumptions. The key assumptions 
that underpin this study suggest that privatisation does not guarantee press 
freedom as the private owners can harbour political ambitions not dissimilar to the 
state. Further, the thesis assumes that the political forces born of democratisation 
have up to this point, minimised the freedom to communicate by individual editors 
and journalists on the Times. The thesis underlines the notion that state elites 
have indirect ways of controlling media regardless of ownership. 
Correspondingly, it attributes the apparent commercial failures of the Times 
Newspapers largely to political controls which conceivably inhibit innovation in the 
liberalised era. Lastly, it assumes that while the benefits of political liberalisation 
might not be apparent, the enhancement of freedom of association has not only 
led to the formation of a media union but also to improvements in the economic 
welfare of journalists - despite state ownership of the Times Newspapers. 
 
There are clearly two dimensions, one with political imperatives; the other 
influenced by changes in economic policy. The political dimensions relate to the 
influence of legal and constitutional changes and their contestation in the 
institutional setting of the Times Newspapers; and the influence of wealth and 
power through the application of varied oversight frameworks during periods of 
political change.  
 
They also include the influence of multiparty party politics on regulations 
governing editorial access to state media systems; and the ownership of the 
Times Newspapers.  
 
The economic dynamics discuss the potential impact of national policies of 
liberalisation and privatisation on the sustainability of the Times Newspapers. It is 
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conceivable that the Times as a state entity might have benefited from 
nationalisation due to advertising inevitably channelled through it by parastatals 
firms. On the other hand, liberalisation and privatisation of the economy under 
MMD gave no such guarantees. It can also be noted that a changing economic 
environment has not necessary provided an incentive for more advertising for the 
private press due to poor capitalisation of privatized companies. The same might 
be true of state media. The economic question also embraces the status of the 
labour force, particularly the professionals who produce the newspapers and how 
this changing political economic environment affects their welfare. Hence, the 
problem as explored in the preceding sections leads to the following research 
question(s): 
 
What is the impact of democratisation on the Times Newspapers (Zambia) 
Limited? 
 
1.3.2 Research questions  
 
 In what ways has democratisation influenced media development in 
Zambia? 
 How has political change affected decision making structures and 
oversight frameworks on the Times Newspapers? 
 What are the policies governing public participation in state media systems 
(and in particular, the Times Newspapers?) 
 What is the influence of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) on the 
conditions of service and job security of journalists on the Times 
Newspapers? 
 What is the impact of the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) and the 
Media Ethics Council of Zambia (MECOZ) on journalism practice on the 
Times Newspapers? 
 In what ways have liberalisation and privatisation policies affected the 
Times Newspapers? 
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1.4. METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis elects to employ multiple methods based on the concept of 
triangulation, to explore the impact of democratisation on the Times Newspapers. 
Triangulation denotes the use of several methods, sometimes both qualitative and 
quantitative, in order to understand a research problem (Wimmer & Dominick, 
2000: 49). It implies that accounts produced from one source can be compared 
and contrasted to those of another through the use of complementary research 
methods (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine & Newbold, 1998: 44).  
 
 “Consistencies can be recognised and interpreted, discrepancies or differences 
can be pursued further, but all in pursuit of deeper, more valid, interpretations. 
Triangulation can be carried out in a variety of ways – across time, space, 
personnel, settings, organisations, methods, and researchers” (Hansen, Cottle, 
Negrine & Newbold, 1998: 45).  
 
Hansen et al (1998: 45) however caution researchers to carefully compare data 
sources from institutional sources with those accessed from documents, 
observation and other bodies of literature in order to arrive at a realistic 
understanding and interpretation of the situation. 
 
Given the historical and institutionally focussed nature of this thesis, the methods 
chosen for investigating this phenomenon are participant observation and 
historical analysis. Historical analysis is associated with both qualitative and 
quantitative studies. In cases where it is employed in qualitative studies it assumes 
a narrative type of description where specific chronological relationship between 
events is hypothesised (Mouton & Marais, 1996: 44).  As Mouton and Marais posit, 
historical analysis is closely associated with descriptive studies which focus on an 
in-depth description of a specific individual, situation, group, organisation, tribe, 
sub - culture, interaction, or social object. On the other hand, participant 
observation is linked more with description and explanation than with 
measurement and quantification (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000:111). Other scholars 
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however maintain that the technique does in fact include quantitative aspects 
(Hansen, Cottle, Negrine & Newbold, 1998:35).  
 
Participant observation is seen by some scholars as being holistic as it involves 
three or more distinct methods of research, the key ones being: document review, 
interviews, observation, all of which are relevant to analysing policy documents, 
speeches, articles and notices and in obtaining data from hard-to-reach media and 
political elites and experts. Hansen et al (1998: 44) explain that while each method 
contained in participant observation may have its weaknesses, it can be improved 
upon through triangulation. The potential rewards of this method are 
acknowledged by Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold (1998: 35-44), Mouton 
and Marias (1996: 75) and Barbbie & Mouton (2008: 293).   
 
As Hansen et al (1998:36) explain further, journalists are a professional group of 
people with connections to powerful institutions and political elites and the impact 
of these influences on their work will not be gleaned from a study of their products, 
rather by an insider’s view of their operational challenges In the case of this thesis, 
document review would include the analyses of existing statistics on trends in 
newspaper sales to signify public participation; and changes in advertising levels, 
to the extent that they are available. 
 
This research topic is of a sensitive and complex nature, certainly not one that will 
readily be addressed through impersonal approaches. Experience suggests that 
political and media elites are usually reluctant to divulge official stand-points on 
matters of public nature where they lack consensus. However, they would be more 
inclined to discuss them in face-to-face interactions, where the researcher is 
formerly introduced and the mission is clearly defined. Hansen et al (1998:35) 
underline that participant observation is useful not only for the so-called under-
dogs or poor of society but also for studying hard-to-examine elite groups which 
have ties to powerful institutions. Once access is negotiated, such interactions can 
yield rich body of knowledge. 
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For Babbie and Mouton (2008: 293) the dilemma of observation lies partly in 
determining whether overt or covert approaches would be the most useful or 
effective. The latter poses ethical questions of non disclosure of a researcher’s 
identity, while the former might compromise them because they are essentially 
participants in the group being observed (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000: 111). Babbie 
and Mouton assert that the method requires self-discipline, proficiency and does 
not always imply complete participation in an activity. 
 
The approach is criticised as a poor choice if the researcher is concerned with 
external validity and representativeness of the sample. Problems of reactivity - the 
influence of observation on the behaviour of the subject - may also occur. Counter 
arguments as those advanced by Janet Ward Schofield (1993:207) contend that 
even in qualitative research components of a study - including the units of 
analysis, concepts generated, population characteristics, and settings - can be 
used as a basis for comparison. One of the strongest justifications of participant 
observation is flexibility, which allows the researcher to pursue angles that might 
not have been covered in a questionnaire, for example (Wimmer & Dominick, 
2000: 48-49). The question here will not be sample size but the status and 
influence the subjects exude which might define their role as a form of primary 
group in a complex network of communicative relationships with executive 
authority. Perhaps the greater motivation for participant observation lies in the 
opportunity it provides the researcher to investigate organisational, bureaucratic 
and professional nature of news production and to be fully schooled on the holistic 
aspects involved in news processing (Hansen et al, 1998: 35). There is a 
distinction drawn between a participant-observer; that is, being embedded within 
an organisation in an overt manner and often being part of the work process; and 
observer-participant, which implies remaining outside of the group to be studied 
and claiming a higher level of autonomy than the former. Hansen et al (1998: 51) 
concede that in practice, the lines between the two forms of observation become 
blurred as one is often drawn into a closer relationship with his objects of study in 
the latter form as well. 
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For instance, the challenge in investigating the Times’ as an observer participant is 
that editorial meetings are carried out behind closed-doors. It could be argued that 
in this case, the participant-observer approach would be more useful as 
involvement in the editorial process might present some hitherto unknown 
perspectives to the professional nature of the news production.  
 
However, the down side could be that editors might not present honest views in 
the presence of a researcher. In this case, flexibility within this methodology would 
mean adopting interviews with select officials within the establishment. In this 
regard, the observer-participant option could be deemed more appropriate. 
 
There are obviously ethical considerations to be made. This researcher formally 
sought the permission of the managing director of the Times Newspapers to 
undertake this study and has done the same for all respondents. Therefore the 
general approach in this thesis can be closely associated with the observer-
participant model given that it involved direct observation, face-to-face interviews, 
electronic interaction and telephonic conversations, in addition to document 
reviews. 
 
 
1.4.1 Stratified purposive sampling 
 
Stratified purposive sampling was applied to select the various categories of 
officials involved in the work of the Times Newspapers and other non state actors 
with vested interests in media development. These were drawn from The Times 
Newspapers, PAZA, the ZUJ and the Society of Senior Zambian Journalists 
(SSZJ). The depth of information to be gleaned is more important in this sense 
than the numbers of interviewees. “ 
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1.4.2 Collection of data  
 
Document Review: Submissions to the United Kingdom Competition Commission 
related to an inquiry on the operations of Lonrho were among the official 
documents examined and analysed in constructing historical, political and media 
developments in Zambia.  
 
Other documents included government policy documents, annual reports, court 
rulings and judgments, financial statements and strategic plans from the 
TimesPrintpak (Zambia) Limited, newspaper reports, legal and media research on 
reforms and press freedom, independent advertising surveys and Afrobarometer 
studies on democracy and the media in Zambia.  
 
Observation: Attendance to workshops by PAZA, ZUJ, MISA and other media 
bodies was considered. However, the information collected in the initial stages of 
this thesis did not warrant additional engagements of this nature, interviews with 
key informants proved much more useful. The fundamental reason for this was 
that the core of the problem was found to be located more in history and required 
face-to-face conversations with some key informants with limited direct 
observation. The approach was, hence, not inclined to understanding how news 
is processed, but rather to unravel the power relations that influence the nature of 
the end product. 
 
Interviews: A standard open-ended questionnaire was applied to guide the 
process (appendices one, two and three). There were minor variations to the 
questions to respond to each context. Interviews were held in three distinct 
rounds each representing a set of groups: Former and current editors of the 
Times Newspapers; senior journalists from the public service; and presidents of 
the professional associations, namely, PAZA, ZUJ and the Society of Senior 
Zambian Journalists (SSZJ). The respondents presented both personal 
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experiences and official positions on matters of press freedom, worker welfare 
and political change. The management of the TimesPrintpak (Zambia) Limited, 
and its former editors were interviewed along the following themes: 
 
 Their experience of state interventions in editorial matters in either; the 
First, Second, or Third Republics or of all three phases. 
 Their opinion on the influence of dominant party structure on the nature of 
oversight on the Times Newspapers. 
 Their impressions of the Times Newspapers as a competitor in a changing 
political economic environment (that is, nationalisation on the one hand; 
and liberalisation and privatisation on the other). 
 Commercialisation of the state media in the face of private competition. 
 The impact of unionisation on the Times Newspapers and the state media 
in general. 
 
Executives of the ZUJ and PAZA were probed on the following main broad 
themes: 
 
 Their overall impressions of democratisation and its dividends for 
journalists, in the state sector. 
 The economic environment and its implications for job security for 
journalists in the state sector. 
 The impact of collective agreements on worker welfare. 
 The future and relevance of state media systems in Zambia. 
 Potential reforms to the legal and constitutional framework.   
 
Hard data on advertising was obtained both from the Times and independent 
advertising consultancies and has been synthesised and corroborated with 
information from interviews conducted by this researcher, to comprehend the 
nature of the commercial challenge that the newspapers face in a liberalised 
economy. Lastly, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services was 
engaged on: 
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 The 1996 Information and Media Policy and its implementation. 
 The implementation of recommendations from constitutional and other 
reform commissions, regarding media freedom. 
 Government financial support to the state media. 
 
This information from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services was 
provided in the form of official documents and policies. 
 
1.5   INDICATORS 
 
A set of indicators were developed to determine the manner in which political and 
economic liberalisation, the key elements of liberal democracy, have affected the 
Times Newspapers.  Specifically, the thesis considers freedom of expression and 
freedom of association, and free market policies (liberalisation and privatisation), 
introduced by macro level political economic forces, and their influence in the 
organisational environment of the SOE.  Babbie and Mouton (2008: 111) define 
indicators as specifications that show the absence or presence of a concept that is 
being studied.  
 
The indicators for each variable are categorised into primary and secondary levels. 
The primary level of analysis gauges the presence of an approximation of the 
characteristic in question at macro level, while the secondary indicators confirm its 
influence (or absence) qualitatively at a micro level. 
 
Freedom of expression and association for instance, will be gleaned in the work 
place context not only from the macro level presence of legal and constitutional 
provisions but in terms of the mechanism of appointment, editorial policies, 
oversight frameworks and worker representation on the Times in the First, Second 
and Third Republics.  
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In this regard, Edwards (1993: 33) is instructive in advancing the notion that 
employee rights are not only contained in statutory and constitutional protections 
but also in collective agreements and in the conditions of service, policies and 
complaints procedures granted by the employer (or enterprise rights). Here, as 
stated in section 1.1.6 of this chapter, the thesis is informed by Employee Rights 
Theory (ERT) a body of theory that has evolved with the aim of extending 
fundamental rights to the workplace from the broader liberal democratic society 
(Nord & Gaines, 1996: 176-174).  
  
It is worth reiterating that ERT supporters have claimed victory in the introduction 
of rights to form unions, free speech and due process within the micro context of 
the work environment. The thesis will in addition be informed by Labour Process 
Theory (LPT) which draws its inspiration from Marxian political economy. The LPT, 
unlike the ERT which is anchored on negotiation with capital, emphasises 
resistance to capitalist control, promotes collective action and equal distribution of 
resources (Ackyroyd, 2009: 264).  While both theories aim for worker welfare, their 
modus operandi is different.  
 
But they can be combined to good effect, assert Nord and Doherty (1996: 206). 
They argue that integrating the two approaches in fact strengthens the strategy for 
advancing worker welfare. They posit that there is a relationship between macro 
level political economic forces, how they produce, sustain and distribute power, 
privilege and rights and the micro level manifestations. Combining LPT and ERT, 
using their Assertion for Empowerment Tool, they claim, enables the workers to 
make optimal use of cooperation and conflict depending on the circumstances.  
 
In addition, it enables them use ‘rights talk’ to catalyse action (Nord and Doherty, 
1996: 206) (Chapter Five of this thesis will extensively discuss ERT and LPT in this 
regard). 
 
Price and Krug (2002: 4) are also instructive in articulating the limitations of formal 
law: They argue that laws alone do not guarantee how media will function. There 
must be prior commitment by the community to values that underpin a free media. 
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They emphasise that it is important to understand the steps or processes that 
allow change to occur and what type of voices will be favoured in the process of 
transformation.  
 
Embracing these approaches, one is challenged to extend this reasoning to the 
institutional dynamics within the Times Newspapers; to understand how 
administrative structures are fashioned to interact with workers and with the state 
within the ambit of the legal and constitutional framework stipulating fundamental 
freedoms. This is also because the state will likely deal with intransigence from 
editors administratively rather than through judicial means.  
 
Understanding the types of over sight frameworks and how they work, will likely 
enrich this thesis in terms of its analysis of how changing political regimes may 
shape communicative space.  
 
In addition, freedom of association and assembly will be reflected in the right of 
media professionals to organise. Formation of media unions as a result of 
legislative amendments born of democratic imperatives will illustrate the influence 
of the democratic process on state media systems.  
 
Comparisons will be made between the First, Second and Third Republics in 
respect of the right of media professionals to belong to a union of choice. The 
outcomes of litigation, collective agreements and other forms of actions will 
provide a basis for assessing how products of political change may have 
contributed to the democratic project. The thesis will address the impact of the 
economic characteristics of liberal democracy - liberalisation and privatisation - by 
analysing the response of the Times Newspapers to competition from the private 
press in advertising and sales. This response will likely be reflected in strategic 
documents and in asset acquisition (new printing press for example), distribution 
strategies and generally, the whole commercialisation approach that the enterprise 
adopts. Finally government intervention might also connote financial insecurities 
among state media in the face of competition.  
 
 62 
 
The figure below shows how the presence of each variable will be assessed: 
  
Table 2: Variables and indicators 
Variable Primary indicators (macro) Secondary indicators (micro) 
Freedom of 
expression 
• Laws on media freedom and freedom of 
expression  
• Reporting structure (Mode of 
appointment of senior editors; editorial 
policy) 
• Representation of media 
associations/union on board of directors 
• Regulations on public access to state 
media 
 
• Litigation on press freedom matters 
by journalists unions  
• Presence of grievance procedures 
in employment policy or collective 
agreements 
• Proposals by journalists adopted by 
state 
• Number of media initiated reform 
processes 
• Outcomes of judicial challenges 
regarding state media access and 
journalists’ editorial freedom 
Freedom of 
association 
• Laws on formation of societies, unions 
• Constitutional provisions on freedom of 
association, assembly 
• Registration of professional unions 
 
• Official recognition of unions by 
Times management  
• Collective Agreements between 
media unions and management 
• Litigations by unions on behalf of 
workers 
• Codes of Ethics and 
Practice/enforcements thereof 
• Membership profiles of media 
unions 
Privatisation • Official government policy on 
privatisation  
• unionisation rates in Journalists Unions 
as a result of privatisation 
 
• Outcomes of press 
union/associations’ input into state 
media reform processes 
• Number of private media 
professionals in ZUJ 
 
Liberalisation • Number of privately owned daily 
newspapers competing with the Times, 
since liberalisation 
• Trends in circulation of the Times since 
liberal reforms  
• Advertising revenues of the Times since 
liberal reforms 
• Proportion of population purchasing 
Times Newspapers since liberal reforms  
State support to the Times since liberal 
reforms 
• Strategic plans by the Times 
responding to 
competition(commercialisation) 
• Changes in marketing strategies 
since liberalisation/structural 
changes  
• Asset acquisition since liberalisation 
• Reasons for economic intervention 
by the state (if any) 
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The indicators will be reflected in standard semi-structured questionnaires to be 
administered to respondents. 
 
1.5.1 Interpretation and presentation of data 
 
This study can largely be described as adopting an idiographic research strategy 
which Babbie and Mouton (2008:272) explain as one that is closely related to 
qualitative research and examines a single event or case and its structural 
coherence with a larger context.  
  
On the contrary, nomothetic strategy draws largely on quantitative approaches, 
seeking to generalize results to larger populations and other settings.  
 
This thesis will use multiple sources of data, consistent with thick descriptions, 
based on the notion of convergence. 
 
In this regard, Babbie and Mouton (2008:272) suggest further that in 
convergence, multiple sources of evidence may be brought to bear on variables 
of interest. Due to the large volume of qualitative information anticipated, 
analytical strategies will embrace two modes of case study analysis: 
 
 Pattern matching: patterns emerging in the data are related with patterns 
in the theory or in alternative predictions. Enhanced validity is assumed if 
the patterns concur. 
 Explanation building; refers to the generation of explanations about the 
case, which is closely related to pattern matching. Generalizability of case 
studies is achieved by showing the linkages between the findings and 
previous studies (Babbie & Mouton:2008: 283). 
 
The results will be thematically matched and organised into chapters responding 
to the five key areas:  
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1) Historical perspectives; colonialism, democratisation and humanism  
2) Theoretical discussion: democracy, political economy and the public sphere  
3) Democratisation and oversight frameworks on the Times  
4) Labour rights  
5) Economic liberalisation and commercialisation. 
 
1.6 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS 
 
In keeping with the ambitions of political economy, Chapter Two embarks on an 
extensive exploration of the political and socio-economic dimensions of Zambia’s 
history and attempts to understand how various transitions have each contributed 
to the pre-eminence of dominant media models. To fully appreciate the state-
media relations in post independence Zambia, the chapter undertakes to explain 
colonial practices of ethnic stereotyping which are often blamed for weak social 
cohesion and instability within African societies at independence. It further 
explores the uncertainties liberation politics may have wrought on Zambian 
political elites, particularly in terms of the extent of freedom of the media they 
would have allowed under the circumstances. To understand this logic, the chapter 
interrogates Kaunda’s Philosophy of Humanism and how it interprets democracy 
and media freedom. In its final quest to establish the levels of public support for 
democracy through recent transitions, the chapter closes by discussing the various 
measurement tools employed by political scientists and their assessment of 
Zambia’s progress thus far. 
 
Chapter Three follows with an analytical discussion on the theoretical perspectives 
of political economy and the public sphere concepts and their relation to 
democratisation and the media. Building on the discussions broached in Chapter 
One, this chapter seeks mainly to unpack the concept of political economy and 
how it applies to communication studies with related phenomenon such as 
privatisation, liberalisation and commercialisation and digitisation forming part of 
the analysis. To understand the dichotomy between liberal political economists 
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and critical political economists, the chapter extensively interrogates historical 
perspectives and how they are articulated in contemporary times. Finally, within 
the context of privatisation and liberalisation, the chapter examines how wealth 
and power could influence traditional media and alternative media alike, despite 
democracy. The chapter underscores the Afro-centric perspectives which fore-
ground the leadership styles of founding presidents and their alliances with 
transnational forces; and the centrality of all this in formulating discussions on 
Third World political economy as it relates to media independence. 
 
To illustrate the relevance of leadership styles to this discussion, Chapter Four 
undertakes an elaborate investigation into the relationship between wealth and 
power, and in what ways their mutual influence manifests within the media 
development discourse in Zambia. The expedition traces pre-independence 
alliances between Zambia’s founding president Kenneth Kaunda and the chair of 
the multinational Lonrho, Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland and explains how the relationship 
between the two, conditioned the types of over sight frameworks that eventually 
governed the Times in the First and Second Republics. Despite the transition to 
pluralism in 1991, the chapter demonstrates that the tendencies for control of the 
media can also be attributed to the presence of dominant party systems in the First 
and Third Republics. Although, they are products of popular elections, dominant 
party structures share characteristics with single party systems to some extent. 
The lack of responsiveness to demands for genuine media reforms by Chiluba’s 
government and his successors from the MMD may be partly explained by this. 
 
Chapter Five critically examines the reasons and consequences of changes to the 
Industrial Relations Act by both one party and multiparty governments and how 
these reforms affected unionisation in general and the media profession in 
particular. The chapter follows with an analysis of the impact of ZUJ, working with 
PAZA, on worker welfare on the Times Newspapers, since its emergence in 1992. 
 
Finally, Chapter Six emphasises that state control should not be viewed and 
examined in political terms alone. The nature of state control has likely had an 
impact on the quality of the product or essentially, perceptions of the product by 
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democratically inclined publics. The influence of nationalisation, liberalisation and 
privatisation on commercial approaches will be discussed here.  
 
Part of the promise of liberalisation was that a free market would attract 
investments and media enterprises would presumably survive off advertising 
revenues, apart from competing for a limited readership. The chapter speaks to 
the privatisation question in greater detail, raising matters around 
commercialisation and sustainability of state media systems (the Times in 
particular). The thesis concludes in this Chapter Seven with a summary and 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
COLONIALISM, DEMOCRATISATION AND HUMANISM: 
UNDERSTANDING MEDIA DEVELOPMENTS IN ZAMBIA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Within the tenets of political economy, this chapter aims to discuss the influence 
of social change and historical transformation on media development in Zambia 
through the prism of colonialism. The chapter launches into a literature review 
analysing political developments from the first stages of colonisation to the 
present day. It argues that to understand the evolution of Zambia’s media system 
one needs to interrogate a range of inter-related socio-political phenomena which 
might explain why political elites have sustained controlled communication 
systems despite transitions to liberal politics. The chapter therefore addresses the 
following: 
 
 The history of colonialism in Zambia. 
 The emergence of organised media and nationalism in the colonial era in 
Zambia.  
 Kenneth Kaunda’s Philosophy of Humanism and its vision for the media in 
Zambia.  
 The advent of liberal democracy, its measurement and public perception 
by Zambians. 
Before we reflect substantially on the problem statement expounded in Chapter 
One, it is perhaps imperative to remind ourselves that the broad context under 
which this discussion is located is democratisation, which has no distinct 
definition or closure as its supposed intended goal - democracy. Consensus 
suggests that both concepts aspire to popularly elected governments, freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement and assembly, freedom of association and 
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property and group rights. Media densification has also been closely related to 
democratisation as a key indicator of progress.  
The preceding discussion however underlines that there is no agreement on the 
finer elements of how this system of democracy may render general public good 
in terms of citizens’ socio-economic welfare and civil and political rights.  
The elusive nature of the concepts not withstanding, the discussion at least does 
place us in pole position to determine a starting point for Zambia’s 
democratisation process.  
It is noted by Huntington (1991: 2) in his seminal works that the process of 
democratisation begins with parting with the authoritarian regime. In this regard, it 
is interesting to note that both Kenneth Kaunda, the country’s founding president 
who espoused African Democratic Socialism anchored by the Philosophy of 
Humanism, and his successor Frederick Chiluba, a convert of liberal capitalism, 
agree that democratisation began with liberation from colonialism on October 24, 
1964.   
In his Humanism in Zambia (Part I), Kaunda (1968:3) lucidly relates the advent of 
democratisation to the ‘defeat’ of the colonial state.  Similarly Frederick Chiluba, 
the man who would vanquish him in the pluralist elections of 1991, underscores 
the same point: 
“Democratisation symbolizes the original objective of Zambia’s struggle for 
independence from colonial rule and the spirit of the people to create institutions 
and a political system that would allow them to elect government and participate 
in decision making on a free and equal basis,” (Chiluba, 1995:1). 
 
It can be posited therefore that Zambia’s democratisation process 
commenced with the collapse of the colonial state and the emergence of a 
nationalist, majority - ruled government.  
The problem statement in Chapter One suggests further that despite this much 
heralded advent of democratisation, political elites adopted colonial mindsets for 
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extended periods enabling the continuance of colonial structures and practices 
through the First and Second Republics. These ‘ colonial bad habits’ may have 
had a fundamental influence on the country’s political, legal and communication 
structures of today.  This remains the core of the problem as several efforts at 
institutional reform driven by presidentially appointed Constitution Review 
Commissions have not yielded much change, particularly in regard to state 
ownership of the major media. The sub problems include the undefined editorial 
relations between the state-owned print media (the Times Newspapers in 
particular) and successive elected governments; and the unclear nature of the 
influence of journalists’ unions and professional associations in opening up 
communicative space and engendering economic security for workers in the 
sector through periods of political transition. 
The chapter also discussed the question of the impact of liberalisation on the 
commercial viability of the Times; the contentious nature of government support 
to state print media which could generate perceptions of misuse of public funds, 
leading to persistent conflict. All these factors necessitate careful evaluation of 
the meaning of democratisation as it relates to media and the place of a state 
sponsored media system in an era often associated with fair rules, interaction and 
broad participation in national affairs. 
 
The problem statement suggests that these phenomena should not be viewed in 
isolation of each other or in narrow historical terms: that, there seems to be a 
relationship between the practices of the colonial, post colonial and the 
contemporary state in regard to how mass media are understood, controlled and 
managed in Zambia. This thesis therefore attaches much importance to the 
establishment of the colonial political economy in Zambia as the entire premise of 
controlled communication seems to also have links to the behaviour of colonial 
governors based on their agenda of modernisation, control, ethnic stereo-typing 
and divisiveness (Luchembe, 1992: 30).  
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In the same breath, it is also conceivable that the nationalist administrations 
sought to control media systems for diametrically opposite reasons: That is, to 
construct a nation out of fractured ethnic groups by using these very mass media 
systems ostensibly to consolidate national identity, unity and foster development.   
In trying to locate the media in these complex historical developments, it is 
perhaps worth noting that the process of democratisation in Africa has not been 
informed by a single set of ideas over the last four decades, going by the several 
attempts made by countries such as Zambia to model societies that reflected 
local concerns as well as satisfy international expectations.  
Zeleza (2009:20) underlines this point when he explains that the development 
project in Africa has been articulated through four paradigms - modernisation, 
dependency, Marxist, and free market fundamentalist theories. 
The post-colonial period was largely swayed by modernisation theory where 
development was measured in terms of the extent to which countries adopted 
western ideologies, market institutions, capital, technology and models.  
Apparent lack of human development amidst economic growth is noted to have 
spurred African governments to agitate for a new world economic order, with 
nationalists largely embracing Marxist ideologies which promoted collective 
ownership of the means of production. But as the Soviet communist bloc 
collapsed, the world witnessed the upsurge of the Washington Consensus or the 
regime of free market fundamentalism which eventually dominated the 
development discourse. The nationalist project paled before the burden of debt 
and proxy wars of the Cold War, leaving it open to colonisation by free market 
ideologies (Zeleza, 2009:20). 
In the case of Zambia, the influence of the four paradigms may be inferred from 
the countries’ transition from the First Republic, which began with a privatised 
economy and closed with a nationalised one; the Second Republic, which 
transferred the means of production to state ownership and was ideologically 
closer to the Soviet bloc while promoting African democratic socialism; and finally 
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the Third Republic, which rose on the collapse of communism in eastern Europe 
and cascaded into Africa on the back of neo-liberal ideas. 
For Scholars, these changes raise both political and economic questions in 
regard to the interaction of the media with development. The first question is 
political and addresses the impact of media on democracy on the one hand and 
the influence of democratisation on the media on the other.  The second is 
economic; and it speaks to the growth of the media as a service industry; 
ownership patterns, competitiveness and profitability. There is also a cultural and 
technological dimension: The former relates to how media can contribute to the 
development of social capital, while the latter discusses how they have embraced 
emerging technologies to their advantage (Zeleza, 2009: 21). 
Some scholars have evidently over romanticized the extent to which 
democratisation has transformed the media landscape in Africa, in error, it might 
be argued. Karin Barber (2009: 14) for example explains in general terms how 
the 1990s wave of democratisation in Africa has led to the partial privatisation of 
state controlled media and pluralisation of the industry.  
Barber claims that the nationalist agenda of mobilizing a national public through 
the media ‘fell by the wayside and the media became a free-for-all-where interest 
groups of all sizes and persuasions could take to the airwaves’ (Barber, 2009:15).  
Barber’s narrative, in some ways, contradicts assertions by scholars such as 
Banda (2006: 461) and Kasoma (2002:287) who observe that deregulation and 
registration of new electronic media outlets in Zambia for instance was a closely 
guarded affair with the large proportion of licenses often being awarded to pro-
government applicants. Barber also ignores the economic constraints faced by 
new media which has given state owned enterprises a consistent edge over 
privately owned entities. While the growth of community radio might represent 
substantial media densification, they do serve small communities or restricted 
public spheres with no means of transporting ideas beyond the boundaries of 
their locale. Finally, in Zambia of course, there has been no relinquishing of state 
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control of the major electronic and print media, partial or otherwise, despite 
privatisation in the broader economy. 
 
The political economy approach to investigating this problem, hence, allows for a 
holistic interpretation of developments in Zambia and the specific unique socio-
political contexts which may or may not necessitate the existence of state-
supported media systems. 
 
Zambia has a complex history of state formation and colonisation which needs to 
be understood in order to make sense of the evolution of its social and cultural 
institutions.  
 
In this regard, Kaplan (1979: 3) asserts that understanding Zambia’s history and 
its institutions requires not just an analysis of individual polities or personalities 
but a much deeper exposition of the social and cultural phases of the territory’s 
development.  
 
Kaplan suggests that human society in Zambia has been punctuated by 
increasing social differentiation and specialisation of economic, social and 
political structures which require careful examination. He divides Zambia’s history 
into three broad categories: Pre-colonial, Colonial and the Period of 
Independence.  
 
Perhaps if the purpose of this thesis were solely to understand Zambia’s history 
and transition to independence; this categorical analysis might be useful. 
However, applying the approach to a study of this nature would not be entirely 
helpful given that the both the periods of colonialism and independence had very 
distinct features which seemed to exhibit their own influences on the country’s 
political trajectory. These varied phases are evidently also inextricably linked to 
media evolution and practices in Zambia. 
 
In this regard, Phiri (2006:1) and Chipungu (1992:1) are more instructive in 
indicating that the colonial period had two discrete phases: 1890 to 1924, when 
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the country was under the British South Africa (BSA) Company; and 1924 to 1964 
when it was placed under the control of the Colonial Office.  
 
Phiri asserts that the two periods of colonialism have influenced the country’s 
political developments in different ways to the present day; with the second 
segments of British rule leaving a firmer footprint.  
 
Luchembe (1992:30) goes further to suggest that some of the fundamental 
problems associated with the colonial state are to be found in the first period of 
colonisation (1890 - 1924), when the BSA company initiated an enduring practice 
of ethnic-based, divisive politics. These divisive policies might have formed the 
underpinnings of a weakened, ethnically divided, independent Zambia, throwing 
the challenge for nation building at the feet of nationalists with limited resources 
to mobilize unity and development. The coercion of foreign owned media such as 
the Times Newspapers into a state - corporate structure, seems to have its roots 
in the insecurities accompanying nation building and developmental ambitions of 
nationalist governments hence. 
 
This chapter therefore launches into an extended deliberation into the country’s 
colonial past, its transition to independence and ultimately its path toward 
democratisation largely focussed on the four step categorisation of the country’s 
history; the Colonial, First Republic, Second Republic and Third Republic. 
 
This is, essentially, the period in which the development of modern organised 
media has been recorded.  
 
What is perhaps striking in this analysis is that media were intrinsic to the 
maturation of colonial and nationalistic politics. For both white settler communities 
seeking greater autonomy from Britain; and Africans agitating for majority rule 
and independence, the importance attached to media ownership as a vehicle for 
political expression is evident, despite the seemingly restrictive environment of 
the time.  
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2.2 THE HISTORY OF COLONIALISM 
Before the advent of British colonialism, the territory today known as Zambia was 
for several millennia inhabited by Stone Age hunter gatherers. The Stone Age 
phase was followed by an Iron Age closely associated with the coming of Bantu 
speaking ethnic groups from the north-western Kingdoms in the first millennium 
A.D. which are credited with further developments in language, culture and 
biology of present day Zambia (Kaplan, 1979: 4). 
 
The appearance of Bantu speaking groups from present day Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) around 700 and 1200 A.D. signified the advent of more 
advanced cultures and agrarian based social structures, leading up to the 
formation of distinct societies and polities.  
 
The development of state systems in the societies in the DRC is thought to have 
had an impact on the formation of Kingships in the Congo basin, central lakes 
districts and present - day Angola. As these Luba-Lunda dynasties expanded into 
Zambia, similar characteristics in regard to social organisation became palpable 
in this region as well. However, major cultural influences also included those of 
the Ngoni in the eastern part of the country who migrated from South Africa, 
fleeing the Mfecane conflicts waged by the great Zulu King Shaka (Phiri, 2006: 2). 
 
Zambia also had its share of foreign raiders in the 18th and 19th centuries: the 
Afro-Arabs from the east coast intent on commerce and the slave trade; and the 
Portuguese and European missionaries and conquerors after them. Eventually it 
was British diplomacy and war mongering that subdued the territory in the 1890s 
heralding a domination that would last until 1964, when independence was 
achieved (Kaplan, 1979:5).  
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The territory became a serious target of British imperialism during the scramble 
for Africa by European powers as the 20th century approached. Determined to 
pre-empt Portuguese, German and later Boer interventions, the British 
government authorised the BSA Company in 1889 to assume control of the 
(potentially) mineral rich lands beyond the Limpopo river which included present -
day Zambia. By signing concessions with local Kings, the BSA Company was 
able to obtain exclusive mining rights in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and extend its administrative authority to Nyasaland 
(Malawi)(Hall, 1976: 2). These were periods characterised by conflict between the 
British and the Boers; and later with the Germans during the First World War in 
1914 to 1918 (Roberts, 1995:1013).  
 
The first incursion into Zambia by the BSA Company was through the western 
Kingdom of the Barotse where Cecil Rhodes, the principal representative of the 
BSA and the Queen of England, was able to sign concessions with local chiefs. 
The rest of the territory, later to be known as Northern Rhodesia was taken over 
by 1891 and subsequently divided into North-Eastern Rhodesia and North 
Western Rhodesia (Phiri, 2006:10) 
 
This territory claimed for the British crown by the BSA Company was situated in 
Southern Africa occupying 752,614 Square kilometres; bordered by eight 
countries: Angola to the west, DRC to the northwest, Tanzania to the northeast, 
Malawi to the east, Mozambique to the southeast, Zimbabwe and Botswana 
southward, and Namibia to the Southwest (Roberts,1995: 1013).  
 
British colonialism essentially fused no less than 73 ethnic groups into a single 
territory. The major groups were: the Bemba in the north, the Nyanja (Ngoni) in 
the east, Tonga in the South and Lozi in the West. Researchers have identified 
up to 80 languages spoken in what is today Zambia with seven of them 
designated as ‘official’ (Roberts, 1995: 1013).  .  
 
In the beginning, the British government had firmer control over the north -
western part of the country through the appointment of an administrator and a 
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fully fledged office of support staff. The north - eastern segment of the territory 
was however supervised by the BSA Company representative. These two 
demarcations were fused in 1911 when ‘official colonialism’ of the protectorate of 
Northern Rhodesia began (Phiri, 2006: 10).  
 
The territory was not considered a colony or an area of permanent settlement but 
as a labour reserve for developing white settled lands of Southern Rhodesia and 
South Africa. Luchembe (1992: 30) describes the 24 year tenure of the BSA 
oversight of the territory as ‘autocratic’. Luchembe contends that the answers to 
the basic enduring problems experienced by Zambia, may be found in this initial 
period of BSA rule when the foundations for a local political economy was 
established and racial and ethnic stereotypes entrenched.  
 
White migration increased substantially with the discovery of copper in 1925 in 
Ndola and in surrounding areas on the border with the DRC. This discovery not 
only stimulated trade and commerce, but also catalysed rapid development of 
Northern Rhodesia, leading to swift urbanisation. The demands of this growth 
generally left the country unable to provide all the required skills from amongst 
the white population leading to expanded opportunities for African workers to take 
on administrative positions in the mines and civil service (Phiri, 2006:10).  
 
Chipungu (1992:5) argues however that the allocation of these roles among 
Africans by the BSA and the Colonial Office was based on a policy of ethnic 
stereotyping; which categorised some ethnic groups as ‘docile’ and therefore 
suited to civil service jobs; while those from belligerent traditions were 
‘troublesome’ and therefore consigned to under-ground mining work, for instance. 
Ethnic stereotyping, he concludes, may be closely related to the accentuation of 
tribalism through the country’s political history.  
 
Luchembe (1992: 31-40) expands on this argument by explaining that the 
Bemba, Ngoni and Lozi were considered ‘stronger tribes’ and were allocated 
policing, military, farming and mining roles. He notes that British administrators 
recorded in turns the superiority of the Lozi, Ngoni and Bemba over others in 
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Zambia. The Lunda, Luvale, Twa and Lamba were among the so-called ‘weaker 
tribes’ which required regular control and deserving of less demanding menial 
jobs. 
 
Luchembe (1992, 35 - 40) also notes that some initial impressions of African 
ethnic groups changed over time. The Lozi originally lumped with the Bemba and 
Ngoni as belligerent tribes, were later thought to be ‘friendly’ and ‘amenable to 
law and order’. As a result the Lozi Kingdom benefited from a series of treaties 
with the British the most significant being the 1909 agreement which rendered the 
Lozi Kingdom a protectorate of the British through the BSA Company15.  
 
 
2.2.1 Settler politics, nationalism and the media 
 
Further exposition of literature on Zambia suggests that neither the appeasement 
politics nor the stereo-typing and ethnic divisions prevented the advance of ideas 
or actions related to emancipation and democratisation. While on the one hand, 
the discovery of copper triggered white settler migration into Zambia, it also 
facilitated the emergence of a small, but literate African elite which increasingly 
began to form the vanguard of modern African nationalism, on the other. 
Similarly, as the European population increased, so did their participation in local 
politics.  
 
As stated in the preamble of this chapter, the evolution of nationalism and settler 
politics in Zambia is tethered to the development of the organised media, which 
began essentially as a political tool for either oppression or resistance. The 
development of media occurred well before the copper-driven economic boom 
took root (Phiri, 2006:14). 
 
                                                 
15
  The allocation of roles and resources by colonial authorities can be linked to Mosco (1995: 140)’s 
definition of political economy as the study of social relations, particularly power relations that influence 
the production and distribution of resources in society. This, inevitably, becomes a source of conflict 
between marginalised communities and the elite, as was the case in pre-colonial Zambia.  
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White settler elites sought a means for expression and social solidarity as 
ambitions for self rule began to manifest, and the newspaper was a natural 
vehicle.  The first newspaper published in Zambia was the Livingstone Pioneer 
launched in 1906 by W. Tranter. It survived only a few months (Kasoma, 1986: 
21).  
It is Leopold Frank Moore, a chemist, who is however credited with the 
establishment of the more stable and significant newspaper in the Livingstone 
Mail, also launched in 1906 (Kasoma, 1986: 21). With this publication, the voice 
of white elites was amplified and the Colonial Office was forced to pay more 
attention to their concerns and aspirations, part of which included emerging 
resistance amongst Africans to British subjugation(Phiri, 2006:14). 
 
Chipungu (1992: 62) traces the rise of political nationalism to the post-Second 
World War period. During this period, it is suggested by other scholars that the 
development of both print and electronic media became more pronounced 
(Chirwa, 1994: Banda, 1997: Makayi, 1997: Makungu, 2004). The electronic 
media were created as an extension of Britain’s war and colonial propaganda 
apparatus, as it prosecuted the protracted conflict against Germany (Makayi, 
1997:16).   
 
Kasoma (2002: 3) explains that the first radio station in Zambia was established 
in 1941 at the back of a series of amateur attempts at wireless communication by 
settlers clubs. Radio was set up to service Africans in the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland while white settlers were supposed to be catered for by the British 
Empire Broadcasting (BEB), and the Salisbury (Harare) based radio station, in 
addition to Radio South Africa (RSA). The local radio in Zambia stifled any 
dissemination of political party events by African nationalists and had no space 
for magazine or discussion programmes. 
 
Robert Martin’s (1998: 63) analysis of freedom of expression in Africa 
foregrounds, perhaps rightly so, the consequences of colonial intolerance for 
democratic impulse and the prohibition of free expression. No independent 
broadcasting was allowed; print media needed prior licensing approval to operate 
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and a range of legal instruments were applied to prevent the growth of any 
meaningful privately owned media, he notes.  
 
It is also noteworthy that even though newspaper ownership was private, most of 
the owners often seemed to clearly lean toward settler or colonial sympathies. 
For example, the Northern Advertiser, established in 1935 by F. Mckenzie, was 
followed by Mutende in 1936; a propaganda instrument later renamed the African 
Eagle.  
 
This might explain why pro-establishment newspapers seemed to have greater 
endurance. Hence, the pro-establishment Eagle survived until 1962 (Makungu, 
2004: 8).   
 
At the height of the Second World War in 1942, two miners E.C Wykerd and E.B. 
Hovelmeier launched the Copperbelt Times, a fortnightly catering for a small 
section of the settler community. This newspaper was purchased by Roy 
Welensky in 1944, who later became prime minister of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Makayi, 1997:16).  Welensky renamed the paper the 
Northern News, essentially the fore-runner of the present-day Times of Zambia. 
Welensky in turn sold the Northern News to the Rhodesia Printing Company. This 
publishing company owned the Herald in Salisbury (Harare) and The Chronicle in 
Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). 
 
The Northern News was transformed into a daily in 1953 at the dawn of the 
Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia with Nyasaland; and was 
circulating 20,000 copies by 1958 (Makayi, 1997: 17). In 1948, Dr Alexander 
Scott introduced the Central African Post which projected African nationalist 
views and therefore became a counter weight to the pro-colonial Northern News.  
 
Both the Northern News and the Central African Post were appropriated by South 
Africa’s Argus Group in 1951. For reasons not fully explained by media historians, 
the Post was closed in 1957. Still a robust opponent of the federation, Scott 
established another newspaper in 1958 - the African Times - which targeted 
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African and moderate white audiences as noted by Banda (1997:9) and Makayi 
(1997: 17).  
 
When the venture failed, Scott came up with the Central African Mail, this time, in 
partnership with David Astor of the London Observer. The Mail was to make a 
mark by employing two African editors, Titus Mkupo and Kelvin Mlenga. 
Commercially, the Mail could not compete with the pro-settler Northern News 
which was becoming the pre-eminent newspaper as Northern Rhodesia edged 
toward independence in 1964. Sikota Wina became the first African in Northern 
Rhodesia to own and edit a newspaper, African Life, released in 1959. It could 
not however survive the economic rigors of the day and closed down in 1960 
(Makungu, 2004: 12). 
 
There are three main observations from these historical records of media 
development and politics in the colonial era. Firstly, it is certain the Colonial 
Office, in prosecuting a protracted and difficult war with Germany, required a 
means to mobilise and galvanise its subjects into a sense of unity; part of which 
was seen in its absolute control of the electronic media (radio, more specifically). 
 
Secondly, there were divisions amongst the white community between those who 
wished to see Northern Rhodesia become an independent white controlled 
territory; and those who were typically aligned to continued British control from 
the Colonial office in London. Certainly, the types of media emerging during the 
war periods seem to indicate that there was a movement toward a settler agenda 
by the likes of Welensky and the media became the extension of that voice. 
 
In this regard, it has been noted by Phiri (2006:14), Kaplan (1999:5) and Pettman 
(1974:11) that European politics were ranged at agitating for the Federation of 
Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as a launch pad for 
greater independence from Britain.  Kaplan (1979:5) observes that European 
settlers became increasingly insecure as African political consciousness matured 
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into nationalism. 16On the other hand, African nationalists feared a merger of the 
two Rhodesia’s because of the presence of accentuated racism in the South 
(Pettman, 1974:12).  
 
The third and last point relates to the space available to Africans to express 
themselves. With evidently low literacy rates, it was left to more educated pro-
nationalist whites such as Dr Alexander Scott to establish newspapers in the 
beginning.  
 
This changed as the Africans sharpened their skills in the 1950s and 1960s when 
the likes of Sikota Wina attempted to establish their own media; and at least two 
Africans were recorded to have assumed responsible positions on the pro-
nationalist Central African Mail.  
 
However, it needs to be asserted that despite a limited space for public 
communication extended to Africans, the nationalists were able to mobilise 
through Welfare Societies, given that trade unions were not permitted by the 
colonials (Hall, 1976: 71). These Societies had branches all over the country and 
converged around a mother body - the Federation of Welfare Societies - which 
transformed itself two years later in 1951, into the Northern Rhodesia African 
National Congress (Roberts, 1995: 1013).  
 
Despite this, Pettman (1974: 12) suggests that African resistance to white settler 
machinations was not strong enough to prevent the establishment of the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The settler efforts were aided by the 
victory of the Conservative Party in Britain in October 1951 which had little regard 
for the opinions of the Africans.  
 
                                                 
16
 DiJohn (2010: 15) notes that popular African leaders worked hand in hand with workers, particularly 
mine workers, to challenge the colonial authority. The formation of the African Mine Workers Union (AMU) 
was a key indicator of both the advent of unionism and an organised struggle for independence. From the 
perspective of Marxian political economy, these actions conform to the tenets of Labour Process Theory 
(LPT), which foregrounds resistance, conflict and collective action as the key means of limiting the 
influence of capital (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 173). This matter is addressed in detail in Chapter Five, where 
labour rights form the essence of the discussion. 
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In 1953, the white settlers’ lobbying proved successful as the two Rhodesia’s 
were placed under a common administration with Nyasaland. The Federation of 
these three territories undermined African trust in the British and galvanised 
indigenous efforts at self determination (Pettman, 1974: 13).  
 
Prominent African nationalist movements such as the Northern Rhodesian 
African National Congress, though somewhat weakened over time, were key to 
leading resistance to white minority domination of the Federation. Internal conflict 
within the Northern Rhodesia ANC caused younger leaders such as 
Munukayambwa Sipalo, Simon Kapwepwe and Kaunda to challenge the much 
older leader Harry Nkumbula. This led to a breakaway movement led by Kaunda 
and Kapwepwe, called the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). Further 
acts of civil disobedience and disturbances alarmed Welensky and his settler 
administration leading to the banning of the ZANC in March 1959. There were 
more splits within the ANC by August 1959 which resulted in further new 
formations, leading up to the creation of the United National Independence Party 
(UNIP). Kaunda was installed as leader of UNIP on his release from prison in 
January 1960 (Phiri, 2006: 116-121).  
 
 
2.2.2 First Republic: Independence, plural politics and the media 
 
A series of constitutional proposals from the Federal government eventually led to 
a transfer of power to Africans; facilitating a coalition government between UNIP 
and the ZANC. With the Federation virtually dead, Northern Rhodesia transitioned 
to independence: Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP won the pre-independence elections in 
January of 1964, taking 55 of the 65 available seats. Formal independence was 
granted on October 24, 1964. Kaunda was installed as Zambia’s first President, 
with UNIP as its governing party (Pettman, 1974: 19).  
 
What is notable in this extended historical account is that the ethnic consciousness 
promoted by the colonial state seemed to have been subordinated to the common 
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good of achieving African liberation by nationalists. This could be discerned by the 
alliances formed during the 1950s.  
 
Harry Nkumbula from the Tonga ethnic group in the South; Sipalo was Lozi, 
Kaunda was born and bred in northern Zambia with roots from Nyasaland; 
Kapwepwe was a northerner.  
 
Secondly, both in political and communicative terms, the rise of Roy Welensky 
after World War II, can be understood as signifying a high point in the trajectory of 
Northern Rhodesia. He not only led the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland but 
was also instrumental in establishing a key publication that spearheaded the 
growth of the printed media in Zambia. We remind ourselves here that his 
Northern News was to form part of a conglomerate that would become the Times 
of Zambia at independence. It was also under his administration, that the 
electronic media, particularly radio, were used as an effective state propaganda 
tool. 
 
Soon after the transition to independence, the Northern News was purchased for 
200,000 pounds Sterling by the London Rhodesia Mining and Land Company 
(Lonrho) owned by British tycoon Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland. Lonrho’s media interests 
had already been exemplified through its purchase of the Heinrich Syndicate, a 
brewing company which owned the Zambia Times and a weekly titled Zambia 
News. Rowland created the Times of Zambia by merging the Northern News and 
the Zambia Times. The Zambia News was renamed the Sunday Times of Zambia. 
 
The Central African Mail was purchased by the new nationalist government led by 
Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP and renamed the Zambia Daily Mail (Makayi, 1997:18).  
 
2.2.3 First Republic: Challenges of security, unity and media independence 
 
As we venture further into the independent Zambian state or the First Republic, 
there are critical observations to be made about country’s transition to self rule: 
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The first is that although African nationalists did largely work toward one common 
goal amidst political differences, ethnic divisions began to manifest a few years 
into the First Republic. Simon Kapwepwe, now state vice president, split from 
UNIP to form the predominantly northern-based United Progressive Party (UPP) 
(Simutanyi, 2008: 10). The UPP was suppressed through intimidation and 
violence as the first stage of pluralist politics faltered.  In December 1972, UNIP 
declared Zambia a one party state, presumably to maintain extended control of 
the country (Roberts, 1995: 1013). 
 
The Zambian case is not unique in Africa. Nyong’o (1995: 29) notes that Africans 
were generally agreed that the most important step to be taken was 
independence and development. Stratified social classes represented through 
competing political parties under varied ideologies stood against the current of 
the time. Hence single-party systems became more of a natural framework for 
organising democratic government on the continent. 
 
Secondly, Zambia had inherited immense mineral wealth, particularly held in the 
Copperbelt region of the country. Exploitation of this wealth by the colonial 
administration did not benefit national development a great deal as much of it was 
funnelled to support British interests in southern Africa and abroad. Kaunda’s 
government hence was initially heavily dependent upon the white controlled 
industrial complex in southern Africa. The Kaunda administration’s dependency 
on imports was inadvertently stemmed by Southern Rhodesia’s Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) which forced independent Zambia to develop 
its own resources: coal deposits at Maamba were discovered and exploited; new 
hydro-electric projects were built; tele-communications and alternative arteries 
established particularly, the Tazara railway through Tanzania to the port of Dar-
es-salaam. UDI Rhodesia also alarmed the new Zambian government into a 
heightened state of security (Roberts, 1995: 1013).  
 
Presumably, this state of alert would justify a more controlled approach to the 
public’s right to know and the state’s impetus toward controlled communication to 
maintain internal unity and political stability.  
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Thirdly, in 1968, Kaunda’s government instituted the Mulungushi Reforms which 
led to the nationalisation of 80 percent of the economy, covering manufacturing, 
transport and construction. These were brought under the umbrella of the 
Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO), designed to catalyse industrial 
growth. Government acquired 51 per cent share holding in the mining industry 
through its parastatals, the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO). The 
Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO) was created in March 1970 as 
the holding company for the new state owned parastatals giants (Kaunga:[sa]).   
 
The economic reforms had ramifications for the development and sustenance of 
privately owned media as the major source of revenue - advertising - was now 
held by the state. Conceivably, the state could order its parastatals to withdraw 
advertising from media entities that were too critical of its performance. 
 
Such action was deployed against the church owned National Mirror (Banda, 
1997:13). The consequence of nationalisation for the media was that newspapers 
allied to the state could be assured of a flow of advertising from the parastatals 
sector. 
 
The parastatals sector is recorded to have grown by 1972 constituting 53 percent 
of total manufacturing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with a 42 percent share of 
employment. Parastatal’s share of GDP and formal employment rose to 56 per 
cent and 54 percent respectively by 1980 (Kaunga: [sa]: 2).  
 
These radical economic developments coincided with the state’s ambitions to 
incorporate the media into this emergent state super-structure. Capitalising on 
this changing political-economic environment, Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland, chair of 
Lonrho, was apparently willing to trade off the partial autonomy of his flagship 
newspapers the Times of Zambia and the Sunday Times of Zambia to protect his 
other industrial interests in Zambia. Based on a consultative arrangement with 
Lonrho, the government of Zambia was allowed to appoint the editor-in-chief of 
the Times Newspapers, albeit without formal ownership of the business concerns 
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by the state. Lonrho however retained control over commercial matters on the 
Times (Makayi, 2007:17).  
 
This meant that the state was now in a position to appoint the heads of all the 
major media which included; the Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS)( the fore-
runner of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation); the Zambia Information 
Services (ZIS), the Zambia Daily Mail, the Zambia News Agency (ZANA) and the 
Times Newspapers. Between 1964 and 1980, some of the key editors-in-chief to 
have their services terminated for criticism of government actions included, 
Richard Hall, one of the founding editors of the pro-nationalist Central African 
Mail; Naphy Nyalugwe and Dunstan Kamana, Kaunda’s former press secretary, 
signifying highly conflictual state - media relations (Makungu, 2004: 15).  
 
2.2.4 Securitisation of the Zambian state and its implications for the media 
 
At this juncture, it is tempting to attribute the concentration of political and 
economic power by the Kaunda government to tendencies for authoritarianism 
without being cognisant of some key underlying arguments concerning Zambia’s 
post colonial challenges of nation building and security.17 
 
For Martin (1998; 69) the slow pace of change was not simply a case of African 
nationalists learning the colonial bad habits and extending their own form of 
‘colonial administration’. Martin rather suggests that the behaviour of post colonial 
governments to retain colonial legislation and limit media freedom may be 
explained by three reinforcing principles embraced by African nationalists: 
 
 Unity: because they headed mass movements, African leaders tended to 
organise the masses against colonialism in demanding freedom. In the post 
                                                 
17
 It should be emphasised that the meaning of democratisation to nationalists was not consistent with 
features often associated with western democracies. The Harbermasan public sphere, which has been 
discussed in section 1.1.6 and will be elaborated on in Chapter Three, is remotely relevant here because 
the principal aim for the emergent Zambia was to foster a collective movement toward common goals with 
minimal friction between ethnic groups. Therefore, the aim was to control communicative space for 
uniform messaging, deemed an important ingredient in national building, it can be deduced. The ambitions 
of classical political economy and western liberal democracy in this regard, are marginalised against the 
goals of the historical project of social change. 
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independent era the same motto was used to engender social and economic 
progress. 
 Development: though ill defined, development was the goal toward which a 
unified nation was to advance. Freedom of expression was, as a result, 
peripheral to the need to work as one. Implicitly, mass media were to be 
state-driven. The emergence of development journalism and development 
support communication, he argues, is related to these principles. 
 Nationalism: finally nationalism provided the ideological foundation for unity 
and development; and presented liberal values of free expression and 
individualism as essentially western and therefore in tension with the core 
values of African society. 
 
But it is Pettman (1974:35), who perhaps places this argument into a Zambia-
specific context and outlays a much more complex problem associated with these 
phenomena. According to this scholar, the Zambia’s priority at independence was 
national security. Zambia had not inherited a fully fledged political and 
governmental system to facilitate the administration of this vast country, he 
posits.  
 
Pettman suggests that because of the fragile nature of independent Zambia, 
national unity and consolidation of state institutions and security took precedence 
over concerns of democratisation. Perhaps one might understand the behaviour 
of the state in the First Republic toward the privately owned media in this context. 
Pettman asserts further that the prioritisation of national security came with the 
following considerations: 
 
 The nationalist government of Kaunda needed to secure and organise 
government to foster an ambitious development agenda. 
 The nationalists needed to consolidate their legitimacy as a government and 
formerly control the entire country. 
 All the units of the polity, the government, the state, and the nation were 
underdeveloped. The sense of nation was almost non existent 
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 Unity and mobilisation attained at independence dissipated within a short 
period of time. 
 
The explanations advanced by Pettman seem to provide some much needed 
insight into the manifestation of a one party state within the first 18 years of 
Kaunda’s rule. He posits for example that the political structure inherited at 
independence became unbalanced upon the withdrawal of the colonial authorities 
and the political forces within the country did not find expression in an 
environment limited in its communicative freedoms.  
 
He argues that an interrogation of Zambian politics of the time is inadequate 
without looking beyond the formal arrangements of government. He proposes 
that an examination include not just formal structures in isolation but the 
individuals who occupy those structures and the political and social context in 
which they operate.  
 
In this regard, he highlights the role the presidency and its development under 
Kaunda as being central to conditioning governance in the First Republic. As with 
most other African states at independence, the Presidency was characterised by 
the charismatic appeal and personal power of the president.  
 
“African presidentialism reflects the post-independence institutionalisation 
of the leader and the party that led the country to independence” (Pettman, 
1974: 35). 
 
He ventures to explain that a charismatic leader has been deemed necessary 
and inevitable in African politics, as a unifying force for nation-building. This 
personalisation of power, he posits, had some influence on the structure of 
government after independence: Firstly, it led to centralisation of power in the 
hands of a few men, based on a politicised civil service.  
 
Secondly and more importantly, it elevated the position of president in 
constitutional, moral and political terms to a point where cabinet - appointed and 
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dismissed at will by the president - would act in compliance nearly at all times. In 
the Zambian case, the pre-eminence of the president through constitutional 
arrangements gave him power over the military as commander-in-chief, the 
appointment of the Chief Justice, members of the Public Service Commission, 
and Electoral Commission.  
 
The only serious counter-weight was parliament which had shared powers over 
the budget, depending on whether dissenting voices in the national assembly 
were sufficient to block legislation. Apart from an unlikely loss in a presidential 
election, parliament is the institution that would remove a president for violating 
the constitution, for incapacity; or gross misconduct. But the procedures are long 
and complicated (Pettman, 1974:35).  
 
 
2.2.5 Presidential pre-eminence and the influence of Humanism on state media 
systems 
 
This pre-eminence of the president described by Pettman would, in the view of 
this researcher, explain why and how Kaunda’s Philosophy of Humanism became 
so pervasive in Zambian political communications and integral to the education 
system, particularly in the mid 1970s and the late 1980s. 18 
 
To fully understand this premise, the thesis hereafter ventures to interrogate in 
some detail the Philosophy of Humanism, the central thinking promoted by 
                                                 
18
 Kaunda’s actions could be described as hegemonic to a great extent. The concept of hegemony has 
often been associated with both coercive and benign intentions in achieving multiple goals on the basis of 
their national interest. Mahao (2006: 1) suggests that it takes the deployment of critical theory to unmask 
the class character of hegemonic theory, which, he argues, conceals domination and subordination. The 
word ‘hegemon’ emanates from the Greek word for ‘political leader’ applied largely in terms of hegemonic 
stability theory, a creature of International Political Economy (IPE) which evolved in the 1970s.  The 
concept is also used in security and war studies and in wider applications related to leadership, primacy in 
an international system or in reference to a state which has the capacities to dominate others (Schoeman 
(2007: 2-3). Schoeman (2007: 1) asserts that hegemony has tended to gravitate toward coercion in most 
instances, leveraging an unquestioned social order. In the context of leadership, hegemony can be 
understood as coercing others to accept values they may not agree with.  This analogy has punctuated 
references to African leadership over the years particularly, the tendency to impose personal ideologies as 
a national system of values. Kaunda’s propagation of Humanism and his deliberate efforts to embed it as 
a national philosophy could therefore be interpreted as such. 
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Kaunda which was presumed to return Zambia to a pre-colonial, man-centred 
African society. In the discussion, the thesis seeks to engage with the concepts 
advanced by Kaunda and how these seem to interact with his pronouncements 
on the role of the media; and in particular, the place of the Times and the Sunday 
Times of Zambia in an elaborate national development scheme. 
 
Perhaps there is something to be deduced from the preamble of Kaunda’s 
Philosophy of Humanism in this regard. Kenneth Kaunda conceives of 
colonialism as intent not just on political and economic domination but cultural 
subjugation as well. The presence of foreign owned media may well have been 
understood as being an extension of alien cultural influences. 
  
“This being the case, the act of political independence forms but the first part 
of the process of decolonisation. This process is a very long one.” (Kaunda, 
1968: 3). 
 
While acknowledging the benefits of western civilisation which he cites as the 
advent of science and technology and modern health facilities, he attacks the 
unfair distribution of wealth and the general marginalisation and suppression of 
African populations that the colonial state stood for. Kaunda sees the pre-colonial 
African society as being inherently just but acknowledges the need to transform it 
from a non-money milieu to a money economy. Traditional community, he argues, 
discouraged individualism and instead promoted common ownership of land and 
common cooperative actions that benefited all.  
 
Although authority over property such as land was vested in the chiefs and 
headmen; they did so, on behalf of the people. His vision of a man-centred 
society seeks to place man above ideology and institutions and extend this 
philosophy as a commonly held virtue in post independent Zambia.  
 
In a 34 point exposition, Kaunda explains that the aim of independence was not 
simply to roll back an undemocratic regime but to ensure that Northern Rhodesia 
embraced the principles of democracy within an African context. 
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Kaunda’s definition of democracy projects a hostility toward individualism, 
tribalism and provincialism and in the same breath espouses freedom of speech 
and of the press (Kaunda, 1968:10). This conceptualisation of democracy or 
‘African democratic socialism’ emphasises social aspects with equitable access 
to; and ownership of; national resources, including communication resources. 
The engineering of African democratic socialism would be a huge undertaking in 
mass systemic education with the deployment of educationists, sociologists and 
psychologists to curriculum development for primary, secondary and tertiary 
institutions, he explains.  
 
Humanism therefore was envisioned to be the under-pinning for a new nation 
going forward, as it attempted to un-do ethnic divisions wrought by the colonial 
state and reverse what might be seen as half a century of cultural imperialism. 
His reference to the media here, in regard to the objectives of the party, is of 
particular interest:  
 
“To run and establish newsletters, newspapers or magazines in order to 
advance the aims and objects of the party (we have comprehensive 
plans afoot)” (Kaunda, 1968:11). 
 
While he clearly promotes the idea of freedom of speech and of the press, it is 
discernible that he refers to the extension of a voice to the once voiceless African 
majority rather than to the promotion of unfettered individual enterprise amongst a 
culturally diverse society. It is implied by Kaunda’s explanation that this freedom 
of expression by the masses was to be managed through participation in the one 
legal mass movement that was UNIP, the ruling party. His aversion for unfettered 
individualism is also self evident. For instance, he expresses a guarded 
appreciation of some form of private enterprise ‘within the framework of accepted 
government policy…’ (Kaunda, 1968: 23). 
 
The thrust of Kaunda’s argument suggests that the damage wrought by 
colonialism caused an erosion of African values and morals and that an alternate 
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strategy for redress was essential. The education system was one instrument, but 
clearly UNIP’s ownership of media would be another. 
 
Kaunda is emphatic on the need for “discipline” in the nation, to be ensured by 
village or section committees at all levels. It seems highly unlikely that a 
watchdog model of the media that constantly seeks to expose those in power to 
ridicule and probe would have been deemed to be “disciplined” in this regard.   
 
It is of course arguable whether Kaunda’s strategy to nationalise state media 
systems helped to consolidate nationhood over time. Kasoma (2002:16-17), does 
seem to think so.  He explains that Zambia was hardly a nation at independence 
in 1964 and it was only through the effective use of national radio which 
broadcast Kaunda’s speeches about unity and nationhood regularly with 
consistent symbolism that a sense of unity was forged amongst the 73 tribes.  
 
Kasoma argues further that the use of the slogan “One Zambia, One Nation” prior 
to the commencement of each news bulletin remained ingrained in the nation’s 
psyche and has provided the foundation for nation - building. Similarly, the 
projection of a tribally balanced cabinet and rendition of unity in the national 
anthem, an adaptation of the African National Congress (ANC)’s ‘Nkosi Sikeleli 
Africa’, on national radio and television would have served the same purpose. 
Although only seven of the 73 languages were granted national status on radio, 
the messages relayed the importance of national unity while the designation of 
English as the official language projected a sense of neutrality. Kasoma however 
admits that in the long term, state media systems were used to consolidate 
UNIP’s hold on power, presenting it as the future of the nation, particularly during 
the Second Republic (Kasoma, 2002:16-17).  
 
It was not quite as easy for UNIP to colonise the Times Newspapers in the same 
manner as radio and television given that the state had not formally purchased 
any shares in the Lonrho entity. Despite the appointment of the editor by the 
president, the professional staff of the Times remained largely tethered to ethics 
and standards of practice that reflected their training or orientation within their 
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institution, both of which were based on western values of media freedom, at 
least by all indications (Makungu, 2004: 27-30). 
 
2.2.6 Watershed Speech: Editorial instructions to the Times and the Zambia Daily 
Mail 
 
The defining moment for the Times of Zambia and the Sunday Times of Zambia 
came in 1975, when the Kaunda announced that the party - UNIP - would 
appropriate 100 percent share holding in the daily and 50 percent in the weekly 
publications. In his Watershed Speech, Kaunda is quoted as saying reporting by 
all journalists in the state owned Zambia Daily Mail, the Times of Zambia, the 
Sunday Times of Zambia, ZANA and ZBS should reflect the official thinking of the 
Party and its Government (Makayi,1997:19).  
 
Media professionals were ordered to be fully committed to the Philosophy of 
Humanism in their respective and personal capacities and promote local cultural 
values.  
 
The most significant and direct form of intervention prior to the Watershed Speech 
was the uproar which led to the sacking of several journalists on the Times of 
Zambia following the publication of an article on land - related corruption involving 
senior party officials. After his Watershed Speech, UNIP apparently responded to 
the demands of members of its Central Committee to ‘fire all journalists, take it 
(Times Newspapers) over and re-employ only UNIP loyalists’ (Makayi, 1997:19).  
 
Although the journalists were reinstated later, the action could be viewed as a 
warning to the Times establishment regarding the supremacy of the party UNIP 
over all spheres of development. This was re-emphasised when the state made 
several efforts to regulate the media through a statutory council. Journalists 
resisted efforts to be organised into a union as an affiliate of the Zambia Congress 
of Trade Union (ZCTU) and hence be controlled as part of a mass movement of 
workers aligned to UNIP.  
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Journalists reacted by creating their own Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) in 
1983 which was non statutory (Makungu, 2004:28). The state responded with 
further actions aimed at creating a Media Council to license journalists and 
therefore determine who practised; and later by proposing the PAZA Act.  
 
The Act, had it succeeded, would have enabled the PAZA to de-register journalists 
who contravened its regulations, effectively ending their careers (Makayi: 1997: 
18).  
 
The tensions between the state and the media in the latter part of the Second 
Republic suggest that the strategy of controlling the media through the 
appointment of a supposedly partisan editor-in-chief had only limited success, 
particularly in the case of the Times Newspapers. This might be because the 
state’s strategy was too focussed on oversight, rather than reconditioning the 
thinking among journalists employed by the Times Newspapers.  
 
Firstly, no consensus-based alternative standards of practice and ethics was ever 
agreed or discussed with journalists to engender majority support for the 
government actions. Secondly, Zambian newspapers had internal training 
programmes for their journalists based on British and American standards of 
practice. In addition, media institutions had increasingly begun to tap into the 
institutionalised systems offered by the Africa Literature Centre in Kitwe’s Mindolo 
Ecumenical Centre and the Evelyn Hone of Applied Arts and Commerce. Later in 
the mid 1980s, The University of Zambia commenced a degree programme in 
Mass Communications (Makungu: 2004: 27).  
 
Thirdly, following the Watershed Speech of 1975, UNIP did not assume absolute 
control of shares in the Times Newspapers until October, 1982, which meant a fair 
level of independence might still have been possible. The take over of the Times 
Newspapers in 1982, finally signifies the achievement of parity between the Times 
and the rest of the state owned media.  
 
 95 
In 1988, the Government formed the National Media Corporation (NAMECO) 
which became the umbrella agency responsible for the overall management of the 
state owned dailies (Firms in new hands, 1998: 3).  
 
This move can best be described as a form of state - driven horizontal 
concentration. NAMECO was directly answerable to the presidency while the 
ZNBC, ZANA and ZIS, came under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 
Services.  
 
Although no legal provision provided for direct control by the minister, the context 
in which the ministry related to the electronic media does give indicators of how 
the NAMECO might be treated: Section 27 of the ZNBC Act provides for the 
minister of information to officially censor any broadcasts that he/she deems 
defamatory, blasphemous, obscene or seditious (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 25). 
Thus, for the first time, the prospect of uniformity of content in the consolidated 
state media systems became imminent.  
 
Despite these controls, the state seemed dissatisfied with the levels of compliance 
by its editors: Makungu (2004: 30) observes that that editors of the Times, Komani 
Kachinga, and the Zambia Daily Mail’s Cyrus Sikazwe, were dismissed in 1990 
due to their coverage of the pro-democracy movements that were emerging in the 
country, preceded by a failed military coup in June 1990 and unrest over 
deteriorating economic conditions. 
 
 
2.2.7 Transition to the Third Republic: Pre-eminence of the Washington 
Consensus  
 
A new formation, named the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 
comprising academics, trade unionists, students and former members of Kaunda’s 
First and Second Republican governments, emerged as a major political force in 
1990, in the wake of the attempted military coup.  
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The MMD sold itself on neo-liberal principles inspired by the Washington 
Consensus which signify a set of policy prescriptions that were deemed capable of 
transforming the Third World in terms of economic growth and affluence (Chiluba, 
1995: Taylor, 1997: 2005: Fine, Lapavitsas & Pincus, 2003).  
 
Fine et al (2003: 1) attribute the rise of the Washington Consensus, which is 
defined by the notion of a minimal state and free markets, to the apparent failure of 
the Soviet-inspired development ideology and practice of the 1950s and 1960s. 
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank promoted these principles in 
their engagement with developing countries.   
 
Apart from embracing this neo-liberal framework therefore, the MMD categorically 
stated its promotion of a libertarian model of the media in its manifesto: “Freedom 
of expression and the right to information are basic human rights. As such 
journalists will have to play an important role in promoting democracy and 
development in an MMD-led Government” (Matibini: 2006: 6). The MMD Manifesto 
of 1991 outlined its vision in regard to the media as follows: 
 
 All bona fide journalists, both local and foreign, would be accredited to 
perform their functions without interference. 
 All Publications shall be registered by the National Archives of Zambia. 
 In case of conflict within mass media, a press council composed of 
professional representatives would be established to receive and resolve such 
conflicts. 
 Individuals and organisations shall have a right to own and operate their own 
press and electronic media facilities (Matibini: 2006: 6). 
 
While the MMD did not categorically indicate that they would privatise the state 
owned media, they did seem to imply a changed media policy, albeit unwritten, in 
the Third Republic. As noted in section 1.2.1 of Chapter One, the first five years of 
MMD rule witnessed the birth of several new publications as registration rules were 
eased. However, the economic environment did not allow for rapid growth of the 
printed media. Generally, the early developments under Chiluba won many 
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accolades from political commentators initially as the judiciary demonstrated a 
measure of independence, and as sections of the press, particularly the Weekly 
Post-were increasingly critical of government. However the situation seemed to 
stagnate within five years.  
 
Tordoff and Young (2005: 403) observe that the momentum for change receded as 
the pattern of dominant party politics took root. This phenomenon, leads to a party 
remaining in power for prolonged periods and influencing overwhelmingly, the 
affairs of state (Matlosa & Karume, 2004:1). 
 
For Tardoff and Young (2005:418-419) this is not the only cause of lack of reform. 
They cite the presence of powerful presidential institutions and prevalence of weak 
and unstable opposition parties created for personal advancement, narrow 
regional or ethnic interests as an underlying contributor to the problem. Parliament 
was not strong enough to check the “unfettered” presidential government that 
materialised under Chiluba. Economically, the liberal policies suffered from falling 
copper prices which reduced government revenue. They argue that ultimately the 
state’s institutional framework was not strong enough to support the market 
economy approach. Despite this, Chiluba’s administration managed to privatise 80 
percent of the economy by March 2000.  
 
Tardoff and Young remain unimpressed with the country’s electoral democracy: 
the holding of regular elections serves the minimal function of marking 
democracy’s survival rather than an indication of consolidation, they contend.  
 
Interestingly, as Baker (2000: 2), O’Neil (1998: 10) and Pitts (2000: 284) have 
noted, Tardoff and Young also point to ‘circulation of elites’ as a cause for a loss of 
momentum for democratisation. It can be noted by this researcher that indeed the 
composition of Chiluba’s cabinet suggested a continuation of politicians from the 
First, Second and Third Republics. Sikota Wina and his brother Arthur became 
ministers in Chiluba’s first cabinet. Vernon Mwaanga, a former former Zambia 
representative to the United Nations under Kaunda, and the likes of Michael Sata 
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a former Minister of Local Government, also became influential members of 
Chiluba’s Cabinet.  
 
Mwaanga, controversially appointed to the post of editor-in-chief in the 1970s by 
Kaunda straight from being a diplomat, also served as member of the UNIP 
Central Committee and rose to be minister of foreign affairs and minister of 
information under Chiluba and subsequent MMD administrations.  
 
With a crop of influential first generation politicians possibly accustomed to 
practices of the past, it remains questionable whether this cyclic form of 
governance would allow for radical changes to a media system that might be seen 
as contributing to the hold of ruling elites on state power.  
 
While Humanism was no longer the ideological guiding light for the government in 
regard to how state media operate editorially, the practices hardly changed under 
MMD, by all indications. MMD, as UNIP before it, continued to allow the powerful 
presidency to appoint or certainly influence the appointment of the editor-in-chief 
and managing director of the state newspapers, including the Times.  The media 
policy of the MMD released in 1996 did not cast any doubt on the supervisory role 
the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services plays in the operations of 
the state media systems in Zambia (Zambia: 1996: 19).    
 
Here, it is important perhaps to recall that this thesis has suggested that the 
motivation for control of media systems in the post independence era or First 
Republic could be deduced as being related to the need for unity, nation-building 
and forging a common national identity.  
 
There was the added assumption that matters of security, given Zambia’s 
geopolitical locus in southern Africa amidst raging liberation wars, might also have 
edged the state to stifle private or foreign media ownership. However, no strong 
security argument for continued control of the media appears viable in the 1990s. 
Nor is there a strong argument for ethnic integration and unity as a reason for the 
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failure to privatise. Certainly, no major indication of ethnic tensions has yet reared 
its head in Zambia in the last 20 years to warrant controlled media systems.  
 
The only persistent explanation for retarded media reforms seems to be related 
strongly to the recycled leadership and dominant party hypothesis which suggests 
that while political administrations have changed four times in Zambia at 
presidential level, the substance of the leadership remains the same and the 
political system sustains a single influential party over extended periods.  
 
The cyclic nature of presidential politics implies that mindsets and beliefs regarding 
media power may still be the guiding light of ruling elites in Zambia.  
 
These practices and beliefs might not be dissimilar to the ideas advanced by 
Kaunda in Humanism Part I, despite Zambia embracing Washington Consensus 
principles at an economic level, under MMD.  
 
In summary, the fore-going underscores the complex nature of change. The path 
to democracy is convoluted, and complicated by unforeseen internal and external 
dictates.  
 
It is, perhaps, understandable why different cultures will render different 
interpretations of democracy, given the radically varied contexts in which change 
occurs. This poses challenges for scholars and citizens alike as to what constitutes 
progress or regression and how these phenomena may be measured to ensure a 
common understanding across cultures.  
 
In the next section, this chapter discusses the key scientific methods that are 
commonly used to measure democracy, some of which foreground freedom of 
expression and of the press, freedom of association and assembly. 
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2.3 MAKING SENSE OF ZAMBIA’S DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS 
The case of Zambia certainly shows how complex the notions of democratisation 
and democracy are. Casual interpretation of events over four decades could quite 
easily mislead one into concluding that the country has regressed or stagnated as 
a result of adopting radically different political models over the last 45 years. 
Eshetu Chole warns against this: 
“Social struggles are fought and won by stages, each stage being 
richly textured with advances and setbacks. Gains that appear minor 
when viewed in isolation may cumulatively add up to achievements 
not to be ignored. This is true of democratisation experiments in 
Africa” (Chole, 1995:3). 
Certainly there may be cummulative benefits from the three Zambian Republics 
which could have translated into positive developments over time. Perhaps one 
such instance is the organisation of journalists into unions such as the ZUJ and 
professional associations, such as PAZA following years of fighting state 
encroachment on their sector.  
The other would be the numerous efforts of Zambians to establish privately 
owned media despite the economic limitations and the threat posed by a largely 
colonial constitutional - legal framework.  These steps have been incremental, 
though not substantial. 
The one-party state protagonists might also argue that they ensured political 
stability - a rarity in Africa. And because of their efforts to concentrate power and 
focus national efforts, Zambia enjoyed four decades of peace and stability. Their 
assertions could include their use of media messages tailored toward unity and 
nation building. Certainly, there is veracity in the argument that stability might 
have formed the underpinnings for change in political, economic and 
communicative terms in the present day. 
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2.3.1 Measuring democracy 
 
While understanding progress anywhere, least of all Zambia, seems an exercise 
in futility, scholars posit that there are credible and systematic measurements 
employed in political science to analyse democracy and democratisation which 
include categorical, standards-based, survey-based or objective measures 
(Mattes, 2003: Landman, 2005; Kekic, 2007). None of them are holistic or 
universally acceptable. 
 
The various approaches to measurement are not without their short comings. 
Landman (2005:20-25) observes that the methods generally ignore historical 
processes of both socio-economic and political change at domestic and at global 
political levels. Categorical, standards-based, survey-based or objective 
measures all have merits and demerits, but the scholar argues for the inclusion of 
traditional forms of rule, nomadic populations and indigenous populations in 
developing core indicators that speak to alternative forms of organisation and 
representation. As Alvandi and Hakala, (2007: 5) and Parry and Moran (1994: 1) 
note in section 1.1.3 of this Chapter, Landman concedes that the term democracy 
remains ‘unfixed and is therefore flexible” (Landman, 2005: 26). 
 
At another level, the presence in the legal and constitutional framework of 
provisions that protect basic civil, political and socio economic rights provides a 
foundation for the inference of measurement of political democracy. Kekic 
(2007:1) is instructive in dividing the measurements into ‘thin’ concepts and ‘thick’ 
concepts. ‘Thin’ concepts are the legislative measurement and ‘thick’ are based 
on process.  
 
Thin measurements are benchmarked against the International Human Rights 
Instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), among others. 
Measurements seek to infer the extent to which these provisions are reflected in 
the national legal and constitutional framework. In terms of the ‘thin’ 
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measurement system, a state may be de jure democratic but be de facto one 
party dominant which suggests another form of governance.  
 
The measurements applied by Freedom House, the US-based political think –
tank, define democracy as a competitive multi-party political system whose 
outcomes are determined by regularly contested elections (Kekic, 2007:1). 
Freedom House’s index for measuring democracy is well known. It applies 10 
indicators on a 1 to 7 scale to measure political freedom and 15 indicators to 
assess civil liberties. Kekic observes that Freedom House measures a narrower 
concept of ‘electoral democracy” which he describes as a minimalist approach.   
 
The approach assumes that fair and free practices are instituted which allow 
significant public access to campaigning parties; where the principle of secrecy of 
the ballot is upheld and where resources, presumably including communication 
resources; are accessible to all contestants. In evaluating these approaches, 
Almond and Verba (1963:3), and Kekic (2007:1-8) all agree that democracy 
transcends legalistic benchmarks and is rather also about values, attitudes, 
processes and civic culture. It is noted by a number of scholars that the Freedom 
House approach conceives of the emerging democracies in Africa as falling in 
categories such as: “illiberal”; “liberal” “free” “electoral” and “Pseudo or “virtual” 
democracies (Zakaria: 2003: Mattes; 2003; Landman: 2005). These criteria are 
defined as follows: 
 
 Illiberal democracies: they have general characteristics of free and fair 
elections, relatively free press, freedom of expression, freedom of 
assembly and association. They are weak at protecting citizens from 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion, gender. They may be 
punctuated by torture, death in custody and ill treatment signifying a 
chasm between institutional dimensions of democracy and civil and 
minority rights on the other hand. Landman contends that countries with 
presidential systems, amongst these, have been the most unstable due to 
the extra-constitutional behaviour of presidents that makes the protection 
of rights precarious (Landman, 2005: 23). 
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 Liberal or ‘free’ democracies: Embrace the full range of political 
freedoms and civil rights with competitive politics. Mattes (2003: 78) places 
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana in this group. But all have dominant 
power structures that can inhibit effective competition, hence raising the 
possibility of them being semi-democratic. 
 
 Electoral Democracies: Have political competition with an insufficient 
protection of rights. Freedom House rates Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique 
and Lesotho as ‘partly free’. 
 
 Pseudo or virtual democracies: Zambia has been rated amongst the 
countries that hold elections and allow opposition parties. But competition, 
pluralism and rights of association, speech and media are actively 
controlled by the state (Mattes, 2003: 78).  
 
 
2.3.2 Zambia: A Pseudo-democracy? 
 
The categorisation of Zambia as a ‘virtual or Pseudo-democracy” lends itself to 
further interrogation in regard to how it has protected  its citizens’ communicative 
freedoms through the three republics and more generally how the political actors 
respond to the constitutional rules. 
 
Once again it can be noted that the emerging picture is one of a Zambian state 
that had inherited some modicum of liberalised political space in the First 
Republic, reversed this model in 1972 (Second Republic), adopted a one party 
system of government in 1973 and succumbed to exogenous and endogenous 
factors in 1991, leading to plural politics once again.  Since 1991, it has held 
competitive elections in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2008 with disputes being 
channelled and settled legally through the judicial system.  
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Apart from recycled leadership, the constant in this transition has been the legal 
provisions largely inherited from the colonial administration of Roy Welensky, 
which remained to a great extent unchanged.  
 
While the legal architecture allowed for the existence of private media it was 
debilitating in its penalties where transgression on the person of the president 
and encroachment on restricted public information, was concerned. Freedom 
House’s categorical analysis will be seen to have some, if not much, merit in this 
regard considering that no clear definition of some legal impediments such an 
explanation of what constitutes state security, or sedition, is presented in the legal 
instruments that govern citizen rights to self expression and access to public 
information in Zambia (Chanda & Liswaniso, 2006: 73-102).  
 
However this categorisation could be challenged on the grounds that despite the 
legal environment, civil society and media activists were able to organise 
themselves into trade unions and professional associations that won some key 
legal battles in a judiciary that has itself shown some modicum of independence. 
We could deepen this argument and relate to the capacity of the Zambian society 
to form political parties, establish private radio and newspaper outlets and 
influence to some degree the complexion of national parliament.   
 
Zambia clearly exhibited the emergence of a middle class (intellectuals, unionists, 
students who formed MMD) that was able to position itself for political change by 
the 1990s. While Zambia’s elections since 1991 have been disputed, potential 
conflict has been averted as aggrieved parties have tended to proceed through 
courts of law by launching election petitions at both presidential and 
parliamentary levels (FODEP, 2002: 59-61).  
 
Within this atmosphere, Zambians were able to organise across religious and 
political divides and prevent their second president Frederick Chiluba from 
altering the constitution to extend his two terms in office in 2001(Chirambo, 
Erasmus & Nel, 2003:3).  
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Civil society and media have also had some success in introducing an 
Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act and are discussing a Freedom of 
Information Bill; though the application of the former legislation is still being 
contested in courts of law in regard to the composition and control of the IBA 
(Matibini, 2006: 80-89). These phenomena appear to point to a nation in a state 
of lethargic progression but progression none the less.  
Using economic measurements to determine the durability of democracies 
however relegates much of what might have been achieved in Zambia to the 
back row of development. Mattes (2003:79) suggests there is a point where 
democracy is almost certainly irreversible; that there are economic conditions 
extending ‘democratic endurance’ and therefore its sustainability. 
 
The fundamental thrust of this argument holds that wealthy democracies with a 
Gross National Product (GNP) per capita above $ 6001 United States dollars are 
unlikely to collapse and will be considered at that point to have crossed the 
threshold of no return or on their way to consolidation (another contested 
concept). But the scholar does concede that there is an exception in the case of 
Argentina, which fell apart at the turn of century due to complex economic down-
turns.  
 
Studies in this area, he adds, place the emerging democracies of Southern 
Africa, including Zambia, in a rather precarious position, with the longest survival 
rating of 36 years being held by the Botswana and South Africa both having 
recorded a GNP per capita of more than $3000 in 1999. The underlying discourse 
relating to this study points to Zambia as potentially a country that may suffer 
democratic reversal. 
 
2.3.3 Survey-based methods: Public perception of a ‘democratic’ Zambia 
 
Lastly, the other key measurement tool for democracy is perception based. It is 
imperative, having dabbled into the political and economic measurement 
modalities to determine the democratic endurance, to seek the opinion of 
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Zambian citizens themselves on how they assess governmental performance in 
this regard.   
 
The Afrobarometer, an instrument deployed jointly by the Institute for Democracy 
in South Africa (IDASA), the Michigan State University, the Centre for Democracy 
and Development (CDD) in Ghana and the University of Cape Town (UCT) 
employs survey-based methods which gauge public confidence in their 
institutions, government performance and their understanding and expectations 
of democracy (Lolojih, 2005). The Afrobarometer, which has undertaken a 
systematic survey of ordinary Africans’ views and attitudes towards democracy, 
markets and civil society, provides extensive insights into how citizens view their 
government’s performance on the economy and on governance more generally. 
As part of a broader exercise undertaken in countries that had instituted 
economic reform, the Afrobarometer in the July-August 2005 surveyed all nine 
provinces of Zambia, using a multi-staged, stratified area cluster sampling 
approach. A total of 1200 Zambians 18 years and older were randomly selected 
in proportion to the relative size of each area in the population.  The study took 
into account gender proportionality and respondents had a median age of 37 
years. Thirty seven 37 % of the respondents were urban-based and 63 % rural 
(Lolojih, 2005:1). 
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Figure 2: Support for Democracy: A comparative analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lolojih (2005: 1). 
 
Although Zambians in this survey projected a rather gloomy picture in terms of 
their appreciation of the government’s performance on the economy, 
Afrobarometer studies show they in general endorse the country’s trajectory 
toward democracy thus far. At least slightly over 60 % of Zambians still believed 
in the efficacy of their democracy. Zambia ranks 11th in this core, with countries 
such as Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, South Africa and Nigeria, showing 
higher levels of public satisfaction with their democracies.   
 
Zambians also ‘strongly disapprove’ of a reversion to authoritarian regimes or 
presidential dictatorships characteristic of the Second Republic. In short, there 
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feel there is more room to engender change, including media reforms, under the 
multiparty system than under the one party regime of the Second Republic.  
 
Similar studies undertaken by Afrobarometer in 2009 ((Ismail, 2010/10/06), with 
modified questions show that 39% of Zambians feel their democracy still has 
many problems.  Twenty five (25%) believe the problems are minor, while 22% 
trust that it is a full democracy. A mere 5% hold that it is not a democracy. The 
remaining 8% either did not understand or not know. Overall, when we combine 
those who believe Zambia either has minor or major problems, we find that while 
the majority of the country’s citizens, at 64%, believe Zambia is a democracy, 
they believe it is grappling with many problems. 
 
Figure 3: Perceptions of democracy by Zambians 
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Source: Ismail (2010/10/06). 
 
Barometer studies can be useful in gauging the political temperature in a given 
country and possibly underlining the potential for endurance that a country might 
expect.  However, they are but a snapshot in time and do lack depth; they are 
impersonal and will hence not necessarily expand on the nature of the 
disgruntlement amongst citizens but they do provide a basis for understanding 
public support for democracy on a regular basis. 
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2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The fore-going suggests that the path to democratisation is a long, convoluted 
one. Scholars have been divided for decades on the definition of democratisation 
or democracy as neither concept lends itself to closure. Perhaps, the African 
context is even more challenging as the nationalist sense of progress was 
measured not in the plurality of their politics or the range of media that would 
have merged but in terms of the liberation of the black majority from colonial rule 
fore-mostly.  
 
This was followed by the consolidation of national identity; the fostering of unity 
and development and the nationalisation of the means of production and strategic 
institutions such as media, as part of a broad nation-building agenda.  Kenneth 
Kaunda’s Humanism Part I is explicit, if not instructive, in this regard. 
 
It is worth reiterating that Zambia emanated from a colonial background where 
ethnic consciousness was accentuated by the divisive policy of its British 
masters, which ostensibly pitted one tribe against the other. These divisions were 
to pose immense challenges for nationalising elites as the independence 
movement grew in the 1950s.  
 
Within the white settler community, there were divisions amongst those that 
sought total independence from Britain with closer links to Rhodesia and South 
Africa; and those that campaigned for continued oversight from the motherland. 
These tensions naturally sought a vent for their political frustrations and 
ambitions.  Although preceded by the Livingstone Pioneer, it was the formation of 
the Livingstone Mail in 1906 which signified organised settler communication as 
local politics matured. Subsequent efforts by pro-settler and pro-colonial office 
activists resulted in a number of publications materialising but the legal 
environment rendered it difficult for the registration of the print press; and 
impossible for the ownership of electronic media.  
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The electronic media remained the domain of the state and an extension of the 
British propaganda machinery during the Second World War.  The rise of Roy 
Welensky to the position of prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland had both political and communicative significance.  
 
Prior to this ascendancy, he had shown that he was not only adept at using 
electronic media for political propaganda against the emergent nationalists, he 
also held the distinction of having established the Northern News - a fore-runner 
of the Times Newspapers - and used it effectively to promote his political 
ambitions. 
 
Although we see little in terms of ownership of the media by African nationalists; it 
is clear that they benefited from the efforts of pro-nationalist publishers such as 
Dr Alexander Scott. Over time, Africans such as Sikota Wina were able to launch 
their own publications as independence approached in 1964, albeit with limited 
success. In the mainstream printed media, Africans rose to editorship on the 
Central African Mail, allowing for the subsequent rise in indigenous journalism. 
The agenda for democratisation set by nationalists is inextricable from media 
development as the need for the extension of a voice to the voiceless masses 
was recognised by its key protagonists. 
 
The nationalisation of the major print media in independent Zambia, along with 
wholesale re-possession of the means of production by the nationalist 
government of Kenneth Kaunda, should not perhaps be seen in parochial terms 
as simply a brazen act of authoritarianism. It should rather be contextualised 
within the challenges faced by Zambia at various stages of its democratisation 
process.  
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The first of these challenges was nation-building. The divisions caused by 
colonialism were seen as threatening to a new government as it sought to 
organise all actors and institutions into one common agenda for development. 
The media were integral to these plans of unity and national identity construction; 
hence the move to control them.  
 
The second was national security: Zambia entered its First Republic at odds with 
UDI Rhodesia and supporting the liberation of the southern Africa region despite 
it being dependent on the industrial complex controlled by the white settler 
regimes of the south. Media control could easily be seen as an essential step in 
ensuring that a country threatened by institutional weakness, ethnic divisiveness 
and potentially, an external invasion, did not accentuate internal fault-lines by 
allowing unfettered, if not conflictual, communication. The gradual take over of 
the Times Newspapers, previously owned by British Tycoon Tiny Rowland’s 
Lonrho, signified part of a strategic plan best exemplified by the ambitions of 
Kaunda’s Philosophy of Humanism which promoted a return to a disciplined, 
man-centred African society or African democratic socialism. This philosophy was 
clearly hostile toward western values of individualism and free expression.  
 
While a case could be made for state control under the circumstances of the First 
and possibly parts of the Second Republics, there is little to support the same for 
the Third Republic which does not appear in immediate danger of ethnic conflict 
or external intervention. Despite this, the MMD government led by President 
Chiluba and subsequently by Levy Mwanawasa and now Rupiah Banda, has 
shown little interest in driving a new agenda for partial or total privatisation of the 
state owned media which remain a point of contention amongst political actors. 
Not only has the legal and constitutional framework largely remained the same 
through a 45 year period but the leadership of Zambia has been recycled 
essentially assigning many of the same people to ministerial roles in different 
administrations over four decades. 
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It has been suggested by scholars that this phenomenon is part of the problem of 
the lethargic progress in the democratisation process as the post-colonial 
mindsets amongst policy makers appears to prevail still, negating any significant 
shift in media reform.  
 
Though cyclic, at times uncertain, Zambia’s democratisation process appears to 
enjoy a fair level of support from the masses, perhaps signifying potential for 
further endurance, at least according to the Afro-barometer’s public opinion 
surveys. Subsequent surveys concluded in 2009, suggest 64% of Zambians still 
believe their democracy has either major or minor problems. 
 
Scaler and categorical measurements of democracy, controversial as they might 
be, however seem to suggest the country is a virtual or pseudo-democracy due to 
a variety of reasons, one of which is continued state control of the media. Yet 
liberal democracy remain the goal of Zambia’s ruling party - at least in its 
manifesto (Chiluba, 1995: 126 -127).  
 
In the larger scheme of things, the challenge of modelling a media system that is 
tolerant of individual enterprise but tethered still to state control of mainstream 
media raises serious questions about the condition and manner of what has been 
termed the public sphere by German scholar Jurgen Harbemas. It should be 
noted that private media in Zambia have tended to have a short lifespan due to 
harsh economic conditions and, sometimes, due to the threat of legal sanctions 
from the state.  
 
Under a democratising regime, community radio has grown allowing for the 
emergence of small spaces for interactions amongst various publics but the only 
media with significant nation - wide reach remains the state controlled television 
and radio anchored by two dailies, the Times Newspapers and the Daily Mail, a 
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set of weeklies, local language newspapers and a developmental communication 
network.  
 
Despite the existence of the Post Newspapers, the only privately owned daily, 
and perhaps the only viable private print media entity at present, the influence of 
the state apparatus appears to be a source of concern for scholars and political 
actors alike. Obviously, this is because resources and infrastructure play a key 
role in determining the influence of media systems on democratisation as 
Tomaselli pointedly observes: 
 
 “…the economic aspects of the media play an important role in assessing 
what contribution they can make to democratisation on the continent” 
(Tomaselli, 2002:129). 
 
The question of control and distribution of media resources hence becomes a 
more pronounced source of conflict in an environment where ideas are expected 
to be openly contested.  
 
The next chapter pursues this discussion on democratisation from a theoretical 
perspective by critically analysing the extent to which this form of political change 
may realistically portend well, for free expression and free press.  
 
It examines the origins and application of political economic theory to 
communication studies and positions the discussion in both historical and 
contemporary times, seeking to map the evolution and understanding of these 
concepts in an environment characterized by rapid technological advancement. It 
formulates arguments and counter arguments relating to how politics and 
technology interface; how media, including privately owned media, may not 
necessarily be immune to indirect forms of political control, despite privatisation 
for instance. It will discuss everything from traditional mass media to alternative 
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media and how they may or may not revolutionarise politics and freedom of 
expression. The chapter essentially lays the foundation for the empirical 
engagement in Chapter Four.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND 
DEMOCRATISATION: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary interest of this chapter is to engender a deeper understanding of the 
origins and application of theories of political economy to communications studies 
in order to fully comprehend the influence of political change on the Times 
Newspapers.  In so doing, the chapter seeks to lay a theoretical map of how 
democratisation will be linked to the notion of public sphere through a political 
economic analysis. The principal objectives of the chapter are the following: 
 
 To unpack the origins and application of theories of political economy - the 
foundation of this thesis - to communications studies.  
 To highlight the key linkages between theories of political economy, public 
sphere and democratisation. 
 To discuss the notion of nationalisation, liberalisation and 
commercialisation as they relate to the media. 
 To engage with the concept of the public sphere in a changing 
technological environment.  
 
Ostensibly, the study of communications in the context of political economy seeks 
to understand the link between modern forms of communication and the historical 
and institutional organisation of production, power and ideology (Sussman 
1999:85-86). Political economy captures the sense of ownership, control, media 
behaviour, labour rights and the power relations governing the distribution of 
communication resources and conflict over them (Mosco, 2000: 104).  
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The democratic imperatives manifest within this discourse as labour seeks to 
negotiate its existence, agitates for better working conditions and communicative 
space for media workers. The ownership question, it has been noted, also raises 
the possibility of either increased citizen participation in policy discourses or a 
decline in the discursive space which communication theorist Jurgen Harbermas 
termed the public sphere (Habermas,1989).  
 
This is ever more evident in cases where states or markets impose conditions or 
negative influences upon the editorial functioning of newspapers, radio and 
television stations that they may own, despite purportedly embracing democracy 
which underscores liberty and justice.  
 
It is important to mention on the onset, that this discussion is framed against the 
sustained optimism for improved communicative rights generated by the rapid 
advancements in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the 
recent past. Media convergence - the capacity to use one digital platform to deliver 
multiple media channels - is evidently creating a new media age (McPhillips & 
Merlo, 2008: 237-253). 
 
Digitisation and technological convergence have rendered it easier for cross -
media pollination and raised the need for multi-skilled practitioners therefore 
potentially changing the very nature of the professional practice of journalism 
(Erdal, 2007:51-56).  
 
Despite the excitement over the emancipatory nature of these alternative media, 
however, it is palpable that the radical disposition of this transformation has lately 
caused some states to revise their policy frameworks governing the internet, digital 
broadcasting and other global commons. While on the one hand, there is an 
opportunity for progressive changes, actions by some states may not only 
enfeeble communication systems for supporting civil society but in effect, threaten 
their very existence (Hadl, 2009:3).  
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Undoubtedly, the internet - a key invention in this patchwork of technologies - has 
the incredible capacity to link with traditional media and provide individuals the 
potential to reach global audiences (Couldry & Curran, 2003:5). In addition, mobile 
media technologies can be harnessed to organise, plan and coordinate political 
actions, including insurrections, demonstrations and elections (Rheingold, [sa]:17) 
 
In fact, it is felt that mobile phone technologies present the most feasible means 
for empowering Africans economically and politically. The continent has seen a 
phenomenal 200 % increase in mobile phone usage in the past five years which 
has enhanced the populace’s interaction with markets and with social networks. 
However, low literacy levels, low income, unreliable electricity supplies, corruption 
and taxation and signal limitations inhibit even higher rates of growth on the 
continent. Ultimately, repressive governments may impede progress by imposing 
high tariff barriers on cell phone usage to prevent mass mobilisation by activists 
and opposition elements (Millicevic [sa]). 
 
Therefore, the triumphalism attached to internet and mobile phone technologies as 
tools for political change has to be restrained through a more contextualised 
consideration of the glaring realities of emerging democracies, particularly the 
ability of states to suppress political expression and the lack of economic capacity 
amongst citizens to exploit these apparatus as alternatives to traditional media 
systems.  
 
Given those limitations, this thesis is generally biased toward the examination of 
traditional mass media in its articulation of notions of political economy and the 
public sphere. 
 
At the base of this discussion is the slippery nature of democracy as a concept. 
While liberal theorists extol rights and procedures as though they were 
unassailable, practitioners are often confronted with the harsh realities of 
democracy’s character in practice.  
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Huntington (1991:168-169) for example notes that the third wave of democracy in 
the 1990s may have been exciting but it has often brought disenchantment as 
leaders betrayed the interest of their followers to achieve their intended goal.  
 
Przeworski (1991:182) views this disconnectedness as essentially transforming 
what was meant to be a negotiated democracy into increasing autocratic practice. 
Like Giuseppe Di Palma (1990: 23-109) who doubts that democracy should be 
associated with social progress at all, Przeworski expunges the notion that 
democracy is intent on advancing general public good or that it is reflective of 
general public will. He argues that it is a contest decided by powerful competing 
forces: losing parties in elections simply choose to maintain stability by accepting 
the results and await their turn at the next polls. 
 
Di Palma (1990: 28) augments this by suggesting that the whole notion of 
democracy becomes workable only when powerful groups find the idea of co-
existence attractive enough to warrant an agreement on the rules of the political 
game. Without this understanding, the system will likely be undermined or 
destabilised. Democracy could therefore be seen as a playground for the powerful 
rather than a theatre where equal citizenship is nurtured. 
 
This rather pessimistic view of democracy perhaps entices one to exercise caution 
in analysing political change in Africa. Firstly, not all promises are met by political 
elites. Secondly, an illusion of democracy is likely to endure where dominant 
parties extend their rule for long periods. Collusion over the outcomes and access 
to resources is highly likely as powerful groups seek to co-exist at the expense of 
the masses.  
 
The possible consequence would be to undermine some fundamental rights 
including freedom of expression, association and assembly which might form a 
basis for legitimate citizen reaction. 
 
The case of Zambia has been explained in Chapter Two with its colonial and post 
colonial practices in regard to democracy and the media. The tendency toward 
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centralisation of power and recycling leadership is noted as being problematic in 
regard to how freedom of the press has been exercised and how the policies of 
liberalisation and privatisation of the media industry have been implemented.  
 
At one level, the divisive nature of colonialism seems to have provided a strong 
argument for the nationalists in terms of their decisions to bring all major media 
under state control, largely for the purpose of forging a common national identity 
and national unity amongst the 73 ethnic groups that formed the new Zambian 
nation. 
 
At another level, the re-emergence of multiparty competition in the 1990s, while 
ushering in new media in the form of privately owned newspapers, community 
radio and television, seems to have frightened successive governments into 
breaking their electioneering promises. They have maintained their hold over state 
radio, television and daily newspapers presumably for purposes of sustaining a 
competitive edge over opposition parties.  
 
Explaining these phenomena, Sussman (1999:85-87) posits that whether a regime 
is democratic or authoritarian, it is inherently unstable over time and will primarily 
be concerned with self preservation. As a consequence, it would seek to control 
the outlook, behaviour and welfare of others, and influence the mode of discourse 
by injecting language practices into concepts that legitimise its institutions and 
system of political economic organisation. 
 
In this regard, it can be noted that in Zambia’s First and Second Republics, there 
was a pre-eminence of the Philosophy of Humanism and One Partysm in the 
language discourse of the Kaunda administration. In Chiluba’s multiparty Third 
Republic, the discourse accommodated diversity but the practices were cautious 
toward media liberalisation, deregulation and ultimately hostile toward media 
privatisation.  
 
The idea therefore that media densification experienced in the past 19 years of 
multiparty democracy in Zambia is by itself an indicator of a widening freedom of 
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expression is contestable, given that the politicians in government still decide who 
benefits from communication resources. Rather than an expansion of the forums 
for public expression, it can be argued that media ownership benefits a privileged 
few middle to upper class citizens who have the means to own them and express 
their political views. It might also be a manifestation of a growing economic per-
degree of an upper capitalist class bent on colonising the available media space 
for purely commercial intent, rather than contribute to an out-spring of political 
energy.  
 
The ultimate losers are the poor and marginalised, whose only means of wider 
expression might be an accessible publicly funded national communications 
system, which could accommodate multilingual social interaction. Besley and 
Burgess (2002:1415-1416) typify these assertions by underlining the importance of 
information flows - essentially the role of mass media - in triggering government 
responsiveness to the needs of the poor.  
 
They lament however, that vulnerable groups in society are usually poorly 
informed and less inclined to vote as their access to media systems and therefore 
current issues, may be limited.  
 
The scholars emphasise the importance of media ownership patterns in enabling 
wider social interaction, policy discourse and accountability in this regard.  
 
The merits of media in private ownership is supported by recent research which 
suggests that press freedom is linked to lower levels of corruption in cross-country 
data. Studies on media ownership patterns also indicate that state ownership of 
the media negatively correlates with good government. In addition, societies with 
more privately owned media and distinct provisions for press freedom experience 
shorter tenures of politicians (Bersley & Burgess, 2002:1415-1416).  
 
Within the discourse on democratisation, political economy is concerned with 
interrogating government’s responsiveness to the needs of citizens. This is noted 
as especially relevant in low income countries where limited or absent market 
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opportunities constrain the ability of vulnerable populations to advance in life and 
cause them to rely heavily on the state to drive interventions for their survival. The 
critical issue for scholars therefore is to determine what institutions - economic, 
social and political - could be crafted to improve state effectiveness (Besley & 
Burgess, 2002:1415). 
 
Against this background, a political economic analysis of Zambia’s history provides 
a holistic understanding of the political, economic and social context under which 
decisions and actions on media control and regulation have originated and their 
influence on communicative activity in the long term.  
 
Sussman (1997: 3-6) argues that a political economy analysis is distinct from 
media-centric approaches because it places emphasis on production or supply 
instead of consumption or demand as the determining moment. Understanding the 
political means of organising and allocating resources and energy he asserts, 
provides a basis for explaining society’s communication needs and practices.  
 
Because the thesis is couched under the broad context of political change -
democratisation - to be more specific, the need to explain the influence of political 
elites, economic policies, state and political institutions, civil society and social 
divisions within Zambian society arises.  
 
Adesoji (2006:43) reiterates that the approaches to explaining the patterns of 
democratisation across the globe are generally summarised in three theoretical 
approaches: 
 
 The modernisation approach: it lays emphasis on the level of social and 
economic development and its centrality to the process of democratisation. 
 
 The transition approach: it foregrounds political processes, elite initiatives and 
choices as accounting for progress from authoritarian rule to liberal 
democracy. The hallmark of this approach is to argue that strategies and 
interventions of political elites could benefit or undermine democracy. The 
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theoretical approach holds that ultimately democratisation is dependent 
mainly on what individuals and elites do; when and how they do it. 
 
 The structural approach to democratisation is anchored around a fundamental 
premise that inter-relationships between particular structures of power - 
economic, social and political could - as they change over time - constrain or 
expand opportunities for elites and other actors to pursue democracy (Adesoji, 
2006:43). 
 
This thesis is concerned with transitions and their influence on media 
development. The question of political elites and their practices is central to the 
discussion on why the major media remain in the control and ownership of the 
state after forty five years of independence in Zambia. While the thesis 
interrogates political and economic structures, it does so by examining the policy 
decisions and actions made by political elites at various stages of Zambia’s 
political development. The approach is hence, largely transitional in context, 
despite embracing key elements of what has been termed the structural approach 
to democratisation.  
 
The key issues in a political economy analysis of these transitions in this 
perspective would be to emphasise the actions of politicians; their 
responsiveness to citizen demands; the need to evaluate existing institutions and 
build - if necessary - new models; and finally ensuring that state or public media 
provide reasonable space to meet the informational and communication needs of 
the populace. 
 
The case of the Times Newspapers may therefore present a microcosm of how 
political actions have conspired to either undermine or energise the liberalisation 
and privatisation of the media sector. These actions will likely influence the ability 
of the wider public to fully exercise their informational and communicational rights 
in a country seemingly tethered to a democratic agenda; or provide insights into 
whether emerging democracies such as Zambia require more creative forms of 
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communal institutions that might address ethnic and political divides specific to 
the country’s social-cultural environment. 
 
 
3.2  THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMIC THEORIES  
 
Political economy, as Eileen R. Meehan (2007:1) notes, is the body of theory from 
which communication scholars glean knowledge and methods for understanding 
the rules and regulatory strictures that define the parameters for expression.  
 
Ostensibly, this knowledge of how rules and relationships govern cultural 
production increases the level of appreciation of the nature of the news product. 
 
This plethora of theories attempting to explain economic phenomena have largely 
sought to establish a relationship between economic theory and political ideas and 
actions in a bi-directional sense (Waterman, 2002:14).  
 
Although there has been some tension as to whether political economy is an art or 
a science, the main thrust of academic discourse in the 19th century seemed to 
suggest that it was an art concerned with explaining production, distribution and 
exchange of wealth primarily (Sidgwick, 1883: 13). 
 
Waterman (2002:13) traces the mutation of the body of theories that form the 
modern discourse of political economy to the year 1611, embodied in a treatise on 
government by L. de Mayerne-Turquet; and to Antonyne de Montchretien, Seur de 
Watteville in 1615-1621.  
 
The intellectual ambitions of these scholars Waterman notes, was to generalise 
Aristotle’s ‘economics’ to the level of state or commonwealth. It has been observed 
that Aristotle held economics as a form of household management and sought to 
extend this art of estate administration to the requirements and resources of the 
modern state. 
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The term political economy was apparently first employed by Sir James Steuart in 
his Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy in 1767. According to Steuart 
the term economy related to the art of providing for the needs of a family with 
prudence and frugality. In this context, the entire economy is directed by the head 
of the estate. He sets the laws of his economy and is therefore both lord and 
steward. Steuart distinguished domestic economy from political economy thus: 
political economy is vested in a state but is not entirely the preserve of the 
statesman. The statesman essentially is challenged to consider a diversity of 
operations, circumstances, habits and customs of people and introduce a range of 
institutions to manage social-political relations in the distribution of resources 
(Sidgwick 1883:15). 
 
Adam Smith (1910:241-250) in his Wealth of Nations nine years after Steuart, 
presented a different role for the statesman whom he saw as providing an enabling 
environment for empowering the people to generate wealth. Smith suggests two 
clear objectives of political economy which he assumes would enrich both the 
people and the state: 
 
 The first is to provide sufficient revenue or subsistence for the people or 
enable them provide such revenue for themselves. 
 The second is to supply the state with the revenue sufficient for the public 
service. 
 
His articulation of political economy represents what Waterman (2002: 14-15) calls 
a “decisive rejection” of the original ideas from scholars such as Steuart and 
Montechrentien. Smith agitated for wide spread Laissez faire founded on principles 
of liberty and justice. Adam Smith is hence credited with establishing the analytical 
distinction between the normative sense of political economy, which his 
predecessors understood as a system of policy design that would increase riches 
and power of a country; and a positive, more orthodox sense embracing an open-
ended inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. 
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Smith’s doctrine is characterised by the following key elements which he and his 
supporters deem necessary for the advancement of modern society both politically 
and economically: 
 
 Free competition in regard to distribution. 
 Proportionate rewards to service. 
 Self reliance. 
 Intellectual freedom. 
 Division of labour. 
 Non interference (legislatively or administratively, by the state in the 
market). 
 Limitation of government (Smith 1910: 4-441). 
 
It can be deduced from this discussion that the foundations of modern liberalism 
are to be found in Smithian doctrines. Certainly, the notion of liberalisation and its 
application to the communications sector could also be understood in this sense. 
 
Scholars such as David Ricardo were also steeped in Smithian thinking, but 
distinguished their ideas from Smith’s by suggesting some forms of legislative 
controls to markets to safeguard the wellbeing of the poor (Sidgwick, 1883:22).   
 
The 19th century hence, saw a coterie of philosophical revolutionaries led by 
Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Ricardo through their varying views and confluence of 
ideas begin to shape the body of theory representing classical political economy. 
The coherence in theory appears to have matured around the 1820s ranged on 
the rationality of non-intervention, pro-free-trade and anti-poor-law consensus 
(Waterman 2002:19). 
 
But it is Karl Marx, the socialist scholar, who seems to have provided the most 
holistic analysis of political economy that has to this day inter-disciplinary remit. 
Marxian political economy is seen as being basically Smithian with modifications to 
key assumptions in order to predict spontaneous disorder and the fall of capitalism 
brought about by self-interested individual capitalists.  
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His pre-occupation with the class struggle and the place of the worker in the 
universe controlled by powerful capitalist forces lures scholars into interrogating 
the context of labour relations and rights in industry even as political and economic 
systems change (Waterman, 2002: 19). 
 
Gerald Sussman (1999: 85-87) is instructive when he argues that the Marxian or 
neo-Marxian tradition of political economy provides for what he calls “the 
intellectual self defense of working people and a call to resistance and action for 
the kind of social change that put people and common welfare ahead of personal 
and private accumulation and privilege”.  
 
In short, while Smithian and Ricardian doctrines are anchored by the notion of free 
markets and comparative advantage, Marxian political economy is seen as not 
only holistic but is also rooted in philosophy, social theory and economics; and, in 
addition addresses class conflict (Milward 2000:14).The distinctive and holistic 
nature of Marx’s political economy renders it relevant to all aspects of social 
theory, Milward asserts. The thrust of his argument, in aid of Marx, addresses the 
idea that understanding any system requires that one comprehends “the systemic 
whole”.  
 
Indeed, Marx places the economic system as the primary foundation upon which 
all aspects of society are framed, including existing forms of social consciousness. 
Political and legal systems will vary depending on the economic structures. For 
him,  in the  capitalist system the notion of “freedom” and “representative 
democracy”, is all but an illusion conjured by the dominant class to serve their 
interests and perpetuate class relations formed out of relations of production. 
Similarly, the legal system serves the ruling class who would have the means to 
seek effective representation as opposed to disadvantaged citizens (Milward, 
2000:21).  
 
For Marx, not only is the legal structure in capitalism semi-autonomous, all 
superstructures are born of the economic structure which conditions power 
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relations within society. This would include media institutions. In Marxian 
philosophy, change in society can only be accorded through a change in the 
relations of production and thus through a change in the economic structure. 
 
In explicating political economy from a communicative perspective, Sussman 
(1999:85-87) traces the critical sociology of communication to the Marxian age 
where there was a recognition that modern communications and transportation 
were integral to the corporate industrial complex.  
 
McQuail (1994:84) underscores this point by observing that the media institution 
has come to be understood over time by scholars as being part and parcel of the 
economic system with close links to the political system. 
 
 
3.2.1 Political economy of communications 
 
In this regard, in the context of communication, political economy concerns itself 
with the unveiling of the constitution of power and its hegemonic practices in terms 
of communicative control and ideological legitimacy.  
 
On the contrary, the administrative approach to communication studies is pre-
occupied with the skills and techniques of communicative exchange (Sussman 
1997: ix).  
 
Mosco (2000:104) expresses it more succinctly: political economy interrogates the 
role of power in the production, distribution and exchange of mediated 
communication.  
 
‘Its primary research interests include strengthening the theoretical foundation 
of communication research by incorporating an understanding of how 
structures of power operate and contribute to the transformation of 
communication processes into commodified social relations” Mosco 
(2000:104). 
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With the advent of computer-based communications which seem to promise a 
new form of liberation from conventional state and market controls, the question 
arises whether the new media could in fact supplant mediated public spaces or if 
they merely represent a quasi-private space akin to casual street conversations 
(Couldry, 2003:51).  
 
Despite some acknowledgment of the catalytic effect of the internet on global 
activism (Curran, 2003:228), there is guarded optimism about its transformative 
effects on human communications and social and political relations (Bennett, 
2003:26). Organised discourses would naturally benefit from a critical mass of 
contributors in any given situation.  
 
But only 0.7 percent of the 12 million Zambians use the internet for instance 
(Africa internet usage and population statistics, 2010) which dampens the 
argument for it being a viable replacement for mediated communication at the 
present moment. Cell phones, despite their outreach potentials, have textual 
limitations for activism (Castells, Fernandez-Ardevol, Qiu & Sey, ([sa]:112]) and 
can also be used for distabilisation by the state or its opponents (Rheingold, 
[sa]:237).   
 
The sense of ‘freedom’ extended by new technologies hence should be viewed 
with a realistic lens. It must also be appreciated that the state is still a regulatory 
authority and can interfere with computer - based communications as has been 
the case in China and Zimbabwe.  
 
The underlying premise of political economy of communications therefore 
remains relevant: that politics and technology are fundamentally inseparable: the 
politicians make the rules concerning public and private investment, property 
ownership, tax obligations and rebates, rights and protections for workers and 
generally the financing of public goods and determine who benefits from them 
(Sussman  1997: ix).  
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The advance of globalisation characterised by liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation, Sussman posits, has rendered political economy even more 
relevant as an approach to the study of communications. In emphasising this 
point, McQuail (1994:84) attributes the growing relevance of political economic 
theory in communications studies to three key factors: 
 
 The growth in media concentration worldwide’ with increasing power and 
influence being vested in a few individuals. This is coupled with the 
conglomeration between software and hardware industries which end up 
impacting on the independence of media which may be part of merged 
industries. 
 The growing global information economy which has seen convergence 
between telecommunications and broadcasting. 
 A decline in the public sector of mass media and in direct control of 
telecommunications under the banner of deregulation, privatisation or 
liberalisation. 
 
The widening understanding of the factors that influence media behaviour has, in 
McQuail’s view, caused a decline in or a re-evaluation of dominant theoretical 
paradigms, framed around the transmission model of the media which ignored 
the imperatives of social contexts; that is, the power of local structures, traditional 
values; and economic constraints relative to what mass communications can 
realistically accomplish. 
 
Historically, Robert A. Brady is credited with influencing the teaching of the 
political economy of communications in the United States in the 1930s and 40s 
after developing an analytical framework for emerging authoritarian and cultural 
practices. Dallas W, Symthe and Herbet I. Schiller are however more noted as 
pioneers of the political economy approach (Schiller, 1999: 89). 
 
The application of Brady’s framework to communications was apparently 
catalysed by the growth of electronic media and telecommunication systems 
particularly during World War II: political economists inevitably began to ask the 
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question of what forms of control and ownership characterised the sector; what 
social functions they played; what policies determined the distribution of 
communication resources (Schiller, 1999: 89).  
 
Radical changes to the national complexion of the United States brought about by 
migrations and technological development in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries moved social theorists to evaluate the role newspapers, films 
and radio were playing in social integration and potentially in accentuating moral 
decay in society (Mcquail: 1994: 34).  
 
Inevitably, the question was asked whether the systems of decision making in the 
media were linked with those that presided over other economic, political and 
cultural institutions. Brady in particular was pre-occupied with interrogating what 
he thought were fascist tendencies by business within the capitalist system. This 
led him to investigate how the political system, business and communication 
systems interfaced (Schiller, 1999: 90). 
 
In more recent times, the understanding of political economy and its relation to 
communication has taken a more ‘critical’ approach, considering a range of 
factors in assessing media production and consumption. Peter Golding and 
Graham Murdock (1996:11-31) advance the notion of critical political economy 
which they argue, differs from mainstream economics because of the following: 
 
 It is holistic.  
 It is historical.  
 It is concerned with a balance between capitalist enterprise and public 
intervention.  
 It goes beyond technical considerations of efficiency and embraces the 
need for justice, equity and the public good. 
 
While mainstream economics considers the ‘economy’ as a separate and 
specialised domain, critical political economy, they argue, encompasses the 
relationship between economic organisation and political, social and cultural life. 
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Of particular interest is the impact of economic dynamics on the range and 
diversity of public cultural expression, and its accessibility to various social 
groups. Golding and Murdock are instructive in elucidating that liberal political 
economists emphasise the open nature of markets and the freedom of consumer 
choice that comes with it. Motivated by the doctrines of Adam Smith, liberal 
political economists have also been the strong current behind privatisation of 
public services, they note. 
 
Golding and Murdock distinguish critical political economists from their liberal 
counterparts based on the former’s adherence to the principles of Karl Marx.  
 
While not denying the merits of choice born of open markets, they contend that 
cultural producers and consumers make those choices within wider structures. 
Steeped in Marxian thinking, critical political economy also questions the unequal 
distribution of material and symbolic resources and how this re-configures 
communicative activity. 
 
“Where mainstream economics focuses on the sovereign individuals of 
capitalism, critical political economy starts with sets of social relations 
and the play of power. It is interested in seeing how the making and 
shaping of meaning is shaped at every level by the structured 
asymmetries in social relations” (Golding & Murdock, 1996:14). 
 
An interrogation of modern media systems, they hold, is not just an undertaking in 
understanding their integration into a capitalist economic system but primarily a 
project in analysing their centrality to the exercise of full citizenship. 
 
What is striking about Golding and Murdock’s argument is that they confront the 
predominant notion that capitalists deploy their economic power in a commercial 
market system to ensure the information flow is favourable to their interest almost 
without resistance. Essentially, this framework of analysis - which they define as 
instrumentalist - paints private media as instruments of class domination.  
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Instead Golding and Murdock posit that owners, advertisers and key political 
personnel cannot always have their way as there are structures which would limit 
their overall dominance. The scholars explain that understanding the nature and 
workings of those structures is the concern of critical political economists.  
Presumably the labour unions and professional bodies could constitute some of 
those formations that impede complete dominance of the wealthy over public 
welfare (an intervening variable).  
 
In similar vein, they denounce the structuralist approach which conceives of 
structures as formal, immovable constructions. Instead, Golding and Murdock 
elect to view structures as organic, dynamic formations which can be regularly 
altered through practical interventions.  
 
In short, to relate the outcomes of news directly to the economic structure of 
news organisations is questionable, according to the scholars. Rather, they 
advance the idea that: 
 
 “...economic dynamics play a central role in defining the key features 
of the general environment within which communicative activity takes 
place, but not as a complete explanation of the nature of that activity” 
(Golding & Murdock, 1996: 15). 
 
 
3.2.2 Limitation of political economy analytical frameworks  
 
In the review of literature on political economy, one is drawn into the caveats that 
cast some doubt on the universal applicability to all social contexts of analytical 
frameworks developed in the west.  
 
Mosco (1995:147) for instance cautions against making these assumptions. He 
argues that despite similarities in North American, European and Third World 
approaches, the political economy approach to communication is not sufficiently 
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developed theoretically to be explained in one analytical map. Each region bears 
peculiarities that warrant distinctions. 
 
The North American tradition of political economy was pre-occupied with studying 
media concentration which bred mammoth conglomerates across various media; 
and convergence, where technological systems are integrated and companies 
concerned consumed by a whole.  
 
The concern for scholars was how these larger conglomerates would influence the 
display of information, its distribution and production in a fast changing 
environment. Smythe and Stiller were instrumental in promoting this approach. 
Mosco describes their approach as being steeped in the ‘institutional and Marxian’ 
tradition.  
 
Their focus on the growing power of transnational business renders their studies 
as markedly institutional; while their interest in social class, media imperialism and 
the exploitative and undemocratic nature of big business qualifies their works as 
essentially Marxian (Mosco, 1995:147). 
 
Mosco details European political economic research in communications as being 
less associated with father figures but largely inclined toward defending public 
service media systems and promoting social movements.  
 
Much of the work was categorised by resistance to liberalisation, 
commercialisation and privatisation of the communication industries, he notes.  
 
Mosco posits that there is a domain of political economy which is fundamentally 
Third World in character. This has drawn extensively from dependency theory, 
western Marxism and the influence of worldwide liberation movements as scholars 
sought to understand communication as one among the principal sources of 
resistance to power.  
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Mosco notes that the so-called Third World research on the political economy of 
communication covers a wide area of interests, responding largely to the 
modernisation and development paradigm born in the west; and that Third World 
political economists have had a tendency to oppose the thesis that media growth 
is an indicator of development, in the same manner as urbanisation, education and 
other social forces.  
 
This has formed the basis of criticism of the western approach which tended to 
ignore the power relations that underpinned the links between First and Third 
World nations and the multifarious class associations between and within them 
(Mosco, 1995:149).  
  
3.2.3 Third World political economy in an African context 
 
One could argue however that the so-called Third World political economy has in 
fact marginalised the fundamental differences within the developing contexts; for 
instance leadership styles and their influence on media behaviour and 
development. If political economy interrogates the role of power in the production, 
distribution and exchange of mediated communication, it stands to reason for one 
to vigorously locate this discussion within a context of leadership styles and the 
nature of competitive politics in Africa, where power is largely vested in the 
presidency. Widespread illiteracy and weak institutions within the African political 
milieu will likely also lubricate actions by political elites that are not entirely 
democratic in character. 
 
Adopting a purely western analytical framework, hence, might not capture the 
subtleties that come with state ownership of the media in countries such as 
Zambia. The place of state subsidised media in the theoretical frameworks 
established in the west has, for instance, lately been questioned (Obonyo, 2009:1).   
 
Calling for the development of theories of communications rooted in the African 
tradition, Obonyo argues that the four theories of the press, that is - authoritarian, 
libertarian, developmental and democratic participant - may not adequately explain 
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the structure and performance of media in an African setting which has its own 
unique power dynamics. 
 
One could also appreciate the concerns raised by Hibou (2004:21) who posits that 
to understand the state one needs to understand the people in power, their 
machinations, their strategies and their historical practices.  
 
It has also been noted in Chapter Two, section 2.2.3 that African nationalist 
governments often mirrored the behaviour of their colonial masters in regard to 
freedom of expression (Martin, 1998: 63) and that theoretical frameworks in 
political and communication sciences generally overlooked these influences on 
post independence media structures (O’Neil, 1998:6).  
  
Yet history attests to how media in Africa has played a propagandist or 
developmental role rendering attempts at measuring progress within a western 
liberal paradigm somewhat redundant if not irrelevant to a degree (Berger, 
2002:22). While Berger does not reject the explanatory relevance of the liberal 
pluralist paradigm in all instances, he posits that the liberal framework has its 
limitations as it disregards monopolisation and elite congruence in its articulation of 
media and democracy.  
 
Correspondingly, Martin Sturmer (1998:1-15), in lamenting the dearth of a 
sociological framework to analyse African mass media systems, presents a 
typology for African mass communications which captures both historical and 
political perspectives tethered  to the continent’s history:  
 
 Autochthonous; traditional societies in Africa had inherent checks and 
balances between the powers of the King and those of the elders and 
people. The traditional society limited the powers of the King through home-
grown institutions and practices. Though no media in the western sense 
were present, drums, horn-hooting were some of the medium used to 
communicate and mobilise society. 
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 Colonial: The transition to colonialism brought an autocratic approach to 
public communication: the governor of the colonial establishments in Africa 
personified the law, despite the presence of a legislature or minister of 
colonial affairs. No fundamental freedoms of expression were extended to 
the natives, therefore undermining their historical communicative practices. 
 
 Sovereign: though African governments came to power through democratic 
elections, the ensuing reconstruction of administrations and nations 
subordinated major spheres of public life - including journalism - to the 
broader goals of nation-building and unity (The pre-eminence of state media 
systems is inferred here). 
 
 Democratic societies; lastly, the advent of multiparty democracy in the early 
1990s spawned private newspapers, broadcast stations across Africa, media 
councils and journalists associations, minimising the influence of the state 
and expanding freedom of expression. 
 
This typology does place Africa’s contexts in some perspective and attempts, 
rather unsuccessfully, to distance itself from generalisations characteristic of 
liberal constructions that tend to frame media in Africa in the similar conditions to 
those of their western counterparts. Sturmer does not do justice to the typology 
as he assumes that democratic societies more or less translate into a freer 
media. In examining media in the sovereign and democratic context, it does 
however provide a basis to locate a discussion on leadership styles steeped in 
African tradition and their influence on media practice and development. 
 
In Chapter Two, this thesis discussed the historical tendency in Zambia to recycle 
politicians conditioned by post colonial practices. These tendencies appear to 
explain the maintenance of legal statutes that have been inimical to free speech 
over four decades and the proclivity toward control of the major communications 
resources by the state through a constitutionally powerful presidency. 
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However, it would be myopic to explain the behaviour of media purely by peering 
through a leadership prism. Levels of illiteracy in Africa may limit citizen capacity 
to engage their leaders or interrogate them on the technical aspects of their 
decisions.  Zambia, for example, only had 100 university graduates at 
independence (Kaunda, 2007: xviii). In addition, the integrity of institutions of 
participation and accountability also needs to be factored in order for these 
phenomena to be comprehensively appreciated. In this regard, a related 
discussion on the materialisation of person-based rule and the potential influence 
of dominant party systems and one party government on the leadership style and 
indirectly on the media will be presented in Chapter Four. 
 
For the purposes of this section of the thesis, it is imperative that we continue to 
unpack the centrality of leadership, particularly the nationalising elites of Africa, in 
conditioning social and political communications. 
 
Ali Mazrui (2007:3) presents a potent typology of leadership which Obonyo has 
deployed in interrogating the efficacy of a liberal model and watchdog role of the 
media in Africa. Mazrui posits that the history of leadership in Africa has stood on 
eight pillars: 
 
 Charismatic leader: influenced by Kwame Nkhrumah of Ghana, this style 
exudes great personal magnetism. 
 Mobilisation leader: The use of charisma to mobilise masses on many 
causes. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania epitomised this form of leadership in 
the African context. 
 Reconciliatory leader; tends to seek areas of compromise and consensus 
from amongst disparate views. Nigeria’s Abdusalama Abubakar and 
General Yakubu Gowon are fitted into this category. 
 A Housekeeping style: It is a minimalist approach to power; more 
governance and less genuine leadership; less vision, more verbosity. 
Characteristic of Kenya after Kenyatta. 
 Disciplinarian Leader; Murtala Muhammed of Nigeria approximates this 
description. 
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 A patriarchal system: one in which a father figure emerges using the 
symbolism of the elder and the patriarch. Nelson Mandela is seen as both 
a patriarch and reconciliatory leader while Jomo Kenyatta more of the 
latter. 
 Technocratic leader: Mazrui doubts that Africa has yet produced a 
technocratic president, even though Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and 
Jerry Rawlings of Ghana seem to find favour with him. 
 Personalistic political: is indistinguishable from monarchical political style 
as both thrive on the personification of power’ Malawi’s Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda is described as one such leader who sought unquestionable 
allegiance. 
 
Mazrui argues that there has also been a number of pre-colonial cultural 
traditions which have affected the nine leadership styles and types. The most 
obvious, he terms the elder tradition in the pre-colonial African culture, which 
influenced the patriarchal style after independence.  
 
The older version of this was the monarchical tendency which had a veneer of 
royalty even though African society was itself monarchical.  
 
As indicated in Chapter Two of this thesis, the leadership style of Zambia’s first 
president Kenneth Kaunda, who promoted the Philosophy of Humanism, was 
characterised by personification of power and control of political, economic and 
communication systems through his nationalisation policies.  
 
His style conforms to three of Mazrui’s leadership types: Charismatic; because he 
used his personal charisma to project continuity and infallibility; mobilisational, 
because he used his charisma to mobilise his nation around his ideas and 
slogans; and patriarchal; because in his latter years, his image became one of a 
founding elder statesman, omnipresent in all media, having ruled Zambia for 27 
years. 
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Obonyo’s observations hence are extremely timely: 
 
“The patriarchal style produces a father figure who would have little 
problem treating the nation as an extension of his estate; after all he is 
the wise one.  How would media operate under such leadership? The 
journalist would be considered as one of the young sons and who need 
to come to the old man for counsel” (Obonyo, 2009: 10). 
 
The question raised by this thesis in relation to power is that the Kaunda’s 
leadership style while seemingly over taken by political change and a shift in 
economic policies has not dissipated to a great extent, it would seem.  
 
The substance of the leadership in the First, Second and Third Republics remains 
largely the same. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was formed, in 
part, by former members of Kaunda’s cabinet and have retained some of his 
older traditions, such as the perpetuation of a media culture that serenades their 
personas.   
 
The five elections held since 1991, have all but recycled leaders from the Second 
and First Republics and added little if any significant changes to the discourse on 
media privatisation.  
 
An undertaking in political economic studies of communications cannot possibly 
overlook the imperatives of leadership styles in relation to how transformational 
reform is made in a country such as Zambia. The personalities in the government 
in this environment would likely have substantial influence on how the state 
intervenes in all sectors of the economy including the media sector.  
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3.2.4 Economic liberalism and the media 
 
Because Zambia had elected to pursue free market principles in 1991 with the 
coming of the so-called ‘third wave’ of democratisation (Huntington, 1991), this 
thesis seeks to discuss the essential characteristics of this economic model and 
how they may affect the state owned media.   
 
There is certainly no doubt that the global free market advanced by the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has left an indelible 
footprint on the policies of national government in the mainstream economic arena. 
Mosco (1995: 155) sketches the impact of these policies on states in four ways: 
 
 Liberalisation: states are compelled to open up the markets to free 
competition. 
 Commercialisation: states will embrace new strategies to enable parastatals 
to compete with private entities and generate profits. 
 Privatisation: the state will sell its interests in parastatals to private interests. 
 Internationalisation: new relationships are forged between states with the 
ultimate authority being ceded to supranational bodies. 
 
The notion of a global free market, anchored by the doctrine of laissez-faire which 
is closely associated with the Washington Consensus (or the set of policies 
promoting free market principles), has often been touted as the panacea to the 
ills of the world, including the liberation of media from political control. The early 
1990s witnessed strong currents of opinion contending that while democracy 
almost certainly generates popular support for the market, economic liberalisation 
by itself - as in the case of China - does not seem ‘to be sufficient to trigger the 
demand for democracy’(Grosjean & Senik, 2007: 2).  
 
However, some of the more recent thinking has robustly challenged the efficacy 
and altruism of liberal philosophy. African scholars have, for example, asserted 
that the continent’s masses are now more far removed from popular control and 
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accountability, and that external controls from the west and the encroachment of 
global markets continue to undermine Africa’s democratic constitutions and 
national sovereignty (Mkandawire, 1999: 337).  
 
Mkandawire (2001: 306) strongly denounces the incapacitation of the state in 
Africa due to the stripping of assets through privatisation and the simultaneous 
retrenchment of the civil service. The ‘downsizing’ of the state has rendered the 
provision of social services and infrastructure highly vulnerable to foreign aid 
fluctuations, he argues. Mkandawire’s offensive against the ‘hijacking’’ of state 
functions by global capital emphasises that local capitalists are the losers in the 
liberalisation agenda.  
 
Similarly, John Gray (1998:5-15) is vehement in his criticism of the consequences 
of the Washington Consensus policies. He sketches the failures of the liberal 
paradigm as being manifest in the emergence of new income inequalities, wealth, 
access to work and quality of life that rival those found in the mid-nineteenth 
century England. 
 
He observes that although the laissez faire doctrine was widely applied in mid-
nineteenth century England as essentially a social experiment in free market 
engineering, its consequences were to produce social dislocation and economic   
and political instability on a large scale as the majority of the people had not 
reaped from the economic boom accompanying it.  
 
He contends that the free market was not an accident but a creation of state 
power; Japan, the United States, Russia and Germany all employed state 
intervention as a key factor in economic development. Gray therefore dismisses 
as a ‘classical liberal illusion’ the notion that the free market is a self regulating 
system that is fashioned to deliver general public good.  
 
One of the fundamental features of the free market in regard to the media is the 
policy of privatisation, which, as explained by Mosco, implies surrender to private 
interests of state assets. What proponents of privatisation often ignore is the 
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manner and nature of the process and its potential to produce undemocratic 
outcomes.  
 
Williamson (2004:11), the American economist who coined the term Washington 
Consensus, observes for instance that privatisation can be highly corrupt if not 
properly regulated. The transfer of state assets could benefit a few privileged 
elites for a small proportion of their true value despite evidence that it may bring 
benefits in terms of the quality of service, he notes.   
 
In similar vein, Martin Gainsborough (2008:3) who examines privatisation in 
Vietnam asserts that the sell of state assets should not be seen as a retreat of the 
state.  
 
Political power has the propensity to re-invent itself or is adept at subverting 
practices, such as privatisation, which might threaten its control. To safeguard 
their interests, political elites do craft new ways of establishing indirect 
government over private entities, he argues. 
 
If this kind of thinking were extended to the media sector, it could quite easily 
imply that powerful elites might conspire to possess the most valued of media 
assets and use them to selfish intent, further marginalising the constituencies that 
direly desire voice in governance. Alternatively, they could sell state media assets 
only to people who are confirmed supporters of the party in power, providing an 
illusion of ‘freedom’ from the state. 
 
Privatisation, as experienced in Britain during the Thatcher administration, also 
has tendencies of weakening the trade unions as intermediary institutions 
between workers and the market. The state’s role in ensuring the labour market 
was self regulating allowed for a downward adjustment of wages and low costs 
for employers which whittled union influences in both the United States and 
Britain. The narrative on privatisation is replete with the loss of bargaining power 
by unions (Gray, 1999:29).  
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Both liberalisation and privatisation have been found to lead to higher 
unemployment in the absence of competition policies and oversight frameworks 
that stem the monopolisation of resources (Maxwell, 2005:1).  
 
In other words, it may be over optimistic of one to expect media privatisation for 
instance to translate into an explosion of employment opportunities for journalists 
as new private interests assume control over SOEs. 
 
In fact, the opposite might just be true: new owners will likely streamline 
operations to ensure profitability, leading to job destruction in an industry already 
offering limited opportunities for journalists in countries such as Zambia.  
 
The loss of income is disempowering and could further inhibit the ability of 
workers in this industry to mobilise against state excesses. State ownership on 
the other hand might guarantee workers who are not necessarily productive, 
retirement opportunities given that the political elites in government may prioritise 
self preservation over commercialisation.  
 
Because of these scenarios, the premise of privatisation as a means to media 
freedom has to be examined very cautiously indeed. 
 
Commercialisation on the other hand, could be understood as a form of rational 
response by SOEs to survive a new era of competition from private interests. This 
might impact on the quality and value of the goods they produce and the manner 
in which the entities manage their labour relations, decision making and public 
engagement. 
  
 
3.2.4 Summary 
 
In summary, this thesis adopts a transitional approach in discussing 
democratisation which foregrounds the actions of politicians and relates them to 
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the impact they would have on communication systems as economic, social and 
political institutions changed in Zambia over a 45 year period.  
 
Political economy as an analytical framework provides the opportunity to 
interrogate historical processes and their impact on state media systems, and in 
this case, the changes in ownership and the consequences on communicational 
rights. It enables us to address the responsiveness of politicians to citizen actions 
and demands for press freedom; the role of unions as an intervening force; 
political conflict over communication resources as political systems transform; 
and ultimately the changing nature of state interventions in state owned media, 
particularly in the Times Newspapers, as Zambia experienced some radical 
political-economic shifts in the 1990s. 
 
The economic perspective of this framework will be concerned with the policies 
adopted by successive Zambian governments in the 45 years characterised by 
systemic changes to political and economic institutions in the First, Second and 
Third Republics.  
 
The concepts of nationalisation, liberalisation, and privatisation will, hence, 
provide the framework through which the response of the Times Newspapers to a 
changing political economic environment will be discussed. 
 
3.2.6 Political economy, the public sphere and democracy 
 
While the preceding discussion has been pre-occupied with power and wealth and 
its wider implications for governance and for communication systems more 
generally, the following section foregrounds the manner in which power and wealth 
might undermine informational and communicative freedoms, potentially 
diminishing the public space that has been associated with the Habermasan notion 
of public sphere (Harbermas, 1989). 
 
The notion of public sphere, is one of the many western concepts that are currently 
under scrutiny by scholars in regard to how they relate to indigenous contexts.  
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Harbermas’s central argument suggests that modern capitalism bred an 
autonomous forum of public debate, which he termed, the public sphere. The key 
factors leading to its materialisation relate to the emerging economic 
independence enabled by private property ownership; critical reflection fostered by 
literature (letters, novels), the blossoming of coffee shops and salons as arenas for 
political discourse and ultimately the emergence of a private, market-based press 
engaged in lively, critical political discussion. These phenomena were presented 
as having a fundamental influence on the direction of the state in the seventeenth 
and the first half of the nineteenth century (Curran, 1996: 82). 
 
Scholars interpret the public sphere as a social space rather than a physical space 
or a forum where individual citizens may converse freely about day to day social 
political matters (Mckenna, 1995: Curran 1996; Golding & Murdock, 1996). 
 
It is generally acknowledged that Harbermas’s public sphere provides scholars a 
basis to interrogate the relationship between mass media and democracy, 
particularly in regard to the participation of culturally diverse groups in modern 
societies. 
 
Mckenna (1995: 333) explains that historically, the public sphere has been 
associated with physical locations where citizens congregated to discuss public 
affairs. He argues that these must be regarded as concrete manifestations of the 
public sphere rather than the essence the public sphere by themselves.  
 
Harbermas himself was distinctive in asserting that as long as citizens could freely 
assemble and discuss matters of a general interest, they would have utilised a 
public space for discussion which signified the public sphere (Harbermas 
1974:49). 
 
The public sphere, Harbermas would argue, evolved from a bourgeois public 
sphere, essentially a domain shared by private interests and the state, which 
allowed for public opinion to shape up and popular state supervision to emerge. 
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The public sphere was after the mid-nineteenth century colonised by organised 
economic interests and an expanded state.  
 
The two forces bargained with each other to the exclusion of the wider public. The 
close relations between wealth and power corrupted the media into working less in 
the interest of the public and more as a tool of oppression and manipulation. The 
new corporatist pattern conditioned the public to play the passive role of 
consumers and not as key actors in the political debate. 
 
 
3.2.7 The public sphere and modern citizenship 
 
In their discussion of the Habermasan public sphere, Golding and Murdock (1997: 
xiv) underline the linkage between modern citizenship and a diverse and open 
communications system, which emerged with a democratizing Europe. While the 
system of democracy, they note, relied on popular legitimacy institutionalised in 
national and local assemblies, there was additional need to engender discursive 
representation arranged through public cultural institutions. Subsequently the idea 
of media as institutions of the public sphere gained currency. McKenna (1995: 
334) distils the original conception of Harbermas’ public sphere, which was 
essentially dialogical, as follows: 
 
 It is a space that guarantees access to all citizens. 
 In principle, all citizens are equal once in the public sphere and will engage 
in democratic debate without consideration of hierarchies. 
 The public sphere is without constraint to free expression. 
 The public sphere is distinct from the ‘private sphere’ of citizens as its 
concern is for the public good rather than the pursuit of individual gain. It is 
autonomous from state and market, although it is not the same as civil 
society, the arena in which citizens exercise their independence from the 
state and market as a collective. 
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 The public sphere embraces criticism of state actions, debate and 
facilitates the exchange of information, therefore enabling the existence of 
informed citizenry 
 
This conception assumes that the public is of a particular size and is cohesive 
and aware of matters within the precincts of their existence. It also assumes that 
citizens have unfettered rights of assembly and association. A country such as 
Zambia requires the state’s permission for the congregation of individuals, and 
that would, by itself, be a limiting factor in terms of social interaction. 
 
The second challenge to this notion is the size of publics in the present day. 
McKenna is emphatic in dissipating any notion that equates dialogical interaction 
to the modern challenges of democratic discourse. Beyond a certain size, he 
posits, public communication requires mass media to transmit messages. While 
the media are not the equivalent of the pubic sphere, they should be understood 
as entities that inhabit the public sphere essentially playing a facilitatory role in 
public communication, he explains. 
 
It is of course well known that mass media do not display all of the messages that 
are relayed to it by the public. The communication is mediated and therefore will 
be tinged with bias. Secondly, it is argued by other scholars that government 
influences media behaviour and that media take their cue from official 
government sources, marginalising competing voices (Kuzyk & Mc Cluskey, 
2006: 655). 
 
Liberal scholars promote the idea of a market driven media which is located in the 
private domain and is therefore assumed to be free of state interference or 
censorship. This no-regulation approach is a weak argument in terms of media 
autonomy, as it disregards the influence of commercial interests in stifling 
information that might either undermine the market or injure the markets business 
associations with the state. 
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Promoters of public service media models view public ownership and the 
presence of regulation as a defence against commercial exploitation and market 
censorship. Regulation is considered a necessary instrument to ensure diversity 
in programming and coverage and inclusiveness as opposed to exclusion. 
Particularly related to electronic media, public service media can be bound by 
regulation to inform, entertain and educate. On the contrary, private media can be 
at liberty to commit entirely to entertainment if that makes commercial sense. But 
as McKenna rightly points out, there are many variations of public service media 
and no single definition of public. The media structures are also varied (McKenna, 
1995: 334).  
 
 
3.2.8 The public sphere and the print media 
 
On the whole, the print media’s claim to being institutions of the public sphere is 
compromised by a set of factors which McKenna (1995: 334) details with clarity: 
 
 Newspapers are inclined toward entertainment and are therefore 
depoliticised. 
 Because of the different newspaper types aimed at distinct audiences, 
newspapers constitute a fragmented forum. 
 Newspapers provide an edited public agenda; letters and opinions from 
the public can be filtered, edited or discarded. While access to information 
in the public sphere is this context may be universal, the opportunity to 
contribute to that information is not. 
 Political partisanship is an added problem of the public sphere in the 
press. The industry in Europe is overwhelmingly rightwing, McKenna 
argues, therefore diminishing the prospect of a form of balance in the 
political discourses on display. 
 Unrepresentative ownership: a few privileged people will own newspapers 
because the costs involved, extending influence to a disproportionate 
group of people. 
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 Professional responsibility; the degree of freedom for journalists working in 
the media varies and the concept of professionalism has no standard 
definition to merit serious considerations of the conduct of journalism as an 
intervening factor. 
 
As stated earlier, in a modern sense, there should not be the expectation of direct 
participation in the public sphere despite democracy; the sheer size of modern 
publics entails that such participation be representative and debates be mediated.  
 
The problem in the Zambian context arises partly from the understanding of what 
is public or state. The typology of forms of broadcast media presented by Article 
19 (Article 19, 2006:37) can perhaps render some insights on how we understand 
state media systems in relation to public participation more generally. The 
definitions are as follows: 
 
 State Broadcasting is controlled by the state and represents state 
interests. They may however be partly funded by the tax payer.  
 
 Government media is controlled by the government of the day and 
represents the viewpoint of the executive. They too would be partly public 
funded.  
 
 Public Service broadcasting is entrusted with the role of broadcasting 
material in the public interest. They may not necessarily be public owned 
but should be characterised with a commitment to public duty. 
 
 Public Broadcasting on the other hand is owned by and is accountable to 
the public. The funding is largely public. 
 
In the Zambian setting, the notion of state media (interchangeably also termed 
public media) is equated with nation building and national unity owing to the 
political circumstances of the country’s transitions in the last 45 years.  
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The ZNBC are funded by the state and controlled by the government of the day 
but are integral to the state communication systems that incorporate the Times 
Newspapers, the Zambia Daily Mail, The Sunday Mail, the Zambia Information 
and News Service (ZANIS) and the National Agricultural Information 
Service(NAIS)..  
 
The state media in Zambia hence, are not easily categorised within the frame 
work suggested by Article 19. 
 
Within this complex set up, the Times Newspapers have a history of commercial 
independence, there is little evidence thus far to suggest the exact nature of state 
or public funding, for instance.  
 
Yet, all of the electronic and print media under the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting Services (MIBS) are seemingly expected to project uniformity to a 
great extent on the tone and nature of their coverage.  
 
Banda (2007:162) challenges the idea that a nation building role for the media 
has rendered general public good. Instead he asserts that the adherence to this 
approach has entrenched intolerance for diverse views amongst political elites 
who have tended to interpret any attempt at racial or ethnic self expression as 
detrimental to the national project of unity, reconciliation and reconstruction. 
 
The transformation of the ZNBC from a state to a public broadcaster for instance, 
has stalled due to government machinations over the implementation of the 
ZNBC (Amendment) Act of 2002. The ZNBC, as the Times Newspapers, remain 
part of the network of state media systems that continue to dominate the 
country’s media landscape. 
 
Despite the presence of stimulating interventions from the private media, of which 
the Post Newspapers have been most enduring, it is hard to fathom media 
entities in Zambia as representing significant forums of national expression for 
the vast majority of people. The spaces available - both state and private - appear 
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to pander to distinct political constituencies and will not be obligated to always 
have a public service function.  
 
The notion of media as institutions of the public sphere in these circumstances or 
their potential thereof, has to be carefully examined and not simply assumed to 
be; on the basis of theoretical assumptions. In fact the limited access of general 
publics to state media systems may be quite well known. The thrust of this thesis 
therefore would rather be to explore the ways in which state or public media may 
serve a communal role of social interaction amongst Zambia’s diverse interest 
groups. 
 
  
3.3 THE INTERNET, MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR 
POLITICAL- ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Of course a strong argument against the existence of traditional mass media is 
anchored around the revolutionary nature of the internet and mobile phone 
technologies as social and political mass mobilisation tools.  Opinion is divided 
regarding the potency of web-based communications as an alternative to mediated 
communications.  Ding (2009:327-350) for example demonstrates how alternative 
media facilitated ‘tactical risk communication’ during the outbreak of the Severe 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, through rumour and gossip.   
 
The rumours were disseminated through extra institutional communication before 
reaching demographically diverse recipients, navigating clear of official 
government censorship. 
 
In addition, because of these “alternative media” the whole notion of publishing is 
changing. ‘Open publishing’ for instance is an innovative way of involving readers 
in the process of creating news and shaping editorials and ultimately redistributing 
or publishing the items on their own sites (Couldry, 2003:46). 
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Information and communication technologies, undeniably, have presented a 
‘powerful platform for political autonomy’ and wireless communication especially, 
has demonstrated the ability to ‘bypass the mass media as a source of 
information’, creating a new public space (Castells, Fernandez-Ardevol, Qiu & Sey, 
([sa]:112]). 
 
Bennett (2003:26) and Curran (2003:227) are less enthusiastic about the internet 
in particular. Curran reminds us that new technology has not fundamentally altered 
the underlying economic factors that enable large media organisations to maintain 
their market dominance. The OpenDemocracy, an internet based magazine 
founded in Britain to facilitate networking among constitutional activists, initially 
struggled to attract attention until there was substantial intervention from the 
Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, Irish-Atlantic Philanthropies and the Ford 
Foundation. It eventually succeeded in creating a discursive global forum for 
academics, journalists, activists, politicians, businesspeople and international civil 
servants around the world.  
 
However, Curran also notes that search engines provide a sign posting system 
which influences where people go on cyberspace. Not being listed in the top ten or 
twenty of the search engine hierarchy leads to lack of attention as most people 
would not persist beyond that point. Curran highlights the lack of business acumen 
by the persons who set up alternative media, often leading to their demise. The 
internet as a significant political tool is not immune to the imperatives of 
economics, he further argues.  Sopova (2000:1) simply dismisses the internet as 
an undemocratic tool, exclusive to the world’s elite. 
 
Bennett (2003:19) presents both the benefits of the internet and its shortfalls: the 
positive elements include expanding personal freedoms to choose and change 
identities while the negative effects encompass the production of stress, insecurity, 
complex management issues, and personal responsibility-taking for structural 
problems. He highlights increased global activism against world development 
agencies and corporations and the materialisation of ingenious accountability 
systems for corporate and governments, as evidence of the significance of the 
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internet. Coupled with other technologies such as cell phones and digital video, he 
asserts, people have conquered the limits of time, space, identity and ideology, 
which was previously simply illusory.  
 
Bennett however cautions against embracing the internet as an instrument with 
transformative effects on human communication or social and political relations. 
 
“Rather, it is the interaction between the internet and its users - and their 
interactions, in turn in material social contexts - that constitute the matrix within 
which to locate the power of the new media to create new spaces for discourses 
and coordinated action”(Bennett, 2003:26). 
 
A country such as Zambia has seen user growth increase from 20,000 in the year 
2000 to 816,700 (or 3,983.5%) in 2010. However, against a population of 
12,056,923 that increase represents only 0.7% of the population (African Internet 
Usage and Population Statistics, 2010). 
 
Computer literacy, economic means to pay for internet café costs, and distance to 
internet sites all play a part in determining whether the internet provides a 
substantial public sphere of communication, or for that matter, an alternative 
medium to the cluster of privately owned community, radio stations, television and 
private press and of course, the state sponsored mass media. Globally, upward of 
80% of the population is literally excluded from the political, economic and social 
interactions provided by information networks (Millicevic [sa]).  
 
On a positive note, global information networks do certainly help to lubricate 
communication amongst computer literate Zambians within the country and in the 
diaspora. They also facilitate the display of manifestos by political parties and of 
news by state and private media, beyond the limits of their borders.  
 
However, the diaspora Zambians will not vote under current regulations and are 
therefore redundant, to a degree, as a transformative force in elective politics. 
Overall, unless connectivity can reach the levels of the developed world (94.4% is 
 154 
the average outside of Africa according to internetstats.com), the elevation of 
alternative media to the equivalent of the traditional mediated communication is 
idealistic. 
 
The most viable technological tool for Africa, as stated earlier, is the mobile phone. 
At least 280.7 million Africans accounting for 30.4% penetration were using cell 
phones by 2007(Millicevic [sa]).  
 
Rheingold ([sa]:226), reminds us, that it was the use of mobile phones that 
coordinated political collective actions in the Philippines and Spain, leading to the 
downfall of governments. Cell phones have also been used to report voting fraud 
in elections in Ghana; following which local radio stations would transmit their 
allegations and police action would ensue. In Kenya, similarly, mobile phones 
enhanced transparency, campaign effectiveness and a reduction in fraud.  
 
Mobile phones have also been leveraged to produce social capital or the nature 
and degree to which social interaction between communities and institutions mould 
economic performance (Sinha, 2005:4-14).  
 
The technology, in addition, can deliver financial, agricultural and educational 
services beyond the limited reach of radio, television and newspapers (Aker & 
Mbiti, 2010:8-10).  
 
Castells et al ([sa]) however caution that texting as a tool of political 
communication has serious handicaps: It facilitates short, unedited or 
unelaborated messages which are inadequate for civic deliberation. 
 
The same tools, due to their unpredictable use, can be utilised to cause mayhem: 
disinformation and misinformation, leading to national instability. Conversely, the 
technologies could strengthen the hand of the state through automated 
surveillance, jamming or other countermeasures against oppositional messaging 
(Rheingold [sa]).  
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In many instances, it would seem, mobile phones can be seen to be 
complementary to mass media rather than an alternative to it. This is because they 
do enable individuals to link up with organised mass media alerting reporters to 
events that could then receive more professional coverage.  
 
Despite their capacity to navigate official censorship on regular basis, they are not 
immune to counter-measures by the state or the pressure of the market. 
 
  
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter emphasises that media are an integral part of the political economic 
system and will likely be affected by changes to these institutions in many varied 
ways. The political economy approach to communication studies enables scholars 
to understand the linkages between media institutions, political elites and their 
economic blueprints and how these shape cultural production and expression. 
Through this body of theory, communication researchers have come to appreciate 
better the regulatory frameworks that define the limits of freedom of expression. 
 
While there is arguably the potential to expand freedom of expression through 
computer-based communications, it must be remembered that the economic 
imperatives for the sustenance of alternative media are fundamentally similar to 
those required for maintaining traditional media. In economically stressed African 
countries such as Zambia where connectivity and usage are low, it is unrealistic to 
equate alternative media to the combined reach of state media systems or indeed 
the localised diffusion of privately owned electronic and print media. In many 
instances, they should rather be viewed as complementary to mass media, given 
that they allow for citizens to channel their experience of reality directly and in 
some cases break new events for the first time through existing systems. 
 
Indeed cell phone technology - and less so the internet - has revolutionalised civic 
actions allowing for greater transparency and accountability in procedural 
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democratic processes in Africa; facilitating the growth of social capital and 
presenting a somewhat more open public space. However, none of these 
technologies are immune to state or market pressures.  
 
Counter-measures from the state or other political forces can undermine citizen 
interaction through disinformation and misinformation, jamming and automatic 
surveillance means, therefore dampening the whole notion of technology as 
extending an ‘autonomous’ political public sphere. 
 
The basis of the thesis’ central argument remains relevant: that politics and 
technology are intertwined; the terms for access and usage are determined by 
decisions made by politicians and to some extent the market. The operational 
realities suggest that the conditions of the economic environment do influence the 
survivability of alternative media, even when political conditions are favourable. 
The record of survival of alternative media has been dismal thus far. Framing 
these media in the context of a public sphere - despite the empirically grounded 
positive effects on global activism - should be an exercise in caution at best. 
 
Political economic theory when applied to communications, allows us to 
interrogate a range of influences on communicative activity, encompassing history, 
political and social change. The hegemonic tendencies of wealth and power are 
central to the understanding of how social reality is framed and communicated in 
the final analysis. 
 
Historically, the most influential political economists have been Adam Smith who 
promoted the idea of liberalism, competition, self reliance, intellectual freedom and 
proportionate reward for service; and Karl Marx who expanded on these ideas and 
challenged the control of the economic universe by capitalist forces. Marx’s work is 
touted as being more holistic and inter-disciplinary and therefore widely applicable 
to a range of socio-economic sciences.  
 
Indeed, the association of the media to the modern corporate industrial complex 
arises from the application of Marxian thought. 
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We are cautioned by Golding and Murdock (1996: 14) that the instrumentalist 
approach to political economy is bent on depicting media as instruments of class 
domination as though they were no intervening variables to minimise the influence 
of the rich and powerful on public communication.  
 
The Marxian/Institutional approaches to political economy essentially allow for the 
assessment of the role of social movements in bringing about change and 
therefore limiting the impact of wealth and power on communication outputs. 
 
Golding and Murdock advance the notion of critical political economy, which is 
influenced by Marxian thinking, as a means by which scholars should interrogate 
not just the impact of wealth and power on communications but also on the 
condition of labour and the nature and extent of freedom of expression through the 
communicative space which Habermas termed the public sphere. 
 
While the political economy approach has gained currency amongst 
communication researchers, the analytical frameworks cannot be universally 
applied given the varied contexts of the so-called First and Third worlds.  
 
It has been noted by this researcher that the African, and more specifically the 
Zambian context, is somewhat more challenging in the application of imported 
theoretical frameworks as it requires a further understanding of leadership types 
and practices for one to appreciate the relationship between power and 
communication.  
 
It must be stated however that a discussion on leadership cannot happen in 
isolation. The institutional setting, that is, the primacy of democratic institutions in 
fostering accountability (of failing to do so) is fundamental in understanding why 
leaders may act against the interest of democracy and more specifically, media 
freedom, without recourse to their constituencies. 
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Historically, there has been a tendency for political leaders in Zambia to determine 
the role of media, essentially as a nation-building tool, and control the amount of 
space accorded to competing voices. Political transitions over the last 45 years 
have not extended the policies of privatisation to the state media, a factor which 
detracts from the strides made in liberalising political and economic space more 
generally. 
 
At the base of this discussion is the place of the ordinary citizen in terms of their 
rights to participate in discourses affecting their general welfare through media that 
is ostensibly partly publicly funded or at least assumed to be.  Again, the 
applicability of the notion of the Habermasan public sphere to an African context is 
to be questioned as the political environment appears quite different from that 
which the German theorist idealises in his works. 
 
If the idea of public or state media institutions is meant to extend access to a 
communal system of communication by diverse interest and ethnic groups, the 
structure and power relations within these institutions need to be critically 
examined.  
 
And if for stability’s sake, as some would argue, emerging democracies should 
maintain state supported institutions of some kind owing to the limited resources 
available to citizens to possess their own media, the relevance of such institutions 
to a changing political economic environment needs to be carefully documented 
and analysed. 
 
And if indeed, the measure of democracy includes freedom of association and 
expression and the role of trade unions, then the role of media unions ought to be 
understood, categorised and assessed to determine the nature of economic and 
political gains accruing to professionals as a result of the transition of Zambia from 
a one party state to a democracy. 
 
This thesis will hence explore the influence of democratisation on state media 
systems in the following context: 
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 The political aspects will be seen largely in terms of control and conflict 
over access to communication resources by contending political actors, 
each with potentially its own ideas about the relevance of state media to a 
democracy. This will include an examination of political structures and 
changes thereof during periods of transition and relationship between 
political and business elites and their role in media development. 
 The economic aspects will be largely analysed in terms of privatisation and 
the challenges posed by liberalisation and commercialisation. More 
competition could mean new strategies for state media or over reliance on 
public funding which might strengthen the argument for change in structure 
or ownership of state entities. 
 Public participation of social groups in state media systems, will be seen  
in terms of the rules governing access to space on the Times, in addition 
to newspaper sales and space provided for public voice. 
 The intervention of labour unions on working conditions and professional 
practice will be analysed within the context of freedom of association and 
expression, as constituted within the legal and constitutional framework of 
Zambia; and as localised through labour rights. 
 
As the one institution that has survived three transitional phases in its 
metamorphosis from privately ownership to state control, the Times Newspapers 
hence provide the ideal case for understanding these phenomena.  
 
To conclude, we do note from section 1.1.5 of Chapter One that political economy 
considers historical, social and political imperatives, including the power relations 
that condition the distribution of (communication) resources in a society; that it 
places a pre-eminence on social change and historical transformation and is 
concerned with social and moral values, and the balance between capitalist 
enterprise and public intervention. Further, it focuses on the complex relations 
between media, industry, political and social elites and how they influence 
communicative activity.  Based on the understanding of these perspectives, the 
next chapter seeks to unmask the relationship between Zambia’s nationalist 
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government and foreign capitalists and their dual influence on the media 
landscape. It undertakes an empirical exploration of the political, security and 
economic conditions that helped fashion these relationships and culminates in an 
analyses of the institutional settings in the Second and Third Republics and how 
these, and the actions of elites through transitional phases, impacted on the 
structure and editorial performance of the Times Newspapers. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
DEMOCRATISATION, THE LONDON RHODESIA MINING AND LAND 
COMPANY (LONRHO) AND THE TIMES NEWSPAPERS: EXPLORING 
THE ROLE OF WEALTH AND POWER IN MEDIA DEVELOPMENT IN 
ZAMIBIA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The principle aim of this chapter is to unmask the ways in which wealth and power 
have influenced media development in Zambia within the context of 
democratisation. 
 
The chapter responds to the research questions advanced in section 1.3.2 of 
Chapter One stated as such: 
 
 In what ways has democratisation influenced media development in 
Zambia? 
 How has political change affected decision making structures and 
oversight frameworks on the Times Newspapers? 
 What policies govern participation in the state media, particularly the Times 
Newspapers? 
 
Democratisation has been understood as the popular process that manifested 
with the emergence of Zambia as an independent African state transitioning 
through three distinct phases of political and economic development; the First, 
Second and Third Republics. The democratisation process through the three 
republics has been affected by policies of nationalisation, privatisation and 
liberalisation, with varied implications for media ownership, freedom and 
development.  
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Because the thesis is informed mainly by the transitional approach to the analysis 
of democratisation, the actions of political elites are emphasised.  
 
It is also established in Chapter Two, section 2.2.3, that the action by Zambian 
authorities to colonise media space was not unique in Africa.  The retreat of 
colonialism saw nationalist governments across the continent adopt authoritarian 
approaches to privately owned media, often proscribing, purchasing or controlling 
newspapers and radio and television. By 1980, 90 % of the 90 daily newspapers 
in sub Saharan Africa were either owned by the state or the ruling party, albeit 
with varied degrees of freedom and repression (Sandbrook, 1996: 82). 
 
What has however not been detailed at this juncture are the strategic relations 
between political and business elites that underpinned efforts by authorities to 
possess media enterprises owned by foreign interests.  
 
In the case of the Times Newspapers, the take-over process was punctuated by 
an apparent personal relationship between Zambia’s founding president, Kenneth 
Kaunda, and the chair of the multinational Lonrho, Roland “Tiny’ Rowland with 
implications for media freedom more generally.  
 
This chapter therefore seeks mainly to build on the theoretical discussion in 
Chapter Three, which explored, through a political economic prism, the means by 
which the state and market might limit the notion of media as institutions of the 
public sphere where contemporary politics may be discussed in a democracy. 
The specific aim of this chapter is four-fold: 
 
 To Illustrate how wealth and power, exemplified through the activities of 
the multinational corporation Lonrho and the first president of Zambia, 
influenced media development; and the configuration of the Times 
Newspapers in the First and Second Republics, in particular. 
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 Analyse how political decisions concerning the take-over of the Times 
Newspapers were aided by political systems characterised by person -
based rule, dominant party and one-party systems.  
 Discuss the influence of democratisation, particularly multiparty politics, on 
public participation in the state owned media systems. 
 Draw conclusions on the imperatives of privatisation of the state media 
(the Times in particular) based on the historical precedents of foreign and 
private ownership. 
 
The discussion is fore-grounded by an exposition of Lonrho and its dealings with 
African nationalist governments and white controlled territories of Rhodesia and 
South Africa, to provide insights into the conglomerate’s modus operandi.  
 
It further emphasises that the decision that allowed for a unique co-ownership 
arrangement of the Times between the state and this multinational corporate 
entity has its foundation in a larger political-economic scheme which saw Lonrho 
develop from a modest ranching and mining concern to a conglomerate of global 
renown with more than 90,000 employees and in excess of 500 subsidiaries. 
  
4.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
The principal method employed in this exercise is historical analysis based on   
literature review; and interviews, utilising open - ended questionnaires. Historical 
records of submissions to commissions of inquiry and biographic accounts of 
subjects under investigation, media articles and published works on Lonrho and 
the Kaunda establishment were also consulted in developing a pattern that could 
explain the response of the Times to political change at critical moments in 
Zambia’s history. 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with former editors of the Times of 
Zambia, and Sunday Times of Zambia; representatives of the Press Association of 
Zambia (PAZA), the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) and the Society of Senior 
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Zambian Journalists (SSZJ) using three open-ended questionnaires. Follow-up 
interviews were also conducted to concretise and integrate the findings into the 
revelations gleaned from literature reviews. The editors were chosen based on 
their institutional memory, that is, each with substantial experience or knowledge 
of the workings of the Times of Zambia and Printpak Limited under Lonrho and 
state ownership, in the First, Second and Third Republics.  
 
The key areas of engagement were: 
 
 Their impressions of the impact of democratisation on media development 
generally. 
 The benefits and/or deficits of state ownership of the Times versus private 
ownership. 
 The nature of editorial relations between Lonrho and the Times on the one 
hand; and the state on the other.  
  The preferred alternative to state or private ownership of media.  
 
These insights are essential to understanding how the experience by the key 
informants of the behaviour of private and state ownerships has over time moulded 
their thinking about the future of the media in Zambia, a country that continues to 
espouse liberal democratic values.  
 
4.2.1 Defining wealth and power 
  
The discussion in Chapter Three, section 3.1.3, advances the notion that political 
economy in relation to communication interrogates the hegemonic tendencies of 
wealth and power in mutually constraining or influencing communicative activity. 
 
Concepts of wealth and power are obviously not straight forward, and need to be 
categorised within set contexts to be relevant in a discussion of this nature. 
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Wealth is defined as ‘an abundance of valuable possessions or money’, a ‘state of 
being rich’; ‘an abundance or profusion of something desirable’ (South African 
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 2002: 1330). 
 
In conventional terms, power has varied meanings. As a noun it is construed as 
the ‘right or authority given or delegated to a person of body’ or ‘the capacity to 
influence the behaviour of others’.   
 
It can also be understood as ‘political authority or control’.  As a verb, it is 
expressed as a force that may catalyse desired actions (South African Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, 2002: 916).   
 
Owen (1975:3) conceives of power as a form of freedom, that is, the leeway to do 
or not to do something at some affordable price. 
 
“If there is no choice, there is no power and no freedom. A monopolist whose 
market is protected from entry by law has the power to set the price in a 
manner that achieves any objective he likes” (Owen, 1975:4) 
 
Logically, it can be inferred that power and wealth are related and that one can 
generate influence over the other. Hobbes (1660), for example, considers power 
as the inherent capacity to generate future ‘good’.  Wealth, reputation, fame, 
specialized knowledge can be sources of power. In a militaristic sense, Hobbes 
conceives of power as a strength of arms which impedes aggression from other 
principalities or states.  
 
More contemporary articulations of power, anchored by rational choice theory, 
forward the argument that the agent exercises power through his sensual and 
cognitive faculties. Rational choice holds that individual choices are enticed by 
calculations of benefit given the exclusion of all relevant factors beyond the agent’s 
control (Green, 2002: 4-5). This interpretation of agency and power has generated 
game theory in which outcomes of agent choice can be individuated and 
collectivized (Stern & Hedstrom, [sa]). 
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The Marxian entry point to the power discourse derives from social structures and 
the social means of production. Marxian theory not only conceives of power as a 
finite sum inherent in social structures but sees it also as a capacity to collectively 
act and capture economic and political apparatus, which essentially are the 
instruments of power (Slaughter, 1975:1). Vayrynen ([sa]), too, relates the origins 
of power to forms of governance, political or economic.  
 
However political and economic institutions are not the only sources of power or its 
contestation. Media markets can for instance generate a form of symbolic power, 
against the influence of corporate entities and the state (Couldry, 2003:43-44). 
Symbolic power, in Couldry’s articulation, relates to the possession, by media 
entities, of organisational and economic resources, which over time influence 
people’s beliefs. States and markets however do contest this power which arises 
from the intention to access markets. In the case of the state, the market would be 
the electorate.  
 
Couldry’s construction of power, which intimately weaves political and economic 
controls with media’s inherent - albeit limited influence - over communicative 
activity is fascinating and prepares ground for this discussion in terms of what 
actually transpires when the state and a major corporate entity contest the same 
media space for contending objectives; or sometimes similar political aims. 
 
While the ambition to understand the mutual influence of wealth and power might 
benefit from an exploration of formal institutions and their intimacy with social 
processes, illustrating their patterns of influence will likely be underlined more 
succinctly through the actions of the individuals who occupy them.  
 
After all, society is manipulated by social elites who command major hierarchies 
and organisations of society, from government, corporate to the military 
establishments (Mills, 1956: 1-5). 
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In a world where international institutions are weak and national institutions are 
conflict-ridden, power resides - not in formal structures - but in a cluster of wealthy 
individuals with immense global influence. This emergent ‘superclass’ with ‘cross-
border potency’, determines the trajectory of global politics and economics 
(Rothkopf, 2009; 14-85). Rothkopf (2009)’s empirically grounded argument holds 
that individuals could assume power from financial and professional success; and 
leadership of strategic institutions or by commanding quantifiable support from the 
masses. 
 
Therefore, it can be understood, that individuals capitalise on professional, 
financial or leadership ascendancy to assume power. Conversely, it can also be 
inferred that persons who command quantifiable support from constituencies, 
through personal charisma for example, could exploit this power to assume wealth. 
 
The exploration of relations between the multinational London Rhodesia Mining 
and Land Company (Lonrho) and the government of President Kaunda, and the 
mutual influence of this relationship on the Times of Zambia, is multifarious. It has 
institutional and personal dimensions; it encompasses cross border political weight 
by the multinational Lonrho and its chair Rowland; and the authority of the state 
through a powerful president, with a leading newspaper as the forum through 
which contending national priorities are reflected.  
 
The implication here is that neither President Kaunda nor Lonrho would be seen to 
have complete freedom to exercise choice; that there would be political or 
economic limitations to the exercise of their power over one another. To some 
extent, there would also be limitations in their exercise of influence over the Times 
of Zambia, allowing it some space to express its choice over messaging - its 
relative freedom to interpret social reality.  
 
This thesis therefore conceives of power not only as the individual’s relative 
freedom to influence others but also - fundamentally - as a derivative of political 
governance structures and economic means of production. 
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4.2.2 The relevance of Lonrho 
 
The Lonrho saga is intrinsic to the broader discussion on what Libby (1983: 379) 
terms ‘transnational class alliances’ that have tended to determine national policy 
and the allocation of key resources particularly in post independence Africa.  
 
This is particularly relevant because Lonrho’s interests were internationally as well 
as domestically multi-sectoral, ranging from ranching, mining, breweries to 
publishing.  
 
This form of conglomeration has tendencies of undermining the independence of 
media entities within its group that either report negatively on its potential areas of 
investment or embarrass state elites with whom they would have strategic 
relationships.  
 
Lonrho’s ownership of the Observer in London for instance, resulted in its 
Chairman Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland exerting undue pressure on the newspaper’s 
editor to resign after exposing the Matabeleland atrocities in Zimbabwe in the 
1980s. Zimbabwe not only hosted some of the multinational corporation’s prized 
African assets, its president, Robert Mugabe, had close ties with the British 
Tycoon (Trelford, 2000: 1). 
 
To start with, it is prudent to map the conditions that fertilise the entry of 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) into developing nations and discuss briefly the 
challenges nationalising elites faced in building communal institutions in the face of 
administrative weaknesses. The discussion will then transition into the sphere of 
media ownership in an integrated manner. 
 
 
 
 
 169 
 
 
4.2.4 History of Multinational Corporations 
 
Scholars have traced the earliest forms of transnational trading from the age of the 
Phoenicians 2500 years BC and the Venetians from the 10th century who traded 
on an international scale. However, the emergence of modern MNCs, business 
entities that control economic activity in more than a single nation state, are 
recorded more recently in the 19 the century in Europe.  
 
These were best epitomised by firms such as Cockerel Steelworks in 1815 in 
Prussia, Bayer of Germany in 1863; Nestle of Switzerland and Lever Brothers of 
the United Kingdom (Ghertman & Allen, 1984: 7). 
 
The period between 1895 and 1945 saw the growth of MNCs in major sectors in 
Japan, North America, Western Europe and Russia (Clairmonte & Cavanagh, 
1984: 49). 
 
The initial phase of growth of the modern multinational was impeded by the First 
and Second World Wars. The MNCs, hence, found firmer ground after World War 
II (Ghertman & Allen, 1984: 8). 
 
The corporations extended their network of subsidiaries beyond borders and 
continents characterised by product differentiation; large scale organisational 
capacity; oligopoly power; research and development leading to technological 
monopolies, all underlined by extensive capital accumulation (Langdon, 1981: 4-
5). 
 
The influence of MNCs clearly varies in different development contexts and 
opinion is divided on what benefits are brought to bear on the host nation.  While 
some scholars have a decidedly favourable view of the role of multinationals as 
engines of policy formulation in transitional democracies (Bernstein & Berger, 
2000:7), others elect to cast in sharper focus their inclination to reduce the 
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government’s control of the economy, particularly in developing countries (Hymer, 
1979: 51). 
 
However, the case of Africa, particularly post independence Africa, lends itself to 
further inquiry given the institutional weaknesses, poor infrastructure and fragile 
ethnic relations which appear to entice MNCs seeking exclusive favour with state 
elites.  
 
In this regard, LaPalombara and Blank (1984:16) posit that there are a number of 
‘givens’ that facilitate the entry and domination of developing nations by foreign 
interests: 
 The endowment of natural resources. 
 The political instability born of the colonial policies of divide and rule.  
 The level of political and economic development at the time of 
independence: that is, whether a country had sufficient administrative and 
economic management capacity and infrastructure. 
 The means by which a country gained independence: were it by force of 
arms or gradual non violent actions. 
 
LaPalombara and Blank argue that these ‘givens” have a fundamental influence 
on the types of choices a country makes and its capacity to negotiate favourably 
with foreign corporations. Without coherent national development policies and the 
requisite skills that go with implementing them, developing countries with 
resources will fail to harness the full potential for growth and will likely depend on 
foreign agents to provide the relevant skills.  
 
These weaknesses and lack of cohesion within nation states sometimes facilitate 
the entry of MNCs acting in collusion with what they term ‘strategic elites’.  
 
The elites may be leaders of political parties, trade unions, influential industrialists 
and educators, opinion makers in the mass media and high level officials in the 
executive and legislative arms of government; and the civilian and military 
managers who hold sway in public bureaucracies.  
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For Beinstein and Berger (2000: 6-7), who rationalise the role of business in 
altruistic terms, a country in transition is mired between depending on the 
capacity of the old order - which lacks legitimacy - and taking calculated risks with 
new leaders - who lack both resource and organisational capacity to meet the 
aspirations of their people.  
 
It is here that they conceive of business as playing a facilitatory and instrumental 
role, particularly pointing to the function corporate entities played in negotiating 
and implementing a National Peace Accord in South Africa. 
 
Poynter (1985: 27-30), in his examination of foreign investment policies, identifies 
four types of host-nation interests groups that affect the intervention of MNCs: 
 
 The ruling political party. 
 Domestic capitalists or, in socialist countries their government peers. 
 Influential leaders outside of the ruling party. 
 Domestic managerial class. 
 
While there are several approaches to the analyses of the behaviour of these 
influential groups, Poynter highlights the confluence of right-wing political groups, 
domestic capitalists and foreign investors whenever there is a leftist threat to the 
control of resources.  
 
He argues that foreign investors tend to favour an economic and political system 
preferred by the two groups: - domestic capitalists and right wing political actors. 
Conversely, situations could also arise where the groups position themselves 
against a foreign investor.  
 
Haley (2001:92) proposes however, that MNCs are not as pedantic: ‘They 
behave as chameleons, changing in relation to their environment’. 
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The case of Lonrho and its investments in Zambia defies easy categorisation as it 
involves primarily, relations between two powerful men: a wealthy industrialist 
(Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland) and a charismatic founding president (Kenneth Kaunda). 
That alliance was likely aided by inherent institutional weaknesses and lack of a 
credible opposition, a matter to be examined later in section 4.3.7 of this chapter.  
 
Therefore, by placing the influence of organised groups in sharper relief, the 
conceptual approach discussed by Poynter falls short of unravelling the role of 
charismatic leaders and imbalances in the political system in fashioning out or 
facilitating national agenda that affect a country’s intervention policy over the long 
term.  
 
Understanding the various socio-political and economic contexts that condition 
the relationships between MNCs and state entities appears certainly to be a 
much more complex affair that seems in some ways limited in scope by the 
theoretical perspectives often applied to analyse situations affecting developing 
nations.  
 
Ronald T. Libby (1983: 379-380) argues for example that dependency and 
Marxist theory are insufficient to explain the circumstances of what he terms 
‘peripheral capitalist societies’. 
 
Dependency and Marxist theory tend to subordinate indigenous bourgeoisie to 
international capitalist interests inferred from the analysis of how capital flows, 
trading patterns, production and inflation affect domestic markets. This approach 
ignores the role of political elites and classes in promoting or impeding capitalist 
accumulation, Libby argues. Libby asserts instead that there is a convergence of 
interests between foreign capital and “dominant classes” in peripheral capitalist 
societies and these transnational class alliances determine the nature of capital 
accumulation within these environments.   
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His study of Zambia in the 1980s revealed that there was a major class division 
within the country’s dominant class: He distinguishes the political or state 
bourgeoisie from a subordinate, indigenous capitalist-owning class fraction.  
 
Although the interests of the two classes sometimes over-lap, he argues that it is 
the MNCs allied to the politically connected or state bourgeoisie that receive 
preferential treatment from the state. The context of this relationship between 
MNCs and the state bourgeoisie is conditioned by several factors including the 
importance of the foreign enterprise and particular threats and vulnerabilities to 
the dominant classes. 
 
Libby subscribes to the notion that the ruling class in Zambia in the mid 1980s 
encapsulated elites in the ruling party, government agencies including army and 
police, parastatals and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).  
 
However, the folly of embracing Libby’s accounts fully as we peer into the First 
Republic resides in the time period in which the research was conducted.  
 
For example, the Zambia of the First Republic could barely claim to have 
generated an indigenous capitalist-owning class of any significance (1964-72 
periods).  
 
There is evidently a lacuna to be exploited in extending the knowledge on the 
nature of political and economic influences that shaped events in Zambia in the 
three phases of transition, which would have had significant implications for the 
media then and now.  Essentially, the history of the media in Zambia is intrinsic to 
the political economic history of the country itself. 
 
As Ayub Rioba (1998:1) rightly asserts: “Understanding media history in any 
society is - in itself - understanding a society’s political, economic and social 
history”. 
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4.2.5 Lonrho’s growth in Africa and Zambia: Understanding the influence of a 
Multinational 
 
In attempting to understand the influence of political and business elites on media 
development and behaviour in the First Republic therefore, this section of the 
thesis will begin by retracing the emergence of the conglomerate Lonrho and its 
chair, Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland, in colonial and post independence southern Africa.  
 
Secondly, this section of the thesis will analyse the strategic political alliances 
developed by Lonrho through its chair Rowland, which appear to have spurred its 
success while other British interests withdrew upon the advent of independence of 
its colonies.  
 
Thirdly, this section of the thesis will link Lonrho’s business concerns and the 
media it owned, to the conglomerate’s wider political and commercial aspirations in 
the hope of unfurling the firm’s modus operandi which will later provide a basis for 
understanding its behaviour in relation to the sell of the Times Newspapers to the 
state. 
 
 
4.2.6 Tiny Rowland  
 
Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland’s name is synonymous with the growth of Lonrho. He is 
recognised as the architect of the company’s expansion whose business 
approaches were characterised by close liaisons with Africa’s political elite (Bower, 
1994: 270-276).  
 
Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland was born in India on 27 November, 1917.  Rowland 
changed his name from Furhop, inherited from his pharmacist father, to Rowland 
upon his arrival in England in October 1939 (Cronje, Ling & Cronje, 1976: Bower; 
1994). 
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After serving in the British Army’s medical Corps as a non-combatant from 1939, 
he was discharged, and worked thereafter as a porter at Paddington station in 
London. Later in life, Rowland worked as an unofficial purchasing agent for a 
number of local authorities in Holland. In his ascendancy, he became proprietor of 
a refrigeration company in London (Cronje et al, 1976: 13). 
 
Possibly using profits form these activities, he migrated to Rhodesia (present-day 
Zimbabwe) where he purchased a farm at Gatooma and subsequently established 
Shepton Estates as a private holding company for other business ventures. One of 
the ventures included Norton Motors which had the franchise for Mercedes Benz. 
Expanding from car dealing, he acquired shares in gold and copper mining. He 
established himself within the copper mining industry as a middle man for a 
number of firms, with one of his most significant arrangements being the purchase 
by Rio Tinto Company Limited of the Sandawana Emerald mine in Rhodesia. 
Rowland aided Rio Tinto’s expansion in Rhodesia by involving them in negotiation 
with Lonrho over the acquisition of the Cam and Motor Gold mining Company 
(1919) Ltd. Rowland was appointed to the board of Cam and Motor thereafter. In 
1961, he joined the board of Lonrho Ltd (Cronje et al, 1976: 14-17). 
While Cronje et al (1976), Sardanis (2003) and media reports (Africa: Bye-Bye for 
Tiny Rowland: 1978) portray Rowland as a manipulative self-serving industrialist 
with little regard for the general welfare of the continent, Bower (1994), his 
unofficial biographer, presents a more sanitised image of a tycoon with ‘genuine’ 
concerns for Africa: 
 
“His affections for Africa were genuine as were his public utterances of 
devotion to the African cause. But that could not interfere with the real 
business of earning profits” (Bower, 1994: 124).  
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4.2.7 Lonrho 
The ascendancy in business of Tiny Rowland and Lonrho coincided with the 
decline of the Federation of Northern-Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; and the 
rise of nationalist sentiments against this colonial formation. As other British 
investors in Africa withdrew in the face of the uncertainty that accompanied African 
independence, Rowland saw opportunities amidst what others considered a crisis 
(Cronje et al, 1976:16).  
In fact Bower (1994: 93) suggests that Rowland, as Lonrho head, began to 
speculatively acquire properties across Africa precisely because of instability in 
those territories. 
 
Lonrho was formed in 1909 as the London and Rhodesia Mining and Land 
Company Ltd. Its principle aim was to acquire mining, agriculture and ranching in 
Southern Rhodesia (Kareithi, 1991:199). 
 
In the first 50 years of its incorporation, Lonrho expanded its mining interests 
within Rhodesia and possessed property, ranching, agriculture and asbestos 
concerns. It acted as secretary and manager of several companies as well as 
dealing primarily in mining shares (United Kingdom 1981: sec.2.1). 
But the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Rhodesia on 11 
November, 1965 jeopardised Lonrho’s assets in the rebel territory due to the 
resultant economic sanctions. Under the Prohibited Trade and Dealings Order of 
December 1966, the United Kingdom instituted legal restraints on the operations of 
all subsidiaries resident in Rhodesia, including Lonrho (United Kingdom, 1981: 
sec. 3.1). 
 
UDI especially threatened to harm Lonrho’s oil interests in Rhodesia where the 
firm had built a pipeline to the Mozambican ports. Eager to be seen as an 
opponent of UDI, Lonrho voted for the closure of the pipeline and gained 
temporarily from ‘bribes’ of 54,000 pounds per month from the British government 
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(Bower, 1994: 94). However, it is apparent that the company did not completely 
withdraw from Rhodesia. Instead it strategically decided to leave behind a 
percentage of its assets (Hall, 1969: 91). 
 
4.2.8 Lonrho’s strategic political alliances in Africa 
 
Rowland entered Zambia on the second day of UDI and registered as a Zambian 
resident (and did the same in Malawi). Despite this, Rowland located Lornho 
headquarters in London, with Lusaka as its Africa operations base (Bower, 
1994:124).   
According to Bower, Rowland reasoned that Lonrho was too small by comparison 
to large MNCs such as Anglo American and Rio Tinto to meddle in partisan politics 
and was therefore intent on a very measured approach to the new leaders of the 
continent. He identified Kaunda as a natural ally. 
“Zambia had become the hub of Lonrho’s expansion in Africa and Rowland’s 
developing relations with Kaunda was pivotal” (Bower, 1994: 124).  
Kariethi (1991: 204), Bower (1994: 109), Cronje et al (1976; 26), Langdon, (1981: 
141) and Sardanis (2003:142) all underscore Rowland’s propensity for using 
inducements to gain access to power in the post independence era.  
Kareithi (1991: 204), in particular, attributes the survival and growth of Rowland’s 
‘revolutionary capitalism’ ideology, to a four pronged strategy: 
 
 Lonrho forged partnerships with government and financial agencies which 
assured access to local resources and strategic political support. 
 The conglomerate appointed politically connected African elites to 
positions of influence in Lonrho to secure long term political assurance and 
to create a loyal indigenous bourgeoisie with access to credit facilities the 
entity could benefit from. 
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 A symbiosis was created between business interests and the Lonrho 
owned media which defended and glorified the ideology of capitalism in the 
public sphere. 
 In Kenya, multinationals, epitomised by Lonrho, worked in collusion with 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTU) to suppress 
radical trade unionism and instead promote a wage - orientated apolitical 
movement through the Kenya Federation of Labour. Dissent was hence 
suppressed through institutions and the Lonrho media. 
Kareithi’s caricature of the Lonrho modus operandi suggests a complex inter-link 
between government, corporate entities, media and labour which would arguably 
condition a capitalist-friendly political environment. Rowland and Lonrho, Kariethi, 
posits, survived numerous political storms in Kenya by employing this cosy nexus 
of allies, with the Standard, the daily owned by Lonrho, playing a supportive role. 
Rowland’s political liaisons are well documented, the analyses of which begin to 
illustrate a pattern across much of Africa. 
“Securing personal introductions to those presidents was essential and, 
accordingly, Rowland sought Africans whose personal connections could 
pave his success” (Bower, 1994: 109). 
In Kenya, he appointed Udi Gecaga, President Kenyatta’s son-in-law, as 
Managing Director of Lonrho’s Kenyan holding company, a factor the company’s 
critics suggested accounted for its success (Langdon, 1981: 141).  
Upon the death of Kenyatta, Gecaga was dismissed and Mark Too, son of the 
then in-coming president Daniel Arap Moi was appointed as deputy chairman of 
Lonrho (Kariethi, 1991: 204). 
In Malawi, Rowland impressed President Hastings Kamuzu Banda with the 
construction of a sugar refinery at Sucoma who asked him further to build a social 
centre for the Women’s League of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) as a 
‘present’. 14,000 pounds Sterling of share holders’ funds was used according to 
Bower. Lonrho went on to own Malawi’s railways (Bower, 1994: 96).   
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In Togo, he sought the friendship of Gil Olympio, the son of the assassinated 
president and representative of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in West 
Africa, who introduced him to Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the Ivorian President at 
the time. Rowland sold an $80 million sugar complex to the Ivorian president. He 
also ensured Lonrho was retained as its manager.  
In Sudan, he used the foreign minister Mansour Khalid to promote Lonrho as a 
possible service provider for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)’s oil 
requirements (Bower, 1994: 110-264).  The transformation of Lonrho from a 
Rhodesian Mining and Land Company occurred hence five years after the 
collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as the firm opened offices 
in 14 newly independent countries in Africa by 1967. By 1968, Lonrho had moved 
into Ghana in West Africa (United Kingdom 1981: sec. 2.8). 
Kenya and Zambia epitomised the growth of this new empire as diverse 
acquisitions included motor dealerships and rail transport, breweries, sisal, tea, 
cotton and sugar farming, warehousing and packaging; and newspapers and 
publishing (Cronje, 1976: 32). 
Hence, from varied literature constructed at different periods of the 20th century, 
there is a confluence of thought regarding the general approach to business by 
Lonrho characterised by its chairman Rowland, who evidently used his wealth to 
achieve political aims.   
 
 
4.3 DEMOCRATISATION IN ZAMBIA AND THE ROWLAND - KAUNDA 
ALLIANCE 
The similarities in the countries in which Lonrho thrived are in many respects self 
evident: weak institutional capacities, political fragility and the endowment of rich 
natural resources. 
Zambia was no exception to these conditions and institutional challenges. The 
country’s administrative limitations at independence have already been alluded to 
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by Pettman (1974:35) in section 2.2.4 of Chapter Two of this thesis. However, it is 
Kaunda who perhaps succinctly summarises Zambia’s incapacity to manage its 
vast natural resources at the dawn of the new nation, a factor that naturally raised 
foreign attention: 
“At independence in 1964, the country had produced only 100 university 
graduates after 70 years of British rule. Of these only three were medical 
doctors. We realised that we needed to develop our manpower in order for 
the country to attain the capacity to develop” (Kaunda, 2007: xviii). 
The limitations on skill not withstanding, it is certain that the promise of 
democratisation in Africa was not simply the attainment of political freedoms. 
More fundamentally, the struggles were about economic liberation and therefore 
a transfer of assets to local ownership. 
As a result, Nationalisation - the acquisition by the state of strategic industries -
and Africanisation - the partial or complete transfer of foreign enterprises to local 
nationals - became a characteristic feature of countries such as Zambia, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Swaziland, Ghana and Nigeria among others. In all these 
newly independent states, Lonrho was compelled to negotiate with local interests 
for shared ownerships upon the advent of independence in the 1960s (United 
Kingdom 1981:sec. 2.17). 
But while in countries such as Tanzania, Lonrho was compelled to sell all of its 
companies to the government-owned National Development Corporation, the 
case of Zambia was somewhat much more complex. For the Kaunda-Rowland 
relationship (and by implication, the state-Lonrho liaisons) transcended the 
boundaries of business and publishing, extending to the realms of security at the 
height of the liberation wars of southern Africa. 
According to Andrew Sardanis (2003), a former Lonrho executive, pro-
independence activist and Kaunda’s financial advisor (Pettman, 1974:245), the 
relationship between Tiny Rowland and the Zambian President had its roots in 
the pre-independence era.  
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Born and schooled in Cyprus, Sardanis worked as a journalist in Northern 
Rhodesia in 1950; was involved with the independence movement led by 
Kenneth Kaunda; worked for Lonrho and later played an important role in the 
country’s administration and its dealings with foreign interests.  
Sardanis (2003:141) reveals that Rowland came to the aid of Kaunda’s financially 
crippled UNIP in the colonial era. After a rebuff by the Anglo American 
Corporation, which apparently had been supporting the Federal government of 
Roy Welensky, Kaunda turned to Lonrho, then an emerging Rhodesian firm 
newly headed by Rowland.  To secure his long term interests in Zambia, Rowland 
is reported to have paid a bank guaranteed cheque of 250,000 pounds 
($700,000) to Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) through his 
newly acquired Heinrich Syndicate (Sardanis, 2003:141-142). 
“It was a colossal sum of money in those days, particularly for UNIP, and it 
earned Tiny, KK’s eternal gratitude and friendship. In the years that followed, 
Rowland drew heavily on that obligation and made a lot of money, repeatedly 
embarrassing Kaunda internationally and locally” (Sardanis, 2003:142). 
The Heinrich Syndicate was owned by Max Heinrich who had other investments 
in Johannesburg and Durban (Hall, 1968:91). In Zambia, Heinrich operated 
breweries and a duet of newspapers (Kasoma, 1986:86).   
Recognising the challenges of travel in Africa, Rowland further extended as a 
courtesy, his newly acquired personal Beechcraft Queen Air 80 to the use of the 
Zambian President which ferried Kaunda to talks with President Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania, a country where Lonrho had already acquired the Central Line Sisal 
Estates (Cronje, 1976:36). 
In years to come, he was also to fly Ian Smith to Lusaka in his Lear-jet to 
clandestine meetings with Kaunda and Joshua Nkomo, the liberation leader of 
the Zimbabwe People’s Union (ZAPU) (Africa: Bye-Bye for Tiny Rowland, 
1978:19). 
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Lonrho’s expansion in Zambia began with its acquisition of Consolidated Motors 
in 1961, a modest spares firm. This was followed in 1964 with the takeovers of 
Puzey and Diss and Milne’s Motor supplies Ltd.  
 
Sardanis (2003, 173-181) notes that the sanctions applied on Rhodesia provided 
the ideal opportunity for Rowland to grow his firm and edge closer to the Zambian 
establishment. Rowland apparently exploited British ambivalence on the 
construction of a Tanzania - Zambia oil pipeline and presented Lonrho as a 
service provider, using the company’s reconstruction of a similar project between 
Rhodesia and Mozambique as a reference point.  
 
Opposition from influential copper companies (Hall, 1969:212), particularly Anglo 
American (Libby, 1983:396) at the modest credentials of Lonrho, cost the 
conglomerate the oil deal. Libby (1983:396) contends however that over time 
Lonrho made strategic decisions that enabled it gain political favour with the state 
and catalyse its dramatic growth in Zambia in the 1970s: 
 
 It committed itself to the achievement of the objectives of the Second 
National Development Plan (1972-1976) and;  
 It offered financial support to Zambia’s failing agricultural sector in 1970-
71, thereby identifying itself with the ruling party’s African democratic 
socialist ideology for the reconstruction of the country. 
 It complied with United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia endeared it to 
the Zambian government politically. 
 
But as we shall learn, Lornho was to renege on its position on sanctions against 
Rhodesia, inferentially with some collusion of silence from the Times Newspapers 
and the Kaunda government. 
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4.3.1 Lonrho’s newspaper acquisitions:  The emergence of the Times of Zambia 
 
“The main impact of the democratisation process at independence in 1964 
was to make the media more inclusive. Prior to independence, the media 
was segmented and tended to serve the interests of the settler community 
more than that of the natives” (Simuchoba, 2009/12/2). 
 
In the years to follow, Lonrho acquired interests in amethyst mining, brewing and 
newspapers. As stated earlier, among them was the Heinrich Syndicate Ltd which 
included the Chibuku Breweries established in 1955 by Max Heinrich.  
The Heinrich Syndicate included the Zambia Times and the Zambia News, two 
unprofitable newspapers. The Northern News, another medium circulating in 
northern Zambia, was also taken over taken over by Rowland’s growing concerns 
(Makayi, 1997:17). 
In the re-organisation that followed, the weekly Zambia Times was closed; the 
Zambia News was transformed into a weekly while the Northern News became a 
daily named the Times of Zambia. The first edition of the Times of Zambia 
appeared on June 30, 1965 (Kasoma, 1986:87).  
Again, Rowland’s political connections materialised: He appointed Tom Mtine, 
Mayor of Ndola and employee of the Breweries, to the managing directorship and 
chairmanship of Lonrho-Zambia. Mtine had connections and access to powerful 
Zambian leaders, including President Kaunda. However, Rowland’s influence on 
Kaunda and his venture into the publishing industry had begun to unsettle some 
within the Kaunda administration.    
Intent on owning a voice of its own, the government hence moved to take over 
The Central African Mail owned by the Astor Group and renamed it the Zambia 
Mail, a bi-weekly. Rowland, after initially failing to possess the newspaper, bought 
the less significant Financial Mail of Zambia (Cronje et al, 1976:34-35). 
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As Simuchoba (2009/12/2)19 a former managing editor of the Times newspapers, 
intimates in an interview, the entry of the government as a key player in the 
media industry had the effect of reducing the credibility of the state’s first major 
publication - the Zambia Daily Mail. 
“The effect was reduced credibility for the Daily Mail which was derisively 
referred to as the Government Gazette” (Simuchoba 2009/12/2). 
During this period, business deals that accompanied the government’s acquisition 
of private newspapers are however not sufficiently documented by Zambian 
media scholars.  
It is Cronje et al (1976:34-36) who expose the behind-the-scenes trading that 
eventually consigned the Times to political ownership by the state: Initial plans 
should have involved a joint newspaper scheme between the state and Lonrho 
with the Zambia Mail and the Zambia publishing company and Lonrho’s Zambia 
Newspapers Limited merging.  
Equal shareholding of 50 percent was apparently discussed between the 
government and Lonrho, with one percent for voting purposes, inter-changeable 
between the state and Lonrho, depending on whether the matter concerned was 
of a financial or editorial nature.   
Kaunda was to have the sole right to nominate senior editorial staff. Under the 
deal, the Times of Zambia would remain a daily while the Zambia Mail would 
become a Sunday newspaper. The Zambia News was to be discontinued. 
According to Cronje et al (1976; 35), the arrangement collapsed due to a number 
of factors: 
 
 Firstly due to the discovery that the Lonrho assets were worth only 
100,000 pounds sterling while the assets of government’s Mail totalled 
1.25 million pounds sterling.  
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 See Interview transcripts in Appendix One of this thesis 
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 Secondly, Lonrho’s close links to Rhodesia caused some discomfort 
among some officials in the Zambian government, including vice president 
Simon Kapwepwe. 
 Thirdly, the merger was going to reduce the number of dailies effectively to 
one, which might not have suited the new government’s nation-building 
agenda. 
In anticipation of the merger, Dunstan Kamana, Kaunda’s press secretary was 
appointed as editor of the Times of Zambia, even though a formal announcement 
of the intended takeover was only made in June 1975 during Kaunda’s watershed 
speech. The actual takeover did not come until October 1982 (Kasoma, 1986: 
142). 
  
 
4.3.2 Examining the editorial independence of the Times Newspapers under 
Lonrho - state ownership 
Consequently, during the period 1968 to 1980, the Times survived complete 
state ownership and remained under an unusual joint ‘ownership’ arrangement 
between Lonrho and the state. 
The Times of Zambia, largely because of its long history as the only foreign 
owned newspaper in Zambia, ostensibly continued to enjoy a favourable public 
image over the years.  
Not surprisingly, the refrain in the Zambian academic fraternity has upheld the 
post independence media (and in particular the Times) as relatively free 
(Kasoma, 2000:25) and or categorically free (Makungu, 2004: 101), without 
often framing arguments within the broader political economic and social 
contexts of the day. 
In this regard, Richard Hall, the first editor of the Times of Zambia vehemently 
denied any editorial interference from Lonrho (Kasoma, 1986: 93). 
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Interviews with former editors of the Times of Zambia conducted by this 
researcher understandably project the newspapers as having played a 
watchdog role in the First Republic. But there is a mixed impression of how far 
this freedom extended. 
Arthur Simuchoba (2009/12/2) one of the first generation of formally trained 
Zambian journalists in the Lonrho era contends that the newspaper enjoyed 
‘complete editorial independence’ (see interview questionnaires, appendix one).  
Denis Kapata (2011/02/21), a former news editor who worked under Lonrho 
ownership of the Times; and later experienced the take over of the newspapers 
by UNIP, concurs. 
Ridgeway Liwena (2008), 20the first black sports editor on the Times of Zambia, 
is more measured in suggesting that the newspaper recognised its limitations 
by, for instance, not directly criticising President Kaunda. Sandbrook (1996: 82) 
augments this assertion. 
John Phiri (2009/11/20) the current managing director of the Times/printmaker 
Limited, however, rationalises that the Times Newspapers under Lonrho were 
inclined to protecting the interests of the Tiny Rowland primarily, despite the 
presence of a state appointed editor-in-chief.  
 
4.3.3 UK Competition Commission Inquiry into Lonrho’s alleged editorial 
interference on the Times 
The relationships between the Times and its co-owners hence have lent 
themselves to much speculative analysis over the past 45 years. However, 
corporate censorship and collusion between the state and the market have not 
been emphasised at all in discourses on press freedom in Zambia.  
And yet the revelations of the United Kingdom (UK) Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission Report (1981) on Lonrho severely discredit assertions of ‘complete’ 
independence ascribed to the Times in the First Republic.  
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 Unpublished face-to-face interviews: See transcript in appendix one 
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The Commission’s investigations into the dealings of Lonrho unravelled allegations 
of corporate interference in the editorial workings of the Times of Zambia in the 
1966-68 periods, when the newspaper was edited by Richard Hall. 
H.L. Leeds, who served as manager of the Times of Zambia between 1965 and 
1968 submitted to the Commission that the paper’s editors were continually 
harassed by Tiny Rowland for publishing news stories critical of the government or 
the ruling party (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.1). Some of the incidents cited are as 
follows: 
 That Rowland instructed Hall to publish anti-Italian articles to counter negative 
publicity of Lonrho by the Italian press. This arose ostensibly because Italian 
companies were the major competitors to Lonrho for the construction of the 
Tanzania-Zambia oil pipeline. Both Rowland and Hall were placed on record 
has having denied these charges21. 
 That the managing director of the Lonrho-owned Heinrich Brewery had 
instructed Leeds to suppress an article on labour disputes and the harassment 
of white management by its black workers. The Commission asserts that there 
is no doubt the story was suppressed and that as a result an assistant editor 
resigned. Richard Hall, apparently in London during the incident, wrote a 
memorandum to a local director “seriously condemning the incident” (United 
Kingdom 1981: sec 7.3). 
 That in 1967, Tom Mtine, the managing director of Lonrho Zambia Limited, 
upon losing mayoral elections, instructed Hall’s successor at the Times, Philip 
Griffiths, never to publish a picture of the new mayor in the Times Newspapers. 
Following his appeal to Tiny Rowland, the editor was allegedly ordered to obey 
Mtine’s instructions or resign.  In defence of Mtine, Lonrho provided evidence 
of pictures of the managing director with the new mayor, at the installation 
ceremony. 
                                                 
21
 According to the Zambia Mail of 27 August 1965, Leeds, while still serving as Lonrho Manager of the 
Lonrho newspapers, is reported to have publicly denied having personally ordered the removal of a story 
in the Times of Zambia involving the Lonrho owned Heinrich Syndicate (Kasoma, 1986: 94). 
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Further written evidence was submitted to the Commission by Derek Taylor, a 
former journalist (1963-65), political editor (1965-66) and deputy editor; and acting 
editor (1966-68). Taylor’s affidavit focuses on occurrences in 1967 in Lusaka, the 
Zambian capital. 
Taylor admits having been told by Leeds of Tiny Rowland’s ire with Hall for an 
article critical of President Kaunda’s remission of a prison sentence of a UNIP 
official. In Rowland’s view, the story generated political hostility toward the 
newspaper. Rowland had allegedly suggested that both Taylor and the editor of 
the business magazine be dismissed (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.4). 
Richard Hall’s own submission appears to confirm the gravity of the situation, 
despite his earlier assertions of editorial independence.  
The Commission reports that Hall volunteered to resign following the uproar over 
the UNIP article, a move ‘reluctantly’ accepted by Rowland. Rowland denies 
having forced Hall to resign or pressurising him over the incidence. 
In the submissions, Hall claims Kaunda displayed no hostility toward him thereafter 
and had in fact offered him a senior position in the public service, which he 
declined (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.6).  
For his part, Rowland defended Kaunda’s press freedom credentials, citing the 
numerous occasions the Times of Zambia had attacked the president without 
repressive action.  
During the hearings, Hall and his news editor, G. Gillies, submitted evidence 
denying any interference in the workings of the newspapers by either Rowland or 
Mtine. Gillies attested that the Times of Zambia had been severely critical of UDI in 
Rhodesia despite the vulnerability of Lonrho in Rhodesia (United Kingdom 1981: 
sec 7.10). 
In support of this stand-point, Hall similarly pointed to occasions when the Times 
had been critical of Lonrho despite it being the parent company.  
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The most compelling piece of evidence in defence of the independence of the 
Times of Zambia under Lonrho relates to the paper’s vociferous criticism of 
Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko’s visit to Zambia, which resulted in the 
expropriation of the company’s assets in that country.  
The editors did not lose their jobs, Hall, Gillies and Rowland contend in their 
evidence. However, it is significant to note the Commission’s final observations on 
this submission: 
 
“Mr Rowland also referred to this incident in his evidence and confirmed that 
it led to the confiscation of Lonrho’s assets in Zaire. But three years later, 
the company’s property was returned” (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.10). 
 
In short, Rowland was inexplicably able to regain his investments in Zaire despite 
the rancour over the Times reports. 
 
4.3.4 ‘Unexposed’ security liaisons between Rowland, Kaunda, Smith and Vorster 
 
It is prudent to continue to question the ‘complete’ independence of the Times of 
Zambia under Lonrho's ownership and the shared co-ownership arrangement with 
the state, given the gravity of the omissions in the recording of a significant aspect 
of the country’s history, that is; the nature of its involvement in the liberation of 
southern Africa.22 
Rowland and Hall’s submissions to the United Kingdom Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, in defence of the Times of Zambia’s under Lonrho, certainly pale in 
the face of detailed published works of Cronje et al (1976; 37) and to some extent 
                                                 
22
 It was not considered necessary, given the parameters of this thesis, to interview a large pool of 
journalists employed on the Times over the 45 year period, particularly on the specific cases of 
controversy relating to the coverage of political and business elites or policies/practices for hiring and 
firing reporters in the first, second and third republics. This was, obviously, not the central focus of the 
thesis and would therefore not have added value to the knowledge already gleaned from the methods 
adopted. This researcher recognises however the importance of this as a potential area for future 
research.  
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that of Rowland’s biographer, Bower (1994:271) who expose how the newspapers 
allegedly covered up Rowland’s secret dealings with Ian Smith and Vorster while 
working as an emissary of Kaunda’s. 
Cronje et al (1976: 37-38) posit that, at home, the Times of Zambia reflected 
Lonrho’s interests in criticising the nationalisation policy announced by Kaunda in 
1968.  
This was because Lonrho’s own Smith and Youngson was affected by the 
nationalisation programme and the company’s displeasure was hence reflected 
through adverse newspaper articles. 
Lonrho’s influence is also attributed to the failure of the Times Newspapers to 
report the company’s continued involvement in Rhodesia, a country which was 
effectively at war with liberation - inclined Zambia.  
In this regard, Bower (1994: 269) suggests Kaunda was aware of Lonrho’s 
sanction busting and was not able to expose Rowland’s company because his own 
government was maintaining low key trade with Rhodesia.   
 
“Kaunda’s and Rowland’s ambitions in Africa were mutually dependent to a 
degree” (Bower, 1994:271). 
Indeed it is established that there was a level of covert trading going on between 
Zambia and Rhodesia during UDI (Hall, 1969:31).  Although Zambia had reduced 
its imports from Rhodesia; the importation of goods from South Africa increased 
by a similar volume.  Hall suggests that some of the Rhodesian goods were 
simply re-packaged and re-labelled in South Africa to avoid embarrassment. 
The Times of Zambia made no exposé of these covert exchanges23. However, in 
1971, Kaunda told the UNIP Parliamentary caucus that Zambia had imported 
                                                 
23
 Kasoma (1986: 175) reveals that in 1977 the government owned Zambia Daily Mail, at the time, had 
received a late confirmation from the state of Ian Smith’s visit to Zambia. The article was generated by the 
Mail’s syndication department, under pressure from its foreign clients. The item was not essentially for the 
local market and had vital details missing. To emphasise the sensitivity of these matters, Kasoma 
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maize from Rhodesia to avert a national crisis.  The Times of Zambia editorialised 
in favour of the state’s decision endorsing the action as inevitable and a matter of 
national interest (Mtshali, 1973: 262).  
Except for modest exposures of government sanction busting such as the use of 
the Rhodesian corridor for the export of copper, the Times of Zambia was 
generally in agreement with the Zambian government on matters relating to UDI 
Rhodesia (Kasoma,1986:88). 
According to Kasoma (1986:93), himself a former journalist, the Lonrho editorial 
policy allowed the newspaper to criticise UNIP as a party; but was wary of souring 
relations with the government or president Kaunda. 
Perhaps the most profound of the revelations concerning the Times and the close 
relationship between the Zambian president and Rowland was the deployment of 
the latter as an intermediary in matters related to the country’s security relations 
with apartheid South Africa and UDI Rhodesia. 
Rowland was apparently used to set up meetings between Kaunda and South 
Africa’s apartheid leader John Vorster. This was done against a background of 
incursions into Zambia by rebel Rhodesian troops and South African forces.  
The meeting between the two allowed for a settlement for Rhodesia to be tabled. 
These events occurred to the ire of Zambia foreign minister and former editor of 
the Times, Vernon Mwaanga, who felt undermined by Kaunda and Rowland 
(Bower, 1994; 273). 
Exploiting his secret mandate, Rowland apparently initiated the events that finally 
culminated in a summit on August 25 1975 at the Victoria Falls between Kaunda 
and Vorster. Vorster persuaded Smith to release Zimbabwean nationalist leaders 
Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe from detention and declare a ceasefire. 
Because of his close ties to Kaunda, Rowland had to support the pro-western 
                                                                                                                                                              
highlights the arrest in 1983 of Daily Mail Syndications editor Shadreck Soko, for carrying copies of 
Kaunda’s speech on a holiday to Swaziland, a country located within the borders of the then, apartheid 
South Africa. Soko was interrogated for 13 days before release. 
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candidate, Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU over ZANU’s Robert Mugabe (Bower, 1994: 
276). 
The public meeting between Kaunda and Vorster was reported widely. But not 
surprisingly, Rowland’s role and the convert meetings between Smith and 
Kaunda are not to be found in the content of the Times at a time when the 
newspapers had their most enduring image as a public watchdog! 
The logical explanation for this would be the complex entanglement of Lonrho 
and the state with Ian Smith’s Rhodesia and possibly the national security 
considerations surrounding Rowland’s activities necessitated a collusion of 
silence amongst state, Lonrho and its newspapers. 
Herman and Chomsky (2002: 2)’s articulation of the propaganda model of the 
media, seems relevant here. While it is relatively easy to determine that the 
media serves the dominant class in environments where the state is in direct 
control, it is less evident where they are in private ownership. The influence of 
wealth and power will be masked by private media’s periodic attacks and exposé 
of corporate and governmental shortcomings. Media in this instance will portray 
themselves as champions of free speech and the general community interest. 
 
“A propaganda model focuses on this inequality of wealth and power and its 
multilevel effects on mass media interests and choices. It traces the routes 
by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, 
marginalise dissent, and allow the government and dominant private 
interests to get their messages across to the public” (Herman & Chomsky, 
2002: 2). 
 
 
4.3.5 Comparing the behaviours of Lonrho media in Zambia and Kenya 
 
To augment these assertions, one is tempted to examine similar cases in other 
parts of the continent where Lonrho was active in business and publishing.  
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It is Kariethi (1991) who perhaps reinforces the notion of corporate interference 
from Lonrho by demonstrating similar behaviours in the Kenyan media milieu. 
Although Kenya’s media history is quite dissimilar to Zambia’s, particularly in 
terms of the endurance of multinational ownership of the media to the present 
day, there are some parallels in respect of the Lonrho-owned newspapers which 
would prove useful to this discussion. 
Kenya has an array of privately owned newspapers of which the three largest 
publishing groups are the Nation Newspapers Limited, owned by the Aga Khan, 
the Standard owned by Lonrho’s Consolidated Holdings Limited; and the Kenya 
Times, owned by the founding political party, the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU)(Kariethi, 1991:200). 
Kareithi (1991:208-209) posits that the Standard unwaveringly supported Tiny 
Rowland’s notion of “revolutionary capitalism” and was scathing in its reaction to 
any public media criticism of foreign owned press or interests. 
The key elements of his assertions can be summarised as such: 
 
 Ostensibly because of Lonrho’s close ties to political elites in Kenya, the 
Standard editorialised in support of detention without trial for opponents of 
President Moi. 
 In 1982, when George Githi, the Standard’s editor attempted to condemn 
detentions of dissidents, he was summarily dismissed by the Lonrho board 
of directors. 
 The Standard was one of the leading supporters of constitutional 
amendments in May 1982 to render Kenya a de facto one party state. 
 The Standard had not promoted indigenisation of the economy and land 
reforms, matters which were close to the masses of landless 
Kenyans(substantial portions.  
 
The fore-going analysis establishes a pattern from various bodies of knowledge, 
that strengthens the argument that markets and states have similar influences on 
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media or more pointedly, that collusion between the two does occur and can 
undermine media freedom.  
 
In fact, it can be argued quite authoritatively, based on corroborated accounts 
from the various sources thus far, that the Times was constrained by Lonrho in 
some respects although it was allowed enough leeway to sustain a sufficiently 
strong public image through generalised criticisms of government policies. 
For instance, from Kasoma (1986), Sandbrook (1996) and Liwena (2008) we 
learn that the Times Newspapers were regularly critical of the party and its 
government but did not directly attack President Kaunda presumably because of 
his close ties to Rowland and the Zambian leader’s unique position as the 
appointing authority of the chief executive of the foreign owned entity. 
 
“Political control started with Dunstan Kamana. Although he never directly 
criticised the president, he was fearless. He always protected his staff. I 
don’t recall a reporter being called to answer to outsiders” (Liwena, 2008). 
 
The explanation for Kaunda’s insulation from direct criticism is to be further 
deduced from the analysis presented by Cronje et al (1976: 37). These resonate 
with the allegations made by former senior employees of the Times to the United 
Kingdom (UK) Monopolies and Mergers Commission.   
 
Therefore, while there is little doubt that the Times did interrogate party and 
government actions, it is certain that the two most prominent protagonists in the 
Zambia - Rhodesia saga, Kaunda and Rowland, were spared any traceable 
amount of critical scrutiny by the Times. The role of Lonrho in constraining the 
Times at critical moments in the politics of the country has virtually been left 
untouched in the wider academic project regarding the media in Zambia.  
Needless to say, the state and Lonrho each had somewhat varied interests in 
maintaining political controls on the Times Newspapers. 
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4.3.6 The state-corporate control model 
 
Ultimately, it becomes increasingly evident that provided the Times Newspapers 
generated profits for Lonrho and avoided embarrassing the president and 
government to a certain degree, the conglomerate was disinterested in the day-to -
day reporting of the newspaper (Kasoma, 1986:93). The evolving structure of the 
Times during the First republic, leading into the Second Republic begins to support 
this thesis.  
 
“Lonrho used board members largely drawn from the business community; 
whereas under the state ownership, party, government operatives have 
always outnumbered business community representatives” Phiri 
(2009/11/20). 
 
For Lonrho’s profit motive to be fulfilled, the Times had to maintain a favourable 
public image. Rowland appears to have done so successfully without losing 
political favour from UNIP/state and from Kaunda in particular for most of the First 
Republic.  Lonrho maintained its control of the commercial side of Times and 
Printpak, the publishing company and therefore continued appointing a General 
Manager and Chief Accountant: 
 
“Yes, they allowed Kaunda to appoint the editor-in-chief, but they continued 
to appoint the general manager and chief accountant because they were 
interested in the profits” (Liwena, 2008/05/08). 
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Both Lonrho and the state, considered this enterprise as key to their own 
ambitions but from slightly different perspectives. The compromise position 
reached by the two eventually produced a structure that enabled what might be 
termed a state-corporate control model (Figure 5). 
The model escapes the four theories of the press or the modified philosophy of a 
social-centralist media, to describe centrally controlled and guided newspapers 
(Merrill 1990:37). In essence, the applicability and adaptability of Siebert, 
Peterson and Schramm’s Four Theories of the Press (1956) is increasingly 
challenged by rapid changes in global political and economic contexts 
characterised by the phenomena of liberalisation, privatisation, 
commercialisation, convergence and globalisation which necessitate a shift from 
the media as a cultural institution to a market driven one (Fourie, 2007: 3). 
Changing political economic dynamics will also contest assertions by key 
authorities such as Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 40-41) who conceptualises news 
media as a semi-autonomous social sector, which despite experiencing external 
pressure, maintain internal homogeneity and are collectively capable of 
generating power to influence other sectors. 
Bourdieus holds that the social world is structured around two opposing forms of 
power; economic capital - money or assets that can be transformed into money - 
and cultural capital, which includes educational credentials, technical expertise, 
general knowledge, verbal abilities and artistic sensibilities. Bourdieu views 
economic capital as being exhibited through circulation, advertising revenues or 
audience ratings whereas cultural capital of the field is demonstrated through the 
award of high profile honours to media professionals, such as the Pulitzer Prize. 
Exposing the limitations of Bourdieu’s field theory, Benson (2006: 189) rightly 
acknowledges the possibility of external heterogeneity, or; “the multiple and 
potentially cross-cutting constraints on journalism arising from the political and 
economic fields’’. 
The “cross-cutting constraints” imposed on journalism by political and economic 
elites have been substantially illustrated in this chapter of the thesis, buttressing 
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Benson’s position. The alliances formed by Kaunda and Rowland are expressed, 
hence, through the state corporate control model.  
That alliance, and the entity it creates, lends itself to scrutiny from the Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) perspective. ANT’s principal feature is that both humans 
and non humans constitute a network to be studied. It concerns itself with the 
motivations and actions of human actors that tailor their interests around the 
requirements of the non human actors. In the conventional understanding of this 
theory, the state, the public and media owners would be the human actors while 
the market would constitute the non human actor (Gao, 2005: 257).  
ANT has been criticised for being ‘politically neutral’, being too pre-occupied with 
questions of how networks are established in terms of relations, but not with 
whether these relations are characterised by ethical or unethical means 
(Alcadipani & Hassard([Sa]).  
Based on this interpretation, the state-corporate structure (or network) formulated 
by Kaunda and Rowland, with the Times as the non human entity, is not based 
on any discernible ethics, but has invariably aligned the various interests of 
different humans and non human elements into a social artefact. The role of the 
politically powerful is fundamental here and can therefore not be avoided. 
Shoemaker and Reese (1996:199) reinforce this notion that media content has 
multiple influences, with the powerful, being elemental in this regard.  
Interestingly, Shoemaker and Reese, after evaluating a body of research on 58 
countries in respect of state-media relations, conclude that all governments exert 
controls on mass media.  Obviously the manner and extent of this influence 
varies from different developmental contexts. 
In the case of China for example, Ernest Zhang and Kenneth Fleming (2005: 319-
339) categorise media influences by the powerful in a three-way party control 
model which employs party and government at various levels to mould media 
content. This model might partly speak more distinctly to the Times of Zambia 
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after 1982 when Lonrho relinquished ownership to UNIP and its government, 
ironically, a similar party-government model reminiscent of the Communist bloc 24. 
Figure 4: Three-way party-control model 
 
 
Source: Zhang & Fleming (2005: 325). 
 
However, the Lonrho-state arrangement does not conform to these descriptions 
forwarded largely by western inspired scholarship.  
Therefore, to fully appreciate how the interests of UNIP (which is conflated with 
the state in this context) and Lonrho co-existed symbiotically, one is challenged to 
re-construct the oversight framework of the Times of Zambia in the first 17 years 
of independence, a period when a fragile dominant party structure influenced the 
transformation of Zambia into a one party state by the end of 1972.  
Figure 5 is constructed based on the insider accounts gained from interviews with 
current and former editors of the Times of Zambia, regarding the nature of the 
power relations between state, Lonrho and the Times establishment.  This 
                                                 
24
 This thesis does not pertinently address normative theory in the conduct of interviews and in the  
articulation of insider accounts because the main interest lies more in the field of political economy. 
Party-Government 
Appointing Editors Issuing Directives Direct Instructions 
Controls 
Newspaper Content 
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structure is demonstrative of actual lines of accountability rather than the 
conventional operational model presented by the Times.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: The two-way state-corporate control model  
 
Source: constructed by author. 
There are three key aspects to this model: 1) It has been inferred from the fore-
going analysis that the state influenced content on the Times to some degree 
through the direct appointment of the editor-in-chief by the president. 2) This was 
reinforced by an unwritten policy by the Lonrho-appointed board to allow the 
editor of the newspapers to criticise the party and less so the government and the 
president 3) Lonrho controlled the commercial aspects of the company, with 
direct access to the general manager of Times/Printpak and the chief accountant, 
therefore matters of sustainability and profitability remained under their 
superintendence. Conflict arose between the general manager and chief 
accountant on the one hand, with the editor-in-chief on the other, in respect of 
space and libel cases. It is here where the influences of the commercial and the 
editorial aspects of the Times can be said to be bi-directional. Simuchoba 
(2009/12/2) illuminates this pointedly:  
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“Under Lonrho commercial interests were paramount and Lonrho always 
appointed the general manager of the Times whose responsibility was to see to 
the commercial interest. It is instructive that the editor-in-chief and the general 
manager were nearly always at odds as when the former would order withholding 
of adverts to create more room for news. The GM was never amused. Neither 
was he by a “big” libel file. The autonomy was tenuous in that sense-while the 
EIC could write pretty much what he thought fit, Lonrho had to make its money.” 
(Simuchoba, 2009/12/2). 
It has to be stated however that the transformation of the Times during the first 
republic and succeeding periods is not by any means, a social anomaly.  
Functionalist-structural approaches to mass communication studies have 
indicated that social systems respond structurally to environmental changes. The 
capacity to compensate the environmental influences serves as the assurance of 
the survival of a social system (Sturmer, 1998:6-7). 
To summarise: This chapter has thus far mapped the extent of power relations 
that occasioned the distribution of communication resources in post 
independence Zambia, leading up to the present day.  
The economic imperatives of this discussion point to a multinational entity that 
exploited personal friendship with charismatic leaders in Africa and Zambia more 
specifically; and that exploited the institutional weaknesses of independent states, 
to expand its empire. In all instances, the MNC Lonrho acquired media interests 
which played key roles in advancing its causes. 
The arrangement between Lonrho and the state to co-own the Times underlines 
assertions that states and markets can have similar influences on media freedom, 
and in this rare instance, common purposes for limiting the political public sphere. 
What is perhaps less certain at this point is how the institutional settings, the 
primacy of personal-based rule and conflation of party and state, may have 
facilitated these political actions and liaisons; inevitably impacting on the conduct 
of the Times. 
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4.3.7 Dominant party structures and person-based rule: how the political system 
contributed to the demise of the Times 
 
This section of the chapter will therefore examine how the unassailability of Kaunda’s 
relationship with Rowland was aided by three key factors: 
 
 The dominant party structure that emerged at independence characterised by 
weak opposition and the subsequent single party state established in 1972. 
 The constitutional powers of the presidency in Zambia which allowed him to 
appoint all cabinet ministers and speaker of national assembly 
 The institutionalisation and personalisation of the presidency and the ruling 
party, a charismatic/patriarchal leadership style common to post 
independence Africa 
The three factors will be discussed in an integrated fashion, to expose the extent 
to which political actions might have occurred without hindrance within and 
without the party political system. 
In Chapter One section 1.2.1 reference was made to the over-riding influence of 
dominant party systems over many critical aspects of democracy in Africa.  
It is important to reiterate on the outset that Zambia has had two periods of 
dominant party systems - the First Republic and the Third; and one of a de facto 
one party set up (the Second Republic). 
Scholars note that despite some obvious similarities, there are clear distinctions 
between dominant party and one party system. A dominant party arises and 
endures as a result of the will of the people through elections. On the other hand, 
in the one party system, the ruling party and the state are the personification of 
the charismatic leader, a relationship that is forged around the ideology of the 
latter (Heywood, 2002:260).  
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Historically, one-party systems were not subject to competition and resulted from 
coercive legal proscription of opposition parties (Matshiqi, 2010: 2) or executive 
action (Simutanyi, 2008:11).   
The two systems, in some instances, do share similar features, such as the pre-
eminence of the presidency over other institutions and the propensity for 
centralised decision making, a fundamental feature which would encourage the 
kind of political liaisons that existed between Kaunda and Rowland over time. 
The one party state might nonetheless present itself as the more repressive 
system given the preponderance of the so-called person-based rule, which 
immortalised founding presidents therefore rendering them invulnerable to wrong 
doing. 
 
Spiess (2002:1) suggests that dominant parties are defined by numerical 
superiority over a prolonged period of time; dominance over bargaining when 
forming governments; and in determining the policy agenda.   
 
Simutanyi (2008:11) identifies four key features of Single Party Dominance 
(SPDs): 
 
 Control over the presidency. 
 Proportionally higher share of parliamentary seats. 
 Degree of exclusion of the opposition in policy formulation and decision-
making. 
 Presence of a maximum coalition de-legitimising opposition; and a weak 
and less institutionalised opposition. 
 
Not only are dominant parties over bearing, they can also be resilient, surviving 
popular dissent due to their propensity to politicise public resources (Greene, 
2010:2-4). 
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that political scientists are 
beginning to increasingly question the relationship between one-party dominance 
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and democracy (Heywood, 2002: Simutanyi, 2008: Maudeni, Sebudubudu, 
Kebonang & Mokhawa, 2008, Matshiqi, 2010). 
Disappointingly, none of the scholars lays any emphasis on media controls that 
arise as a result of single party dominance. For while the one party state is often 
associated with hostility to media independence, the dominant party phenomenon 
cannot be absolved of similar blame either.  
In his analysis of SPDs in Zambia, Simutanyi (2008:3), as others before him, 
concentrates on the political effects arising from one-party dominance which 
include reducing political competition, excluding specific groups from political 
power and representation; blurring the lines between party and state, blocking 
political initiative, fuelling corruption, promoting self-centred/personal behaviour 
and preventing policy innovation. 
However, by examining political events in Zambia in the First and Second 
Republics, an inference can be drawn that Kaunda’s actions on the media were 
certainly bolstered by the emergence of UNIP as the dominant post 
independence party.  
Pre-independence elections held on January 4, 1964, saw UNIP coast to victory 
with 55 seats against the African National Congress (ANC)’s 10, consigning the 
latter to a provincial party (Simutanyi, 2008: 9). 
Simutanyi (2008: 9) traces Kaunda’s personal rule to the 1967 UNIP Central 
Committee meeting which saw the nationalist leader replace competitive 
intraparty elections with a pre-selected list of preferred candidates who were to 
be endorsed at each party conference. The departure of Vice President Simon 
Kapwepwe in 1971 to form the United Progressive Party (UPP), referred to in 
Chapter Two, resulted directly from Kaunda’s leadership style, he asserts. 
Simutanyi observes that the post independence political parties were generally 
characterised by personalised leadership, lack of institutionalisation, factionalism 
and a high degree of fragmentation.  
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Because of UNIP’s dominance and ethnic dissent over access to power 
compounded by weak opposition, Kaunda moved to consolidate his power base 
after the 1967 UNIP central committee meeting, combining the position of 
secretary-general and party president and dissolving several key positions within 
the party. 
The pre-eminence of Zambia’s first president and UNIP as the founding party 
hence allowed for the entrenchment of Humanism as a national philosophy.  
With conditions set for the establishment of the one party state in 1972, Kaunda’s 
person-based rule was institutionalised and expressed through national slogans.  
The content of Humanism Part 1 and the deification of Kaunda on the front pages 
of both the Times and the Zambia Daily Mail, and his headline treatment by both 
radio and television emphasise conformity driven by a deliberate state policy in 
this regard (Chisala, 1994:44).  
Overall, it can be argued that the political climate propagated by dominant parties 
could allow for excessive actions, given that the public accountability role of 
opposition and media is often denuded.  
It stands to reason to conclude that the liaisons such as those forged between 
Kaunda and Rowland would have gone unchecked because of the overriding 
influences of the person in power, the absence of opposition or organised civil 
society and above all, the nature of covert controls imposed on the leading daily 
of the day - the Times of Zambia.  
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4.3.8 The one party state and the structure of the Times under the Zambia 
National Holdings (Second Republic) 
 
The advent of the one party state in 1972 saw a more aggressive agenda to 
colonise the Times Newspapers by the state, which was now distinctly conflated 
with the ruling party, UNIP.   
It is critical to reiterate here that it was characteristic of many founding African 
leaders to prioritise national unity over individual freedoms (Sturmer, 1998:18) 
and therefore the media were increasingly seen as a tool for fostering social 
cohesion or national assimilation of ethnically diverse groups. 
Consequently, upon the official takeover of the Times by UNIP in 1982, the 
reporting structure, at least in principle, changed.  The Times of Zambia and 
Sunday Times of Zambia, along with Printpak Zambia, and Newspaper 
Distributors fell directly under the Zambia National Holdings (ZNHL), the parent 
company of all of UNIP’s assets. This essentially rendered the newspapers the 
property of the ruling party (Kasoma, 1986: 142). 25 
While the Zambia Daily Mail continued to be referred to as a ‘government owned 
newspaper’ the Times Newspapers were considered a party entity (Press now 
under one roof. 1988:1). 
As a ‘party paper’ the Times was expected to be the extension of the voice of the 
party and its government’ and the principle vehicle for the promotion of the ideals 
of Kaunda’s Humanism, which has been discussed in section 2.2.5 of Chapter 
Two. 
                                                 
25
 The take over of the Times Newspapers by UNIP in 1982 underlines the end of the Lonrho era. Further 
afield, it is inferred that Lonrho’s influences in Zambia’s political economic affairs also waned ahead of 
Tiny Rowland’s passing. Bower (1994) has infact suggested that the rise of the MMD and particularly the 
re-emergence of Vernon Mwaanga as foreign affairs minister under the Chiluba administration, accounts 
for the eventual marginalisation of Lonrho in Zambian politics. Rowland was deposed by the board of 
directors in 1994 for allegedly concealing financial information. The dismissal and eventual death of 
Rowland in 1998 finally, signified a change in the modus operandi of the multinational, that is, a noticeable 
departure from exploiting class national class alliances to achieve commercial aims. The Lonrho PLC 
report for 1998 commits to the demerger of Lonrho Africa from the Group. Chairman Sir John Craven, in 
January 1999, proposed a change in name of the company to Lonmin Plc (Craven, 1999: 1). 
 206 
The management structure inherited from Lonrho remained largely the same, 
with a general manager who presided over the commercial functions of the 
Times/Printpak Zambia Limited, and an editor-in-chief whose main mandate was 
to lead the editorial aspects of the establishment. 
There were modifications to the newspapers distribution department, which was 
constituted into a subsidiary company named Newspaper Distributors, headed by 
its own general manager. 
The Second Republican structure of the Times ensured that Times staff, including 
the editor-in-chief and his reporters and editors, became card carrying members 
of the ruling party. 
The implication of this was that employment could quite easily be denied on 
account of lack of party loyalty. This was alluded to in Kaunda’s 1975 Watershed 
Speech and through the sackings of some senior editorial staff who appeared to 
deviate from prescribed party thinking (Makayi, 1997:19). 
 
4.3.9 The structure of the Times under the National Media Corporation (NAMECO) 
and the MMD (Second and Third Republics) 
 
Kaunda remained committed to transforming the media sector along the lines of 
his philosophy of Humanism under which he sought to advance the party’s aims 
and objectives through the ownership of newsletters, newspapers and magazines 
(Kaunda, 1968:11). 
During the mid to late eighties when industrial unrest and food riots had began to 
manifest the first major signs of popular disaffection with the one party 
regime(Roberts,1995:1014-15), Kaunda began to publicly entertain a more 
integrated media conglomerate which would absorb loss making government 
media entities. 
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“I know the Times of Zambia is standing on its own and does not get subsidy. 
But the Zambia Daily Mail cannot. It gets subsidy. There is need to bring 
them under one roof” (Spread Wings-KK, 1988:1). 
 
Darnoff (1997:202) notes that pressure on the state media has emanated from 
the ruling party (conflated with the state) in three key vectors: 
 
 The economic dependence of the media on the state (which leads to the 
expectation of favourable and guaranteed coverage). 
 The appointment of members of boards of directors (often chosen for their 
political orientation rather than their performance). 
 The direct influence of ministers over news editors and programmers.  
Kaunda’s proposed horizontal concentration of all state media certainly made this 
a reality. 
In 1988 Kaunda brought the Times Newspapers and the Zambia Daily Mail, with 
their respective printing companies under the aegis of the National Media 
Corporation (NAMECO). 
Kaunda instructed the board of NAMECO to ensure that the new media 
conglomerate became economically viable. Subsidies were assured for the first 
year of NAMECO’s operations; thereafter, the entity was to be self sustaining. 
Kaunda assigned his special assistant for press and minister of national 
guidance, information and broadcasting, Milimo Punabantu to manage the re-
organisation of the media entities. Punabantu, a former editor-in-chief of the 
Times, was to be assisted by Naphy Nyalugwe, himself a previous editor of the 
newspapers, who had fallen out of favour with the president for his critical 
editorials. The ZNHL formally ceased to be the holding company of the Times 
Newspapers, Printpak and Newspaper Distributors on 21 February, 1989 (Firms 
in new hands, 1989:3).  
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Under the new structure, the Times Newspapers and the Zambia Daily Mail were 
both headed by a managing editor that was the equivalent of the general 
managers of Printpak, Zambia Printing Company and Newspaper Distributors. 
The position of editor-in-chief was abolished to suit international trends. 
The chief executives of these subsidiaries reported to the managing director of 
NAMECO, which had an elaborate governance structure. The managing director 
in turn, reported to the director general, who in this instance was Kaunda’s 
personal advisor, Milimo Punabantu. The management structure of NAMECO 
included a director of press, director of finance, director of personnel and 
administration and a director of operations. 
In effect, the structure confirms that the entire NAMECO establishment was 
controlled at the highest level from the presidency through Kaunda’s top advisor 
Punabantu. 
According to Punabantu, each of the subsidiaries of NAMECO were expected to 
operate profitably, by among other means, fully exploiting commercial printing, 
publishing and distribution to satisfy public demand while achieving the required 
return on investment. George Pelekamoyo, a former permanent secretary in the 
ministry of information and broadcasting, was named managing director of 
NAMECO on 5 March 1990. On Kaunda’s instruction, 60 percent share capital of 
NAMECO was equally apportioned to leading parastatals - the Zambia State 
Insurance Corporation (ZSIC), the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZANACO) 
and the Zambia National Provident Fund (ZNPF). NAMECO was to eventually 
hold 40 percent of the total share capital (3 financial giants get 60p.c. NAMECO 
shares. 1990. 1). 
The new conglomerate came with a promise of the acquisition of new printing 
equipment which would allow NAMECO to print the Times of Zambia, Sunday 
Times of Zambia, and Zambia Daily Mail simultaneously.  
In effect, the horizontal concentration of state media entities was fashioned to 
commercialise all aspects of the newspapers with wider distribution of products 
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across a sparsely populated country (NAMECO to acquire new printing 
equipment, 1990:1). 
Improved conditions of service were also promised to journalists and media 
workers in general (Media boss promises goodies, 1991:1). 
Perhaps the striking factor concerning this transformation of the media lay in its 
timing. This researcher asserts that the creation of NAMECO was strategic and 
pre-emptive in nature, given the fast changing global political context which 
encouraged democracy, independent media and active citizenship.   
NAMECO was conceived at a time when indicators of political change from the 
collapse of communism in Europe were self evident and when rumblings within 
the African continent for an end to one partysm were becoming more amplified.   
The MMD harnessed this popular discontent of a nascent civil society to garner 
its own power.  They used this power to begin to challenge the status quo, 
including greater public access to state media systems.  
The advent of the third wave of democratisation hence stimulated UNIP to project 
one voice promoting its activities as opposed to disparate communications 
issuing from the Zambia Daily Mail, which was traditionally government inclined, 
and the Times, which occasionally retained a sharper critical edge from its Lonrho 
days.  
The formal registration of the MMD in July 1990 and the emergence of the 
Weekly Post, generally regarded as an opposition mouthpiece by UNIP, 
prompted the NAMECO establishment to launch a multiplicity of publications 
through the newly appointed Times managing editor, Bweendo Mulengela 
(Nameco director salutes Times, 1991:5).  
The Evening Times, the monthly Search Magazine and an expanded 32 page 
Times of Zambia were just some of the new changes on the establishment. The 
Daily Mail launched the Financial Mail and the Sunday Mail widening coverage of 
state activities during a period of intense political activity. 
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4.3.10 The Third Republic and the influence of opposition politics on public 
participation in state media 
 
‘‘It (political pluralism) brought a shift in public expectations: from simply 
being dismissed as a government mouthpiece, the public started to demand 
that state media operate more as public media, by taking aboard the public’s 
interests in news content’’(Phiri, 2009/11/20).  
 
The MMD strongly contested the idea that the NAMECO newspapers were state 
owned and therefore to be excessively abused by the ruling party. 
 
Evidently due to the pressure applied by the new opposition movement, UNIP 
attempted to transfer the Times Newspapers, Printpak Zambia and Newspaper 
Distributors back to ZNHL, (leaving the Daily Mail and Zambia Printing 
Companies in government hands) ahead of October 31, 1991 multiparty 
elections. However, through a high court injunction by the MMD, this action was 
halted (Musaika 1991:1). 
 
The interim injunction restrained NAMECO, Punabantu, Pelekamoyo, the Times 
and Printpak, Newspaper Distributors and the minister of finance and planning 
from proceeding with Kaunda’s instruction. The MMD argued that its members, as 
citizens of Zambia, were convinced that it was against public policy and an abuse 
of trust for UNIP to re-possess public assets reposed by the people to it during 
the one party era.  The minister of finance and planning held the majority interest 
in NAMECO, incorporated on January 16, 1989. Essentially, it was argued that 
UNIP used tax payer’s funds to transfer the Times to ZNHL and subsequently to 
NAMECO. This effectively rendered the entities, public institutions.  
 
UNIP's argument was that there was no transfer of shares when the ZNHL 
subsidiaries were moved to NAMECO. The entities therefore were legally held by 
UNIP’s holding company. The court hearings dragged on beyond UNIP’s 
mandate in power. After the MMD won a landslide victory from the October 31, 
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1991 elections, Mwanawasa, now state vice president, instructed state lawyers 
assigned to the case by Kaunda’s government, to withdraw their defence, 
effectively ending the legal contest (Times won’t go back to UNIP, 1991:1).  
 
The MMD dissolved NAMECO on 17 September, 1993, declaring all of its work 
redundant. All of NAMECO’s interests and shares were to be transferred to the 
ministry of finance. All subsidiaries, which the new MMD administration admitted 
were loss making, were to be restructured and made commercially viable (state 
dissolves Nameco, 1993:1). 
 
Certainly without the benefit of political change, particularly the repeal of article 4 
of the constitution in 1990 by Kaunda upon pressure from MMD and an emerging 
active civil society, the media developments that prevented the consignment of 
the Times to a political party would likely not have taken place. 
 
Not only did the presence of an opposition movement, and independent media in 
the Weekly Post, generate a new, energetic discourse on democratisation and 
the need for horizontal accountability, change appeared to have emboldened the 
judiciary to make decisions that challenged the primacy of government over all 
other institutions.  
 
Vondoepp (2005:275-285), in his study of Malawi and Zambia’s neo-patrimonial 
democracies,26 augments this notion by noting that the uncertainty generated by 
electoral competition can encourage politicians to respect judicial independence. 
For example, President Frederick Chiluba’s attempt at expelling members of his 
cabinet opposed to his third term in office was halted by the High Court in April 
2001 for example. Media, particularly The Post, and to a lesser extent, the Times 
of Zambia, have also benefited from favourable judicial outcomes to ward off 
state inspired legal challenges in the past 20 years (Kasoma, 2003: 13). 
 
                                                 
26
 Neo-patrimonialism refers to the arranged exchange of goods and services between patron and client, 
to solicit political support. Clientelism is the patrimonial side of neo-patrimonialism, where politics are 
defined by family and personal relationships (Erdmann, 2002: 1-8). 
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4.4 POLITICAL PLURALISM AND THE STATE MEDIA: THE NEO-
MULTIPARTY CONCEPTION OF THE PRESS 
 
Therefore, while it is indisputable that the state owned media, including the Times, 
have continued to be largely an extension of the state, it is critical to consider that 
democratisation has provided the space for opposition parties to demand and 
initiate actions based in law, that allow for public access to state media systems, 
albeit during election time. 
 
Because of opposition pressures in the prelude to the 1991 multiparty elections, 
UNIP acceded to proposals for equitable access to the state media during 
elections for all registered political contestants.  These regulations have changed 
over the last four presidential elections as electoral dialogue becomes the norm in 
Zambia. 
 
Through the mid 1990s to the year 2001, donor, opposition and civil society 
pressures have led to public commitments by the MMD government to more 
equitable coverage of public policy events, particularly matters relating to the 
electoral process.   
 
The government’s National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in 
Zambia (NCBPGG)(Zambia: 2000:13) - a direct response to donor and civil society 
actions - emphasised the importance of a free and independent press and the 
value of wide access to information in an emerging democracy. 
 
Kasoma (2000:61) also confirms that the state media in Zambia has responded to 
donor pressure on the government to allow opposition voices. The multi-
stakeholder environment evidently introduces a vector of pressures onto the state 
media, under what has been termed a neo-multiparty conception of the press. The 
conception advances the notion that the philosophy, policy and performance of the 
press in African countries that democratised in the 1990s is donor-driven, with 
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other playmakers such as government, opposition parties, civil society and the 
church exerting their own influences. Donors would therefore be in a position to 
use their wealth, extended to the Zambia government in the form of conditional 
grants and loans, and their collective political power to achieve some modicum of 
compliance to democratic benchmarks.  
 
Figure 6 relays a media model which is pummelled by multiple forces. Donor 
influence is all encompassing given that they finance or certainly have a measure 
of influence on virtually all the actors in the construct; civil society, government and 
political parties. 
 
The neo-liberal philosophy is an agenda that embraces both political liberalisation 
and economic liberalisation as dual processes to be achieved in tandem. Media 
liberalisation and privatisation are both integral concepts of the liberal paradigm. 
The model therefore is predicated on the sensitisation and application of liberal 
values in the operations of media institutions. Although influence is bi-directional, 
the over-arching authority emanates from the donor community. Furthermore, 
since there has not been an effective multiparty forum in Zambia over the years, 
the model can be understood to facilitate political party influences on the media 
through indirect pressure on the donor community and direct challenges on the 
integrity of the state press through judicial means and public denunciations. 
Similarly ‘others,’ presumably, interest groups tethered to donors and varied 
political interests, will seek to either utilise the controversial nature of politics to 
question the role of the press or to refuse to purchase a particular medium and 
therefore use economic means to leverage change in coverage. Generally, 
economics and politics will have their own imprints on the media, particularly in the 
consideration of the quality of the product, public image which would affect sales 
and advertiser perceptions. 
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Figure 6: The neo-multiparty model of press control  
 
 
 
 
Source: Kasoma (2000: 60). 
 
However, it is certain from the behaviour of the MMD government since 1991 that 
political elites have learnt to manipulate donors when the need arises. 
 
For example the MMD’s commitments to the NCBPGG were prompted by the 
withdrawal of donor support in 1996 following a flawed elections process 
(Chirambo, Nel & Erasmus, 2003:48-49).  
 
The promise of improved enforcement of the provision of the Electoral (Conduct) 
Regulations of 1996 (Zambia, 2000:19) can be seen hence as simply a means for 
re-gaining donor support by the MMD.  
 
DONOR COMMUNITY 
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and good governance 
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PRESS ECONOMY POLITICS OTHERS 
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Civil society has also shown some clout by campaigning for an Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA). However, the end result shows the state is very 
much in control of the process as its presence and influence does appear 
assured (XIX/Article 19, 2006: 3). 
 
It can be argued based on the continued contestation of state media ownership in 
Zambia and regression on promises by the state, that while donor influence and 
actions of non state actors are certainly there, it is discernible only in relation to 
certain contexts (elections being one field). Overtime, donors can be manipulated 
with impunity by political elites.  
 
It is also certain that the presence of opposition is paramount in the multiparty 
dispensation.  
 
Unlike the one party state where explicit public orders were given to the state 
media without much external challenge, the advent of democratisation has 
allowed for opposition parties to use judicial leverage to seek communicative 
relief: the MMD sued the ZNBC in 1991 for refusing to air its political 
advertisements and was granted an order to access the station by the High 
Court. ZNBC for its part introduced a policy and practice to accommodate 
opposition parties in its election advertising and reportage (Kasoma, 2000:69). 
 
Similarly, the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), through a High Court 
injunction, was able to temporarily dislodge media heads of ZNBC, Zambia Daily 
Mail and Times of Zambia for two weeks prior to the 1991 multiparty elections, 
owing to their alleged bias against opposition parties. This also fostered a more 
balanced reflection of the elections going forward, as Sakala, (2010/02/19) notes. 
 
In editorial terms, the impact of democratisation on the Times Newspapers can 
be gleaned from a total collapse of public input and a predictably one-sided 
approach to opinion writing. While content analysis is not the pre-occupation of 
this thesis, it is important to note these changes. For instance, in 1969, Dunstan 
Kamana, the first black editor-in-chief published only three editorials in support of 
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government with 14 being critical (Kasoma, 1986: 96). With the advent of 
multiparty politics in 1990, editors on the Times and the Zambia Daily Mail were 
being fired for merely reporting the activities of the MMD (Makungu, 2004: 29). By 
1997, the letters column had completely disappeared (Simuchoba, 2009/12/02). 
 
Partly due to this, the tradition in Zambian politics since 1991 has been to use the 
electoral regulations, now held in the Electoral Code of Conduct, 2006, to 
cultivate public participation or more specifically, political communications by 
political parties. 
 
For the 2006 presidential elections, the Electoral (Code of Conduct) Regulations, 
of 2006, issued under the Electoral Act no 12 (2006) instructed all public 
television and broadcasters to allocate public airtime equally to all political parties 
for their political broadcasts. The instructions state: 
 
 A political party shall not buy more than thirty minutes air time in any given 
one language on public television and radio in any one week. 
 Television shall not schedule any party’s political broadcast or other 
political discussion or interview, opinion poll results or broadcast prediction 
of the result of polling day until the polls have closed. 
 Broadcasters shall inform the public on the source of a public opinion poll 
and shall indicate its margin of error. 
 
The Regulations have since been extended to all media, including newspapers  
of the provisions which demands of them to base their reporting on confirmed 
election results as announced and published by presiding officers (Zambia, 
2006:sec 12–17). 
 
In addition, the regulations allow all candidates to lodge complaints of unfair 
treatment or coverage in the course of elections campaigns in writing to the 
Electoral Commission and the newspaper so concerned to submit back copies of 
its publications. 
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“Where a right of reply, a retraction or the correction of a matter of 
significance is necessary, it shall be made in a like manner and with equal 
and prominence as the original report or publication”(Zambia 2006: sec 14: 
6). 
 
 
Interestingly also, the regulations attempt to protect reporters from their editors:  
 
“Heads and other senior management staff of public or private media 
organisations shall not intimidate media practitioners and shall allow them to 
exercise professional judgement without undue influence (Zambia, 2006: sec 
12: 3). 
 
The gradual changes have been attributed to the emergence of a ‘working 
parliament’ from the 2001 elections when MMD’s parliamentary dominance was 
for once overturned by the opposition, albeit momentarily (Chirambo et al,, 
2003:33 ). None of these positives however, has any transformative effect on the 
state owned media in its regular reporting particularly because of the subtle 
nature of controls from state apparatus. An editor-in-chief is not obliged to justify 
the none-usage of a news story to his reporter for example, or its placement.  
 
The Third Republic has also demonstrated that despite multipartysm and the 
presence of a variety of interest groups and media, the state can still influence 
journalists in state, private and international media. In 2002, PAZA alleged that 
journalists were taking bribes from the state to ensure favourable coverage of the 
MMD in the elections. In late June of 2002, Reuters News Agency suspended a 
senior Johannesburg based correspondent following allegations that he had 
received payments from Zambian authorities to write positive articles about the 
Chiluba regime (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2002). Leading up to his failed 
attempt to seek an unconstitutional third term in office, Chiluba was also accused 
of using the presidential discretionary fund, which was not to be audited, for 
corrupting opposition parties and buying the support of interest groups (Chirambo 
et al, 2003: 1).  
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Chiluba’s leadership style exhibited charismatic tendencies when he assumed 
power in 1991. He used his wide appeal to mobilise people behind the belt-
tightening liberal initiatives fairly successfully. Over time however, as his 
popularity waned, it seemed to reflect more a housekeeping style, which Mazrui 
has described as ‘a minimalist approach to power; more governance and less 
genuine leadership; less vision, more verbosity’ (Mazrui, 2007:3). 
 
His attempt to seek a third term of office against the stipulations of the Zambian 
constitution invited opposition from within his own party and from a broad 
spectrum of civil society. Leaders in government, including his own vice president 
Christon Tembo, church and civil society stalwarts stood united in opposing his 
intentions (Chirambo, et al, 2003: 1). This potential reversal of democracy was 
thwarted by what Huntington would call: ‘the methods of democracy’ (Huntington, 
1991: 164). It was demonstrations, campaigns and non - violent resolutions. 
 
In the broader scheme of things, democratisation has also opened up potential 
opportunities for communication through the internet, expanding the avenues for 
activism to a global stage. The obvious reality of the internet is that it is an 
instrument that generally tends towards salacious gossip, scandal, mayhem and 
personal profiles (Couldry, 2003:19).  
 
As a new communication option, however, it definitely remains open to future 
exploitation by a country such as Zambia, which currently has limited access to 
fulfil this potential. 
 
4.5. CONCLUSION  
 
This discussion opens up some critical matters relating to the notion of 
privatisation as an alternative path to nationalisation of media systems.  The 
sense that privatisation will inevitably lead to greater freedom of expression must 
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be re-evaluated on the basis that private media owners can themselves form 
alliances with political elites in government and limit the scope of communication. 
 
With trends in Zambia already exhibiting a lack of stability in privately owned print 
media, it is hardly far fetched to assume that some of the more viable print media 
entities that would survive the economic restraints in Zambia would likely be 
foreign funded or would have some level of donor support, and could therefore 
not be considered to be entirely independent.  Certainly, the only surviving private 
daily, The Post, has received external financial grants (Phiri, 2009: 266). 
 
In addition, (as noted in Chapter One, section 1.2.1) Zambia’s deregulation of 
radio licensing can be illusory: foreign and private actors in this field were allowed 
in on the state’s terms. This clearly restricts the media in reporting or entertaining 
opinions that might harm that relationship. 
 
The case of the Times Newspapers under Lonrho illustrates just how complex 
matters of press freedom could be where political and economic interests affect 
both the investor and the party in power.  So five key scenarios present 
themselves for further inquiry: 
 
 The possibility that privatisation would attract a multinational entity with 
broader interests than publishing, therefore, more inclined toward guarding 
its relationship with the state to protect its more valued investments 
 The possibility that a foreign investor will establish a leading daily.27  
 The possibility that local entrepreneurs would seize the opportunity to 
purchase the Times (but would likely have to be vetted by the state as the 
seller; and therefore conform to some form of censorship). 
 That a model encompassing a governance structure with key non-state 
actors as part of the boards of directors and minimal state presence might 
                                                 
27
 However, given nationalistic and xenophobic fears of foreign ownership the world over, this is not 
envisaged. Even major democracies such as India have not allowed foreign newspaper ownership (Price 
& Krug, 2002: 11). 
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be accepted by the government as an alternative form of developing 
communal institutions within the context of Zambia’s democracy. 
 Lastly, the highly unlikely prospect that state media might become 
irrelevant anyway in the future given the advent of new social networks 
that might well funnel political information to an increasingly inter-
connected mass audience.28 
 
These possibilities will be resurrected in Chapter Seven as we conclude this 
thesis and examine potential ways forward. Realistically, given the influential 
nature of the state in determining licensing of electronic media, duty on newsprint, 
advertising support, among other things, its presence or influence in all scenarios 
can be envisaged.  The experience of implementing the IBA already points to 
how the state apparatus can frustrate a perfectly legal process, despite its public 
acquiescence to the idea. 
 
On the whole, it can be noted, that the intimacy between wealth and power has 
shaped the trajectory of print media development in Zambia in ways which do not 
necessarily promote press freedom. The state has gradually achieved a 
horizontal concentration process of existing print media and not sufficiently 
provided an enabling economic environment for the development of viable private 
alternatives.  
 
Historically, the relationship between President Kaunda, a powerful, charismatic 
leader by any description, and the wealthy industrialist Tiny Rowland catalysed a 
number of inter-related developments which ultimately influenced the structure 
and imposed an unwritten editorial policy of the Times of Zambia: 
  
                                                 
28
 A highly unlikely scenario: a study by AMV/OSISA (2008: 41) shows that while the state media often 
trail the privately owned Post Newspapers in reader preferences, Zambians still prefer the Dail Mail for 
instance to either the Post or the Times in terms of their advertising information. Other studies such as 
Tailoka et al (2008) similarly suggest that the newspapers could improve on their sales with greater 
diversity and depth in content. The question of viability hence lends itself to greater creativity in the final 
product. Lastly, the lack of disposable income amongst the Zambian populace militates against 
accessibility to modern technology dampening hopes for the elevation of alternative media over traditional 
media in the near future. 
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 The awarding of a grant by Rowland’s Lonrho to UNIP for its successful 1964 
campaign for power: this assured Rowland of Kaunda’s personal friendship; 
privileged access to the country’s national resources to a great extent and 
Lonrho’s continued presence in the Times up to 1982. 
 The unreported clandestine meetings with leaders of apartheid South Africa 
and UDI Rhodesia that led to the release of Zimbabwean nationalist leaders 
and brought significant political changes to southern Africa. 
 The insulation of President Kaunda, Rowland and government (particularly 
regarding its Rhodesia-South Africa liaisons) more generally from exposure to 
adverse publicity by the Times of Zambia. 
 
While it is conceivable that security considerations overrode narrow journalistic 
ambitions in some respects, it appears certain the corporate interference was 
present under Lonrho in matters relating to the ruling party and the president of 
Zambia, going by the submissions of former non-Zambian, senior editors and 
managers of the Times to the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission.  
 
The structure of the Times during the First Republic speaks, to some extent, to 
the divergent interests in the newspapers by state and Lonrho: the multinational 
retained the commercial aspects of the newspapers but surrendered political 
controls (appointment of the editor) to the state. Despite that the two entities’ 
interests converged at some point, it is generally understood that efforts from 
both state and Lonrho undermined the editorial independence of the newspapers. 
 
In this regard, Lonrho’s modus operandi of establishing relations with political 
elites in each African country to further its economic interests is well documented 
by Cronje et al (1976), Bower (1994), Langdon(1981), Kariethi(1991),  Sardanis 
(2003) and the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981) as such.  
 
It is also underlined in this discussion that the actions by President Kaunda to 
engage Rowland in sensitive national matters might not have been possible 
under a more open and competitive multiparty dispensation. Certainly, the actions 
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would likely have been exposed by opposition parties, and independent media 
(that is, media outside of the state-corporate control model). 
 
By examining the integrity of the political systems and the institutions therein, it 
can be inferred therefore that the actions by President Kaunda were aided by the 
pre-eminence of person-based rule under the one party state and the dominant 
party structure and ultimately the political culture of the day which lubricated the 
inclination for centralised decision making.  
 
Furthermore, the influence of dominant parties in emerging democracies in 
southern Africa has been widely exposed by political scientists, addressing their 
control over public policy and their disregard for alternative views. Although 
similar in some ways to the one party state, it has been noted that a dominant 
party is a product of competitive, democratic elections.  
 
However, its actions can be over-bearing, denuding media independence, 
undermining the principles of separation of powers and controlling the 
presidency, among other things. 
 
Chiluba’s administration, despite riding on the hopes of liberal democrats, is 
associated with subverting press freedom through bribery of local and foreign 
journalists and intimidation. 
 
Zambia entered the Third Republic with a dominant party structure which has 
been blamed for inertia on media privatisation and constitutional reform, more  
generally over the past 19 years. 
 
Regardless, it has been noted that Zambia had benefited from the opening up of 
political space with increased civil society activity and eventually the emergence 
of a more balanced parliament, all of which have aided the cause for gradual 
political and media reform. A clear demonstration of this is the tabling of important 
bills on freedom of information and independent broadcasting championed by 
media associations, unions, civil society and opposition parliamentarians.  
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For the first time, democratisation also ushered in a clause Article 20(2) specific 
to the protection of a free press29. The Third Republic, unlike the First and 
Second Republics, has been punctuated by opposition or media-led court 
injunctions against the state aimed at claiming communicative rights and 
defending journalists.  
 
Political parties, at least in principle, can now hold state media to account during 
elections using the amended Electoral Code of Conduct regulations (2006).  This 
does not however open up the state media to all actors, at all times, as might be 
expected in a democracy. Space is arguably made available when there is 
pressure from donors, opposition parties, civil societies, and churches or in 
extreme cases, when there is judicial intervention. The argument for privatisation 
hence may appear logical.  
 
However, it is not unassailable.  In an environment where citizens lack the 
economic capacity to own viable print media, it is plausible to assume that a sale 
of the Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail might well consign them to political 
and business elites whose interests would not necessary be promoting open 
public discussion on matters of national interest. 
 
In short, this chapter re-affirms some of the basic assumptions of this thesis: 1) 
that privatisation does not guarantee press freedom as the private owners can 
harbour political ambitions not dissimilar to the state 2) that democratisation has 
up to this point, minimised the freedom to communicate by individual editors and 
journalists on the Times 3) that state elites have indirect ways of controlling 
media regardless of ownership. 
 
                                                 
29
  As Chanda and Liswaniso (1999) before her, Mwanayanda (2011/02/25) a lawyer and former journalist, 
argues however that:  “There is no enabling legislation on freedom of expression; it is a constitutional 
provision which has no real/practical enforcement mechanism in subordinate legislation. Legislation 
around sedition, official secrets etc (is) not democratic.  Lack of a freedom of info law is a real 
impediment.” 
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The findings of this chapter have been validated by matching the patterns in 
various bodies of research particularly Kariethi (1991: 204), Bower (1994: 109), 
Cronje et al (1976: 26), Langdon (1981: 141), Sardanis (2003:142), Kasoma 
(1986: 93), the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981) with the 
substance of key informant interviews conducted by this researcher. The 
synthesis of this literature establishes a pattern in the manner in which Rowland 
and Lonrho constructed a vast business empire which used high level political 
relations and media systems to promote radical capitalism as well as shore up 
the company’s ties with the state. Parallels were drawn between the case of the 
Times of Zambia and that of the Standard in Kenya, where similar transnational 
class alliances impacted on media independence. 
 
To briefly recap, this thesis has up to this point asserted that the political 
economy of the state media in Zambia is best understood by extensively 
examining the practices of colonial, post colonial and multiparty regimes. 
 
Chapter one argues that despite democratisation, nationalist governments 
adopted the practices of their colonial masters in converting mass media to state 
use for purely political intent. While Zambia has undergone three distinct periods 
of political change, all palpably leading to experimentations with democracy, the 
trajectory for mass media has been set toward integration into a state corporate 
structure by successive administrations regardless of the political system in place.  
 
This has compromised public confidence and possibly commercial viability of 
state media systems, including the Times Newspapers. It has also bred political 
conflict between contesting political parties during the multiparty era subsequently 
causing ruling establishments to subject editors to tighter oversight frameworks. 
The state media has, as a result, been deployed more as a counter-weight to 
emergent private media, despite the latter being relatively miniscule and largely 
unsustainable in the face of a harsh economic environment.  These factors have 
had a tendency of virtually limiting the space available for public discourse in this 
realm, the controlled expansion of community voices via community radio 
notwithstanding.  
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Chapter Two contextualises this debate with historical perspectives which 
underline some key reasons explaining the nationalisation of communication 
resources by the UNIP government from independence in 1964. Ethnic stereo-
typing by colonial authorities perceptibly aggravated tribal fault lines, rightly or 
wrongly, justifying the acquisition and establishment of controlled media 
apparatus by the state evidently for the purpose of building national identity and 
unity.   
 
However, structural continuities, leadership styles, the one party system and the 
Philosophy of Humanism exhibited intense hostility toward press criticism of the 
state illustrated through public pronouncements and overt actions to control and 
purchase the only significant foreign owned daily, Times Newspapers from 
Lonrho for example.  
 
The advent of the second phase of multiparty democracy in 1991 brought the 
prospect of privatisation of the state owned media and the creation of an enabling 
environment for the establishment of the private press. These expectations have 
been dashed, to a great extent, as successive leaderships in Zambia appear 
wary of an uncontrolled media, a matter empirically underlined by Pitts (2000: 
270).  
 
Furthermore, optimism for the future of democracy by citizens (Lolojih, 2005:1) is 
often undermined by the actions of ruling elites who are supported by the 
leverage of dominant party politics. 
 
Democracy supporters Chapter Three argues, over estimate the emancipatory 
value of privatisation, a key feature of the liberal doctrine pursued by Chiluba’s 
MMD. Political economy as a concept helps us understand how the mass media 
are an integral part of the political and economic systems and are therefore 
subject to controls from both fields. Through what may be experienced as 
abstract political economic theory, Chapter Four finally, illustrates how wealth and 
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power undermine the democratic media project through collusion and indirect 
controls despite democratisation.  
 
The fore-going re-affirms some basic tenets of critical political economy which 
frame the analysis of media in historical terms and foregrounds the role of 
government and business elites in constraining news production. The 
commandeering of media by large corporations with business interests beyond 
the sector is underlined as a major impediment to freedom of expression even in 
supposedly democratic settings.  
 
Rejecting the classical political economic position that favours a minimal state 
and a dominant market, critical political economists hold that the distortions and 
inequalities of market systems should be remedied by state intervention (Golding 
& Murdock, 1996: 12-17). The case of Zambia somewhat eludes this analysis 
primarily because the state and the corporate body, Lonrho, at one stage worked 
as part of a network, sometimes, toward similar ambitions. The corrective agency 
of the state is lost in these contradictions. The state eventually assumed control 
of the media but has not surrendered enough editorial space since the country’s 
1991 democratic elections.  
 
From the findings, one could rightly support the notion that some form of balance 
needs to be struck between public and private intervention given the excesses of 
both political and business elites. The place of the citizen as a shareholder in 
media enterprise might present a plausible starting point for balancing a system 
such as Zambia’s. 
 
Opinion is divided within media circles in this regard. For instance, Simuchoba 
(2009/12/02) suggests that the Zambian market is too small for ‘an out and out 
commercial investor’ to develop media industry in Zambia and sees limited 
government involvement in the media as inevitable. On the other hand, Sakala 
(2010/02/19), the president of PAZA at the time of research, is opposed to any 
form of state involvement in a restructured print media industry owing to the 
decline in free expression in the state media systems. 
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Finally, one other key assumption in critical political economy; that capital will be 
constrained by intervening forces such as labour, is less certain in the 
explorations in the First Republic in respect of the media. It becomes more 
evident towards the dawn of Third Republic. On the whole, it is evident that the 
state succeeded in thwarting any manoeuvre by journalists to act as a collective 
and form a representative body of their own in most of the First and Second 
Republics.  
 
What the next chapter is challenged to examine as a result are the power 
relations between capital and labour as Zambian transitioned through three 
distinct cycles of political change. More specifically, Chapter Five examines the 
manner in which labour-based media formations and journalists’ associations that 
mushroomed upon the advent of multiparty democracy in the Third Republic have 
responded to the challenge of the powerful despite their members’ dependency 
on the state for their livelihood.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF MARKET AND LABOUR LIBERALISATION ON TRADE 
UNIONISM AND EMPLOYEE WELFARE ON THE TIMES NEWSPAPERS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter’s primary interest is to examine the welfare of media professionals 
within the context of labour rights as politics in Zambia evolved. The chapter 
revives the discussion broached in Chapter One, section 1.1.5 and Chapters 
Three and Four, which expand on the evolution of political economic theory and 
the imperatives and practicalities of liberal philosophy.  
 
Chapter Three was absorbed in the discussion of the history of political economic 
theory, particularly the tension between liberal and critical political economists in 
their approaches to analysing the power relations governing the distribution of 
resources in societies.  
 
Its ambition was to unpack the key elements of political economy which include 
historical, socio-economic and political imperatives and how they interface with the 
‘independence’ of traditional and alternative media. It is noted that politics and 
technology are intertwined and media systems are not immune to the influence of 
political and economic systems, or the indirect control by the powerful. However, 
we also understand from the critical political economic perspective, that capitalists 
cannot always have their way: there is often resistance from labour which 
moderates the impact of employers on the welfare of workers. 
 
Chapter Four illustrates how wealth and power have fundamentally influenced 
media development and performance, particularly the Times Newspapers, over a 
period of 45 years. Interventions by both state and business elites, in many 
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instances working together, undermined the credibility of this news media entity 
over time but the reasons have a much wider context than a naive fixation on 
censorship. For example, concerns about the exposure of covert security missions 
to South Africa and Rhodesia involving Lonrho chairman Tiny Rowland, working 
on behalf of the Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda, were just part of a complex 
matrix of international activities at the height of the liberation struggle for Southern 
Africa that were conceivably masked from the public eye.  
 
The presence of organised resistance to capital and state interventions is not at all 
evident in the First and Second Republics when Journalists lacked cohesion as an 
occupation and were seemingly overwhelmed by the machinations of state power 
which left them de-unionised and without a coherent professional identity.  
 
But as Zambia returned to liberal politics in 1991, organised groups, including 
media formations began to utilise judicial leverage to challenge the state.  
 
This chapter begins to explore the ways in which democratisation has enabled or 
enfeebled, efforts by Journalists to exploit their freedoms of association and 
expression to organise unions and professional bodies and foster collective action. 
It narrows the discourse to the liberalisation of the labour market and its 
implications for the unionisation of journalism. It utilises a wide range of historical 
literature to illustrate how political change and specifically, market and labour 
liberalisation, have impacted on trade unionism and the ability of employees, 
including journalists, to organise themselves as an independent force.  
Fundamentally, the chapter uses primary and secondary data to understand how 
journalists’ unions and associations, as intervening variables, have responded to 
the influence of wealth and power in the Third Republic.  
 
Its main interest will be to establish how macro level rights held in the Zambian 
constitution have been applied at an institutional level to the benefit of media 
professionals. Labour Process Theory (LPT), a creature of Marxian political 
economy, and Employee Rights Theory (ERT), an offspring of liberal democratic 
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philosophy, will inform this section of the thesis. The key aims of Chapter Five as a 
result are: 
 
 To discuss LPT and ERT in relation to the changing political economic context 
in Zambia. 
 To unpack the history of trade unionism and the changing relations between 
labour and capital as the country underwent political economic reform. 
 To explore the influence of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) on the 
working conditions of journalists in the state media (the Times of Zambia in 
particular). 
 To analyse the role of ZUJ and the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) in 
addressing freedom of expression and association in the state media work 
environment and in national affairs more generally. 
 
The effectiveness or potential thereof, of the ZUJ will be explained by gauging the 
bargaining outcomes, industrial disputes and legal challenges, part of the 
framework suggested by Buhlungu, Brookes and Wood (2008:439-440) for 
interrogating the impact of unionism on the workplace.  
 
Evidently, there is a diversity of means by which unions may be measured as 
Bhulungu, Brookes and Wood (2008: 439) note: a comparison of legal contexts, a 
broad analysis of membership trends and understanding the orientation of 
workers, are some other ways of assessing trade unions depending on what the 
aim of the study might be. These approaches will largely be peripheral to this 
discussion as the main interest of the thesis lies in understanding bargaining 
outcomes and disputes. 
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5.2. BACKGROUND  
 
‘Pluralist paradox’ (Webster, 1998: 39), to borrow a phrase, is perhaps an apt way 
of describing the democratisation process in Zambia in relation to labour 
movements and the imperatives of reform.  
 
Collective wisdom over the years has suggested that the retreat of the one party 
state in 1991 opened new space for the emergence of civil society, opposition 
parties and strengthened labour formations, previously suppressed by a monolithic 
state structure. 
 
However, the reality, which is increasingly empirically grounded, shows that the 
out-spring of non-governmental organisations and opposition parties in Zambia in 
1991, coupled by the exigencies of dual reform processes (political and economic 
liberalisation) have led to a decline in the influence of labour in the emerging 
democracy for a variety of reasons (Rakner, 2001:509).  
 
Significantly, while state-driven amendments to the Industrial Relations Act (1990) 
30inexorably led to the end of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions’ (ZCTU) reign 
as the sole, apex industrial body; it released journalists from the sector-specific 
union formations that were more inclined to the welfare of telecommunications and 
typographic workers than to media professionals.  
 
As a result of the creation of ZUJ, political and business elites were, for the first 
time in Zambia’s history, faced with the prospect of resistance from journalists as a 
collective, seeking both economic and communicative emancipation. Whereas the 
actions of the wealthy and the powerful, characterised by the state-corporate 
control model (explained in section 4.3.6 of the Chapter Four) went largely 
unchecked by media professionals as an organised group in the First and Second 
                                                 
30
 The legal framework regulating the labour market in Zambia is provided for in the Employment Act CAP 
268, the Industrial and Labour Relations Act CAP 269, the Employment Special provisions) Act CAP 270, 
the Workers Compensation Act CAP 271, the Employment of Young Persons and Children’s ACT CAP 
274, the Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment ACT CAP 276, the Factories ACT CAP 441, 
National Pensions Scheme ACT No: 40 of 1996. 
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Republics, the presence of ZUJ and other associations in the Third Republic 
introduced resistance and conflict between capital and labour. 
 
Historically, the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 by the Kaunda 
government which promoted the policy of ‘one industry, one union’ consolidated 
unions under the aegis of the ZCTU, ostensibly, as a control measure.  
 
Inadvertently, however, the action rendered ZCTU the most powerful ‘opposition’ 
to the UNIP government during the First and Second Republics by virtue of that 
consolidation.  
 
As the multiparty movement materialised in 1990 amidst a severe economic crisis, 
the ZCTU strategically assumed the role of political ally to the market - orientated 
MMD and provided its first president in Frederick Chiluba. Paradoxically, it was 
Kaunda who first liberalised the labour sector with the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Act of 1990, an intervention interpreted as a calculated move to 
instigate divisions within ZCTU, the core of the pluralist movement. The MMD and 
ZCTU both resisted it but the Act endured into the Third Republic (Fashoyin, 
2008:5).  
 
Yet, within a short period of presiding over government, Chiluba too expressed his 
unease with the ZCTU’s opposition to the MMD’s liberalisation and privatisation 
policies and acted deliberately to perpetuate the Industrial Relations (Amendment) 
Act of 1990 in its liberal form against his own electioneering promises (Fashoyin, 
2008: 5).  
 
The amended labour law presented an opportunity for dissenting elements within 
the mother union to consider forming an alternative body. Consequently, 
differences between private sector and public sector workers resulted in a major 
split in the ZCTU and the emergence of rival unions (Rakner, 2001:509).   
 
Chiluba proceeded to align the Industrial Relations Act in 1997 with international 
norms and standards. Therefore, despite the appearance of the Industrial 
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Relations (Amendment) Act of 1997 as another state-orchestrated move to further 
weaken the labour movement, it was ironically in conformity with the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and the 
Right to Organise, which Chiluba subsequently ratified (Fashoyin, 2008: 7). With 
its traditional membership base eroded, the ZCTU ceased to be a major, united 
threat to the state’s economic policies. 
 
But while the demise of the ‘one industry, one union’ policy may have sealed the 
fate of ZCTU to a great extent, the positive outcome of this development in the 
1990s was that it allowed journalists to accelerate and justify their liberation from 
their coerced membership to the Typographical Workers Union (TWU) and the 
National Communications Workers Union (NUCW),31 which had no coherent or 
strategic agenda for the improvement of the conditions of media professionals per 
se; but rather, generalised their work to the welfare of workers in their respective 
niche areas.  
 
The history of the ZUJ, a body representing media professionals in the state 
sector, cannot hence be divorced from the broader industrial narrative of Zambia’s 
labour relations nor the consequences of the country’s political and economic 
transitions.  
 
In this sense, the birth of ZUJ can be considered a milestone and a direct result of 
political liberalisation more specifically; and democratisation, more generally.  
 
Similarly, the narrative on the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), formed in 
December 1983, is also compelling as it metamorphosised from National Press 
Clubs, discursive forums convened through the First, Second and Third Republics, 
which unfortunately had no organisational sense to mobilise journalists toward 
common press freedom causes across the country when journalism experienced 
incessant attacks from the state (Kasoma, 1986:175). PAZA assumed a much 
stronger role from 1990, spurred on by new leadership, the push for political 
                                                 
31
 Not all journalists subscribed to these unions. The print media journalists were particularly distanced, 
serve for some of the more junior workers. 
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liberalisation and by the judiciary’s bolder dispensation of justice toward the Third 
Republic, which this thesis noted earlier in section 4.3.1 of Chapter Four. 
 
Against this background, this chapter will discuss the influence (or lack of) of ZUJ 
and to a lesser extent, PAZA, in an integrated fashion, as their work converges 
around matters of freedom of expression. Although the ZUJ is more inclined 
toward the working conditions of workers, it has similar ambitions to those of the 
PAZA, regarding communicative freedoms.  
 
Much of the chapter shall, however, be dedicated to the role of ZUJ in negotiating 
for better wages and conditions for its members. This is essentially because the 
economic aspects of journalism - important as they seem - are often neglected, 
although they should ideally constitute a measure of progress or lack of it, arising 
from liberalisation of political and economic space in the 1990s. The chapter 
argues that the economic welfare of journalists will likely also influence the 
intensity with which they may oppose state practices and policies that are inimical 
to media advancement.  
 
5.2.1 Theoretical perspectives 
 
As referred to above, this section of the thesis shall be informed by Labour 
Process Theory (LPT) and Employee Rights Theory (ERT), which are bodies of 
theory developed within the realm of the social sciences and specifically, political 
economic studies.  The theories have, however, enjoyed wide application across 
disciplinary lines (Ackyroyd, 2009: 264).   
 
The matter of labour rights was introduced in section 1.1.5 of Chapter One of this 
thesis in the initial presentation of political economy as the analytical framework 
through which media development was to be discussed.  
 
The notion of labour process has its roots in Marxian political economy, emanating 
from Karl Marx’s works in the 19th Century (Ackyroyd, 2009: 264). 
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But not until it was radicalised by activists on the left in the 1970s in Britain and the 
United States, did it assume intellectual application and development to a great 
extent. Although the two bodies of theory - LPT and ERT- have their differences, 
they also have convergence points: - both share the concerns of improving human 
welfare and dignity in the workplace (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 173).  
 
LPT is however anchored by different assumptions about the employer - employee 
relations and holds a more negative view of the capitalist political economic 
system. It will be concerned with conflict over the distribution of the resources in 
organisational settings, resistance and control matters in the workplace and the 
struggles of interest groups in societies, particularly those between labour and 
capital (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 173).  
 
On the other hand, ERT, which has been developed largely in the United States as 
an extension of rights within a free democratic society, assumes that it is in the 
interest of capital to observe the rights of employees for capital’s own longevity 
and survival. In that regard, it contrasts sharply with LPT which emphasises that 
worker welfare will seldom be attained without struggle with capital (Nord & 
Gaines, 1996: 173-174). A detailed analysis of LPT and ERT, their strengths and 
weaknesses, and their relevance to the analysis of labour rights will be presented 
in sections 5.2.3 and 5.3.4 of this chapter. 
 
5.2.2 The Evolution of Labour Rights 
 
It is important to reiterate at this point that the area of labour and employment 
rights and related theory is often overlooked in media studies. This is a vital 
omission, in this researcher’s view, as the relationship between capital and labour 
would likely have implications for how workers are able to express themselves 
individually and collectively. With the exception of, for example, the work of Mosco 
(1995: 158) and Golding and Murdock (1995: 11-31), there is, as far as this author 
could ascertain, little substantial literature in media studies that links the condition 
of the labour force in the mass media to their overall capacity to express 
themselves, organise and resist state power, certainly not from a theoretically 
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grounded labour rights perspective. This section of the thesis and section 5.2.3, 
therefore, undertakes to extensively discuss the evolution of labour rights and how 
ultimately emergent theory within political economic studies has been, and can be 
applied. Following this, the tenets of LPT and ERT will be used in the analysis of 
the workings of the ZUJ in section 5.3.8 of this chapter. 
 
The underlying premise in the social sciences of what constitutes rights is that 
humans - simply by virtue of being human - have certain entitlements of a general 
nature which are aggregated under moral or natural rights (Gaines & Domagalski, 
1996: 1). 
 
The idea of rights predates modern society and is implicit in Hebrew, classical 
Greek city-states, and African society. Hebrew Societies upheld legitimate claims 
to physical security, basic necessities of life and participation in community 
governance. Greek societies, also, provided for rightful claims to private property, 
freedom of association and to equality before the law (Keeley, 1998: 27). Similarly, 
African society claims the centrality of man and his right to be a member of a 
community, to be protected by and respected by that community (Kaunda, 1968). 
 
Although the middle-ages are considered to have developed rights more 
significantly, there are academic standpoints that doubt this as a truism.  
 
Arguments against these assertions hold that individuals in the middle-ages had 
no rights other than those conferred from above by Kings. Day-to-day life was 
however able to continue without the benefit of instruction from the nobility 
(Keeley, 1998: 27-28).  
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“Rights of self determination in some political and economic matters, then, 
were not unusual facts of medieval life, but integral aspects of various 
customary practices that were beyond the power of Kings to effectively 
abolish. From these practices, sprang a growing body of English common 
law, the infamous declaration of rights in the Enlightment era and the 
modern idea of individual rights as claims to autonomy for one’s own 
sake”(Keeley,1988: 27) 
 
 
Gaines and Domagalski (1996:177-178), echoing the opinions of leading 
philosophers and legal scholars, reiterate that, in the present day, the category of 
moral or natural rights include the rights to life, freedom and equal opportunity and 
that these rights contain common elements: 
 
 They are universally applicable. 
 They are accorded equally to all persons. 
 And at times, there are justifiable exceptions to their claim. 
 
For Montemayor (2008: 143), workers are entitled to specific moral rights merely 
by being part of the organisation that employs them, just as citizens of a country 
possess specific moral rights. Employee rights are defined by the understanding 
that an employer should not visit harm on his employees.  
 
However, scholars also lament the paucity of literature and inconsistencies in the 
employee moral rights discourse. 
 
Gaines and Domagalski (1996: 178) for example concede that an examination of 
employee rights literature unveils a lack of coherency in theoretical positioning 
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which compromises the understanding of the role of worker rights in the 
employment relationship.  
 
Correspondingly, Montemayor (2008: 143) regrets the confinement of the rights 
discourse to ‘workplace human rights’ ignoring the rights derived by workers from 
their role in the employment relationship. He refers, here, specifically to matters of 
corporate governance which connote collaborative engagements between 
employer and employee and also recognises employees as key investors in the 
organisation they work for. 
 
Edwards (1993: 31-41), in attempting to explain the fading influence of unions in 
the United States, posits that in addition to the law, labour rights also emanate 
from the institutional settings and can therefore be in tension with other rights.  
 
He identifies three key sources from which employee rights emanate: 
 
 Statutory and constitutional protections. 
 Collective agreements (or collective contract rights), which are based 
on signed understanding between employer and employees. 
 Enterprise rights, which are independently granted by the organisation to 
its workers, arising from competitive pressures or designed to under-cut 
union organising efforts. 
 
To strengthen workers rights, Edward proposes that enterprise rights be 
integrated into employee handbooks and the establishment of instruments for 
dispute resolution between employees and managers. 
 
It is Nord (1993: 341) who finally cautions us against the loose usage of terms 
such as ‘rights’ without clear rationale or definition or simply to advance political 
or religious agenda. He argues that users of the term often ignore historical 
contexts, ‘…the pragmatics and evolution of rights’ and the absolutistic and 
universal connotation that the term relays. Nord differentiates between de jure 
and de facto rights - which absolutist standpoints neglect - and stresses the 
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centrality of struggle, which, he posits, is necessary for translating ‘stated rights’ 
into ‘concrete rights’. 
 
The place of labour, hence, as the agent that leads the struggle to constantly 
transform stated rights into concrete rights contextualises the understanding and 
appreciation of the labour rights discourse in this thesis. In addition, the thesis 
incorporates Edward’s three dimension typology which includes Constitutional 
rights, collective agreements and enterprise rights in a broader understanding of 
what constitute labour rights. 
 
5.2.3 A short history of Labour Process Theory (LPT) and Employee Rights 
Theory (ERT) 
 
The evolution and re-application of labour rights has a long history. Harry 
Braverman’s book Labour and Monopoly Capital (1974) is generally adjudged by 
scholars to have restored the labour process as an artefact of critical inquiry, 
even though other critical literature had preceded it (Ackyroyd, 2009: Doherty, 
2009: Zipp, 1996: Rowlinson & Hassard, 2001: Collinson & Collinson, 1996: 
Thompson & Smith, 2009).  
 
For more than 30 years in the post-Braverman era, LPT has influenced 
approaches in industrial sociology, industrial relations, labour history and 
organisational analysis (Thompson & Smith, 2009: 253). 
 
Braverman conceived of work as a labour process that contributed centrally to the 
mechanics of accumulation, therefore placing capitalism back into the spotlight. 
Calling for a revision of Weberian conceptions of industrial work, Braverman 
insisted that work as a labour process rendered it a means for the production of 
surplus value and capital accumulation (Ackyroyd, 2009: 265). 
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However, it was Karl Marx’s Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production 
(1867/1967) that first provided the definition of labour process as the channel 
through which the human workplace transformed raw materials (Gaines & 
Domagalski, 1996: 178).  
 
Through the 20th century, LPT continued to integrate the intellectual links between 
Karl Marx and Max Weber, displaying hostility toward the negative effects of 
capitalism on human well being and casting in shaper focus the interface between 
macro-level political economic forces with the nature of work organisations (Nord 
& Doherty, 1996: 200).   
 
The core-theory of LPT is, perhaps, best captured by Thompson (1990: 99-101) in 
his articulation of labour as a central determinant in the relations of production. 
Based on that, Zipp (1996: 253) summarises the nature of control relationship as 
such: 
 
 What capitalists purchase is labour power - not actual labour: therefore 
capitalist production is based on the conversion of potential labour into 
actual labour. As a result of this, labour occupies a central status because 
it produces a surplus. 
 The logic of capital accumulation needs capital to regularly revolutionarise 
the workplace. 
 Transforming labour power into labour requires control: The existence of 
capitalism and market processes - alone - is inadequate to exercise that 
control. 
 Finally, the relationship between capital and labour is antagonistic or is 
defined by ‘structured antagonism’, (where coercive strategies to generate 
desired behaviour by management meet with varied forms of worker 
resistance). 
 
Zipp argues that the control relationship between capital and labour is not as 
simplistic as often presented. He talks of the relationship having ‘a dual nature’ or 
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exhibiting a ‘two-fold’ visage. Workers and management both face contradictions, 
he asserts.   
 
Because capital is confronted with the contradiction of simultaneously treating 
workers as both ‘commodities’ and ‘non commodities’, and the need to continually 
‘revolutionarise’ the production process, it is inevitably inclined toward seeking 
the cooperation and creative powers of labour. 
 
Employees, on the other hand, face the dilemma of opposing some elements of 
capitalist exploitation, ‘while, at the same time, maintaining a strong interest in 
keeping their jobs, thus supporting the unit of capital that employs them’ (Zipp, 
1996: 253). 
 
Importantly, Zipp concludes that explaining control relationships from the 
perspective of the production alone is reductionist. Exogenous factors to the 
workplace, such as capital mobility, gender relations, race and cultural factors do 
also play key roles in moulding internal relations between capital and labour.  
 
Unlike LPT, ERT has its origins in the United States where applied social 
scientists raised concerns about the conditions of labour in a capitalist economy 
characterised by tensions generated by competing interests of management and 
workers. Some scholars such as Dahl (1970), expressed worry about the impact 
on democracy by the capitalist workplace’s hierarchical set up (Nord & Doherty, 
1996: 194-195).  
 
ERT departs from the universe where workers were dismissed at will by 
employers to one where the employer was expected or assumed to be 
responsible for the welfare of workers. Some key rights gained during the 
evolutionary period of ERT include the introduction of the following: 
 
 Unemployment compensation. 
 Occupational health and safety. 
 Social security. 
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 Pensions and other benefits. 
 Freedom from sexual and racial harassment. 
 The right to form unions. 
 Free speech. 
 Due process. 
 And privacy. 
 
From Nord and Doherty (1996), we begin to understand that despite the 
differences between ERT and LPT, the two theoretical approaches can be 
combined to potentially good effect.  
 
5.2.4 LPT and ERT: Congruence, weaknesses and strengths 
 
It was stated earlier that ERT and LPT converge around some key issues. Nord 
and Doherty (1996: 194) reiterate that LPT assumes a macro view in attempting 
to comprehend sources of control and conflict that have to be eliminated to 
improve worker welfare and autonomy. ERT on the other hand advances a micro 
perspective, holding that collaboration between employers and employees in 
pursuing common interests is what ultimately secures worker rights.  
 
Nord and Doherty identify the key areas of confluence between ERT and LPT as 
such: 
 
 Emancipation of workers from oppressive practices, goals of asserting and 
gaining rights. 
 There is agreement between scholars on both ends of the spectrum that 
achieving labour rights in a protracted process. 
 Both perspectives have significant blind-spots which constrain their 
effectiveness. 
 
Gaines and Domagalski (1996: 190) assert that LPT renders three major 
contributions to ERT:  
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 Uncovering the layers of capitalist ideology and revealing ways in which 
labour and capital can relate.  
 It sows the seeds for worker emancipation by raising awareness of the 
exploitative nature of capitalism. 
 Contributes to an informed understanding of employee rights by focusing 
on specific rights from a more critical paradigmatic perspective (also 
identifies control mechanisms in organisations that infringe or constrain 
employee rights). 
 
Ironically, the strengths of one appear to compensate for the weaknesses of the 
other, providing a basis for cross-fertilisation of ideas to achieve essentially the 
same goal. For Zipp (1990: 255), ERT lacks the critical edge presented by LPT: 
 
“ER is less a theory and more a set of concerns and problems. 
Underlying the ER literature is the recognition that the half-century has 
witnessed a tremendous shift in the employer-employee relationship”, 
(Zipp, 1990:255). 
 
ERT’s normative positioning is criticised for its concern with rights that workers 
ought to have.  
 
It is argued that ERT is also myopic in that it does not pay sufficient attention to 
the prospect that the demise of firms is determined by the policy choices of the 
powerful, who may elect to shift capital to achieve their own aims (Keeley, 1998: 
30). That obviously closes the door to negotiation with workers. 
 
Although appearing to rise above the shortcomings of ERT, LPT is itself not a 
faultless empowerment tool, contend Nord & Doherty (1996: 203). It is pivoted on 
collective action to overcome barriers but does not extend enough consideration 
to the means for generating that very intervention.  
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That, however, did not seem to concern Marx as he assumed capitalism would be 
doomed by the escalation in exploitation, slavery, degradation, misery and 
oppression. 
 
“Mobilisation was not problematic for Marx; it was more or less 
inevitable” (Nord & Doherty, 1996: 203). 
 
In their exposition of LPT, Nord & Doherty identify the following as key problems 
with the collective action option: 
 
 Several classical incentive problems are ignored: for instance, there is no 
motivation for potential leaders of social change to sacrifice their well being 
for uncertain gains. 
 There are no incentives for followers either(even though there is a 
recognition of Olson’s(1971) analysis of collective action, suggesting that 
many people opt to ‘free ride’, letting other people take the risks, while they 
benefit indirectly from the action).  
 In response, Nord and Doherty assert that, if too many people ’free ride’, 
the purpose of collective action is defeated. 
 
Recognising the strengths and weaknesses of LPT and ERT, Nord and Doherty 
offer to integrate the two into one mutually supportive empowerment tool, which 
they term: the Assertion for Empowerment Perspective. 
 
“It maintains for example, that the degree of empowerment is a function 
of what people do and/or don’t do and see and/or don’t see in their local 
situations”(Nord & Doherty, 1996: 206). 
 
They synergise ERT and LPT, by isolating four key processes that ‘appear to 
affect empowerment’. These four processes are: 
  
1) Impact of macro forces on local level perceptions: LPT is deployed as a 
corrective measure to ERT’s limited attention to macro-level political 
 245 
economic forces that produce and sustain the distribution of power and 
privilege, including the distribution of rights. It is argued that ERT supporters 
ignore the fact that claims of rights preserve some privileges while 
disempowering others. Combining ERT with LPT would recognise the 
interface between conditions of work and the macro contexts in which 
organisations operate. 
2) Choice of optimal levels of cooperation and conflict depending on the 
situation: LPT concentrates on the antagonism between labour and capital, 
while ERT assumes cooperative approaches. An approach embracing both 
would be more beneficial. 
3) Use of rights talk to mobilise action: ERT and LPT complement each 
other through ‘rights talk’. Rights talk is combined with collective action as 
rhetoric, pictures, phrases articulate an injustice, moving people into action, 
and; 
4) Use of rights talk or some alternative rhetoric to arouse emotions to 
provide the basis for an enriched theory of empowerment. 
 
To summarise, we understand the approaches to industrial relations as having 
assumed two opposing paradigms: the ERT, which favours compromise and is 
motivated by the liberal democratic norms, and the LPT, which draws on Marxian 
motivations for collective action and has inherent hostilities toward capitalism. 
 
The two theoretical approaches have strengths and weaknesses which are 
unique to themselves. The ERT concentrates on micro level interventions but 
ignores the possibility that political, economic and socials change could 
drastically alter labour relations, sometimes undermining the rights of workers and 
reducing the strengths of trade unions. 
 
LPT offers the radical paradigm; seeking to mobilise the power of workers into a 
single force ranged at remedying the oppressive nature of capital. However, it 
overlooks the need to provide incentives for leaders and followers alike that might 
need to calculate risks and benefits in order to proceed with conflict. 
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The work of Nord and Doherty (1996) is instructive, in that it combines the ERT 
with the LPT, covering the weaknesses of one, with the strengths of the other. 
This produces an empowerment tool that interfaces collaboration with collective 
action ranged at the same goal - the welfare and dignity of workers. 
 
Going forward, this thesis then begins to relate the evolution of labour unions in 
Zambia, from the colonial era to the present day, by framing the actions of labour 
within the context set by ERT and LPT. 
 
  5.2.5 The history of trade unionism in Zambia 
 
This section of the thesis applies a historical prism to understand how state elites 
have used constitutional and legal instruments to either deny or apportion labour 
rights to competing interests and the effect of this on the expression of 
fundamental human rights. The influence of historical labour relations contexts 
has been virtually marginalised from media studies despite the potential for these 
perspectives to inform the analysis of power relations between political and 
business elites on the one hand and media workers on the other. As O’Neil 
(1998: 1) rightly notes, political transitions have had the tendency of carrying over 
colonial structures and practices which continue to impede freedom of 
expression, association and assembly to the present day in developing countries 
such as Zambia (discussed earlier in section 1.1.4 of Chapter One of this thesis).  
 
From a media perspective therefore, history would help us fortify our 
understanding of the factors that would likely inhibit journalists from unionising 
their profession and defending their rights to organise and communicate in 
society. In essence, the political history of Zambia, as perhaps other countries, is 
closely inter-twined with the emergence of labour and the development of media 
and their role in transitional processes as discussed in Chapter Two. For this 
reason a broad politically based history of trade unionism and industrial relations 
is provided in order to arrive at a more informed analysis of media and 
democracy.  
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The formation of trade unions in Zambia is inextricably linked to the evolution of 
political parties in the colonial era. 
 
The first vestiges of unionism in Zambia can be traced back to the mid 1930s 
when Africans rallied themselves to challenge the exclusionary nature of 
Legislative Councils set up by British Authorities in 1924, after the administration 
assumed full control of the territory from its proxy, the British South Africa 
Company (BSA) (Roberts, 1995:1013).  
 
Historical literature on Zambia identifies the period after the Second World War as 
the most significant in terms of African nationalism (Roberts, 1975, Chipungu, 
1992, Phiri, 2006, DiJohn, 2010).  
 
Phiri (2006: 22-23), suggests that the outbreak of World War II, especially, had a 
transformative effect on labour relations in Northern and Southern Rhodesia in a 
number of ways: 
 
 It coerced whites into joining the armed forces, thereby opening up job 
opportunities for Africans, particularly in Northern Rhodesia.  
 The war effort enlisted Africans, who were shipped off to South East Asia, 
to fight for the British empire (presumably, precipitating ideas about self 
government). 
 In seeking wide-spread sympathy for the war amongst Africans through 
propagandist communications, the colonial authority inadvertently 
‘hastened” African political awareness.  
 
Hence, African nationalism developed initially as a political response to 
imperialism and its racial ideology underlined by the notion of white supremacy. 
Conceived as a reformist movement, the initial aim of African nationalism was to 
liberalise rather than overthrow, the thinking of which was embedded in the 
capitalist mode of production promoted by the colonial education system (Phiri, 
2006:23).  
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The first moves toward political organisation were made by Africans from 
Nyasaland (Malawi), who dominated the African job market in Northern Rhodesia. 
Nyasas capitalised on their superior education from Livingstonia mission and 
began the earliest forms of political organisation in Northern Rhodesia and much 
of southern Africa. Opened by Scottish missionaries in 1894, Livingstonia Mission 
at Mwenzo generated a diverse pool of cadres of politically conscious Africans 
who in turn, catalysed the influences that led to the growth of African protests in 
Northern Rhodesia (DiJohn, 2010:14).  
 
Among them was David Kaunda, father of Zambia’s first President, Kenneth 
Kaunda, who set up a school in Chinsali, northern Zambia. Outspoken leaders 
such as Donald Siwale, a schools inspector at Mwenzo led the way into the 
formation of the first organised entity - the Mwenzo Welfare Association in 1912 - 
to engage with the colonial establishment more effectively (Roberts, 1976:196). 
 
The Mwenzo initiative went into oblivion over time as World War I broke out but 
its impetus was assumed by other similar formations - spurred on by former 
Livingstonia mission students. Most of the welfare societies began to take on a 
more political zest in the 1929-31 periods (DiJohn, 2010:14).  
 
Although not significant agents in shaping public opinion, the welfare societies 
culminated in novel - but failed - attempts at consolidation through the creation of 
the first territory wide body - the African Welfare Association of Northern 
Rhodesia in 1933. African Unions were still not allowed at this point, therefore, 
nationalists established welfare societies across Northern Rhodesia as large 
numbers of their compatriots were drafted into the copper mines as cheap labour 
(Roberts, 1975: 196-197). 
 
Hall (1976: 71) describes the establishment of the Federation of Welfare 
Societies as ‘the first step towards a national African political party…’ 
 
Indeed, as indicated in section 2.2.1 of Chapter Two of this thesis, the body 
eventually constituted itself into a political party named the Northern Rhodesia 
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African Congress (renamed, the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress 
in 1951) (Roberts, 1995, 1013).  
 
Supported by popular African leaders, workers in the long run became more 
organised and bold enough to challenge the colonial administration: the first strike 
by mine workers was recorded in 1935, which led to the killing of six workers by 
colonial police. The colonial office responded by extending more powers to tribal 
authorities, assumed to be the official vector of communication with colonial 
leaders. Meanwhile, fearful of the growing African workers’ influence in industrial 
and political matters, European employees created the European Mine Workers’ 
Union(EMU) (DiJohn, 2010: 15). 
 
Formal efforts by the British at recognising the importance of African unions were 
made in 1947 by a labour government in Britain which accepted proposals for the 
formation of trade unions in all of the empire’s colonies.  
 
However, despite the secondment of a labour organiser to Northern Rhodesia, 
Africans were still not allowed to involve themselves in politics or finance any 
political activities. It was the appointment of William Comrie as labour officer for 
the Copperbelt that finally led to the implementation of the new government’s 
policy on African trade unions, a precursor to formal political organisation. 
 
Following that, the formation of the African Mine Workers Union (AMU) in 1947 
not only symbolised a protracted struggle by African mineworkers to distinguish 
their aspirations from the European Mineworkers Union, but also signified the 
growth of the trade union movement in Zambia (Gilmore, 1988: 199-200).  
 
Although the analyses of colonialism is often tinged with negativity, Chiluba 
(1995:23) argues that Britain, unlike other imperial regimes, prepared Africans for 
self government by involving them in elective Legislative Councils from 1959, and 
training them for administrative positions as non-partisan architects of the public 
service.  Perhaps Zambia’s foremost unionist in his day, Chiluba asserts that the 
principle of collective bargaining, introduced by the colonialist, was ‘an important 
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legacy’ in the transition toward preparing the nationalists for ‘a form of liberal 
democracy.’ 
 
Between 1959 and 1964, the number of African trade unions increased from eight 
(8) to 50. The ZCTU was formed in 1966 and registered under section 8 of the 
Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance of 1949 of Northern Rhodesia 
(Shikwe, 2003: 3). Independence in 1964 led to the consolidation of all unions 
into 18 entities by 1972, which formed the foundation of the ZCTU, then boasting 
a membership of 140,000(Gilmore, 1988: 199-200). 
 
5.2.6 Democratisation, economic reforms and the labour movement: 
Understanding industrial relations in Zambia 
 
The first tentative phase of liberal democracy in Zambia - the First Republic - saw 
a ruling party in UNIP, galvanise a nation around the nationalist sentiments of the 
independence struggle, while making overtures to labour as an ally (Fashoyin, 
2008: 5).  
 
Even as far back as the 1950’s the autonomy of the labour movement had been a 
source of concern for the nationalists, as it declined to be directed in terms of 
economic and political liberation. Upon independence in 1964, the UNIP 
administration compromised the autonomy of the unions by reducing their 
capacity to strike through legislative changes. Presenting itself as the protector of 
labour from foreign capital, UNIP then began to lure the Mine Workers Union of 
Zambia (MUZ), the most powerful of the formations, into the umbrella of the 
ZCTU (Larmer, 2006: 296). 
 
However, UNIP’s policy of voluntary co-option of the labour movement into its 
development objectives failed as the country was continually rocked by industrial 
unrest.  
 
The UNIP government elected finally to use legislative means to curb labour 
unions: In 1970, it passed the Industrial Relations Act (1971) which required 
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mandatory membership to one mother union (the basis of the ‘one industry, one 
union’ policy). In principle, the Act strengthened UNIP’s control over unions 
(Rakner, 2001: 513) but it also generated overtones of dissent from labour 
leaders (Fashoyin, 2008:5-6). 
 
Inadvertently, however, the fusion of the unions consolidated the labour 
movement in financial terms and organisationally, breaking with the post 
independence tradition of intra-labour conflict (Simutanyi, 1996: 151-172). 
 
It was, in effect, the nationalisation of the economy that brought UNIP into direct 
conflict with the interest groups representing labour, business and agriculture. 
Underpinned by the Philosophy of Humanism, the introduction of the one party 
state and nationalisation is seen by some as the expression of an explicit policy of 
co-option into a state corporate structure that was centrally controlled.  
 
Yet, the one-party state did not dampen labour’s resistance to the state’s 
development agenda - it seemed to embolden it (Rakner, 2001: 514). 
 
Seemingly, UNIP sought to control the labour movement by extending 
membership drives to the various branches, capitalising on its status as the sole 
legal party. But this scheme was subverted by the rise of Frederick Chiluba as 
president of ZCTU and Newstead Zimba as its secretary-general in 1975, both 
strong opponents of the one party state.  
 
Under their leadership, ZCTU’s membership grew to 350,000 by 1991. The ZCTU 
hence became not only the most powerful non state actor in one party Zambia, 
but essentially the strongest political opponent to the government’s development 
project (Rakner, 2001: 514). 
 
In underlining his hard-line opposition to UNIP, Chiluba (1995:20-23), is emphatic 
in dismissing the notion that single partysm had pacific intentions at any given 
time.  More than a century of socio-economic modernisation had rendered 
Zambia not only the most urbanised country in Africa but had also changed the 
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sense of ethnic consciousness that motivated the nationalists to develop a state 
corporate structure under visions of national unity, he asserts. 
 
“Today, many Zambians see themselves as individuals and not simply 
as members of some ethnic group. They are geographically mobile as 
between rural and urban areas, and at times the individual interests 
may be given precedence even over familial obligations. Zambia is a 
large country and government must be by representation of the people 
and not direct participation” (Chiluba, 1995: 21). 
 
Chiluba also strongly contests the idea that the one party state was brought about 
by popular acclaim, citing the opposition to it in the Chona Commission of Inquiry 
which preceded the 1972 legislation confirming the Second Republic. The one 
party regime exhibited vestiges of the colonial government which operated on the 
basis of surveillance of ‘trouble makers’, maintenance of the state of emergency 
and indefinite detention of opposition, he argues.  
 
The failure of Kaunda’s socialist development strategy manifested in the poor 
management of the country’s nationalised industries including the copper mines. 
Copper prices and oils shocks worsened Zambia’s economic profile in the mid 
1970s and into the 1980s. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from 6.7% to -
2.4%; while overbearing state controls and bad management stifled employment 
creation in the productive sector (Fashoyin, 2008:1).  
 
The economic downturn in the late 1970s leading into the 1980s saw the 
Zambian government face unrest as subsidies on the staple food maize were 
removed and the price of the commodity shot up by 120 %.  
 
The price of fuel also went up by 70 %. In addition, student unrest typified the 
year 1986 when the state reintroduced boarding fees. This forced Kaunda to 
reverse his decisions and also break away from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) inspired economic austerity programme (Roberts, 1995: 1014). 
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The 84 industrial strikes that took place in the 1980s, and the detention of Chiluba 
and his colleagues during the same period epitomise the relationship between 
UNIP and ZCTU in the Second Republic (Rakner, 2001: 514).  
 
Tayo Fashoyin (2008:vii), Director of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
Sub Regional Office for Southern Africa, crucially notes, that employment 
relations in Zambia have been influenced by successive economic and political 
developments. 
 
Going forward into the multiparty dispensation of the Third Republic, the 
expectation was certainly one of a more liberated labour environment, with rights 
of association being a given. 
 
However, Rakner cautions that while political liberalisation generally leads to new 
freedoms of associations and free speech, the economic imperatives have 
proved challenging for African democracies. The same interest groups that rose 
from the liberalisation process have exercised their liberties to oppose the state’s 
economic liberalisation policies and reforms, placing the continent’s new 
democrats in a quagmire (Rakner, 2001: 514).  
 
Fashoyin (2008:vii), also acknowledges that the tensions between economic 
liberalisation and market-oriented economic regimes and public policy, ‘by design 
or default’ undermined the role of trade unions and the employers’ association’ in 
Zambia. 
 
5.2.7 Trade unionism and liberal democracy 
 
Trade unionism and democracy, in short, do not sit comfortably with each other, 
even though it is held in some scholarly circles that a nation’s development relies 
upon harmonious labour-management relations. Because of the assumed political 
and socio-economic fragility of developing nations, the existence of cordial 
relations between state and labour is considered even more paramount (Gilmore, 
1998:196).  
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Democratic consolidation also, is presumed to be pivoted in part, upon robust 
union organisation that can enable workers to engage in negotiations and 
enforcement of agreements with the state and capital (Webster, 1998: 40).  
 
However, opinion is divided as to whether labour’s role should be predominantly 
political or economic. Supporters of the political paradigm have marshalled a 
plethora of evidence augmenting their position particularly for developing nations 
where alliances between nationalists and worker movements have led to liberation 
from colonial forces.  
 
Those in support of the economic paradigm cite the cases of Tanzania and Ghana, 
where labour’s resistance was spurred by the abuse at the hands of agricultural 
employers - not by political sentiment per se (Bates [Sa]: 366-369). 
 
The political paradigm has however marshalled enough evidence to buttress its 
claims: There are significant highlights indicating that during periods of political 
change through the twentieth century, labour and politics have often tended to 
forge alliances to achieve common political and economic goals (Buhlungu, 2005: 
701).  
 
And yet in the recent past, the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies by African 
states has often undermined these coalitions. For liberalism imposes high costs on 
workers and minimises the power of the state to intervene in social, political and 
economic reconstruction (Webster, 1998:39-40).  
 
Therefore, despite its promise of more equitable distribution of political power, 
democratisation’s economic face increasingly relays social inequalities while its 
political character tends to compromise substantive political equality (Burnell, 
2001:191). These development inevitably position labour to interrogate and 
challenge the efficacy of imported political models. 
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Contending priorities between state and unions in changing political-economic 
contexts inevitably undermines the union-party alliances: countries such as South 
Africa are increasingly attracting scholarly attention in regard to the African 
National Congress (ANC)’s and the Congress of South African Trade Unions’ 
(COSATU) relationship as social inequalities remain a concern and expectations 
amongst workers meet with constant disappointments, for example (Buhlungu, 
Brookes & Wood, 2008: 439-468). 
 
5.2.8 The impact of Washington Consensus doctrines on Trade Unions  
 
 
The importance of this broad discussion to the overall aim of this thesis is two 
fold: 
 
 To understand how economic policies and labour practices could either 
strengthen or weaken the ability of journalists to consolidate their efforts at 
unionisation. 
 To provide an informed analysis of how political and business elites may 
undermine job security, freedom of association, and ultimately the growth 
of media unions in the foreseeable future. 
 
The preceding discussion therefore illuminates how changing economic 
conditions may compromise political alliances between unions and ruling political 
parties, leading to a lack of confidence in the existing political model. The reaction 
of the ruling party, using state power, is of a fundamental interest here.  
 
This would likely play a key role in determining the extent to which labour would 
claim a legitimate role in the political public sphere as an independent force. As 
an integral member of the ZCTU, a union of journalists cannot hence be deemed 
immune to the overall political conditions that influence labour relations in any 
given situation. 
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The Zambian case testifies to how the relations between UNIP and the ZCTU on 
the one hand; and MMD and the ZCTU, on the other, in both cases deteriorated 
as the economy collapsed at various points in history (Rakner, 1999: 507-527). 
 
The fall of UNIP and its socialist development strategy of nationalisation, provided 
the launch pad for the enhancement of MMD as an alternative and rendered its 
economic blue-print, informed by the Washington Consensus, a viable 
proposition for the masses.  
 
From the time Frederick Chiluba took over the reins of state power in 1991, 
Zambia experienced an intensification of the market - oriented economic reform 
(explained in section 1.1.2 of Chapter One ), which began modestly in Kaunda’s 
last years in office. Chiluba solidly believed in the doctrine of the Washington 
Consensus and was quick to privatise 83% of the 280 state enterprises, which 
had been draining public finances. The sum effect of Chiluba’s policies was to 
strengthen employers substantially while severely crippling the trade unions, 
which experienced huge membership declines through mass retrenchments.  
 
In addition, the reforms generated social effects amongst workers, as the state 
used colonial liquidation laws to implement its plans, thereby inadequately 
compensating retrenchees.  Chiluba’s perpetuation of the Industrial Relations Act 
in its liberal form, while consistent with liberal philosophy, is blamed by labour 
officials for the factionalisation of the ZCTU because it encouraged groups with 
different viewpoints to government policy, to legally align along ideological lines. 
The ZCTU’s influence, as a collective force, began to wane, hence. As a 
consequence, the two unions with the most financial capacity, the MUZ and the 
National Teachers Union (NUT) withdrew their affiliation to ZCTU in 1993-4 
(Fashoyin, 2008:1-6).  
 
They instead joined the newly created Federation of Free Trade Unions of 
Zambia (FFTUZ). The FFTUZ drew its membership from the public service, local 
government, mining and agriculture.  The FFTUZ became a significant option to 
ZCTU and for the first time, the voice of labour was splintered exposing it to state 
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manipulation. The first two years of MMD rule, 1991 to 1993, showed some 
stability in major macro economic indicators but caused painful social effects. 
Zambia’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) registered 6.8 % growth in 1993, 
6.4% in 1996, 3.5% in 1997, 3.2% in 1999 and 3.5% in 2000. The manufacturing, 
transport, wholesale and retail sectors also recorded growth but without 
generating jobs in any significant sense. By 2000, 80% of Zambia’s population 
was surviving on a dollar a day, conditions signifying acute poverty (Global Policy 
Network, 2001). 
 
Unemployment and under - employment continued to deteriorate in the country 
as a consequence of adopting the IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP). Some major salient points on the socio-economic situation in 
Zambia in the first ten years of Chiluba’s rule are summarised by the Global 
Policy Network (2001) as such: 
 
 Because of retrenchments in both public and private sectors of the 
economy, the unemployment rate increased from 13% in 1986 to 22% in 
1991. 
 The 122,500 youths who entered the labour market every year, had no 
hope of securing jobs. 
 A total of 61,000 formal sector jobs were lost between 1992 and 1995 
 Formal wage employment continued to decline, compelling Zambians to 
resort to informal means of subsistence. 
 The two policy measures which caused these phenomena are the Public 
Sector Reform Programme and the Privatisation Programme. 
 
The other major factor undermining the economy and by extension unionisation, 
was the under performance of newly privatised firms. Some of the prolific 
acquisitions stand in sharper relief: 
 
 Kapiri Glass Factory (eventually closed under private ownership). 
 The Roan Antelope Mining Corporation (RAMCOZ), went into receivership 
during the same period jeopardising the futures of 4000 miners. 
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 Maamba Collieries had to be resold due poor performance under its 
original buyers. 
 
Kabwe Pharmaceutical Limited was another of the several under achievers 
(Global Policy Network, 2001). 
 
Table 3: Formal sector employment trends, 1997- 2000 (Global Policy 
Network, 2001) 
 
Sector 1997 1998 1999 2000* % Change 
Formal Employment by 
Industry 
475,161 467,193 477,508 476,347 -0.2 
Agriculture, Food, and Fishing 58,898 58,898 60,000 59,377 -1.0 
Mining and Quarrying 44,498 39,160 38,521 35,042 -9.0 
Manufacturing 47,118 46,685 46,000 47,782 3.9 
Electricity, Gas and Water 5,009 5,237 5,300 5,049 -4.7 
Construction 17,106 13,459 12,895 13,828 7.2 
Trade and Distribution 48,893 48,964 51,097 52,336 2.4 
Transport and Communication 45,963 45,840 45,000 46,719 3.8 
Finance, Real Estate, and 
Business Services 
37,862 35,276 34,682 31,483 -9.2 
Community, Social, and 
Personal Services* 
169,814 173,674 184,013 184,731 0.4 
      
Formal Employment by 
Sector 
475,161 467,193 477,508 476,347 -0.2 
Central Government (civilian 129,200 117,250 112,345 101,300 -9.8 
Local Authorities 15,161 13,048 12,900 12,500 -3.1 
Parastatals Companies 73,900 68,046 65,300 65,700 0.6 
Private Companies 256,900 268,849 
 
286,963 296,847 3.4 
 
* Estimates as of June 30, 2000. 
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When the MMD began to pursue the Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP) as 
part of its project to foster efficiency and cost effectiveness, the ripple effects on 
workers were profound. There were 180,000 public workers of whom, 75,000 were 
civil servants, 26,000 Local Authority workers, 45, 000 non-joint council employees 
and 34,000 classified daily employees.   
 
The PSRP aimed at pruning 17,200 civil servants and non civil servants between 
1994 and 1996. But the mass retrenchments were somewhat delayed due to the 
enormous pay-outs involved. However, the gradual attrition had a telling effect on 
the profile of unions and on employer-employee relations (Global Policy Network, 
2001). 
 
  
5.3 FROM PRIVATISATION TO COMMERCIALISATION 
 
Labour movements accused the government of non-consultation and of being 
donor-driven in its development agenda. Thus, Chiluba’s presidency, leading into 
Mwanawasa’s in 2001, were characterised by conflict with unions over the 
following factors: 
 
 Hyperinflation had eroded wages and incomes: despite a 3 digit inflation in 
the mid 1990s, nominal wages had only risen by 30 % per annum. 
 The economy experienced a steady decline in employment, with formal 
employment - which represented 75% of the labour force - dropping to 
10.3% in 1999. 
 The mining, manufacturing and construction sectors witnessed declines of 
between 33% and 62%. 
 Although trade, finance and services recorded 16% and 58 % growths 
during the same periods, the bulk of these jobs were in the casualisation 
category. 
 Public service reform, aimed at efficiency, quality and cost-effective service 
delivery, led to the retrenchment of 3% of public workers, i.e. a reduction 
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from 139,000 to 101,000 between 1997 and 2000. These radical changes 
destabilised the labour movement in terms of membership, social effects 
on workers and created operational difficulties in employment relations. 
 The Zambian economy became increasingly informalised with the 3.6 
million people in the sector representing 79% of the labour force 
(Fashoyin, 2008:1-5). 
 
To its credit, in 2005, the Mwanawasa government introduced the National 
Employment and Labour Market Policy which aimed to create quality and 
adequate jobs, improving incomes, protection of labour and human rights, whose 
results are yet to be seen (Fashoyin, 2008:1-5).  
 
Because some state owned enterprises were not as attractive to investors, Levy 
Mwanawasa emphasised commercialisation - rather than privatisation - of 
existing state enterprises such as banks and the Zambia Electricity Supply 
Corporation (ZESCO), which were central to the country’s development 
(Fashoyin, 2008:1-5).  
 
Under Mwanawasa, Zambia recorded a GDP growth rate of 10.1% in 2006 
attributed to a robust performance of the mining sector (50% growth between 
2001 and 2003) and the cancellation of the country’s $7.1billion external debt. 
However, the economic growth’s impact on poverty and unemployment was 
intangible which led to labour and civil society rallying against the state’s 
liberalisation policies once again.  
 
5.3.1 Privatisation, liberalisation and unionisation 
 
Economic reforms had major impacts on nearly all 29 registered national unions 
in Zambia, particularly in terms of membership levels and unionisation rates (25 
of the unions were members of the ZCTU, while four were affiliated to the 
FFTUZ)(Global Policy Network, 2001). 
 
 261 
However economic reforms, while constituting a major factor, were not the only 
explanation for receding membership. The unions concede that, to a lesser 
extent, natural attrition, voluntary retirement and improvement in technology in 
the financial and banking sector replaced human labour with machines. 
 
Unionisation rates dropped from 70% and 80% in the First and Second Republics 
respectively to about 50% in the Third. The Global Policy Network (2001) asserts 
that unions have failed to organise themselves under a new hostile environment 
introduced by the privatisation because the new capitalist owners were less 
inclined to promoting or observing worker rights. 
 
“The new private industry is more anti-union and some 
investors/employers are even refusing to recognise unions. Workers 
showing union sympathy are usually intimidated and threatened with 
dismissals. The new investors are encouraging part-time, temporary, and 
casual employment in an attempt to lower costs and avoid unions”, 
(Global Policy Network, 2001). 
 
The Global Network study supports its assertions by illustrating how the sectors 
with the largest proportion of privatised firms have had the lowest unionisation 
rates: Transport and communication (28.1%), agriculture (26.7%), manufacturing, 
trade, and distribution and hotels (27.8%), and finance (22.6%). 
 
The mining sector is highlighted as the one sector which still enjoys high 
unionisation rates at 88.3%, attributed to the strengths and organisational 
capacity of the MUZ. In sectors dominated by parastatals firms, such as electricity 
and water (79.2%) and construction (88.3%), unionisation rates remain high. 
Finally, the public sector stands at 63.7% which is described as ‘moderate’ levels 
of unionisation. 
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Table 4: Trade union membership, 1995 - 99 (Global Policy Network, 2001) 
Union  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Airways and Allied 
Workers 
2,800 3,000 3,000 2,500 775 
Bankers’ Union of 
Zambia 
1,000 1,000 1,600 500 500 
Civil Servants Union of 
Zambia 
29,000 29,000 34,500 30,000 39,267 
Guards Union of 
Zambia 
10,000 10,000 10,000 8,000 6,720 
Mineworkers Union of 
Zambia 
48,000 47,.000 40,000 38,000 31,251 
National Union of 
Commercial and 
Industrial Workers 
18,000 15,000 15,000 12,000 18,000 
National Union of 
Communications 
Workers 
5,547 5,000 4,800 3,900 4,381 
National Union of Public 
Service Workers 
35,000 34,000 33,000 20,000 16,000 
National Union of 
Technical Education 
Lecturers 
- 800 800 800 800 
National Union 
Transport and Allied 
Workers 
5,000 5,000 5,200 3,000 1,099 
Railway Workers Union 
of Zambia 
7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 4,000 
Secondary Education 
Teachers Union** 
2,600 3,000 5,000 4,500 4,500 
University of Zambia 
and Allied Workers 
4,275 4,000 4,000 2,500 2,500 
University of Zambia 
Researchers and 
Lecturers  
Union 
 
- - - 282 282 
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Workers Union of 
Tazara 
- - - 2,000 2,383 
Zambia National Union 
of Teachers 
45,000 46,000 46,000 46,500 38,249 
Zambia National Union 
of Health and Allied 
Workers 
6,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Zambia Revenue 
Authority Workers 
Union 
2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,743 
Zambia Typographical 
and Allied Workers 
Union 
2,000 1,500 1,200 1,000 1,000 
Zambia Union of 
Financial and Allied 
Workers** 
7,000 6,000 6,000 5,800 5,800 
Zambia Union of 
Journalist 
300 300 300 300 300 
Zambia United Local 
Authority Workers 
Union 
22,000 18,000 18,000 17,000 10,000 
Total Trade Union 
Membership 
289,322 280,400 282,700 245,742 234,522 
Total Formal 
employment 
485,000 479,000 475,000 467,000 478,000 
* Formerly Zambia Electricity and Allied Workers Union. 
** Not affiliated to ZCTU. 
 
What the study misses however, is the situation of the ZUJ in this equation. Table 
4 above indicates that the journalists’ union had 300 paid up members in 2001. 
This is still the case today, going by the information provided by both the 
management of the Times Newspapers (Phiri, 2009/11/20) and the ZUJ 
executive (Chonya: 2010/02/02). This is accounted for by the fact that ZUJ 
merely represents journalists working in the two state owned daily newspapers, 
not the entire fraternity of media professionals.  The stability of the membership 
profile of ZUJ will also be explained in part by the state’s treatment of its media as 
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a strategic political tool which may, occasionally perhaps, be supported and 
strengthened by subsidies, rather than weakened through all manner of attrition. 
 
ZUJ’s expansion, as will be explained in greater detail in section 5.3.5 appears 
inhibited by rival unions in the public sector or by the state itself, the latter being 
possibly uncomfortable with a union of journalists embracing public service media 
professionals. The other reason, of course, would likely be ZUJ’s own lack of 
capacity to actually navigate inter-union and state manoeuvres to increase its 
membership base and unionisation rates. 
 
The Global Network study provides no figures in terms of ZUJ’s ‘potential 
membership’ or ‘number of workers in industry’ and will therefore not facilitate the 
calculation of ‘estimated unionisation rates’ in the media entity. It stands to 
reason, at this stage, to assume that the absence of membership data may be 
caused by the lack of a clear definition of who, in essence, qualifies to be a 
journalist, a matter addressed in the same vein in section 5. 3.3 of this chapter. 
 
In summary, it can be said that political and economic liberalisations do not 
necessarily work correspondingly with the growth of trade unions and other 
interest groups. The experience of Zambia, as other emerging nations, indicates 
that liberal democracy and its market orientated policies have a tendency to 
undermine worker rights and livelihoods, generating tensions between state and 
labour. 
 
In all of Zambia’s three republics, labour relations have been aggravated by 
deteriorating economies either caused by poor management, external forces 
such as oil shocks and poor copper prices; or austerity measures that are driven 
by the IMF and World Bank. Internally, labour has been compromised by state -
orchestrated moves: under Kaunda’s one party state, the introduction of the 
Industrial Relations (1971) Act  promoted the policy of ‘one industry, one union’ 
which limited the ability of sectoral unions to exercise choice in terms of which 
apex organisation they belonged to.  
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Inadvertently, the Act consolidated the ZCTU into a single, robust union which 
presented UNIP with its stiffest challenge during the First and Second Republics. 
 
The UNIP administration employed the same tactic in reverse to attempt to split 
ZCTU ahead of the 1991 elections, a measure interpreted by scholars as a direct 
assault on the MMD, whose membership was largely bolstered by labour. The 
liberalisation of the labour sector through the Industrial Relations (Amendment) 
Act (1990), met with opposition from the ZCTU and the MMD. Organisationally, 
the pro-democracy movement and labour were too cemented and ranged on 
change to fracture at that stage.   
 
Upon ascendancy to power in 1991, however, the MMD’s unanticipated reaction 
was to renege on its electioneering promise to reinstate the ‘one industry, one 
union’ policy and instead liberalised freedoms of association further, aggravating 
the dismantling of the ZCTU as a monopoly umbrella union. Subsequently, rival 
unions emerged, compromising the ZCTU’s position as a force in Zambian 
politics. While the changes to the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act of 1997 
can easily pass as a calculated political manoeuvre to disable a consolidated 
labour movement through deliberate fragmentation, they can conversely be 
defended as being consistent with the liberal philosophy. Perhaps, more 
importantly for the MMD, the actions conformed to the ILO Convention 87 on 
freedom of association and the right to organise.  
 
Soon after the MMD assumed office in 1991, relations with its pre-election ally, 
the ZCTU, began to deteriorate as radical privatisation and liberalisation policies 
threw thousands of workers - union members in many instances - out of formal 
employment. The economic reforms also reduced the size of the public service, 
weakening the unions further.  
 
The measures served to strengthen the hand of the employer as the government 
opted to use liquidation Acts from the colonial era, which left retrenched workers 
poorly compensated for their loss. Unions declined in both membership levels 
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and unionisation rates. Apart from the IMF and World Bank inspired policies the 
other causes of attrition were early retirements and the replacement of human 
labour with technology, particularly in the financial and banking sectors. 
 
Labour scholars (Global Policy Network, 2001) assert that the unions, more akin 
to a nationalised economy and its political dynamics, had not mustered the art of 
mobilisation under a novel hostile capitalist environment, where new investors 
avoided unions, electing to use casual labour instead of formal contract workers. 
Available data demonstrates that it is in the sectors with the highest number of 
privatised firms in which unionisation rates have declined the most. The exception 
has been the mining industry which has the most well financed and historically 
most organised of the unions. The public sector too has had modest declines 
compared to the private sector, owing to the PSRP launched by the MMD as part 
of its Washington Consensus inspiration. What is ignored in this discourse is that 
the ZUJ seems to have maintained its membership levels at 300 probably as a 
result of the state not deliberately retrenching workers in the newspapers. 
 
Hence, while the history of liberal philosophies and their impact on unionism in 
Zambia strongly demonstrate sharp declines in the power of labour, amidst the 
crisis had arisen an opportunity for journalists to define and grow a union for 
themselves. 
 
5.3.2 The formation of the Zambia Union of Journalists 
 
Organised literature on unionism in the media industry is virtually non-existent 
therefore much of this section will be constructed from official documents and 
unstructured interviewees with founding and former executives of ZUJ. 
 
Formally constituted in 1990, ZUJ introduced a new dynamic in Zambian media 
culture with the first structured approach to improving the economic welfare of 
journalists, since independence. 
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The idea of a union was driven by mid level journalists on the Times of Zambia 
who were experienced in shop stewardship at the workplace either operating as 
members of the Typographical Workers Union (TWU) or loosely aligned to the 
NUCW (Phiri, 2009/11/20).  
 
Unlike the PAZA which was initially headed by persons at the level of editor-in-
chief (Kasoma, 186: 175), therefore very much tethered to the state as their official 
appointing authority in their formal employment, ZUJ remained relatively 
unshackled from the restrictive construct of the state-corporate structure by virtue 
of being grass-roots driven. 
 
Its first president, the late Edwin Musaika, a sub editor and subsequently chief 
reporter on the Times, hence, was able to launch broadsides at authorities 
insulated by the law, and without the uncertainty of job insecurity that might be 
associated with upper echelon editorial staff. 
 
The constitution of ZUJ in Article 1(1) (ZUJ [sa]) defines the organisation as a 
professional entity as well as a trade union. ZUJ is registered in terms of the 
Industrial Relations Act and not under the Societies Act, as is PAZA. The 
professional Union’s main objectives are articulated in Article (2) of its constitutive 
document thus: 
 
 Professional advancement of journalism in Zambia. 
 Safeguard the freedom of the press and freedom of journalists engaged in 
legitimate professional activity. 
 Capacity building of members through training. 
 The promotion, defence, protection of members’ salary and conditions of 
service. 
 To preserve the tenets of journalism as well as advance its ideals. 
 To encourage the participation of workers in decision making processes 
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 To protect and advance the socio-economic and cultural interests of the 
community ‘…and such other objects as are lawful and are not 
inconsistent with the spirit and practice of trade unionism’. 
 
5.3.3 ZUJ and the professional dilemmas of Journalism 
 
It is noteworthy that, in representing media professionals, ZUJ faces the dilemma 
of journalism everywhere: there is no clear definition of who should be called a 
journalist. Given the varied levels of education amongst media professionals, the 
unclear definition of ‘journalist’ may also partly explain why governments have 
been reluctant to extend uniform conditions to the industry for an extended 
period. The advent of Face book, Twitter, You Tube and other web/internet based 
communicative tools has, in addition, bred a new coterie of communicators who 
lay claim to being recognised as ‘citizen journalists’, further complicating the 
notion of ‘professionalism’ within this field. 
 
We learn from Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 40-41) that any social formation consists of 
a hierarchy of multiple, relatively autonomous fields with codes of practice but 
with power contestation between agents and their positions within the field and 
with the sum of the parts being greater than the whole.  
 
The extent of field autonomy is projected in the capacity of the occupation to 
defray intrusion from other fields. There are competing interests among the 
agents within the field, with each utilising their economic, cultural, social and 
symbolic capitals to gain leverage (Lingard, Rawolle & Taylor, 2005: 760).   
 
The limitations of Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the relative autonomy of the 
field of journalism have been raised in section 4.3.6 of Chapter Four of this thesis. 
Framed against new institutionalist theory, Bourdieu’s field theory is seen to 
ignore the mutual role of political and economic fields in influencing journalism as 
an occupation (Benson, 2006: 189). 
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The empirical reality rather suggests that defining the constituent elements of 
journalism that could correspond with other occupations with professional 
recognition has been an elusive undertaking for sociologists the world over.   
 
For example, while the trait approach to the study of professions has adjudged 
lawyers, accountants and medical professionals as belonging to occupations that 
play a societal system maintaining role, journalism has not measured up 
(Dickinson, 1996: 21). The trait approach distinguishes professions from other 
occupations by employing a three-pronged methodology to the undertaking of 
such assessments: 
 
1) The possession of high level educational qualifications (presumably, 
university degrees). 
2) Membership to a central body which lays down codes of conduct, and; 
3) The enjoyment of a relatively privileged position in the hierarchy of 
occupations. 
 
Action-oriented approaches embrace the notion of ‘professional project’ which 
focuses more on social closure or control over entry to the occupation, often 
through systems of accreditation founded on the acquisition of esoteric 
knowledge (Dickinson, 1996: 21-22). 
 
Dickinson (1996: 22) is emphatic in his reflections as he raises fundamental 
perspectives that inhibit the advancement of journalism as a profession. The key 
impediments he identifies are as follows: 
 
 Journalists are a heterogeneous group. 
 Not all media personnel exhibit the traits of traditional professions. 
 The range of specialities in journalism is too wide to bracket into a single 
category. 
 The workforce is relatively weak as a collective sharing common interests. 
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 Hierarchies within organisations which distinguish between levels of 
professionalism in most media have not caught the attention of 
sociologists of professions. 
 
Overall, he concludes that media occupations do not meet the sociological criteria 
that would qualify them as professions. Dickinson however moderates this rather 
harsh assessment by drawing on the concept of power as an analytical tool within 
the professional project approach.  
 
First advanced by Johnson (1972), the approach suggests that it is possible to 
differentiate between occupations by examining the extent to which their 
members exercise control over themselves and the level of control they are able 
to exercise over those who seek to control them. The approach raises the 
question of media autonomy from internal and external forces. 
 
In this regard, the argument for self regulation 32in Zambia, closely related to that 
of professionalism, is introduced. However, the case of Zambia shows that even 
within one occupation, there can be serious fissures over definitions and ethics. 
For an extended period, Zambian journalism has been riven by tensions between 
private and state sector professionals over these matters.  
 
These differences did not escape the attention of the then Minister of Information 
and Broadcasting Services, Ernest Mwansa, in 1997 when journalists sought to 
refract state sanctions by proposing a composite non statutory regulatory body: 
 
“The government wonders whether a council not backed by law could 
seriously deliver the goods. How will enforcement be carried out, 
considering the stand-off between government owned media and those 
belonging to the independent press?” (Mwansa,  1997:3). 
 
                                                 
32
 It can be noted also, that there is a proposed introduction of a media tribunal in South Africa, arising 
from concerns by state elites about the supposedly unfettered nature of journalism.  
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The levels of education amongst journalists are also so diverse that to use 
academic attainments as a measure for defining who, in essence, is a journalist 
might prove futile.  Okigbo (1996: 212) notes that Zambian journalists were not 
only poorly trained but were also underpaid in the 1990s. Reviewing literature on 
Zambian journalism and democracy, he observes that journalists had no 
motivation, exhibited a low self esteem, and a poor public image fostered under 
the one party regime and perpetuated by the Chiluba government in the mid 
1990s. He notes that fewer than one out of ten held college degrees in 1995.  
 
Their lowly public profile was reflected in their ‘agonistic’ writing which is intent on 
supporting one political camp or the other. However, other authors, particularly in 
the 1990s, have recognised the courageous efforts of journalists to expose wrong 
doing and efforts by the state to control them through legislated press councils as 
noted by (Makayi, 1997: 17) and (Kasoma, 1986:155-176). 
 
In terms of intellectual capacity, Okigbo also underplays the existence of major 
training hubs for journalism that had extended their facilities to other Africans over 
the years: 
 
 The Evelyn Hone College of Applied Arts and Commerce provides a three 
year Diploma programme in journalism (with mass communication). 
 The Mindolo Ecumenical Centre, offers a one year certificate in 
Journalism. 
 From 1985, the University of Zambia introduced a department of Mass 
Communications offering degree level training. 
 The Zambia Institute of Mass Communications offers in-service training for 
working journalists. 
 
Okigo is, nonetheless, implicitly correct in alluding to the heterogeneity of 
Zambian journalism: When the Times of Zambia was under the ownership of the 
London Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (Lonrho) for example, journalists 
were trained in-house by their British supervisors and therefore horned their skills 
outside of formal educational structures.   
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“Under Lonrho, the policy was kind of elitist in that it sought to recruit 
the best the market could offer or mould its reporters to be among the 
best. Thus the Times of Zambia had a galaxy of talented reporters over 
the years. Government is not interested in that. It seeks and is 
comfortable with conformists and the mediocre’’ (Simuchoba, 
2009/12/02). 
 
Ridgeway Liwena (2008) indicates that he began engaging with the Times as a 
letter writer before proceeding to apply for employment and seeking formal 
training at the Mindolo Ecumenical Centre to study Journalism. This situation 
gradually changed as Zambians generally began to reap the benefits of higher 
education during the First, Second and onward to the Third republic.  
 
This researcher recalls from his experience as chair of the Commonwealth Press 
Union (CPU) Zambia section in 1996-1998, however, that even with the presence 
of formal training, it was common practice amongst some emerging, poorly 
financed private media to cost-save by employing school leavers or modestly 
trained personnel, therefore compromising efforts at achieving some form of 
‘social closure’.  
 
The state owned media and The Post Newspapers, on the other hand, began 
increasingly to absorb graduates of state tertiary institutions, logically because of 
their relatively more stable financial backgrounds. 33The lack of social closure and 
                                                 
1. 
33
 The profile of a Zambian journalist has evolved over time from one who was trained in-house, 
without formal academic qualifications, forming the core of institutions such as the Times and the 
Zambia Daily Mail in the First Republic; to one that is increasingly in possession of a basic formal 
certificate or diploma in journalism. This caricature became more apparent in the Second Republic 
when graduates from the Evelyn Hone College and Africa Literature Centre filtered into influential 
editorial positions. From 1986, onward, journalists with Bachelor of Arts degrees in Mass 
Communications from the University of Zambia added to this portfolio of formally trained 
practitioners. However, the advent of liberalisation introduced a plethora of poorly funded 
publications which have been referred to in Table 1, in section 1.2.1 of Chapter One. The 
tendency in this category of media was to employ school leavers due to their inability to meet the 
relatively higher salary demands of college and university graduates. Distinct descriptions of who 
in fact was a journalist have hence eluded media agencies seeking to promote the integrity of the 
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distinctness did pose problems for the founders of ZUJ when they initially 
attempted to register the union in 1992: 
 
 
‘’...but the people in the office wanted change, and so they allowed us 
to register; When registering, we could not even come up with 100 
names required to set up the union. We then got employees from the 
ZNBC, ZIS etc, fast, to make up the numbers. The broadcasting 
workers still belonged to the National Union of Communication 
Workers’’ (Phiri, 2008). 
 
The positive aspects of heterogeneity, of course, lie in the numbers. Precisely 
because of the unsubstantial numbers of people who would qualify to be 
journalists if the benchmark were a college or university degree, it makes sense 
to expand the definition of journalist, if only for strategic purposes. The inclusion 
of general workers in the media industry and other support staff therefore, 
potentially contributes to the creation of a critical mass. The ZUJ’s membership 
has increased since its formation from 15 to 300 and remained as such (Chonya, 
2010/02/02). 
 
5.3.3 Membership and governance 
 
Against this backdrop, Article 3(1) of the ZUJ constitution makes an attempt to 
define who is a journalist and therefore who qualifies to be represented by the 
union: 
 
‘’Any person who is employed or has been employed as editorial staff 
(that is reporters, editors, sub editors, features editors. Sports writers, 
                                                                                                                                                              
profession in the eyes of the public. It is perhaps more realistic to draw parallels between 
journalists working for the privately owned Post Newspapers and state media journalists, 
principally because these institutions would have the means to consistently employ qualified 
professionals. On the whole, no single frame can capture the variety of people who qualify as 
journalists in Zambia, given the proliferation of community and commercial radio stations, 
television, weeklies and single issue publications which encompass a variety of media staff 
profiles. 
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photographers, artists, information officers etc), directly employed and 
earn 60 percent of his income as editorial staff of newspapers, 
magazines, periodicals and other journals, book work, radio, television, 
news agencies and information officers engaged in corporations or 
companies as public relations officers, may become a member of the 
union”(ZUJ [sa]). 
 
Members who are employed for less than 12 months are regarded as 
‘probationary members’ while ‘honorary membership’ may be granted to retired or 
physically disabled media professionals upon the decision of the General 
Conference. Non Zambian journalists, who are accorded associate membership, 
can participate in the deliberations of the general conference but will be excluded 
from voting. 
 
The demands for membership seem to take into account the financial limitations 
that potential members would no doubt encounter: Article 5(1) stipulates monthly 
membership fees of K20 Kwacha, or $4.00 US dollars paid through a check-off 
system (ZUJ [sa]).  
 
A more recent document from the union suggests that ZUJ draws its resources 
from the 2% subscription by members from their monthly incomes (ZUJ, 2007).  
This is deducted by the employer in an understanding with the union, and 
channelled directly into the National Secretariat account of ZUJ. 
 
Structurally, the supreme authority of the ZUJ is the General Conference which 
comprises provincial council chairmen and secretaries, district council delegates 
and elected chapels. The General Conference is held every four years to review 
accounts, reported, revising rules and charting the policy course (ZUJ, [sa]). 
 
The National Executive Committee (NEC) of ZUJ is headed by a part-time 
national chairman (now called president) elected every four years with a national 
executive committee constituting a deputy national chairman, a full-time general 
secretary, and a national treasurer, nine (9) provincial chairmen, three national 
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trustees and six other elected members representing special interests that are not 
ordinarily catered for in defined categories of employment. Of the NEC, only the 
general secretary may be a non journalist, (given the requirement for 
administrative skills). 
 
5.3.4 Impact of market and labour liberalisation on the membership of ZUJ 
 
In section 5.3.1 of this chapter, we dwelt intensively on how trade unions 
registered sharp declines in membership as policies of liberalisation and 
privatisation took effect in the 1990s. ZUJ was one of the few unions that seemed 
to be unaffected, particularly in terms of membership loss. This is presumably 
because no major retrenchment exercise has taken place in the media sector 
apart from natural attritions of early retirement, which are apparently recoverable.  
 
A closer examination of the situation however, seems to suggest that the 
liberalisation of the economy and the labour market, while largely a positive 
development for ZUJ and state sector journalists, has had its negative effects on 
the union as well. 
 
Morgan Chonya (2010/02/02), the most recent past president of ZUJ confirms that 
ZUJ has, since its formation, failed to attract journalists from the private sector, for 
example. This scenario arises partly from protracted differences between 
journalists in the state sector and their private sector colleagues, largely over lack 
of congruence in ethics, practice and autonomy. 
 
Secondly, it can also be surmised that the wage demands that accompany 
collective bargaining might bankrupt weakly financed private press entities.  
 
A ZUJ Secretariat statement in July, 2007 reinforces this point by indicating that 
emerging privately owned media owners have been reluctant to allow their 
employees to join the union: 
 
 276 
“In the implementation of the liberalised economic and labour market 
policies, a number of challenging key issues have emerged, These 
include notable reluctance of new investors to tolerate and deal with 
trade unions leading to preponderance of casualisation of labour and 
the use of contract labour”(ZUJ, 2007). 
 
 
Again, this point has been raised by the ZCTU in regard to the reluctance of new 
investors to unionise their employees (Global Policy Network, 2001). 
 
All things considered, other than for moral and strategic reasons, it hardly seems 
to matter that the private media sector is absent in ZUJ at present.  
 
This is certainly because the death rates of privately owned newspapers, referred 
to in section 1.2.1 of Chapter One of this thesis, has been high, with The Post  
and the Monitor, being the only long term survivors thus far. Hence, the 
membership complement from the private press would be minimal to say the 
least. 
 
On the whole, it would appear that the ZUJ’s membership drive has been 
compromised more by the intervention of the state and rival unions than the 
dithering of private sector compatriots. It is understood in conversing with media 
unionists that state and public service unions have resisted efforts to incorporate 
journalists working in the public service into the ZUJ since 1990. Journalists 
working for the Zambia News and Information Services (ZANIS) and National 
Agricultural Information Services (NAIS) and the Zambia Information Services 
(ZIS) subscribe to the Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ) while those in the 
Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) continue to subscribe to 
NUCW, which essentially embraces all manner of communications workers - 
rather than just journalists alone - into its fold. 
 
However, recognising that the voice of journalists is subdued in NUCW, some 
media professionals in the ZNBC opted to form their own union termed: the 
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Zambia Union of Broadcasters and Information Disseminators (ZUBID) (Chonya, 
2010). 34The potential for fragmentation and divisiveness, reminiscent of the 
ZCTU and FFTU debacle, presents itself here. In this regard, Chonya indicates 
that ZUJ and ZUBID have been discussing a merger, which would consolidate 
journalists from print and broadcasting industries into a single body. It would still 
leave out public service journalists however. 
 
In the present day, hence, ZUJ remains a union for journalists in the print media 
section of the state controlled communications sector. In addition, not all 
journalists employed by the state owned print media can be effective members of 
the union: As they rise in rank, they are absorbed into management scales. A 
distinct example is Chonya himself, who soon after his interview with this 
researcher, has since assumed an editorial position on the Zambia Daily Mail, 
bringing to an end his reign as president of ZUJ.  That is in conformity with the 
Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act of 2008 (Zambia, 2008: sec 
4.1.). 
 
Therefore, because the members of ZUJ are largely drawn from the middle and 
lower rungs of the Times Newspapers and Zambia Daily Mail, it not only explains 
the membership levels of 300 or thereabouts, but also underlines the vulnerability 
of the union to state machinations (that is, the promise of promotion as an 
incentive, essentially silences a vocal leader). 
 
 
5.3.5 ZUJ and worker welfare: Collective Agreements with the Times Newspapers  
 
The ambition of this section of the thesis is to unveil particularly what Edward 
(1993: 33) terms, enterprise rights and collective contract rights which might assist 
to formulate empirically grounded discussions and arguments regarding the 
effectiveness of the union, ZUJ. 
 
                                                 
34
 Telephone conversation with author, notes in appendix. 
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To fully appreciate the ensuing discussion, one is tempted to briefly reflect on the 
perceptions of veterans of the profession on the rewards reminiscent of First and 
Second Republican journalism.  The purpose is not to compare remuneration 
levels in any scientific sense, but to glean an understanding of the mechanisms 
that would have rendered improvements to worker welfare. 
 
In the post colonial period which saw to the birth of the Times of Zambia as we 
know it today, there were, ostensibly, significant disparities between the conditions 
of service of African reporters and those of their British counterparts. Ridgeway 
Liwena (2008), who joined the Times of Zambia in 1966, recalls that Africans 
shared rented homes in high density townships.  
 
“One of the local conditions of service was that local workers should 
accommodate themselves. I was one of those who fought that: local 
workers lived in the townships-I lived with my uncle. Lonrho insisted 
they could only provide accommodation for people from outside the 
country. Though we were black, we all came from different districts, we 
couldn’t be expected to accommodate ourselves; we were also 
expatriates in our own right’’ (Liwena, 2008). 
 
It was Dunstan Kamana, the first black Zambian editor of the Times of Zambia, 
who uplifted the situation of Africans, eventually bringing parity to salaries and 
conditions of service, Liwena recalls. 
 
“We were satisfied, not so much with the salaries, but that now we 
were going to take over in a few years. With black management, all the 
archaic practices gave in to the more realistic Zambianisation policy. 
Kamana changed the complexion of the paper and blacks benefited” 
(Liwena, 2008). 
 
Onward into the 1970s, Lonrho extended incentives to its entire staff as the 
Times continued to publicly declare successive profits.  
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During the Second Republic, employees depended on the employer to 
acknowledge their input into the company’s success: 
 
“Economic performance under Lonrho was excellent. There was 
always a 13th cheque for staff at the end of the financial year’’ 
(Simuchoba, 2009/12/02). 
 
After the takeover of the Times of Zambia by UNIP’s Zambia National Holdings 
(ZNHL) in 1982 (which has been referred to in section 4.3.9 of Chapter Four of 
this thesis) the conditions of service remained largely stagnant with the bulk of 
junior reporters categorised in the same grades as general staff in the elaborate 
ZHNL structure. This is also the period that the Times’ historical record of profit 
making turned into concurrent financial losses (Phiri, 2009/11/20). 
 
In the absence of a journalists’ union, there is no specific record that testifies to 
any organised approach to ZNHL by Times Journalists for improved conditions of 
service during this period. 
 
When the Times/Printpak were brought under the aegis of the National Media 
Corporation (NAMECO) with the Zambia Daily Mail/Zambia Printing Company 
and Newspaper Distributors limited, in 1989, there was a marked change in the 
range of benefits(Simuchoba, 2009/12/02).  
 
Kaunda had essentially fulfilled his pledge to improve the welfare of journalists 
with the formation of the new print media conglomerate, a matter referred to in 
section 4.3.9 of Chapter Five of this thesis. Apart from introducing a more 
competitive salary structure, some of the fringe benefits extended by NAMECO 
were: 
 Entertainment allowances. 
 Subsistence allowances. 
 Housing allowances. 
 Education allowances. 
 Medical schemes. 
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These fringe benefits can be categorised as enterprise rights, which are 
conferred by an employer without the agency of the worker.  
 
On the contrary, Journalists falling directly under the public service had the worst 
experiences in terms of remuneration. They were subjected to government 
conditions which did not systematically recognise nor reward them in accordance 
with their professional academic certificates.  
 
For example, Mwaba Phiri, a former publications editor on the Zambia Information 
Services (ZIS), worked with the state entity for 18 years until 1996, and was one 
of the first journalists to obtain a university degree in mass communications at the 
institution. Now an executive producer with the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), Phiri recalls in an interview with this researcher:  
 
“ZIS had no policy along the lines of professional qualifications. If there 
was one, it was not enforced. ZIS employed school leavers (Form two 
or Form five) who usually made their way up the ranks via long service. 
Long service in fact played a stronger role in one’s promotion than 
mere qualification. Some of our Directors rose in this manner having 
bettered their academic qualifications with an Evelyn Hone College 
Diploma while at work. So you usually expected some kind of 
promotion after your diploma but it was your service (and how savvy 
you were with the bosses) that counted” (Phiri/2010/09/21). 
 
One would deduce from this that the undefined process of recruitment of 
journalists inevitably impacted on the esteem that the occupation or its 
practitioners commanded within government circles and beyond. To the MMD 
government’s credit, the civil service has, in the recent past, undergone a process 
of professionalisation which has had positive outcomes for public service 
workers, including journalists. This can be regarded as a response to the 
competitive pressures of a liberalised market. 
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In 1996 a GRZ/UNDP report Prospects of Sustainable Human Development in 
Zambia, showed that a mid level civil servant was earning the equivalent of $45 
to $70 per month compared to $333 per month by civil servants of equivalent 
ranking in neighbouring Botswana. Within Zambia, there were wide disparities in 
wages at the time across sectors, industry and enterprises ranging between 50% 
and 70% (Global Policy Network, 2001). 
 
“What has happened is that it is no longer possible to pay journalists 
below government levels or deny them fringe benefits that apply to the 
public service.  In recent years too, government has began to pay 
professionals in its service very competitively and pays generally well. So 
the knock-on-effect on salaries in the media and conditions of service 
generally has been good” (Simuchoba, 2009/12/02). 
 
Indeed, the Zambian government, following two year cycles of negotiations with 
public service unions, continued to respond to new wage demands. One of the 
most significant steps taken was on 27 April 2010 when the state agreed to a 
15% increment for all civil servants (Civil Servants win 15% salary increment, 
2010:1).  
 
The state followed this up with the establishment of a 15 person Public Service 
Salary Review Commission, sworn in on 29 July, 2010 (Public Service Salary 
Review Commission Sworn in, 2010: 1).  
 
Before this, the real wages for the majority of workers had continued to decline 
with the erosion of the Zambian Kwacha’s buying power. Despite increases in 
nominal wages from the early 1990s, it is noted that real wage levels had in 
essence, declined between 1997 and the year 2000 (See table 5, below). 
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Table 5: Trends in average earnings per month (Kwacha), 1997 - 2000* 
(Global Policy Network, 2001) 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 % Change 
1999-2000 
1999 as 
base year 
 
Average Nominal 
Earnings by 
sector ** 
 
150,230 184,281 233,687 245,265 5.0 
Central Government 
(civilian 
134,154 154,850 194,377 205,265 5.6 
Local Authorities 152,328 124,536 189,792 197,681 4.2 
Parastatals 
Companies 
291,176 341,564 467,001 501,612 7.4 
Private Sector 
Companies 
103,264 141,780 187,661 206,771 10.2 
      
Real Average 
Earnings by 
Sector 
625.4 616.5 616.6 513.4 -16.4 
 
 
 
Central Government 
(civilian) 
566.5 524.0 515.9 429.7 -16.7 
Local Authorities 643.3 421.4 503.7 413.8 -17.8 
Parastatals 
Companies 
1,229.6 1,155.9 1,239.4 1,050.1 -15.3 
Private Sector 
Companies 
436.1 479.8 498.0 432.8 -13.1 
 
* Estimates as at June 2000. 
** Totals do not add up as a result of weighted averaging. 
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The benefit of collective action in this regard cannot be under estimated nor 
denied. Civil servants appear to be benefiting from collective action from public 
service unions, who for years have argued for better conditions for workers.  
 
The challenge for ZUJ was to struggle for improved conditions using ERT 
methods, something never before attempted in the media.  
 
The union’s strategic engagements are fostered through its Collective Bargaining 
Unit (CBU) which is composed of the president (formerly chairman), vice 
president, general secretary, treasurer and two chapel(branch) presidents from 
the company ZUJ is negotiating with (ZUJ, 2007).  
 
The union’s impact on the work environment, particularly on the Times 
Newspapers can be gauged qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative 
aspects of this assessment would speak to the content of the collective 
agreements (range and nature of conditions of service). The quantitative 
component would seek to project the incremental value of salary raises by 
comparing the 1994 (the period prior to the first collective agreement) with the 
2010 portfolio.  
 
John Phiri, the current Managing Director of the Times/Printpak Zambia limited, 
summarises the ZUJ’s qualitative imprint as follows: 
 
 ZUJ has continuously bargained for improved conditions of service for 
journalists. 
 ZUJ  has demonstrated the value of representation. 
 ZUJ has improved job security ‘here too, there is more protection as a 
result of the work of ZUJ”. 
 Conflict resolution; dialogue between workers and management has 
improved. 
 Expansion of communicative space has made it possible for journalists to 
be taken seriously as stakeholders. 
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In some cases, ZUJ has employed ERT approaches to negotiate for lesser 
punishment for erring journalists, notes Miti (2011/02/15) in addition to securing 
the conditions of professionals:  
 
“A good example could be when ZUJ fought for fixed overtime for sub-
editors” (Miti/2011/02/15). 
 
 
Indeed, an examination of collective agreements signed between the Zambia 
Daily Mail Limited and ZUJ between 2004-2006 shows that the range of fringe 
benefits and conditions of service generally have qualitatively improved 
(ZDM/ZUJ, 2004-2006: 7). The following conditions, uniform to those negotiated 
for workers on the Times, are notable: 
 
 Introduction of commuted car allowances. 
 Housing allowances. 
 Tool allowance (payable to any employee who has been permitted by 
management to use his or her own tools). 
 One-off Allowances. 
 Business Travel Abroad (at official government rates). 
 Education Allowances. 
 Leave allowances. 
 Out of pocket allowance. 
 Repatriation (upon retirement/redundancy) allowance. 
 Subsistence allowances. 
 Membership to one local professional body and one club for employees 
(professional scales) paid for by the company at rates agreed to with the 
ZUJ. 
 
However, to fully comprehend the assertions made by former editors and unions 
leaders as to the ZUJ’s influence in the workplace, it is critical at this stage to 
examine the quantitative data made available for the purposes of this research.  
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5.3.6 Calculating improvements to salaries and benefits  
 
In the absence of collective agreements for the intervening years salary levels for 
1994 prior to ZUJ entering into its first collective agreement with Times 
management, were compared with current salaries (2010) for grades 1-6 which 
represent unionised scales on the establishment. These grades exclude senior 
editors (news editor, Sunday editor, business editor, features editor, deputy 
editor-in-chief, managing director). As Giya advised (2010/09/23), adjustment for 
the cumulative inflation developments during the period was made to the 
calculations of salary and benefits to determine the levels of improvements. 
 
The following calculations were made to account for inflation adjusted earnings: 
The inflation adjusted earning Y1 is a function of the past year earning Y0 and 
average inflation in the previous period Infl0.  
 
Y1 = f (Y0; Infl0)   ….. Equation 1 
 
The adjustment process to get the inflation adjusted earning this year (Y1) 
involves adjusting previous year earnings (Y0) by the adjustment factor (1+ Infl0) 
which depends on the level of inflation (Infl0) in the previous year. This process is 
represented by the equation below: 
 
Y1 = Y0 (1+ Infl0)   ….. Equation 2 
 
Equation 2 was applied to inflation rate and earnings for 1994 to derive the 
inflation adjusted earnings for 1995.  
 
The 1995 inflation adjusted earnings and the inflation rate for 1995 are then used 
to derive the inflation adjusted remunerations for 1996.  The process is repeated 
for the subsequent years up to 2010. The 2010 inflation adjusted earnings is 
obtained using the 2009 average inflation rate and 2009 inflation adjusted 
earnings.  The 2010 inflation adjusted earnings are then compared with the 
current earnings to find out if 1994 remunerations are better than the current 
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rewards. The earnings include basic salary and allowances (transport, housing, 
subsistence, lunch, holiday, education and tools).  
 
The results of this exercise indicate that all the unionised employees on the 
Times (grade 1-6) have experienced improvements to their salaries and 
conditions of service compared to the earnings in 1994. The only exceptions are 
the subsistence and lunch allowances. Three key factors present themselves: 
 
 The current purchasing power of the employees is firmer than that of 1994.  
 The cumulative adjustments to the current earnings have outpaced the 
cumulative pace of the inflation dynamics between 1994 and 2010.  
 Housing allowance is the only exception because it is pegged at 60% of 
the basic salary for grade 1-4 and 45% of the basic salary for grade 5-6, a 
significant proportion of the basic salary.  
 
 Figure 7: Average earnings at 2010 levels versus 1994 levels in ZK 000 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
ZK
Average earnings at current levels versus 1994 levels in ZK'000'
Current earnings 2 442.34 1 360.54 244.17 41.83 25.83 311.67
1994 earnings adjusted for inflation 1 384.91 429.57 429.57 85.91 16.11 64.44
1994 earnings 64.48 20 20 4 0.75 3
Basic salary Housing Subsistence Lunch Holiday Education
 
Source: Times of Zambia (2010) & Giya (2010/09/23): Calculations by author. 
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The foregoing underlines succinctly the influence of collective agreements which are 
negotiated for between management and ZUJ every two years since 1994, on the 
conditions of service and salaries of media professionals.  
 
The regularity with which this occurs also demonstrates the extent to which ZUJ can be 
considered an active and effective union. Previously these benefits would have been left 
to the prerogative of management. 
 
5.3.7 Conflict with employers and grievance procedures 
 
It is noteworthy that ZUJ acknowledges that despite its successes in negotiating 
better conditions for its members, its relationship with management has not been 
without ‘confrontation and intimidation’ (ZUJ, 2007). 
 
ZUJ laments that when its members on the TimesPrintpak resorted to strike 
action in 2007, for example, not only did management consider the wage 
demands as unrealistic, the state followed up with threats of dismissal. 
 
“There was a lot of intimidation of union leaders and threats of dismissals 
if they continued their industrial action as it was considered illegal”, a 
statement from the ZUJ Secretariat in 2007 alleged (ZUJ, 2007). 
 
Apart from the reluctance of new investors to unionise their employees, ZUJ’s 
argues that its effectiveness has been compromised by the following additional 
factors: 
 
 Despite its freedom to operate, the union felt the state contributed to the 
friction between ZUJ and the management of the Times of Zambia in 
particular. 
 Collective action by workers in the form of strikes was met with intimidation 
and threat of dismissal. 
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 Under the existing Zambia law, the union found it difficult to stage a legal 
strike. 
 
Implicit, in this discussion, is the threat posed by management to individual 
employees who may be victimised indirectly for participating in strike actions as 
part of a collective. It is hence critical at this stage to take note that the terms and 
conditions of service of the employees of the TimesPrintpak negotiated between 
management and the ZUJ for the 2008-2010 periods, provide for specific 
grievance procedures. The procedure applies to individual employees and their 
adherence to ‘self discipline’. 
 
“Discipline must be just and uniformly administered to ensure that all 
individuals are treated in a fair and consistent manner…this provision is 
not intended as a substitute for good management. It is an expression of 
the joint Disciplinary Policy of the Times Printpak Zambia Limited and the 
Zambia Union of Journalists, as employer and union respectively” 
(TimesPrintpak/ZUJ, 2008: 11).  
 
The procedure has three stages: the first, where an aggrieved employee may 
take up the matter with his/her immediate supervisor, with the option of consulting 
his shop steward. If dissatisfied with the resolution of the problem by the 
supervisor and human relations, the employee resorts to stage two: the chief 
executive; who must communicate with the employee within seven days of the 
employee’s appeal. Stage three, is operationalised when a worker is still unhappy 
with the chief executive officer’s decision upon which a Disciplinary Committee is 
constituted as a final option with the establishment. An employee retains the 
option of taking the matter to the Industrial Relations Court should the three 
stages not resolve the matter, from the worker’s perspective (TimesPrintpak/ZUJ, 
2008: 11).  
 
Therefore, despite that macro level constitutional rights condition the formulation 
of employee privileges this is where the definition of worker rights is held to be 
distinctive from the general concept of rights. Edwards (1993: 28-29) elucidates 
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that worker rights are legitimated claims or privileges that an employee 
possesses ‘as a result of being an employee and that the employee may exercise 
as protection from the established workplace governance’. 
 
The right to a minimum wage for example would have no meaning for the self 
employed, retirees or foreign tourists, he notes.  Framed against constitutional 
rights, worker rights have one salient characteristic: dismissal from the workplace 
or expulsion from the group (union) may result in the loss of those rights. The 
threat to worker rights is hence more pronounced than citizen rights because 
democratic constitutions rarely allow for the withdrawal of formal citizenship. 
 
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that ZUJ has indeed introduced change 
to the print media from a worker rights perspective and in economic terms as a 
result of the democratisation process. The range of benefits that media 
professionals now in enjoy, and which were denied them under most of the one 
party era, are quite distinct in this regard.  
 
It is also certain that the competitive pressures of the country’s liberal market 
have forced the state to also offer competitive salaries and conditions of service 
to the public service, which by extension has also rewarded journalists working in 
government departments.  
 
Lamentably, the union has failed to co-opt either wider membership from within 
the public sector or from the rather unstable private sector media. 
 
Its membership drive is compromised by its strategic limitations, the autonomy of 
the labour market, the economic instability of the private print media and the 
insecurity of their owners; the prevailing suspicions between state sector and 
private sector journalists, and the lack of alignment between the ambitions of 
broadcasting and public sector peers, with the aspirations of ZUJ. 
 
ZUJ has been, and continues to be, a union for print journalists on the Times 
Newspapers and the Zambia Daily Mail. While the union can be hailed as a direct 
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product of liberalisation and democracy, it appears not to have mustered the 
means to marshal support from a wider base of media professionals, given that it 
has been in existence for the past 18 years without much change to its 
membership diversity and profile. 
 
In this sense, the name of the union, while projecting homogeneity amongst 
journalists, does not reflect its character in practice. It remains to be seen how 
ZUJ progresses beyond its current limitations. 
 
Ominously, early indications from the experience of trade unionism under liberal 
democracy, may suggest that the privatisation of the state media might just 
contribute to ZUJ’s decline or collapse, if trends in the private sector of opting for 
casual labour were to persist. 
 
From a strategic standpoint, what can be gleaned from examining ZUJ’s track 
record in negotiations with the two major government dailies is that it has used 
collaborative approaches defined in the ERT, and collective action which forms 
the central thrust of the LPT. 
 
On the evidence of its actions and agreements, it can also be deduced that the 
ZUJ has effectively combined the two tools to good effect.  
 
Given the consistency with which collective agreements are signed, on average, 
every two years, it can be said for example that ZUJ conforms largely to the 
tenets of the ERT: favouring negotiation and dialogue with the managements of 
the Times and Daily Mail, to leverage change in the livelihoods of its members.  
There are four principal areas in which ZUJ can claim success, that are apparent: 
 
 The right to form unions (recognition by management). 
 Due process (consensus based grievance procedures, recourse to 
Industrial Relations Court, as part of collective Agreements). 
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 Fringe benefits and privileges (enshrined in collective agreements, which 
include repatriation, funeral, education, car allowances, housing, 
Christmas bonuses, medical schemes). 
 Gender Equality (which also includes specific reference to the Times as an 
equal opportunity employer, which will not discriminate on any other 
grounds: race, sex, marital status, religion, political opinion, tribal 
extraction or social status   (TimesPrintpak/ZUJ, 2008: 1). 
 
It does however tend to revert to LPT methods from time to time: the strike in 
2007 brought it into direct conflict with the state and the Times of Zambia 
management. The mass demonstration against the Media Bill in 1997 also 
illustrates this perspective to ZUJ’s strategies. Therefore, it can be noted that the 
notions of resistance and conflict characteristic of LPT are also evident in the 
union’s approaches. From the LPT perspective, the areas that the union appears 
to actively pursue are related mainly to the promotion of freedom of speech. 
Administrative structures on the Times constrain free expression leading to the 
regular sacking of editors. However, judicial recourse has worked in at least one 
case involving acting managing editor Arthur Simuchoba which shall be explained 
in section 5.3.9 of this chapter. While mass action has prevented inimical 
legislation from reaching parliament in several instances, it has not led to state 
acquiescence to the privatisation of state media systems, yet. 
 
In essence, one of ZUJ’s main challenges is in its relations with the state: Its 
leaders are state employees, and while they appear to be better placed agitating 
for change while occupying lower scales in their respective organisations, their 
potency is certainly quite easily neutralised through promotions into management, 
which by law, excludes them from unionism. 
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As Kapata (2011/02/21) 35notes:  
 
“…Recently a member of ZUJ who was also a senior member of staff with 
the Times of Zambia was retired at a very young age for being critical of 
government – ZUJ has failed to have him reinstated”. 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, the arm of the state becomes more 
pronounced when one casually examines the range of options that state sector 
journalists may enjoy as a result of being loyal to their employer such as 
appointment to the diplomatic service, senior government positions and to the 
presidency as press assistants. In the past 10 years at least 8 journalists from the 
state press and the ZNBC have landed appointments in diplomatic positions in 
Africa, Europe and the Americas.  
 
This is good from the personal development point of view but perhaps not 
beneficial for the self esteem of journalism as an occupation that is purportedly 
designed to foster accountability, particularly since there is no publicly known 
criteria suggesting how the candidates for the foreign service are selected (other 
than the perception that they are party loyalists). 
 
The union might also need to address the matter of intellectual capacity to 
effectively engage government as a collective, given that journalism is constantly 
accused of not resembling, to the barest minimum, the features of an established 
profession, that is, higher qualifications, high public esteem, codes of ethics and 
practice and self regulatory mechanisms that can lend it some modicum of public 
confidence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Kapata refers to the retirement of Andrew Sakala, news editor at the time of his retirement and former 
president of PAZA. Sakala was, at the time, a member of the management of the Times, having been 
promoted in 2010. Technically, because of this promotion into management, he was no longer considered 
a union member.   
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5.3.8 ZUJ, PAZA and press freedom imperatives 
 
ZUJ, as other media formations, cannot however be accused of not attempting to 
formalise ethics and codes of practice. The history of such attempts is well 
documented (Makayi, 1997: 25) as are its opposition to state schemes to license 
and punish journalists through legislated media councils (CPU, 1997:1-3). 
 
In fact, while ZUJ can be said to have a fairly formidable capacity to negotiate 
conditions of service for media workers, its press freedom credentials are not 
without merit either, albeit with some inconsistencies over the years36. 
 
Much of the work the union has undertaken in this area, has been in collaboration 
with other, perhaps more activist orientated formations, such as the 
Commonwealth Press Union (CPU) Zambia Section, the Media institute of 
Southern Africa (MISA) Zambia Chapter, the PAZA and the Zambia Media 
Women’s Association (ZAMWA). 
 
The most underplayed intervention by ZUJ in terms of press freedom and 
unionism is perhaps the defence it launched in support of the dismissal of Arthur 
Simuchoba from the position of acting managing editor of the Times Newspapers 
by the state in 1995 for undefined company performance related charges. 
Simuchoba had cultivated a strong image as a fearless editorial writer, unflinching 
in his attacks on the presidency and cabinet, quite uncharacteristic of his 
immediate predecessors. 
 
The state’s first response was to restructure the Times and the Daily Mail, 
introducing the position of managing director, a higher designation to that of 
                                                 
36
 It is worth underlining here that the benefits of being a ZUJ member, from the fore-going, include legal 
aid support; relatively higher job security; and improved group rights which enable the expansion of 
communicative space as a collective. Conceivably, this means there is less dependency on the employer 
to determine the plight of journalists in a consistent fashion, but rather, there is an opportunity for ZUJ 
members to expose exploitation through a relatively insulated forum and more widely through marshalling 
extra muscle from the ZCTU.  
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managing editor. While it was not clear how they two positions inter-faced, it was 
certain that an amount of friction might occur.  
 
Emmanuel Nyirenda, a former diplomat, senior civil servant and former editor of 
the Mail, was appointed over and above Simuchoba after his dismissal. It was the 
ZUJ that sprang to Simuchoba’s aid and successfully defended him in the High 
Court, leading to his reinstatement. Simuchoba’s contract was eventually 
terminated. 
 
‘I was supported by the ZUJ who paid the legal costs. No reason was 
given for the termination and under the contract they were not obliged to 
give any reasons’ (Simuchoba, 2010/09/03). 
 
Comparatively speaking, there is a marked difference between how journalism as 
a profession responded to the dismissal of editors in the First and Second 
Republics, when there was no media union or association, and in the Third 
Republic when there was ZUJ and PAZA. 
 
The republican president of Zambia appointed eight (8) editors-in-chief on the 
Times of Zambia between 1966 and 1985. All were either dismissed or forced out 
(Kasoma, 1986: 87-119) without the benefit of organised support from peers, or 
any known media formations. On the other hand, the first editor to have his 
contract terminated under multiparty democracy received the legal and moral 
support from a nascent trade union in ZUJ, born of liberal democratic policies37.  
There is a fundamental difference here in terms of how labour suddenly 
intervenes against the actions of state power.  
 
Prior to ZUJ’s formation in 1992, PAZA, with the benefit of new leadership, had 
just succeeded in temporarily removing heads of the state media through a court 
                                                 
37
 Excluding Bweendo Mulengela, former managing editor of the Times appointed by President Kaunda, 
who PAZA wanted out in 1991 and whose services were eventually terminated by the MMD administration 
upon pressure from journalists. On the otherhand, Simuchoba rose through the ranks and assumed the 
position of managing editor in an acting capacity and was therefore seen to be a legitimate professional 
candidate.  
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injunction on account of their bias against the MMD prior to the 1991 elections 
(Sakala, 2010/02/19).  The leadership of PAZA had changed from the likes of 
Komani Kachinga, then editor-in-chief of the Times of Zambia to Richard Sakala, 
a lecturer from the church run Africa Literature Centre Journalism School. For the 
first time, PAZA had a president and an executive committee, who were not all 
state employees. Perhaps that, and the more open multiparty system ushered in 
1991, might also explain the organisations more aggressive posture on press 
freedom matters.  
 
Related to this, what needs to be defined here is that the membership of ZUJ and 
PAZA overlap. Essentially, PAZA’s membership is founded largely on workers 
from the Times Newspapers and the Zambia Daily Mail.  
 
However, it has managed to extend its tentacles, without opposition, to the public 
service and the ZNBC, ZANA, ZIS, the Mirror and NAIS presumably because it is 
not a union and therefore is not in competition with any entity in that category. 
 
In exploring the relationship between ZUJ and PAZA one is certain that the 
former has benefited from the experience and ‘press freedom per-degree’ of the 
latter and other media professional associations such as MISA - Zambia, and the 
CPU Zambia section at the time.  
 
PAZA was formed in response to the state’s intention to create a legislated 
association of journalists. Despite the formation of PAZA in 1982, the state still 
attempted to create a legislated media council in 1986. When this failed, the state 
moved to pass a PAZA Act which would have had punitive effects on media 
professionals. The intent was eventually overtaken by political change in 1991 
(Makayi, 1997: 22).  
 
Ironically, it was under the multiparty system that the media began its most 
extended battle to prevent state sanctions and controls through a legislated 
council.  The attempt in 1995 by Chiluba’s administration to introduce the Media 
Council of Zambia was opposed both through the judicial system, led by PAZA, 
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and through mass action, led by a coalition of associations which included  CPU, 
PAZA, ZUJ, MISA and ZAMWA (CPU, 1997: 3). 
 
A law suit by Professor Francis Kasoma, representing himself and other members 
of the Press Association of Zambia V the Attorney general sought to quash the 
decision by the state to enact a Media Council Bill (Matibini, 2006: 23).  
 
Kasoma’s High Court applications were based on the following grounds: 
 
 The MCZ Act was not in furtherance of freedom of association, expression 
or of the press. 
 The decision was made in bad faith because it aimed to control journalists 
rather than promote the good of the profession. 
 The applicants were not consulted in rendering that decision. 
 The establishment of the MCZ would harm journalists. 
 
The announcement to parliament of the state’s aim to regulate journalism by 
president Chiluba in 1997 provoked the first organised demonstration by 
journalists in Zambia (CPU, 1997:3). The CPU, PAZA, ZUJ, MISA and ZAMWA 
created the Media Liaison Committee (MLC) headed by former Times of Zambia 
assistant editor and first editor of the Weekly Post, Robinson Makayi. The state’s 
threats were largely understood to be aimed at the private owned press, 
particularly, the Weekly Post, which was regularly exposing graft within state 
circles. 
  
ZUJ and PAZA mobilised more than 100 journalists from the state media while 
MISA drummed up support from the private press. The joint demonstrations were 
widely publicised. On 22 August, 1997, then High Court Commissioner Anthony 
Nyangulu, having considered that the state’s actions would negatively affect the 
freedom of journalists to assemble and associate and its inconsistency with the 
provisions of the constitution, halted the government’s decision (Matibini, 2006: 
23-26). 
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This was a major landmark in the history of journalism in Zambia, signalling for 
the first time, that democratisation, whatever its short comings, had opened 
avenues for the furtherance of employee rights and freedom of expression. 
 
Consultative meetings and forums organised by the CPU brought the 
associations, lawyers and activists together with deputy minister of information 
and Broadcasting Services, Ernest Mwansa at the Zambia Institute of Mass 
Communications, 11-22 August, 1997 culminated in the proposed formation of a 
non statutory Media Council (CPU, 1997: 1-3). 
 
Subsequent efforts by MISA Zambia working with PAZA have led to the 
continuation of these efforts leading to the formation of the Media Council of 
Zambia (MECOZ), launched formally on 11 July 2004, headed by retired Judge 
Kabazo Chanda. But MECOZ neither had the endorsement of media 
enterprises, the state, nor the financial means to be sustainable. Its legitimacy 
to sanction media heads or indeed claim to represent all media interests was 
sharply brought into question by government ministers (Matibini, 2006: 29-31). .  
 
Although these efforts at strengthening MECOZ continue to this day, the body 
faces many intricacies one of which would be to inculcate a culture of self 
regulation amongst journalists. Some of the key efforts by MISA, PAZA and ZUJ 
working together have succeeded in achieving the following: 
 
 The development of a document on media law reform which formed the 
basis for launching counter motions for public broadcasting. 
 Agitating for the creation of an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA). 
 Campaigning for the repeal of the Zambia Broadcasting Corporation 
(ZNBC) Act. 
 Agitating for the promulgation of a new Broadcasting Act, and; 
 Campaigning for the enactment of a Freedom of Information Act. 
 
Taking advantage of a strengthened opposition presence in parliament after 
2001, the media associations used Members of Parliament (MPs) from the United 
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Party for National Development (UPND), the Heritage Party (HP), UNIP, the 
Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), among others to present a 
private members motion for the enactment of a Freedom of Information Act and 
the creation of an IBA and repeal of the ZNBC Act. Upon notifying the Clerk of the 
National Assembly on 30th July 2002, the associations learnt that the state had 
initiated similar action (Matibini, 2006: 49). 
 
Dithering on the bills by the Speaker of the National Assembly, on account of the 
financial costs to be born by the state, stalled the introduction the bills which had 
already been gazetted.  
 
The state out manoeuvred MISA, PAZA and ZUJ by merely amending the ZNBC 
Act to remove broadcast licensing powers from the minister of Information and 
Broadcasting Services and ZNBC, and transferring them to the functions of the 
IBA.  
 
The amendment also relinquished the powers of the minister to remove a director 
of ZNBC without cause or consultation. The board can however remove the 
director without the minister’s consent (Matibini, 2006: 49). 
 
Promising efforts at introducing a Freedom of Information Bill, which would, if 
enacted into law, allow citizens access to information held by the state, fell by the 
wayside in 2004, owing to state delays. State officials, in arguing against the bill, 
elevated concerns for national security over rights to information (Matibini, 2006: 
122-123). 
 
While campaigns by PAZA, MISA and ZUJ have born results which were 
previously inconceivable in the one party state, it is evident that the ruling party 
remains a powerful actor despite compromised numbers in parliament by the 
party in power at any one stage. This has been demonstrated in the way both the 
Speaker of the National Assembly has responded to private members motions 
and the indirect manner with which the state had undermined those initiatives, 
that is, by crafting similar legislation but with vital omissions. 
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5.4 OPPOSITION TO VAT ON NEWSPRINT 
 
One of the most recent contributions of ZUJ to the wider media development 
project has been its joint opposition with PAZA, ZAMWA, and the Press Freedom 
Committee of the Post Newspapers (PFCP), MISA-Zambia and the Society for 
Senior Zambian Journalists (SSZJ), to the attempted increase by the Mwanawasa 
administration in taxation on newsprint. 
 
Banda (2004: 44-46) has aptly documented the challenges of sustainability faced 
by the private sector media, much of which revolves around the high  taxes on 
editorial inputs. At the time of Banda’s study, Value Added Tax (VAT) on 
newsprint, printing ink, chemicals, films, plates and other requisites attracted a 
17.5 % VAT rate. Newspaper advertising space was also targeted for VAT 
(excluding funeral related advertising). 
 
Arguing that newspapers ‘serve a democratic function in society’, the media 
associations protested at the finance minister intended raise of VAT on newsprints 
and other inputs. 
 
“Instead of imposing taxes on the newspaper and magazine industry, the 
government must be proposing special incentives for the growth of this 
rather sleepy industry. For a population of 10 million, the current 
circulation levels are dangerously too low’’, (Media, 2006: 3). 
 
Again the associations presented their concerns in a joint statement dated 2 March 
2006, to the Parliamentary Committee on Estimates.  The key areas of argument 
were: 
 
 That the cost of production would increase and affect the cover price of 
newspapers. The result would be a loss in 25% sales which would also harm 
government revenue from VAT. 
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 Job losses would result from reduced newspaper incomes affecting Pay-as-
You-earn (PAYE), Corporate tax, excise duty on imported materials and 
Withholding Tax (WHT). 
 Media institutions would further downsize distribution of products, which was 
already low. 
 New taxes would inhibit any hope of growth in the troubled newspaper 
industry. 
 
Contesting the Minister’s assertion that the media industry was profitable, the 
associations underlined their point by referring to the viability (or lack of it) of the 
state media systems: 
 
“It is an open secret that both the Times of Zambia and the Zambia Daily 
Mail are just breaking even rather than making profit. Neither of them has 
declared a dividend to government, which is a majority shareholder, in 
many years. If the industry is profitable, why are they not declaring 
dividends?”(Media, 2006: 4). 
 
The increase never happened. The spectre of costly newsprint and other 
publishing inputs has haunted attempts at developing and sustaining privately 
owned media before. Weekend World, an entertainment inclined newspaper 
established by the ZNHL in 1978 barely survived a year, partly due to a lack of its 
own printing facilities.  
 
The Sunday Post (1982-1983) blamed its demise on ‘powerful forces’ that had 
denied it newsprint. The Sunday Drum, started by Sikota Wina, previously the first 
African to own his own newspaper back in the colonial era, also failed for similar 
reasons (Kasoma, 1986: 177-183). 
 
What is striking though is that since multiparty democracy in 1991, journalists 
have increasingly lobbied opposition parliamentarians and civil society as allies in 
their bid for increased communicative space.  
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On more than a single occasion, the judicial system and parliament have been 
used either to advance an agenda, as in the IBA and Information bills cases, or to 
oppose state actions that are seen to be inimical to press freedom.  
 
As noted in Chapter Four, such actions were unheard of in the Second Republic, 
therefore underlining the notion that Zambia, while appearing to regress in some 
respects, demonstrates the impulse for democratisation as exemplified by the 
gradual proliferation and influence of media associations:- and a union in ZUJ. 
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The fore-going underlines the momentum gained by the ZUJ from political and 
economic liberalisation, even as larger and older union formations struggled to 
maintain unity amidst diversity in a challenging new environment.  
 
Generally, trade union-state alliances forged at critical periods of political 
transitions since Zambia’s independence have been compromised over time by 
differences concerning economic policy.  
 
While in the First and Second Republics relations between the ZCTU and the 
UNIP administration worsened with the poor performance of the economy, the 
period following the victory of the MMD in the 1991 multiparty elections exhibited 
much sharper impacts on working populations. The MMD’s privatisation and 
liberalisation policies began to catalyse a decline in the influence of labour, which 
rendered the once formidable movement largely ineffectual in checking executive 
excesses.  
 
Politically, the liberalisation of politics by President Kaunda in 1990 led to the 
emergence of new political parties and encouraged the formation of governance -
based civil society organisations which claimed some of the space previously 
occupied by labour as the sole opposition to the state under the one party regime.  
Economically, the reforms implemented by the MMD caused mass retrenchments 
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and reluctance by new investors to unionise their workers, leading to a decline in 
union membership countrywide.  
 
The liberalisation of the labour market also stimulated interest groups within the 
ZCTU to breakaway and form their own apex bodies. The FFTUZ was the result 
of divisions and a direct response to the liberalisation of the labour sector. The 
influence of labour unions as a united force under ZCTU noticeably declined 
thereafter. 
 
Ironically, these developments enabled the ZUJ to emerge as a union for media 
professionals, after years of uncertainty among journalists occasioned by their 
uneasy, coerced, membership to the TWU and NUCW, both of which had no 
recognisable agenda that could be aligned to the ambitions of journalism. 
 
It is clear however, that ZUJ is challenged by many factors, including the 
nebulous nature of the occupation of journalism, the disparities in education 
levels and backgrounds and low self esteem among media professionals, among 
others things. ZUJ nonetheless, has demonstrated the relevance of a union in the 
media sector through the several collective agreements signed with the 
managements of the Times and the Zambia Daily Mail, which have markedly 
improved conditions of service and salaries since 1994.  
 
These actions speak more to the translation of stated rights of freedom of 
association into concrete rights within the realm of state media systems. The 
developments would, also, likely contribute to greater self esteem amongst media 
professionals serving in the state sector. 
 
Previously under the now defunct NAMECO, the state owned umbrella body 
which controlled the operations of both the Times and the Zambia Daily Mail, 
media professionals relied on management to improve their conditions - which 
the conglomerate did to a degree. These enterprise rights did not however 
include the legal protection implicit in group memberships (Edwards, 1993: 29). 
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ZUJ has employed both the ERT and the LPT in approaching and pressuring 
management and the state in improving conditions of service as well as 
defending editors, reporters and championing media law reform along with other 
formations, such PAZA, MISA-Zambia, the CPU-Zambia, ZAMWA, SSZJ and the 
PFC.  The use of collective action is pronounced in the political aspects pursued 
by ZUJ, working with PAZA, MISA-Zambia, ZAMWA, CPU and others.  
 
Apart from strike action characteristic of LPT, undertaken in 2007, which invited 
alleged intimidation from management and the state, ZUJ appears to have 
adopted an ERT approach to its bargaining strategies in most instances. 
 
What is perhaps salient when one compares the Second Republic to the Third, is 
the use of avenues for redress that union formations and association adopted 
when aggrieved by state actions. The ZUJ successfully defended, in the High 
Court, the first managing editor to be sacked by the MMD administration in the 
post liberation era.  
 
It can be noted therefore that while rights of freedom of expression and freedom 
of the press, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution’s Article 20(1), 
Article 20(2) have not been positively experienced by state media journalists 
because of tighter pre-censorship frameworks under democratisation, freedom of 
assembly and association held in Article 21(1) have had substantial impacts in 
terms of their manifestation within the organisational setting of the Times. The 
exploitation of groups rights have taken root inspired by the liberalisation of the 
labour market. Collective action born of emergent unions has been used as a 
cover to address the loss of communicative space.  
 
The legal defence staged for Arthur Simuchoba, the acting managing editor of the 
Times in the early 1990s; the public demonstration against the introduction of the 
media bill and cross sectoral actions demanding constitutional and institutional 
reform underline this point.  
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Edwards (1993: 28-29) is emphatic in distinguishing worker rights from civic 
rights. Despite that fundamental human rights of expression and association are 
gained from constitutional provisions, worker rights are enjoyed by virtue of being 
an employee and their protection result from processes of workplace governance.  
 
He asserts that worker rights can also be lost upon termination of employment 
while a citizen’s constitutional or statutory rights are rarely withdrawn. 
 
‘Because of this limitation, how effectively a worker can exercise his 
rights will usually depend upon such diverse factors as the tightness of 
labour markets, the presence or absence of unions, employers’ 
commitment to workers’ rights, the degree of governmental resolve to 
protect workers’ rights, and employers’ option for organising production 
elsewhere”(Edwards, 1993: 29). 
 
Nord’s (1993: 341) insistence on struggle to translate constitutional rights into 
concrete rights is also underscored here. 
 
ZUJ, along with other sister media agencies, has forged alliances with opposition 
MPs, civil society and international organisations to pursue their common agenda 
on expanding communicative freedoms, with a measure of success. One of the 
most notable is the introduction of private members motions on bills relating to 
access to information and independent broadcasting.  
 
Now Zambia has, though still to be implemented, an IBA and has seen changes 
to the ZNBC Act, reducing the powers of the minister to dictate all proceedings on 
the board of the national broadcaster. These actions might also inform future 
strategies on how the state owned print media’s boards of directors might be 
fashioned. 
 
What the preceding discussion and analysis of ZUJ has clearly illustrated, is that 
the impact of democratisation on state media systems can be understood from 
the labour perspective, in terms of the changing livelihoods of journalists and the 
 305 
potential for labour to continuously claim the space to catalyse change in that 
regard. It can also be demonstrated by the milestones in pushing and achieving 
tangible legal reforms that would have long term impacts on media developments 
in Zambia.  
 
The question remains however, whether ZUJ can indeed sustain itself as an 
effective union given that its members continue to depend on government for 
promotions to higher offices, which disqualifies them from unionisation, and of 
course are also eligible for the incentive of prestigious appointments to diplomatic 
or senior government positions. There is a genuine risk to the ZUJ leadership 
pre-occupying themselves with drawing the attention of authorities in government 
to be aware of their pedigree, for potential consideration of an appointment 
abroad for instance, than to purposefully pursue the risky proposition of 
engendering change. It is also noteworthy that ZUJ does not appear to have 
mustered how to garner membership from amongst public workers and private 
sector journalists.  
 
Opposition from rival unions and subtle reluctance from the state; and resistance 
from private investors, are said to contribute to limiting the union’s membership 
interventions. However, the limited capacity of ZUJ to organise beyond the realm 
of the two state dailies is confirmed by the lack of change in its membership 
status in 18 years of its existence. The union, going forward, needs to diversify its 
membership to remain competitive in a liberalised labour market. The emergence 
of a union for broadcast journalists may portend good or ill for the place of ZUJ in 
the union milieu, in this regard.  
 
Finally, collective action by the media unions and professional associations had 
seemingly stalled state intentions to upwardly adjust VAT on newsprint. Taxation 
is certainly one of the most potent weapons the state can currently employ to 
undermine the growth of the print media. Already troubled by a range of inhibiting 
growth factors, all print media in Zambia are confronted by the harsh proposition 
of liberal philosophy: - to swim or sink.  
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Whereas in this chapter the emphasis was on the impact of market and labour 
liberalisation on trade unionism and employee welfare, and how this affected the 
Times Newspapers (and the media environment in general in Zambia), the next 
chapter, begins to interrogate the commercial implications of economic 
liberalisation and privatisation on the Times Newspapers’ commercial profile.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION ON THE TIMES 
NEWSPAPERS’ COMMERCIAL PROFILE 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
What is unravelling in this thesis thus far is the manner in which state power and 
to some degree, wealthy foreign interests, through out the First, Second and 
Third Republics have influenced the evolution of the print media in Zambia.  
 
This process began with carefully nuanced efforts at nationalisation in the late 
1960s.  A nationalist government challenged by administrative frailties, ethnic 
tensions, security concerns and under development, crafted a trajectory that 
prioritised unity and development over political democracy.  
 
The mass media were seen as central to this development project and were 
hence gradually absorbed into a state corporate structure. The case of the Times 
Newspapers, demonstrates that this was by no means easy to accomplish. In the 
absence of resources to purchase all the existing media entities, the government 
of President Kenneth Kaunda elected to enter into a co-ownership arrangement 
of the Times, with the multinational Lonrho, which survived until 1982.  
 
The commercial significance of this over sight framework rests in the fact that it 
was managed well enough to mask the filters that determined what the public 
heard.  The Times was able to criticise the party and government officials but not 
directly attack President Kaunda or Lonrho’s Tiny Rowland, nor expose any 
substantial dealings they had with Rhodesia and South Africa for instance. 
Therefore, the framework not only enhanced the image of the newspapers in 
political terms, it also elevated it in commercial terms. 
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“Media freedom also leads to positive benefits for the everyday needs of 
social organisation. For instance the credibility of any news and 
information supplied is largely dependent on confidence that it is not 
unduly or secretly influenced by partisan or vested interests, of 
government, advertiser, proprietor, source etc” (McQuail, 1996: 72). 
 
Over time however, as state influence became more obvious and as editors lost 
their jobs for crossing the line, the Times began to experience a down turn in 
fortunes, exacerbated by deteriorating economic conditions in the late seventies 
and eighties.  
 
The advent of the second phase of liberal democracy in 1990 brought a new set 
of challenges as fresh entrants into the market, such as the Weekly Post, and a 
receding state corporate structure signified the coming of competition.   
 
This section of the thesis reinforces the argument that despite democratisation, 
the state continues to play a significant role in shaping the media industry in 
Zambia by maintaining ownership of the major mass media, determining the cost 
of editorial inputs, regulating participants in electronic broadcasting and driving a 
media and information policy that marginalises popular participation.  
 
As Price and Krug (2002: 14) have written, the media structure that materialises 
in any society ‘is usually not an accident’. Even with democracy, the state can 
influence media growth by using its purchasing power to advertise only in those 
media that are supportive of its policies. State subsidised media could also under-
cut private competitors in a liberalised market, they argue. The aims of the 
chapter therefore are the following: 
 
 To explore the impact of liberalisation and privatisation on the commercial 
aspects of the Times Newspapers. 
 To unpack the key causes of readership decline on the Times. 
 To identify the main sources of revenue for potential sustainability of the 
Times. 
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 To understand the nature and extent of state support to the Times 
Newspapers, if any. 
 
 
6.2 METHODS 
 
The discussion in this chapter is mainly the result of a literature study and 
analysis of key documents related to the topic of the research. The chapter is 
considered relevant to the study as it seeks to demonstrate, within the tenets of 
political economy, how economic forces, driven by changing political regimes, 
have shaped or influenced the commercial trajectory of the Times Newspapers. 
The discussion comprises this researcher’s interpretation of recent, unpublished, 
market surveys commissioned by the Times Newspapers, and independent 
reports on advertising trends in Zambia. The second aspect of this chapter 
analyses the company’s response to its market survey by interrogating the 
contents of its strategic plans, financial statements/audit reports, official 
communications and the substance of interviews with the management of the 
Times Newspapers and former editors conducted by this researcher. The import 
of document reviews and key informant interviews therefore is used to support 
the tenets of the political economy of the media, especially as applied to 
developing countries, in this case the Times of Zambia. This approach is 
consistent with idiographic research strategies and the use of multiple sources of 
data aimed at achieving convergence; that is, bringing varied forms of data to 
bear on variables of interest. As this researcher has already explained in section 
1.5.1 of Chapter One, this method can allow for generalizability to be achieved 
through pattern matching and explanation building, by demonstrating the linkages 
between findings in this study with the results of other studies. In addition to the 
findings emanating from interviews by this author therefore, the original 
inferences and conclusions drawn from the synthesis of related data in this 
chapter are also based on, and derived from, the following principal documents: 
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 Tailoka, f., Mwiya, B., Phiri, J., Kabinga, M., & Musonda, M. E.2008. Times 
of Zambia Readership Survey Report: Lusaka: TimesPrintpak. 
 Africa Media Ventures.2008.Market feasibility of a business, economic and 
socially – orientated newspaper publication: The case of Zambia and 
Malawi. [SI] Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. 
 Lolojih, P. (2005) Summary results, round 3 Afrobarometer survey in 
Zambia. Pretoria: Idasa.  
 Times Printpak (Zambia) limited, revised strategic plan 2003-2005. 
Lusaka: TimesPrintpak. 
 Times Printmaker Zambia Limited Strategic Plan, 2009-2012. Lusaka: 
Times Printpak. 
 Times Printmaker Zambia Limited Strategic Plan, 2009-2012. Lusaka: 
Times Primped. 
 Synovate.2009.Category spends review, 2007-2009. Lusaka: Synovate. 
 
 
6.2.1 Structure of the Times Printpak in the post liberalisation era 
 
Ahead of the discussion on the commercial aspects of the Times, it is important 
to briefly reiterate that following misunderstandings between chief executive 
officers of the sister companies of the Times Newspapers, Printpak (Zambia) 
Limited and the Newspaper Distributors Limited (NDL) in 1993 over unpaid dues 
to each other (referred to in section 1.1.2 of Chapter One), the minister of 
information consolidated the companies under one management structure 
headed by a managing director.  In 1997, the board of directors approved a new 
management structure with three key divisions. The Production Division was 
headed by a director of operations (reporting to the chief executive) and 
comprised, the Works Department, Advertising and Commercial Department and 
the Circulation Department. The Service Division was headed by the chief 
executive (managing director) and comprised the Accounts and Human 
Resources Departments. The third and last division, constituted the chief 
executive and the Editorial Department (features editor, business editor, sports 
editor, political and Sunday editor, reporters and sub-editor. The division of 
 311 
interest to this chapter is the Operations Department which embraces the 
advertising, circulation and commercial functions of the entity. Since the merger, 
the core business of the Times Printpak has had five strands: 
 
 Newspaper publishing and distribution. 
 Advertising. 
 Printing of commercial stationery, calendars, and industrial labels. 
 Book publishing. 
 Courier services. 
 
At the time of the study, the Times/printmaker employed 280 staff complemented 
by 76 casual workers. Its main activities were located in the Zambian capital 
Lusaka, and Ndola, situated in the country’s industrial hub.  
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Figure 8: Times Printpak (Zambia) Limited Operations Department 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Times of Zambia (2010). 
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6.2.2 Background: Socio-economic conditions 
 
It is Banda (2004:7) who makes the case for the sustainability of the media 
following the liberalisation of the economy in 1991 by the market oriented MMD 
government. Decrying poverty, the fact that 80 % of Zambians survived on less 
than a dollar a day by the turn of the century, Banda doubts that there are many 
Zambians who could afford to purchase a newspaper on a regular basis in the 
present day. 
 
The Times Printpak (Zambia) Limited’s Revised Strategic Plan of 2003 to 2005 
also laments ‘the significant drop’ in sales volumes of the newspaper ‘as a result 
of eroded buying power of the readership, a consequence of closed companies 
and retrenchment of those in formal employment’ (Times/Printpak, 2003-5: 5). 
 
Other official documents and independent studies in the last 18 years underline 
the impact of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) on human 
development in Zambia contextualising the incapacitation of the Zambian 
workforce (Global Policy Network, 2001: ZHDR, 2007). 
 
The Africa Media Ventures (AMV) and Open Society Institute of Southern Africa 
(OSISA) study of 2008 also  identifies low levels of disposable incomes, non 
availability of state-of-the-art technological infrastructure and poor reading 
cultures as some of the key problems afflicting the newspaper industry in Zambia 
(Africa Media Ventures/OSISA, 2008: 56). 
 
In fact, the Zambian government’s own media policy for 1996 concedes that the 
print media in the country are constrained by declining per capital income of the 
readership, poor capitalisation; illiteracy; inflation, poor communication 
infrastructure and high cost of newsprint (Zambia, 1996: 14).  
 
Consequently, the newspaper industry has not registered any quantitative growth 
in the recent past (Tailoka, Mwiya, Phiri, Kabinga & Musonda, 2008: 21). 
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The significance of this point rests in examining the historical profile of the case 
being studied, the Times Newspapers, framed against prevailing socio-economic 
conditions. For instance, the Times boasted a circulation of more than 60,000 
copies daily between 1974 and 1982. The Sunday Times of Zambia produced 
71,093 in 1979 and 63, 941 in 1982 verified through the Audit Bureau of 
Circulations (ABC) (Kasoma, 1986: 113).   
 
This can, perhaps, be explained by the presence of 70,000 economically 
empowered white expatriates in the post independence era, who constituted the 
readership of the Northern News38, the forerunner of the Times(Kasoma, 1986: 
78).  
 
Compared to the 20,000 daily circulation which today officially represents the 
daily outputs for the Times and the Post and the 12,000 copies for the Zambia 
Daily Mail (Zambia, 1996: 6), the numbers associated with the Times of Zambia 
and the Sunday Times of Zambia in the First and Second Republic, raise serious 
concerns about newspaper sustainability in the Third Republic. 
 
As indicated in section 5.2.8 of Chapter Five, Chiluba’s market driven policies 
generated mass retrenchments not only eroding trade union membership bases 
but also creating a new category of ‘poor’ in the thousands of retrenches, retirees 
and lowly paid public and private sector workers (Banda, 2004: 7). Banda 
suggests that after years of enjoying the benefits of the country’s copper wealth, 
Zambia’s middle-class experienced radical changes to their lifestyles, noticeable 
from increasing poverty by the turn of the century. 
 
The Zambia National Human Development Report for Zambia (ZHDR, 2007: 69), 
published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), underscores 
this point by indicating that, compared to eight countries of similar human 
                                                 
38
 The Central African Mail (Now Zambia Daily Mail) was a weekly serving 2.5 million Africans, who 
conceivably had a weaker buying potential. The Northern News circulated 21, 388 daily while the Central 
African Mail produced, 20,000 weekly in 1965 (Kasoma, 1986: 113). 
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development profiles, Zambia had performed the worst in almost 30 years 
between the period 1975 and 1985. 
 
Zambia’s Human Development Index (HDI) - the composite indicator that 
measures human progress by gauging education attainments, life expectancy 
and health, and material wellbeing - grew at a slower rate than the other eight 
countries up to 1985. The studies showed that the HDI value declined sharply to 
the extent that it exceeded the 1975 levels. 
 
“The global Human Development Reports have noted that no other 
country among 79 countries with data to allow the calculation of HDI, 
since 1975, has experienced that kind of reversal” (ZHDR, 2007: 69). 
 
Although it is acknowledged that the socio-economic environment began to 
deteriorate under the reign of UNIP, from 1973 to 1986, the country slid faster 
after the implementation of the market orientated policies by Chiluba’s MMD in 
1991(Global Policy Network, 2001).  
 
The ZHDR however reveals that the country has experienced a turn-around in 
HDI since 1994 with sharper increases from 0.451 to 0.462 being registered 
between 2000 and 2004. The steady increases in HDI which ranked Zambia only 
second to Morocco in the 1999-2004 periods have been attributed to sustained 
growth in the economy from 1999, achievements in health reforms, gains in 
education and strong responses to communicable diseases. 
 
The ZHDR report asserts that the rise in Zambia’s human development index is 
largely attributable to the consistent seven year growth in the economy between 
1999 and 2005, which was accompanied by an 18.9 % increase in per capita 
income. Growths in construction, wholesale and retail trading and mining account 
for the improvements. Investments in mining resulted in 60 % increases in copper 
production from 256, 884 metric tonnes (MT) in 2000 to 410,971 MT in 2002. 
Cobalt also rose by 80% from 3, 538 in 2000 to 6,390 in 2004. Increases in 
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agricultural output and in non-traditional exports have also made important 
contributions to the turn - around (ZHDR, 2007: 75-80).  
 
This was during the reign of the late President Levy Mwanawasa who exhibited a 
technocratic leadership style (Mazrui, 2007:3), marshalling immense donor 
confidence with his zero tolerance for corruption until his death in August, 2008 
(Shacinda, 2008, 19 August:1). 
 
By 2004, extreme poverty in rural areas declined from 71% in 1998 to 53%, while 
per capita GDP rose from K234, 933 to K276, 416 in the same period. 
Disappointingly the overall rise in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at an 
average 2.7% is rendered insignificant when the country’s population growth rate 
is factored in. 
 
“It is thus not surprising that poverty between 1998 and 2004 dropped 
slightly from 73% to 68% despite this growth. It has thus been suggested 
that for a significant impact on poverty, the Zambian economy needs to 
grow constantly at a rate higher than 7 %’’( ZHDR, 2007: 75). 
 
By 2007, therefore, the Zambian economy was not buoyant enough to empower 
the citizenry to support a wide range of new and old publications on a daily basis.  
Taking all this into account, this section of the thesis explores the strategic 
response of the Times of Zambia to the dual reform process catalysed by the 
MMD.  The readership characteristics, preferences and public perceptions of the 
Times, framed in commercial terms, constitute the main ingredients of the 
discussion. 
 
6.2.3 Liberalisation and the Times of Zambia 
 
In general, the advent of democratisation has led to the encroachment of the 
state on principal media enterprises over a 45 year period. Despite what appears 
to be positive steps in liberalising the media sector, it is increasingly evident that 
the state’s maintenance of high taxation on newsprint and other editorial inputs is 
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a primary factor in inhibiting quantitative print media growth. In some cases, overt 
political actions have led to the demise of promising private initiatives. For 
example, the reasons for the failure of Second Republican newspapers such as 
the Sunday Post and Weekend World were a combination of poor planning, bad 
economics and a modicum of political hostility (Kasoma, 1986: 195), in the case 
of the former. 
 
Moreover, it has been inferred from the exposition in Chapter Four that the 
newspapers that were not allied to the state could simply not survive the First and 
Second Republics, except for the National Mirror, which had the benefit of 
assistance with newsprint donations from the German and Norwegian-based 
churches (Kasoma, 1986: 120-136). 
 
In this regard, the covert use of state power to undermine the competitiveness of 
private media entities has been recognised as a problematic of democracies in 
the recent past (Price & Krug, 2002: 14). 
 
The case of the National Mirror and The Post demonstrate this. Due to its 
incessant criticism of the UNIP leadership, the Mirror was subjected to politically 
instigated economic censorship through a denial of advertising from State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). The Chiluba administration deployed similar strategies 
against the Post through the first ten years of MMD rule. Richards and Murphy 
(1996: 21-22) define economic censorship as when advertisers use their 
economic influence to act as unofficial censors of the press.  
 
The practice changed with the ascendancy to power of Levy Mwanawasa 
(Banda, 2004: 86) who extended state advertising to the Post and other privately 
owned media. This spell was short lived with the demise of Mwanawasa in 2008 
and the rise of Rupiah Banda, whose disputed election brought him into direct 
conflict with the Post. 
 
The Times of Zambia on the other hand, despite being critical of state policy in 
many instances in the First and parts of the Second Republics, did not 
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experience a withdrawal of SOE advertising support. The logic, already 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, is that the class alliance between Kaunda’s 
administration and business elites in Lonrho insulated it from punitive actions of 
this nature. The state and Lonrho could after all, settle any disagreements with 
editors administratively. 
 
The Kaunda - Rowland relationship expressed through what has been termed by 
this thesis as a state-corporate control model also enabled a cautious balance 
between the Times Newspapers’ coverage of politics and its marketisation. This 
model, by all indications, had a notable measure of commercial success but was 
not sustainable over time as state controls resulted gradually in editorial timidity 
and subsequent loss of credibility. 
 
In the last three years of the Second Republic (1989-1991), the state ensured 
that all print media came under the National Media Corporation (NAMECO), while 
the electronic media answered directly to the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting Services (MIBS). The Mirror as a result remained the only constant 
through this period. 
 
The MMD administrations have behaved much in the same manner as their UNIP 
predecessors in restraining state media since their ascension to power in 1991.  
Zambia’s history is therefore replete with the use of state power to structure the 
media industry, despite democratisation.  
 
The sum effect of this seems to be a harsh rendering of public assessments of 
state media in particular.  Historically, one notable development was that the 
state take-over of the Central African Mail (now Zambia Daily Mail), earned the 
newspaper the sobriquet ‘government gazette’ (Simuchoba, 2009/10/02), making 
it susceptible to negative public perception and potentially undermining its 
competitiveness in a relatively small market.  
 
In recent times, successive studies by the Afrobarometer in 2005 (Lolojih, 2005): 
and in 2009 (Ismail, 2010/10/06) have demonstrated continued discomfort by 
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Zambians with the notion of state control of the media, the nature of political 
reporting and state of the country’s democracy in general. It stands to reason to 
assume that the decline of the Times of Zambia in circulation terms at least is not 
only to be linked to socio-economic factors but also to increased negative 
perceptions over time of its lack of credibility as a newspaper: The latter being a 
consequence of political interference (Kapata, 2011/02/02). 
 
The Afrobarometer surveys of 2005 (referred to in section 1.2.4 of Chapter One) 
show that the state media in Zambia experience relatively less public confidence 
than their private competitors. The result of this would presumably be not only to 
weaken the newspaper’s sales but also dampen the morale of advertisers.  
 
The relatively weaker perception of the state owned media in the Afrobarometer 
survey can partly be explained by the state’s deliberate positioning of the 
apparatus as a counter-weight to the privately owned press. There seems to have 
been no discernible ambition by the state to strategically modernise operations or 
enrich the quality of the product in this respect as a response to the challenge of 
the surviving private press. 
 
The 2009 survey by Afrobarometer in Zambia (Ismail, 2010/10/06) 
correspondingly shows high public support for a watchdog media model. Figure 
9, shows how 75% of respondents favour a media that investigates and reports 
on corruption and mistakes by government, against 16% who prefer a more 
cooperative press. Only 8% did not agree with either position or simply did not 
know what to say. The Afrobarometer study underlines the dissatisfaction by the 
public with media content at the moment. 
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Figure 9: Afrobarometer on Zambians’ preferred media model 
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Source: Ismail (2010/10/06). 
 
Similarly, a readership survey commissioned by the Times Printpak Zambia 
Limited in 2008 (Tailoka, Mwiya, Phiri, Kabinga & Musonda: 2008: 21) argues 
empirically that the state owned media have not diversified their political 
reportage in the post liberalisation era, surrendering space to the private media 
particularly the Post and the Weekly Angel, which have given a platform to 
alternative voices. A market survey sponsored by OSISA also found that 84.6 % 
of respondents preferred the Post over the Times or the Daily Mail (AMV/OSISA, 
2008: 34) due to the former’s relative depth. By all indications, the lack of 
ingenuity has characterised the state media’s commercial response to a 
liberalised environment since 2001. 
 
On the contrary, the Post’s business strategy has enabled it establish an 
educational supplement targeting teachers and pupils, supported by the Business 
Development Services (BDS) project of the International Labour 
Organisation(ILO).  
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Funding injected into the Post facilitated the exploration of new markets amongst 
small to medium scale businesses. The privately owned daily also introduced 
colour printing 39and purchased its own printing press, improving its advertising 
appeal and circulation. The competitive market has seen the Post overtake the 
Times as the most widely read newspaper in Zambia ((Tailoka et al: 2008: 21). 
 
The TimesPrintpak Readership Survey (2008) which administered 2000 
questionnaires to readers from Lusaka, Kitwe, Ndola, Mufulira, Luanshya, 
Kalululushi and Chingola found that approximately 50 percent of the readers do 
not purchase the Times of Zambia or the Sunday Times, while 18 % no longer 
purchase either of the two papers. Cumulatively, 68 % of the readership does not 
buy the state owned papers (Tailoka et al, 2008: 8). 
 
In terms of participation - defined here as the proportion of the population 
purchasing the newspaper - therefore, it can be asserted upfront that the majority 
of the reading public does not participate in the Times Newspapers. 
 
In hindsight, the immediate impact of democratisation on the Times Newspapers 
in commercial terms was first to propel it into a leading position as the most 
credible information vehicle: subsequently, it succumbed to a complex oversight 
framework fashioned by the presidency and Lonrho to manage its content amidst 
a period of political upheaval in Southern Africa but retained a fair amount of 
commercial and editorial freedom; ultimately, it was fully colonised by the state, 
which prioritised propaganda over profitability. The company has since been 
perceived by the public as an entity lacking credibility.  
 
The twin policy characteristics of democratisation - political and economic 
liberalisation - found the Times unable to respond strategically to new competition 
particularly the Post Newspapers. Government restraints on content meant that 
                                                 
39
 It has to be said, that the Zambia Daily Mail also purchased colour printing facilities during the same 
period underlining the sense that there was no common strategy for sustainability for the state print media 
initiated by government. 
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the creative capacity or indeed the incentive for creativity amongst the company’s 
planners was likely undermined.  
 
 
6.2.4 The 2003-2005 Times/Printpak Strategic Plan: A post liberalisation response 
 
According to official company records, the decline in the circulation of the Times 
was openly noted by the Times management in 2003. The chairperson of the 
Times Board of Directors at the time, Miss Joyce Muwo, acknowledged that the 
company was being overtaken by technological advancements and new entrants 
to the market and needed to ‘reinvent itself’ (Muwo, 2003: 2). 
 
“We have to change to meet the expectations of our clients. What we did 
in the past and how we did it in the past is not what will make us what we 
ought to be in the future. We have to change our culture as an 
organisation, we have to change our behaviour, we have to change our 
image in order to survive the competition from both local and foreign 
news and publishing houses. Failure to embrace change and the way we 
do things may result in our organisation disappearing from the face of the 
earth like many organisations have done” (Muwo, 2003: 2). 
 
The Times Printpak Strategic Plan (2003-2005) shows that Printpak had began to 
experience sustainability problems because of liberalisation and globalisation. 
Generally, the expansion of markets from South Africa gradually edged out poorly 
equipped Zambian competitors. At least 12 local Zambian printing firms lost 
business to South African competitors. Liberalisation and globalisation, hence, 
presented a local and foreign perspective to competition in the following manner: 
 
 The clients that previously assigned their work to Printpak, were at liberty 
to import South African goods. 
 Printpak clients began to subcontract their work to South African printers 
that had superior quality. 
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 The advent of computer technologies virtually ‘killed’ Printpak’s stationary 
printing contracts. 
 
The immediate economic effects of liberalisation on the Times Newspapers 
appear to have been under-estimated, however. In 2003, the Times management 
surprisingly believed the paper still retained its ‘loyal readership’. Although it 
noted a significant decline in sales, the company felt then that it was ‘a market 
leader’ and that its fortunes would be reversed as the economy improved 
(TimesPrintpak, 2003: 5). 
 
Some of the first signs of trouble for the Times/Printpak/Newspaper Distributors 
formation were the intra company conflicts of 1993. As noted in section 1.1.2 of 
Chapter One, the Times Newspapers and Printpak operated managerially as 
semi-independent companies, since the days of Lonrho. However, the structure 
was further complicated by the takeover of the media entities by NAMECO. The 
subsequent restructuring led to the appointment of a Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) for each of the subsidiaries-the Times Newspapers, Printpak Zambia and 
Newspaper Distributors Limited (NDL).   
 
All three CEOs reported to the managing director of NAMECO. Printpak owned 
the printing machinery and building in Ndola and provided printing services to the 
Times at commercial rates. The returns accounted for 10% of its income. 85-90% 
of Printpak’s revenue came from printing food labels, calendars, boxes, 
stationary, cartons and books (TimesPrintpak, 2003: 4).  
 
Following the NAMECO takeover of the state media, NDL were constituted as a 
subsidiary firm with its own general manager.  The Times subcontracted the 
distribution and sales of its newspapers to NDL at 32% commission. 
 
After the liquidation of NAMECO by the MMD, the subsidiary companies operated 
essentially with three centres of power, and without a central fulcrum. This was 
made more evident in 1993 when conflict flared up amongst them over delayed 
payments.  The NDL ‘misapplied’ the funds from newspaper sales and failed to 
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transfer them to the Times. The Times in turn failed to pay Printpak which had to 
print the newspapers daily. Owed K250 million by the Times, Printpak threatened 
to halt the printing of the paper, prompting the minister of information and 
broadcasting services to convene an emergency meeting on 22 March, 1993. 
The minister presented a political solution to a business problem: he merged the 
companies under one directorship. The CEO of the Times Newspapers, hereafter 
became the managing director of Times Printpak (Zambia) Limited 
(TimesPrintpak Revised Strategic Plan, 2003-5: 4). 
 
6.2.5 Times - State ‘informal relationship’ in the Third Republic 
 
The financial burden carried by the Times into the Third Republic, upon the 
dissolution of NAMECO in 1991, is revealed in the company’s financial 
statements for the year ended 31 March 2003 audited by MT Ncube and 
Associates: In 1993, the government loaned the Times K3.7 billion 40 to pay the 
United Technical Equipment Company (UTEC) of South Africa for outstanding 
payments in newsprint. The Times repaid the amount half yearly over a three-
year phase after a one year grace period. The last amount of K622, 274,182.10 
was paid on 6th January 2000 (Times Printpak Limited Financial Statements, 
2003: 14).  
 
Essentially, Banda (2004)’s suspicions that the state media’s endurance may be 
explained by undeclared government subsidies is somewhat validated – to an 
extent. For, it must also be noted that the amount extended to the Times by the 
state was designated as a loan, which was repaid eventually.  
 
‘The belief is that these companies can generate their own funds’ the current 
Managing Director, John Phiri indicates in an interview with this researcher (Phiri, 
2008). 
 
                                                 
40
 Since the Times paid a total sum of  K622, 274,182.10 twice (2) in each year for three (3) years, we can 
estimate that the total debt amounted to ZMK 3.7 billion or K 3, 733, 645, 092.6 (K622, 274. 182.10 x 2 x 
3). Note: Calculations by author. 
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Phiri (2008) describes the economic relationship between the state and the 
Times/printmaker as ‘informal’. The nature of support depends largely on who the 
permanent secretary in the ministry of information and broadcasting services is.  
During elections in particular, government support takes the form of the purchase 
of extra motor vehicles to improve national coverage.  
 
However, there are other forms of support that begin to substantiate this notion of 
subsidies more succinctly: For example, during the privatisation exercise, the 
state instructed its parastatals, the Zambia National Wholesale Company(ZNWC), 
through the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) to sell its building worth K200 
million to the Times of Zambia. The state made a down payment of K70 million, 
while the Times met the difference (Phiri, 2008/05/09). 
 
Were the TimesPrintpak a private entity, it might probably have failed to survive 
the first three years of liberalisation. The Times could not borrow from the banks 
because of lack of audited accounts during the period.  
 
The structural and financial problems presented one of the company‘s most 
significant challenges. Relating to this, the strategic plan for 2003-2005 
aggregates the weaknesses as follows: 
 
 The company has not replaced old printing machinery. 
 The workforce was bloated but could not be retrenched because of the 
financial commitments involved. 
 The market for newspapers and other products had become more 
competitive. 
 Unemployment due to poor economic performance had eroded 
readership levels. 
 Political trends (presumably dictated influence on content). 
 
To redress this state of affairs, the Times strategised to reduce its wage bill by 
trimming its workforce through early retirements, retrenchments and applying a 
freeze on employment. It opted to strengthen performance appraisals, training 
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and evaluations in order to maintain only the most qualified of staff. Its 
commercial strategies were as follows: 
 
 To increase income from commercial printing from K326 million to K504 
million by 2005. 
 To achieve profit before tax of K500million by 2005 (expansion of commercial 
printing being a major consideration). 
 To increase pagination of the two newspapers to 20 pages on Mondays, 
Wednesdays and Fridays by 2005 (with aggressive marketing by advertising 
personnel). 
 To print 200,000 text books, 400,000 exercise books by 2005 
 Increase circulation to 20,000 by 2005. 
 Improve quality of newspapers and editorial content by 2005 (purchase state 
of the art equipment, vehicles, re-open offices in Kabwe and Livingstone, 
broaden rural coverage). 
 To increase courier tonnage (expansion by aggressive marketing). 
 
The strategic objectives set by the 2003-2005 plan were only partially met. One of 
the key highlights of the plan was the 73% annual turnover from the first year to the 
last. The plan failed to reduce pay roll costs which doubled during the period 2003-
2006(TimesPrintpak, 2009: 13). In addition, Phiri (2008/05/09) concedes that: 
 
 The company lost a lucrative account from a telecommunications firm due to 
its failure to print in colour. 
 Institutional subscriptions continued to be compromised due to the demise of 
privatised companies. 
 The company was not able to increase its newspaper distribution vans from 
10 (or less) to cover the entire country. 
 Circulation in 2008 had dropped from 20,000 to 10,000 daily because 
readership often shared one copy amongst “100 people’’ (a manifestation of 
hard economic times). 
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The fundamental goals set by the 2003 to 2005 plan were not hence substantially 
met. Following that, management commissioned an independent study to empirically 
unveil and articulate the company’s position in the liberalised market. 
 
 
6.2.6  The 2008 Times Printpak Readership Survey: Understanding the impact of 
political and economic liberalisation on the commercial aspects of a state 
media enterprise 
 
“Times newspapers has responded (to the effects of liberalisation) by 
commissioning a Readership Survey and, arising out of the reading of its 
recommendations, fashioning a three-year strategic plan aimed at 
attaining sustainability and later making a profit’’(Phiri, 2009/11/20).  
 
The Times Printpak Limited Readership Survey of March 2008 was the first 
independent study commissioned by the company to assess its commercial 
performance in the post liberalisation era. The findings of the study undertaken by 
the Copperbelt University (CBU) School of Business address the following key 
elements: 
 
 Newspaper buying dynamics. 
 Readership characteristics. 
 Usage and rating of Times products. 
 Satisfaction with paper content and size. 
 Relation between education levels of readership and overall satisfaction. 
 Overall rating of the Times’ quality compared to competitors. 
 
The study used questionnaires administered to 2000 respondents from Lusaka, 
Kitwe, Ndola, Mufulira, Luanshya, Kalulushi and Chingola. 1761 of the 
questionnaires were returned complete. Secondary data was collected from 
official documents from the Times and published works. 
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6.2.7 The newspaper and advertising sales paradox 
 
The decline of the Times Newspapers, once a leading media entity in the country, 
manifests in the significant reduction in sales between 2000 and 2007. During this 
period the survey reveals that annual sales fell from 211,907 to 111,963(figure: 
10). The largest decline in sales (16.2%) occurred between the years 2000 and 
2002, which coincides with the introduction of colour printing by the rival Post 
Newspapers (Tailoka et al, 2008: 26). What is perhaps surprising is that while the 
newspapers experienced a sharp drop in sales, their advertising and courier 
services registered unprecedented increases (Figure 11) 
 
 Figure 10: Annual Newspaper sales from 2000 to 2007 
 
Source: Tailoka et al (2008: 25). 
 
In nominal terms, advertising sales increased from ZMK 4,315 million to ZMK 
18,029 million between 2000 and 2007. In percentage terms advertising 
increased by 33 % during this period. 
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Explaining this dichotomy, Tailoka et al (2008: 27) surmise that the news market 
and the advertising market are two distinct spheres.  
 
On the one hand, consumer preferences caused the newspapers to lose ground 
to the Post. On the other end of the spectrum, subsequent improvements in the 
economy during the reign of President Levy Mwanawasa (2001-2008) catalysed 
advertising sales. The advertising volume in terms of square centimetres 
increased by a mere 15% during the period of the study (2000-2007), with the 
lowest level being 914000 square centimetres and the highest being 1202,000 
square centimetres. The Average per year was 1266,000 centimetres. The 
company also experienced an increase in nominal courier sales between 2000 
and 2007, which rose by an incredible 1000% in nominal terms. In real terms the 
courier sales rose by 300%. The inference by the survey is that courier sales 
have registered a marked increase over time. It is plausible also to interpret these 
findings from a different perspective. It has been established from Afrobarometer 
studies (2005) for instance that the state owned media have received lower 
approval ratings than the private press, largely because they are seen to be 
extensions of the state propaganda machinery.  
 
The disapproval has also been inferred from Afrobarometer studies in 2009 
(Ismail, 2010/10/06) where respondents favoured a watchdog model of the press. 
Therefore we may understand the influence of political liberalisation in terms of 
readership resistance to unidirectional messaging. The presence of private media 
alternatives facilitates choice and on the strength of perception alone, one 
concludes that Zambians would rather spend their hard earned money on a 
newspaper without overt state influence.  
 
Tailoka et al (2008: 30) hypothesise that the Times of Zambia faces competition  
from other state owned media, radio, television and the Zambia Daily Mail, 
because they all project similar government sentiments.  
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Therefore a public that is economically challenged and has had prior exposure to 
state radio and television news will be highly unlikely to purchase a national 
newspaper that is predictably going to publish analogous official news.  
 
The survey also concludes that institutional entities continue to purchase the 
Times of Zambia to glean official policy pronouncements from government and to 
seek business opportunities. This assertion is underscored by the OSISA market 
survey of 2008 which alludes to the notion that readers largely purchase the state 
media newspapers because of their interest in employment advertisements, cell 
phone packages from transnational corporations such as MTN, CELTEL and 
CELL Z (OSISA, 2008: 41-51). News content is evidently the least likely reason 
for attracting readers.   
 
The OSISA study reveals that respondents surveyed preferred business to any 
other news. And of the three dailies, the Post Newspapers were adjudged to have 
had the better business offering.  
 
Banda (2004: 32) on the other hand suggests that globalisation has also affected 
the Zambian newspaper market: South African newspapers such as the Mail and 
Guardian and Botswana’s Mmegi have regionalised exposing the elite section of 
Zambian society to multicultural genres from across borders.  
 
The advent of pay satellite television such as Multichoice Zambia adds to the 
demise of the local press as African news is transmitted regularly through a 
variety of international channels. It has been estimated that only 37.10% of the 
population read newspapers in Zambia while 50% listened to radio and 36% had 
access to television (Tailoka et al, 2008: 30). The advertising market is 
undeterred by these perceptions, it would seem from the Times readership 
survey. 
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Figure 11: Advertising sales in 2000 constant kwacha ‘000 
 
 
Source: Tailoka et al (2008: 27). 
 
A possible explanation would be that dedicated institutional advertisers that have 
close links to the state might be wary of being seen to advertise in (and therefore 
support) a private media entity, such as the Post, that is overly critical of the 
government, ahead of the safer option, as the Times.  This assumption shall be 
tested in section 6.2.8 by analysing advertising trends in Zambia between 2007 
and 2009. 
 
6.2.8 Comparing advertising trends by Multinationals and SOEs in the Times, 
Daily Mail and the Post 
 
To respond empirically to the stated assumption, it is useful to examine trends in 
print advertising in Zambia between 2007 and 2009. The purpose of this is, firstly, 
to identify which companies are the top spenders in the print media advertising.  
Secondly, to establish whether the assumption that companies allied to the state 
would more likely advertise in the state owned media.  
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It would be interesting to note, for instance, where the SOEs in the top 10 
category place their advertising: that is, whether they prefer the state owned 
media over the privately owned entities or vice versa. The logic will be extended 
to private companies and multinationals. 
 
According to the Synovate review of advertising trends in Zambia during the 
2007-2009, the top 10 spenders on print advertising included SOEs, Zambia 
Telecommunications Company (21% share of spending) and the Zambia National 
Commercial Bank (11%), and government departments such as the Road 
Transport and Safety Agency(5%). Multinational companies were the most 
competitive spenders: MTN Zambia (18%), Zain Zambia (14%), and Multichoice 
(12%). Financial institutions, Barclays Bank (6%), First National Bank (4%), were 
less significant (See table 6 below). The largest spender on print advertising 
during this period hence, was the SOE ZAMTEL followed closely by MTN 
(Synovate, 2009: 11). 
 
Table 6: Top 10 print spenders, December 2009 (Synovate, 2009: 11) 
 
Company Name Spend in ZMK Share of spends 
Zambia 
Telecommunications 
 177,688,371     21% 
MTN Zambia  148,662,378     18% 
Zain Zambia  121,949,408     14% 
Multichoice Zambia  102,994,946     12% 
Zambia National 
Commercial Bank 
   92,237,104     11% 
Barclays Bank    51,635,122       6% 
Road Transport    42,525,006       5% 
Golf view Hotel    40,565,710       5% 
First National Bank    37,372,580       4% 
Radian stores    32,830,920       4% 
Total Spend in ZMK 
‘000 
848,461,545  100% 
 
. 
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When the data is disaggregated, amongst the three daily newspapers: The Post, 
the Times, the Daily Mail, and the two weeklies, the Monitor & Digest, and the 
National Mirror, we begin to understand which medium is most preferred 
holistically.  
 
Table 7 shows that the Post Newspapers are the market leader in advertising 
with an average of 54.3 % advertising over three years (57% in 2007; 50% in 
2008; 56% in 2009).  The Zambia Daily Mail averages at 27.3% over the same 
period (25% in 2007; 33% in 2008 and 24% in 2009), while the Times is third at 
14.7% (13% in 2007, 13% in 2008, 18% in 2009). Times Printpak Managing 
Director John Phiri confirms that the company has lost ground to the Post and the 
Daily Mail mainly because of its failure to print in colour. The telecommunications 
companies in particular insist on colour printing. The Times has tended to 
outsource its colour printing which is costly and unsustainable over time (Phiri, 
2010/08/24). 
 
Table 7: Print Advertising Spending Trends, 2007-2009 (Synovate, 2009: 6) 
 
Print Media Jan-Dec, 2007 Jan-Dec, 2008 Jan-Dec, 2009 
Post Newspapers 57%     50%      56% 
Zambia Daily Mail  25 %    33%      24% 
Times of Zambia  13%    13%      18% 
National Mirror    0%      1%        1% 
Monitor & Digest    4%      4%         1% 
 
 
At this point it is important to reflect more substantially on the chapter’s 
assumption that companies allied to the state will likely place the adverts in the 
state owned newspapers, and less so in privately owned entities.  
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A breakdown of ZAMTEL expenditure on television, radio and print advertising 
begins to relay a pattern that could be instructive here. Figure 12 below shows 
that the SOE ZAMTEL/CELL Z spends disproportionately on the state owned 
media. ZAMTEL spent 39% of advertising resources on the Zambia National 
Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) in 2007, 64% in 2008 and 30% in 2009. The 
trend in expenditure has been consistently high. On average, ZAMTEL spent 
44% on television advertising in the state owned broadcaster. Comparatively, it 
spent a mere 1.7% on the privately owned MUVI television. To be fair, ZNBC 
radio reaches 50% of the Zambian population and television 36% (Tailoka, et al, 
2008) while MUVI TV is restricted to Lusaka, the capital and can only be 
accessed through subscriptions elsewhere. ZAMTEL could quite easily argue that 
these trends are logical from a business perspective. 
 
However, when we examine the trends in the print media, we observe here too, 
that the Zambia Daily Mail and the Times of Zambia receive a disproportionate 
share of advertising from the ZAMTEL/CELL- Z, the largest advertiser in the print 
media. The Zambia Daily Mail carried an average 25% of ZAMTEL advertising in 
the print media between 2007-2009 (28% in 2007, 20% in 2008, 27% in 2009). 
The Times of Zambia got a 14.6% share over the same period (13% in 2007; 8% 
in 2008; 23% in 2009). 41 
 
The Post Newspapers, which have been confirmed as the most widely read 
newspapers in Zambia received a meagre 2.6% average in advertising from 
ZAMTEL/CELL Z. Significantly, no advert was placed in the Post Newspapers by 
ZAMTEL in the year 2008.  
 
It seems unlikely that ZAMTEL42 has considered the complexion of the 
readerships of the dailies and therefore assumes its target group is better served 
by the Times. This is because, from the Times Printpak (Zambia) Limited study of 
2008, it can be inferred that the three dailies are essentially serving the same 
                                                 
41
 Averages calculated by author. 
42
 At the time of writing this thesis, ZAMTEL had been sold to Libyan investors. It is yet to be seen whether 
these patterns will change over time. 
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market. It is reasonable therefore to conclude that ZAMTEL/CELL-Z may have 
political reasons for not advertising through the Post. 
 
 
Table 8: Zamtel/Cell Z all media SOS January 2008, to December 2009 
(Synovate, 2009: 32) 
 
Media share spend % Jan-Dec, 2007 Jan-Dec 2008  Jan-Dec, 2009 
ZNBC Radio 2     4%    4%   6% 
ZNBC Radio 4      8%    3%   3% 
Phoenix FM     0%    0%   3% 
QFM     0%    0%   3% 
Total Radio  13%     7%  13% 
MUVI TV     2%     1%     2% 
ZNBC   39%       64%   30% 
Total TV   40%   65%   32% 
Post Newspapers      3%      0%      5% 
Zambia Daily Mail   28%   20%    27% 
Times of Zambia   13%     8%    23% 
Monitor & Digest     4%   28%    55% 
Total Print   47%   28% 55% 
Total Exp. ZMK,000 24, 595 9,541  38,469 
 
Growth by month                                                  -61%                              303% 
 
 
The dispersal of advertising by ZAMTEL/CELL Z in 2009 shows the 
disproportionate nature of allocation of resources to the three dailies. The Times 
of Zambia is the largest beneficiary at 53%, Zambia Daily Mail second at 25% 
and the Post, a distant third at 2%. 
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      Figure 12: ZAMTEL/CELL Z by Print SOS DEC 09 
 
 
 
 
Total share of ZMK 177,688,000 increased by 99% from November 09 
 
        Source: Synovate (2009: 36). 
 
When one compares the preferences of ZAMTEL to those of its multinational 
competitors, particularly, MTN, the second highest spender on print advertising 
(18%), the picture is reversed.  Figure 13 (below), demonstrates that MTN 
exposes its products through the Post Newspapers. In fact 89% of all of its print 
advertising goes to the Post while only 7% and 4% are targeted at the Mail and 
the Times respectively. It can also be noted from the same study that Zain, the 
third top spender in the print media advertising category (18%) prefers the Post 
(19%), to the Zambia Daily Mail (11%) or the Times of Zambia (3%). Infact Zain 
had completely migrated to the Post by the end of 2009 with 100% of its print 
advertising dedicated to the Post Newspapers (Synovate, 2009: 22-26). One 
could argue that MTN’s preferences are likely market driven. This can be 
corroborated by the findings of the TimesPrintpak Readership Survey, which 
places the Post ahead of the Times and Mail in terms of readership preferences 
and circulation. The AMV/OSISA study confirms this categorically: the corporates 
DAILY MAIL
45%
TIMES OF ZAMBIA
53%
POST NEWSPAPER
2%
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interviewed in this survey favoured the Post (40%) over the Daily Mail (33%) and 
the Times (27%) as their preferred publication for advertising (AMV/OSISA, 2008: 
59).  
 
Follow up interviews with the managing director of the TimesPrintpak Zambia 
Limited by this researcher confirm that the state and its parastatals enterprises 
continue to be the main advertisers in the Times Newspapers.  Phiri (2011) 
indicates that ZAMTEL, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi Airways, ZESCO, ZRA, Road 
Development Agency, Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and ZANACO 
have been the biggest spenders on advertising in the Times between 2009 and 
2011. Of these, it can be noted, only Airtel, MTN and Zambezi Airlines are 
privately owned companies. Seven of the top ten spenders are SOEs or 
government ministries. 
 
 
          Figure 13: MTN by Print SOS Dec 2009 
 
 
Source: Synovate (2009: 31). 
 
POST 
NEWSPAPER
89%
DAILY MAIL
7%
TIMES OF 
ZAMBIA
4%
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6.2.9 6.2.9 Readership characteristics and newspaper preferences 
 
In the endeavour to understand the changing fortunes of the company in the post 
liberalisation era, the Times Printmaker Readership Survey (2008), as stated 
earlier, interviewed 1,761 respondents: 56 % from Lusaka province and 44% from 
the Copperbelt (Tailoka et al, 2008).  
 
The sample constituted 65% males and 35% females, signifying a bias toward 
womenfolk. 7.6% of the respondents were aged below 20 years, 49 % between 
20 and 29; 27 % between 30 and 39 and 12 % between 40 and 49 years. 5.6% 
were 50 years or older. 
 
In terms of their education standards, 52% had a college qualification, 23% were 
grade 12 level 19% held a university degree, and 6% had not attained school 
certificate level. It is inferred in the survey that 94% of people in Lusaka and the 
Copperbelt are literate. 
 
It was found that 50% of the respondents did not purchase the Times or Sunday 
Times. 18% had ceased to purchase the Times Newspapers, all together. Only 
32% of readers purchased the newspaper. The reasons advanced were: 
inadequate information (46%), political bias (24%) and prohibitive pricing (19%).  
 
Readers also relied on their employer to purchase the papers (8%), presumably 
shared across several employees. 2% had no access to the newspaper while 1% 
complained the product arrived late on the market. 
 
The findings suggest the Times has not catered for the 20-49 year age group, 
88% of whom complain that there is not enough information in the product. This is 
the same age group that has the highest number of respondents citing political 
bias as the cause for disfavouring the Times. The survey deduces that this is 
probably because this age cohort is the most politically active and therefore 
concerned about content with heavy government flavour. 75% of the 20-39 year 
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olds do not buy the Times because of the cost - a pointer to their relatively 
modest levels of income.  
 
 
Table 9: Reasons for not or no longer buying Vs level of education (Tailoka et al, 
2008: 40) 
 
 
It was found further that 79% of the potential readers who cited political bias as a 
reason for not buying the newspapers, had a college degree while 77% of those 
concerned about price possessed grade 12 certificates or college degrees, 
presumably also reflecting a lack of income or inadequate buying power. The 
survey reveals that the more educated people demand better content.  
 
Hence, the respondents with university degrees exhibited the least satisfaction 
with the content of the Times (30%).  
 
Diploma holders stood at 36%, Grade 12 certificate holders 43% and under grade 
12 respondents had the highest satisfaction rate with the content at 56%.  
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Figure 14: Relationship between education levels and content satisfaction  
 
 
Source: Tailoka et al (2009: 73). 
 
Some of the key improvements recommended by potential readers include: 
 
 Independence from government control and balanced reporting. 
 Coverage of development issues; health education, youth matters. 
 Coverage of religious issues (worth recalling that Zambia was declared  a 
Christian nation by Chiluba and has Catholic, protestant and evangelical 
influences across cultures). 
 Science and Technology coverage. 
 Lifestyles and profiles (rural coverage, business personalities, individual 
accounts of success etc). 
 Gender reporting (which takes into account the disparate needs of men 
and women). 
 Opinion columns (essentially suggests public participation in articulating 
the political, social and economic). 
 
The readership calls for a change in the papers’ size, design and emphasise the 
use of colour to render the product more attractive. It is also certain that the 
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majority of the readers (63.93%) do not think the product is worth what it costs at 
the moment, that is, ZMK3000. 
 
What is even more fascinating about this survey is that the proportion of people 
who read the Times is higher (62%), than the proportion that buys the Times 
(31.70%). Implicitly this means the readership largely rely on shared copies 
bought by family members, employers, libraries, or simply use the internet. 
 
 
Figure 15: Proportion of Readers who read the Times  
 
 
 
Source: Tailoka et al (2008: 49). 
 
 
The survey in essence shows that the Times is read largely in the office 
environment (42%), at home (28%), libraries (19%), news stands or street (8%) 
and Internet (3%). In short, the newspapers are losing revenue to free reading, 
owing to a combination of economic pressures on the consumer and a lack of 
content based incentives to spend on it.  
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Perhaps a pointer to the viability of a content - driven newspaper industry may be 
drawn from the conclusions of both the OSISA study and the Times Readership 
Survey which drew demands for diversity in news content.  
 
A cross section of corporate institutions interviewed in the OSISA survey 
supported the idea of a business orientated newspaper with specialised analysis 
on mining, agriculture, transport and tourism, energy and the environment 
(AMV/OSISA, 2008: 59).  
 
In other words, the state media could capitalise of this lacuna and claim a much 
larger segment of the market. 
 
 
6.4 SUMMARY 
 
To summarise, it is noted from five key studies (Afrobarometer, 2005 & 2009: 
Banda, 2004: Tailoka et al, 2008 and AMV/OSISA, 2008) that the main problems 
afflicting the Times Newspapers are the declining per capita income of the 
readership, the political bias of the newspapers; its limited range of content and 
the antiquated printing equipment and designs. The entry of more innovative 
publications (such as the Post) upon liberalisation in 1991 has relegated the once 
leading daily to second position or worse. Inferentially, the consequences of 
economic liberalisation have contributed to the reluctance of the readership to 
spend on a product that does not generally meet their needs.   
 
This researcher’s follow-up interviews complement the findings of the Synovate 
2009 study by categorically establishing that the bulk of the Times of Zambia’s 
advertising emanates from the state and its agencies. The biggest spenders in 
the last three years (2009-2011) have been: ZAMTEL, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi 
Airways, ZESCO, ZRA, Road Development Agency, the Ministries of Health and 
Education and ZANACO. Seven of these (excluding Airtel, MTN and Zambezi) 
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are state agencies or ministries. This cements the argument that the state is 
largely responsible for bolstering advertising profile of the Times Newspapers. 
The Synovate study of 2009 on advertising trends in Zambia also shows that the 
Times benefited largely from SOE advertising with the largest contributor being 
the state owned ZAMTEL/CELL Z parastatals in the 2007 to 2009 periods. This 
researcher’s interpretation and analysis of this data suggests that ZAMTEL’s 
advertising preferences of the Times and the Mail over the Post are likely 
determined by political allegiances. Conversely, the second largest spender in 
print advertising, MTN, allocates its advertising resources predominantly in the 
Post. The AMV/OSISA survey of 2008 leaves no doubt that corporate entities 
generally prefer the Post to the state owned dailies as outlets for their advertising 
because of better print quality and the elevated status in terms of market 
leadership of the privately owned entity. The disparities in the allocation of 
resources in both instances are huge. The challenges faced by the TimesPrintpak 
(Zambia) Limited can hence be aggregated around three thematic areas: 
 
 The Political.  
 The Operational. 
 The Strategic. 
 
 
6.4.1 The Political 
 
The political dimension is the fundamental problem of the Times Newspapers. 
State control begins with the appointment of the CEO on the basis of political 
considerations rather than business - editorial credentials. This is the starting 
point of negative public perceptions and poor performance.  
 
Secondly, the appointment process is shorn of transparency; there is a lack of 
representation of professional unions and associations; and other stakeholders 
on panels and boards of directors which clouds the candidate in doubt as to one’s 
capacity and impartiality.  
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The high turn over of CEOs on the Times does not engender much public 
confidence in the institution, it can be surmised. The capacity and room for 
creativity seems largely subordinated to the overall political goal of promoting 
government pronouncements and policy.  
 
We learn from both the Afrobarometer studies (Lolojih, 2005: Ismail, 2009) and 
the Times Printpak Readership Survey (Tailoka el at, 2008) that state control is 
detested by Zambians. It is the primary reason that those who would afford the 
newspapers do not spend on it. This intellectual middle class would constitute the 
basis of the country’s opinion leaders in a closely contested political environment. 
The propaganda project that underpins state ownership in this sense self-
destructs at best. The newspapers do hold some support from amongst the least 
educated people. But they are not economically empowered to participate in it 
through purchases. The Times Newspapers are essentially office-bound products 
where shared copies purchased by employers fulfil rudimentary informational 
needs that are not often news - content inclined. 
 
The emphasis on political reporting constrains initiatives and exploration of other 
equally important spheres of human development, inadvertently under-cutting the 
commercial viability of the end product. The content and its relatively poor 
packaging account for a substantial amount of public resistance to the product, it 
can be noted. 
 
6.4.2 The Operational 
 
The operational aspects of the company will include its constantly changing 
structure and a lack of functional harmony with sister companies, the NDL and 
Printpak. Since the constitution of the Times of Zambia by Lonrho in 1965, there 
has been a tension with the structural arrangements, again influenced by wealth 
and power. 
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Because of the unusual partnership between Lonrho and the Kaunda government 
in the First and Second Republics, the Times Printpak had essentially two centres 
of power; reflecting the oversight framework that was imposed.  
 
The general manager and chief accountant were answerable to Lonrho for the 
commercial performance of the company while the editor-in-chief assumed the 
role of political head, reporting to the president, and in subordinate measure, to 
the board.  
 
And yet, the content and the quality of the product produced by Printpak are inter-
related.  
 
Controlling one without consideration of which one was a dependent variable, 
would likely have contributed to the eventual decline of the enterprise.  
 
To be fair, this structure endured for longer than one would have expected, 
perhaps because there was somewhat a clearer editorial dictate from Lonrho in 
the First and parts of the Second Republic: criticise the ruling party, not the 
president (Kasoma, 1986: 93).  This allowed for an intricate balance between 
producing a marketable product and being politically correct. 
 
The takeover of the Times by the party UNIP in 1982 and later by the media 
corporation NAMECO, eventually changed the existing structure. NAMECO 
disaggregated editorial production from printing and distribution. Each component 
was headed by its own CEO.  
 
The Times needed to pay Printpak to print the Sunday Times and the daily paper; 
in turn, NDL needed to be paid for its services.  
 
The underlying tensions manifested in 1993 when misunderstandings over 
payment threatened to disrupt the publication of the newspapers.  
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The merger of the three NAMECO subsidiaries by the minister, in the aftermath of 
the liquidation of the parent company, might be considered prudent under the 
circumstances. However, there was a third problem: - failure to adjust to a 
changing socio-political - economic environment born of the MMD’s dual reform 
agenda. 
 
 
6.4.3 The Strategic  
 
The lack of a strategic sense and capacity is illustrated through the persistent 
poor quality of the product measured against its daily competitors. The strategic 
would include the economics of the newspaper in this regard.  
 
Both the Post and the Daily Mail were able to acquire new colour printing facilities 
diverting some of the business monopolised by the Times.  
 
It would make sense to assume that the tenuous nature of the position of CEO on 
the Times does not lend itself to fore-sightedness. There also appears no 
incentive or for that matter, communicative space for mid level editors and staff to 
engage with management on strategic issues, regarding commerce and viability.  
 
From Chapter Five, it is noted that the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) has 
demonstrated its effectiveness going by the qualitative and quantitative increases 
in the remuneration of staff which are tethered to collective agreements. 
However, both ZUJ and the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) are not 
represented on the board of directors to effectively participate in the strategic 
direction of the company.  
 
Strategic planning and financial accountability have been evidently poor, 
compromising both performance and credit worthiness. The end result has been 
that the Times has failed to exploit a market that is still potentially exploitable: the 
phenomenal growth of advertising and courier services are a pointer to the 
potential viability of the company. However, a poor strategic sense is, again, 
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noticeable. The 2003-2005 strategic plan for example continued to revel in the 
Times being a market leader (TimesPrintpak, 2003-2005: 5), without the benefit 
of empirical evidence, and at a time when the newspapers could barely circulate 
20,000 copies daily.  
 
A change of leadership in 2008 henceforth manifests a more evidence-based 
approach to assessing the company’s weaknesses and strengths and in crafting 
solutions. The TimesPrintpak 2009-2012 Strategic Plan therefore, begins to show 
some urgency in resurrecting the company as a going concern. 
 
Commercially, competition from other state media apparatus which carry similar 
pro-government news have etched into a market the company once dominated. 
Technologically, the Times Newspapers are out of their depth and have taken no 
distinct initiative to expand their electronic outputs in a technologically driven 
world.  
 
Yet, with globalisation, satellite television, limited use of local private television 
and community radio outlets, the Times’ reporting has been rendered irrelevant to 
some degree.   
 
In the broader scheme of things, there is a convergence of opinion from the 
Times management (TimesPrintpak Strategic plan, 2003-5: 5) and independent 
researchers (Banda, 2004: 7), that the consequences of economic reforms 
generated a level of poverty that disabled the purchasing power of the citizen. 
With mass retrenchments came a new category of poor people who could hardly 
afford the leisure of a newspaper. 
 
While it is certain that the economic collapse and public perception of the Times 
Newspapers has fundamentally contributed to their decline, there seems to be 
some hope for revitalisation given that the readership expect a wider variety of 
reportage to encapsulate development, science and technological advances and 
lifestyles.  
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What is perhaps most surprising is that the newspapers have seen an upsurge in 
the advertising sales and usage of courier services between 2000 and 2007.  
 
This alone demonstrates that there is an institutional market that continues to 
consider them an important vehicle for business and possibly for gleaning 
government policy shifts and positions. Or more certainly, that dedicated SOEs, 
such as ZAMTEL/CELL Z, ZANACO, Road Development Agency, ZESCO, ZRA 
and government ministries have contributed significantly to the upsurge in the 
advertising revenues on the Times Newspapers, as part of state-driven 
sustainability initiative. 
 
Similarly, there is a readership segment that uses the papers purely to seek 
knowledge on matters beyond the news; that is, job opportunities, family news, 
funeral notices, auctions and other such matters. 
 
The impact of economic liberalisation is illustrated further by competition for 
Printpak from South African printers who are preferred by the market for their 
superior quality.  
 
The lack of investment by the state in the media is self evident; the company has 
been unable to purchase a modern printing press due to financial problems and a 
low credit rating. State support appears to be extended only in the direst 
circumstances, or for electioneering purposes. 
 
It has been proven from audited financial statements that the state absorbed the 
debt owed to South African printers by the Times but the records also show that 
the loan was repaid by the year 2000. Other forms of support, according to 
company management, come in the manner of extra vehicles bought for election 
purposes. The state has also assisted the Times to purchase offices in Freedom 
Way, in the capital Lusaka, relieving it of rental payments to landlords.  
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Given the fore-going, it is understandable that supporters of private media decry 
the unlevelled playing field that facilitates the continuance of state supported 
institutions while consigning emergent private newspapers to premature mortality. 
 
Since the submission of the results of the Survey, the Times management has 
sought to begin the process of enhancing the company’s commercial viability. In 
2008, the company responded by producing the Times Printpak Strategic Plan 
2008-2012. In the next section, we shall examine and analyse the content of the 
blueprint. 
 
 
6.4.3 How the Times responded to the Readership Survey 
 
The recommendations made by the CBU School of Business suggest an 
overhaul of both the newspaper’s aesthetics and its focus and content.  The main 
recommendations were: 
 
 The introduction of colour to the newspapers. 
 The Times must address perceptions of political bias.  
 The Times needs to deliberately improve public awareness of its range of 
services which are under utilised. 
 Quality, reliability and accessibility of the newspapers needs to improve 
 Training of staff is needed to meet the challenges of the new market 
oriented environment. 
 The company should commission studies to establish market share among 
players in newspaper advertising and courier industries to determine a 
baseline. Studies of this nature should be undertaken every two years. 
 
The company’s 2009-2012 Strategic Plan responds to the study with some clear 
cut intentions to improve its quality, reliability and accessibility. It also, for the first 
time, aims to exploit new opportunities outside of the country’s borders and online 
publication and commerce. The strategy, in addition, emphasises more 
succinctly, the need to introduce more competitive salary structures including an 
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incentive scheme, upgrading of offices, improved intellectual and technical 
capacity of staff, acquisition of appropriate technologies and improved circulation 
of the newspaper. The overall corporate goal set in this strategy is to restore the 
Times to its position as a market leader. Some of principal areas that the plan 
addresses are: 
 
 The acquisition of a modern colour printing press. 
 Investing in electronic media (internet). 
 Developing an electronic picture library. 
 Distribution of foreign publications (through NDL). 
 Expanding the company’s printing business. 
 Change perception effectively in the dissemination of government 
information, (engage specialist writers). 
 Content diversification, including the introduction of new columns, puzzles, 
school quiz to cater for all categories of readership. 
 Improve design by employing graphic and layout consultants 
(TimesPrintpak, 2009: 37). 
 
In 2009, the time this researcher began to examine the commercial aspects of the 
company, it was learnt that the management had signed an agreement with 
Taiwanese firms in October of the same year to supply a new colour printing 
press costing $2.3 million. The equipment was to be funded through a bank loan 
as opposed to government intervention (Phiri, 2009/11/20). 
 
The company’s managing director admits that the Times is increasingly losing 
ground to the Zambia Daily Mail and the Post, both of which had invested in 
colour printing equipment (Phiri, 2008). It is understood that with the new 
equipment will arise the need for better trained staff. Management acknowledges 
that not only are its printing methods and facilities outmoded, the printing and 
maintenance staff are poorly trained.  
 
The 2009 strategic plan demands aggression from its circulations and marketing 
staff, the elements of which are to be provided through training. 
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“One of the main reasons for the proposed training is the fact that the 
company needs (an) aggressive front to weather (the) competitive 
environment” (TimesPrintpak, 2009: 37). 
 
The costs of regeneration have not been quantified in the strategic plan and are 
therefore open to speculation. However, with elections approaching in 2011, it 
remains to be seen how far these new initiatives will proceed. 
 
In closing, it is important to state that the ambitions of the Times in general need 
to recognise the dangers of tethering growth to increased readership and profit 
without an informed analysis of global trends which link commercialisation to a 
paucity of political content. As Mckenna (1995: 334) has noted, commercialisation 
often tends toward entertainment orientations rather than higher level technical 
analysis of political economic matters, thereby compromising the quality of the 
debates in society’s public sphere of communication. 
 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The fore-going signifies the recognition, that state controls have undermined the 
credibility of the Times of Zambia, a matter no longer subject to speculation given 
the empirical evidence of the TimesPrintpak Readership Survey (Tailoka et al, 
2008) and the Afrobarometer studies (Lolojih, 2005: Ismail, 2009).  
 
Since Zambia liberalised its economy in 1991, there has not been any evidence 
of a strategic plan that could re-position the Times of Zambia in a radically altered 
business environment. It took nearly 15 years for a notable proposition for 
transformation to be tabled by the company’s board of directors. The 2003-2005 
Strategic Plan, however was crafted on the assumption that the Times was still 
the market leader, even as sales plummeted drastically.  
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The plan lacked any empirical basis for informed actions and appeared to 
regurgitate old-age formula for improving performance.  For instance, there is no 
mention of tapping into new markets, or strategies around accessing alternative 
financial support to upgrade printing facilities. Nor is there any informed 
engagement with the use of technology in any substantial way. 
 
The impact of liberalisation on the Times Newspapers is more pronounced when 
we consider what competition has wrought both in terms of contests for sales, 
advertising and printing. Advanced colour printing from South African competitors 
has rendered the offerings of the TimesPrintpak obsolete under the 
circumstances.  
 
The company has, as a result, seen its traditional clientele migrate to South Africa 
or opt for local alternatives such as the Post Newspapers which have invested in 
relatively modern printing facilities.   
 
Multinationals such as MTN have channelled 89% of their advertising to the Post, 
while the Times have consequently lost existing relationships with the rapidly 
expanding private cell phone industry.  
 
 The AMV/OSISA market survey of 2008 categorically confirms corporate 
preferences for the Post Newspapers, in this regard. More importantly, 
independent interviews by this researcher reveal that the state and its agencies 
have constituted seven of the ten top spenders in advertising on the Times in the 
past three years (2009-2011).  
 
Therefore, were it not for the consistent support from the state and SOEs such as 
ZAMTEL/CELL Z in the post liberalisation era, it seems likely the Times would not 
only have lost all of its lucrative contracts from the competitive mobile technology 
industry, it would be in much dire circumstances.  
 
On the whole, consistent support from ZAMTEL/CELL Z, ZESCO, ZRA, the Road 
Development Agency, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and 
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ZANACO confirms the assumption that the state (or is allies) can shape media 
growth through selective investment based on partisan considerations. The 
disproportionate nature of the investment by ZAMTEL/CELL Z into the print and 
electronic media indicates that it is inclined to supporting state owned enterprises 
as opposed to private entities, regardless of reputation or circulation. We learn 
from market reviews by Synovate that the ZNBC, the Mail and the Times, are the 
preferred outlets for ZAMTEL advertising. This is despite the fact that the Times 
has not been able to produce satisfactory colour products - by its own admission - 
for the last 19 years.  
 
Conversely, in the whole of 2008, the ZAMTEL did not place a single 
advertisement in the Post Newspapers, despite the newspapers being the market 
leader by all indications. In the two years that it did advertise, it channelled less 
than 3 % of its resources to the Post. ZAMTEL, it was learnt during the course of 
this study, has since been sold to Libyan investors. Whether this pattern of 
advertising persists may depend on the political alliances and business 
considerations by the new owners.  
 
In general the condition of the Zambian workforce; high levels of unemployment 
and poverty constrain the potential expansion and sustenance of print media 
systems in the country. The 2007 Zambia Human Development Report (ZHDR) 
produced by the UNDP underlines that the Zambian economy, while on the 
growth path, has not generated enough capacity to lift the 68% population of out 
of acute poverty (ZHDR, 2007: 75). 
 
In this regard, the financial limitations of the potential readership, ostensibly a 
consequence of economic reforms, has been echoed by scholars such as Banda 
(2004: 1-14), the Times/Printpak (Zambia) Limited Readership Survey (Tailoka, et 
al, 2008: 38) and has been alluded to by the state (Zambia: 1996: 14).  
 
In short, since the economic conditions that occasion poor returns to the media 
industry are unlikely to dramatically change in the near future, it challenges 
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managers to craft new approaches to maintaining the segment of the readership 
that can still afford to purchase newspapers. 
 
What is perhaps an incentive in this sense are the new investments in North-
Western province of Zambia which is rapidly expanding as a copper mining zone.  
 
The area has attracted investors in copper and cobalt mining, leading to 
measured growth in facilities and concentration of professionals in the province 
(Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2010:1). The AMV/OSISA 
(2008) study also re-affirms corporate-Zambia’s desire for business and financial 
perspectives to media content. 
 
Cultivating an expatriate market would invite new demands in terms of content 
and presentation. Foreign interests would likely seek in depth analysis of policy 
matters, long term focus of political trends and investment climate and day-to-day 
business analysis. 
 
The Times, it would seem, should strive to hem in a market of upper echelon 
consumers who may be tethered to gleaning government positions and 
maintaining stronger links with state media because of their investment interests 
in the country.  
 
The response of the Times management, in its 2008-2012 strategic document, 
does indicate a much more informed approach to redressing the company’s 
failures to survive the pressures of the liberalised economy. Efforts at acquiring 
modern printing equipment from Taiwan through bank loans also suggests the 
management realises it needs to be self sustaining and produce a product that 
can valued on the market for its worth. 
 
It is also noteworthy that while it may appear prudent for the Times management 
to acquire new colour printing presses, media entities around the world are 
beginning to experiment with the gravitation from newspapers as we know them 
to iPads, which deliver daily newspapers electronically at minimal cost. It is not at 
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all clear from the strategic plans or the interviews with the management how the 
establishment hopes to scale these technological horizons in the foreseeable 
future. The limitations and current access levels to the internet in Zambia, which 
this thesis addressed in section 3.3 of Chapter Three, standing at an abysmal 
0.7% of the population (Internet Usage and Population Statistics, 2010), 
undermine suggestions for a migration to online platforms in any significant 
sense. Coupled with the lack of clear visions from both the state and the media 
elites (as evidenced by the strategic plans of the Times analysed by this thesis for 
example) in embracing innovative technologies, it remains uncertain whether 
state media in Zambia will substantially benefit from a younger generation of 
readers enamoured to the internet in the near future. 
 
State intervention, it has been established, is present, but is inconsistent and 
opportunistic. The state has made critical subventions which have virtually saved 
the company from collapse at least on the one occasion in 1993, when the Times 
were burdened by newsprint debt to South African suppliers.  
 
The absorption of debt owed to South African newsprint suppliers and the 
purchase of permanent buildings for the Times Newspapers in Lusaka can be 
seen as significant cost saving measures.  
 
Overall, the state seems content with maintaining the newspapers with minimal 
improvements principally because they are deemed to play a critical electoral 
role. This, it might be argued, could be a misplaced understanding of how 
influential media can be in electoral contests. Given the dominance of negative 
perceptions of the Times exhibited in the studies examined in this thesis, it also 
seems strategically flawed to assume that such a resistant audience would base 
their choice of candidates or policy on the reportage of a medium they so distrust. 
 
The evaluation of literature on the media and politics in Zambia leaves no doubt 
that political elites in the country are accustomed to using the state media as a 
conduit for their day-to-day political activities and pronouncements rather a 
source of business and political intelligence.  
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Since it is evident from the 2008 Readership Survey that how politics are reported 
by the Times has an influence on whether they entice the economic participation 
of potential readers, one cannot possibly ignore the political barriers facing a total 
transformation of the state media systems. 
 
And yet, without the freedom to express one-self, it is inconceivable that chief 
executive officers of the Times Newspapers will have enough leverage to fully 
transform the company.  
 
Freedom of expression would include one’s ability to have reasonable say in the 
marketability of the newspaper’s content and focus.  The persistence by the state 
with its strategic support to the Times mainly during election times, however, is an 
indicator that changing the focus and content of the newspaper will not be the 
prerogative of business minded executives only. It remains the preserve of ruling 
elites, particularly at critical moments of the procedural democratic process.  
 
In general, there are lessons to be learnt by states in Africa from the case of the 
Times in regard to press controls and their consequences for media viability and 
the value of a free media in/for society (South Africa is one of the countries that 
have lately moved to reign in the private media through a proposed Media 
Tribunal).  
 
The first lesson for such states is that political controls can disconnect ruling 
elites from their markets (the electorate). The results of the Times of Zambia’s 
own readership survey and Afrobarometer surveys all point to a dichotomy 
between the communications of the state and the reception and appreciation of 
those messages by citizens. The value of this communication is hence to be cast 
in grave doubt.   
 
The second lesson concerns the power of the market, which could have similar 
effects on newspapers to that of authoritarian regimes. Left to their own means, 
market actors can leverage their influence on content to suit their ideological 
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positions. For instance, the inclination of ZAMTEL/CELL Z toward state media, 
this thesis surmises, is conditioned by its relations with the state. As the leading 
advertiser in print media in 2007-2009, the influence it would wield over content 
on under-resourced media entities could be immense. Similarly, MTN and Zain, 
two of the largest private investors in print advertising in the private media, have 
the potential to leverage favourable communications within the private media 
sector. Conversely, markets can also consider a watchdog model of the press as 
a nuisance, one that is likely to undermine business relations with the state.  
 
We noted for example in Chapter Four, the collusion between the state and 
Lonrho in conditioning freedom of expression on the Times of Zambia. The state 
and Lonrho did find common ground in filtering the content of the Times, based 
on mutual interests, and without excessive exposure of their actions to the 
general public. The patronage conditions of the First Republic have not ceased, 
by all indications, given the immovable nature of political elites over media 
privatisation over the last 45 years and continued habit of imposing editorial 
leadership over state media systems. The need for a balance between state and 
private interests cannot therefore be over emphasised. 
 
The starting point for ensuring a more business minded approach to news 
production in the Times and perhaps the construction of an entity with a more 
acceptable public image might be with the composition of the board of directors. 
The gradual maturation of politics in Zambia should allow for a multi-stakeholder 
structure that balances the interests of the state with those of non state actors 
and local business entities. This would be quite unlike the person-based Lonrho-
state relationship which governed the Times in the First and Second Republics. 
 
Commercial inclination will be improved, most likely, by eliciting the expertise of 
board members who possess substantial business pedigree. Basing 
appointments of board chairs and chief executive officers purely on political 
allegiances is unlikely to improve the commercial viability of state media systems 
in a competitive milieu. Under the current conditions, the pre-occupation of the 
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chief executive would be to survive the politics rather than re-engineer the 
economics.  
 
Considering that the only changes to the state media systems thus far have 
occurred as a result of collective action from media professionals, civil society 
and opposition members of parliament, it is reasonable to assume that the overall 
revolutionarisation of state media systems in Zambia as the country 
democratises, will likely depend on the extent to which institutional transformation 
in the wider political environment is achieved.  
 
A strengthened parliament has already demonstrated that it can partner with 
media activists and civil society organisations to pressurise successfully for the 
introduction of an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) for example, despite 
the numerous hurdles yet to be scaled.  
 
As the thesis concludes in Chapter Seven, some final thoughts and alternative 
approaches will be discussed at length. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPEDIMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
7.1 SUMMARY 
 
This thesis embarked on an exploration of the impact of democratisation on state 
media systems, particularly, the Times Newspapers, using a political economy 
framework, steeped in Marxian/institutional tradition. The impact of 
democratisation on state media was inferred from the response of the Times and 
of labour to the political - economic reforms since Zambia’s independence in 1964. 
 
In this regard, the thesis undertook to understand the influence, on the Times 
Newspapers, of nationalisation and the dual reform process of political and 
economic liberalisation which characterised the second phase of liberal democracy 
in 1991. The primary interest was to understand how macro level political 
economic forces born of democratisation shaped the structure, editorial policy, 
labour rights, participation and the economic determination of the state media 
systems - epitomised by the Times Newspapers. This knowledge is essential for 
informing efforts at democratising mass media in an emerging democracy, it has 
been argued. Evidence-based approaches help to reposition advocates of change 
in terms of the substance and moral value of their proposals, with relevant factors 
having been considered. 
 
The holistic nature of political economy as a theoretical outline allowed for a 
historical interrogation of media developments and their links to the actions of 
business and political elites over three distinct periods of transitions from colonial 
rule.  The main thrust of the thesis was that to appreciate the impact and 
implications of the dual reform process on the future of state media systems in 
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Zambia, one has to peer into the past, and interrogate complex relations between 
political, business and social elites and their links to the overall evolution and 
behaviour of media entities.  
 
This understanding positions today’s advocates of privatisation of the state media 
to empirically assess competing interests in Zambia’s media sector by posing an 
array of research questions: What factors influence the allocation of 
communication resources in Zambia in the present day? What roles do the wealthy 
and the powerful play in conditioning communication in Zambia’s democracy? 
What political interests do new investors favour and what are the wider 
implications for privatisation of the state media? What is the political economy of 
the private media? 
 
These potential research questions would help activists, journalists and the public 
understand what vested interests control what they see, hear and read. The basic 
assumption that privatisation and liberalisation may not necessarily translate into 
emancipation from state or other controls does hold veracity, at least in the 
Zambian case, as we extensively explored connections between the political 
system, the economic system and media systems over time. 
 
Historical analysis; and participant observation, a composite approach embracing 
three methods -interviews, document reviews and observation - was employed to 
illustrate the influence of wealth and power on the Times Newspapers, during 
political transitions which saw Zambia warp through three political cycles: two of 
tentative liberal democracy punctuated by dominant party systems, one of an 
extended one party state. The methodology was experienced to be appropriate, 
given the sensitive nature of the study and its relatively novel characteristics. It 
required careful negotiation of access with the Times management and other 
relevant sources to obtain the data, hitherto unexposed to the public.  
 
Further, the historical, political and economic perspectives required literature 
reviews and synthesis to pattern match, and establish generalizability. Face-to- 
face interviews allowed for quantitative data to be supported with qualitative 
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substance. At one level, validity and generalizability were established through 
synthesising the works of Kariethi (1991: 204), Bower (1994: 109), Cronje et al 
(1976: 26), Langdon, (1981: 141), Sardanis (2003:142) and the United Kingdom’s 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981), with the results of key informant 
interviews. Therefore the modus operandi of Lonrho, its links to powerful elites in 
Africa and the dual influence of these relationships on the media were mapped. 
The cases of the Times of Zambia and the Kenya Standard were compared in this 
regard.  From the commercial perspective, patterns in the outcomes of the 
Afrobarometer studies (2005 & 2009) on public perceptions of the media in 
Zambia; the TimesPrintpak Readership Survey, (Tailoka et al, 2008), the Synovate 
Category Spends Review, 2009; the Times Printpak Strategic plans 2003-5 and 
2009-2012; and the AMV/OSISA market survey of 2008, provided a basis to 
conclude that state controls, lack of credibility and business acumen, local and 
foreign competition born of liberalisation inhibit the Times of Zambia’s viability in 
varied ways. 
 
The study was not pre-occupied with quantitative measurement of the impact of 
democratisation on state media systems; rather it sought to qualitatively explain 
how each variable affected the workings of the Times at an organisational plane. 
Key features of liberal democracy: that is, freedom of association and expression; 
and economic liberalisation and privatisation, constituted the independent 
variables; the Times Newspapers, the dependent variable, while media unionism 
(the practice of journalism) was the intervening variable.   
 
Impact has been explained by bringing patterns in the literature to support the 
relevant variables. Hence the experience in the workplace of macro level 
constitutional changes to provisions on free speech, freedom of media and 
freedom of association were gleaned from policy documents, an analysis of 
oversight frameworks, modes of appointments; and from union formation and 
activity. Secondary indicators provided for a deeper analysis of the effectiveness of 
media unions by drawing on the nature and context of collective agreements, legal 
outcomes and contributions to further reform processes. It was noted that formal 
law only takes effect with struggle from interest groups. Hence, it is ultimately 
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through the actions of labour that the inconsistencies and contradictions between 
macro level frameworks and organisational moral rights are exposed. 
 
In endeavouring to respond to the research problem, the thesis’s objectives were 
1) To explore how political change may have affected decision making structures 
on the Times Newspapers and what it portends for public participation and political 
conflict over communication resources in a pluralist society 2) To examine the 
ways in which democratisation has affected labour rights among media 
professionals in the state sector, and in particular, on the Times Newspapers, 3) 
To contribute to evidence-based proposals on privatisation and their implications 
for job security for media professionals in Zambia, 4) To explore the impact of 
privatisation and liberalisation on the commercial aspects of the Times 
Newspapers. 
 
In general, the thesis responds to the principal research question: What is the 
impact of democratisation on the Times Newspapers?  
 
In total, six related research questions were crafted to expand on the main 
problem statement: The six questions were structured into relevant chapters and 
were framed as follows: 
 
 
1. In what ways has democratisation influenced media development in 
Zambia? 
2. How has political change affected decision making structures and oversight 
frameworks on the Times Newspapers?  
3. What are the policies governing public participation in state media systems 
(and in particular, the Times Newspapers?) 
4. What is the influence of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) on the 
conditions of service and job security of journalists on the Times 
Newspapers? 
 363 
5. What is the impact of the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), the Media 
Ethics Council of Zambia (MECOZ) on journalism practice on the Times 
Newspapers? 
6. In what ways have liberalisation and privatisation policies affected the 
Times Newspapers? 
 
The six chapters preceding this one were fashioned to integrate relevant questions 
into organised chapters. Chapter One introduced the thesis and its theoretical 
perspectives, including the methods adopted. Chapter Two responded to question 
one, utilising a wide range of historical literature and contemporary studies on 
Zambia’s colonial, post colonial and history of democratisation and media 
evolution. The chapter explored the colonial political economy, addressed the 
matter of ethnic stereo-typing practised by the British and the insecurities these 
actions bred amongst nationalising elites as they inherited administratively weak, 
ethnically fractured states and elected hence to control print and electronic media 
as unifying apparatus. As in the colonial era, when media were used for 
propaganda purposes by the British, so it was with the nationalist: structural 
continuities from the colonial times in terms of the legal and constitutional 
framework, over sight frameworks and leadership practices underlined a legacy of 
‘colonial mindsets’ persistent to a great degree across Zambia’s three republics. 
The tensions of pluralist politics in the First Republic (1964-1972) and the 
liberation struggle in southern Africa, exacerbated these insecurities, while 
seemingly strengthening the justification for a one party state, achieved at the back 
of President Kenneth Kaunda’s philosophy of humanism, which espoused man 
centeredness, unity and development reminiscent of old Africa. In this construct 
media were part of a collective vision for development: - a watchdog model of the 
media was incompatible with the aspirations of the one party state, hence the 
gradual integration of the Times of Zambia, a newspaper owned by the 
multinational Lonrho, into the state-corporate structure. 
 
But if previous research on the media in Zambia has portrayed this transition in 
ownership of the Times in expansive terms, Chapter Three begins to explore the 
ways in which we can understand the relationship between wealth and power and 
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how their mutual influence can undermine the public sphere of communication in a 
democracy. Chapter Three therefore launches into a discussion on three related 
theoretical imperatives; democratisation, political economy and public sphere, 
drawing linkages and cementing the notion that regardless of democratisation, 
media, including alternative media, are susceptible to political economic cross 
winds. The chapter draws the distinction between liberal political economy which is 
instrumentalist and therefore foregrounds the dominance of capital over media; 
and critical political economy which considers matters of labour and conflict over 
distribution of communication resources.  
 
The importance of media unionism as an outcome of democracy, which has been 
left isolated in the wider academic project on Zambian journalism, is illuminated 
here.  
 
In Africa, the chapter argues, we should not only consider the influence of the state 
and the market in analysing democratisation and the media, but also the 
leadership styles of our presidents, which have many variants: charismatic, 
mobilisational, house keeping, technocratic, personalistic-political; and patriarchal, 
among others. All of them exhibit potential distinctions in how they condition 
governance, language discourses and controls in the media: some traces of these 
leadership types exhibit themselves in the present-day, presumably because of the 
tendency to recycle leaders from the post colonial era. Media reform cannot 
hence, ignore the mindsets of those in power and their hegemonic tendencies, in 
appreciating radically different communication systems. 
 
It is in Chapter Four where the thesis illustrates how political and economic forces 
shaped the media in Zambia, particularly in the First and Second Republics. 
Addressing questions two and three here, wealth and power are largely 
exemplified by the personal influences of President Kaunda and Lonrho’s now 
deceased chair Roland ‘Tiny’ Rowland. Rowland, upon assuming the reigns of 
Lonrho, grew this modest firm into a multinational with immense power within 
Africa. Promoting the idea of ‘radical capitalism’ Rowland worked his way into 
relationships with powerful African leaders from central, eastern to western Africa, 
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knocking on the doors of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) itself. His 
business deals, using influential local proxies, propelled Lonrho into a competitive 
position, vying for a wide range of interests from farming, motor industries, mining, 
ranching to publishing and media ownership. 
 
Lonrho’s ownership of the media presented a problem for editors, often expected 
to carefully mask censorships with well managed public expressions of freedom. 
The tensions of Lonrho media in Zambia were similar to Kenya’s experience. Both 
were carefully nuanced, accounting for why much of this has escaped social 
scientific inquiry.  This thesis unravels the complex nature of the relationship 
between Kaunda and Rowland, and how it conditioned public communication 
through the Times, which inferentially left out crucial information on the country’s 
liberation history and the latter’s role in it. The relationship began with Rowland 
financing the United National Independence Party (UNIP) facilitating its successful 
acquisition of power in 1964. Subsequently, Rowland not only secretly arranged 
meetings between Kaunda, John Vorster, leader of apartheid South Africa, and Ian 
Smith of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), which led to the release of Zimbabwean 
nationalists Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, he also used his private jets to  
facilitate these and other meetings. Lonrho and the Kaunda government 
meanwhile both continued to trade with Rhodesia, despite British-led sanctions 
over its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965.  
 
The Times of Zambia, usually in support of the state’s position over UDI, neither 
reported Lonrho’s presence in Rhodesia or Zambia’s trading, except in rare cases 
where there was open admission by the state through parliament.  
 
The presence of Smith in Zambia in 1977 for instance, the thesis notes, was 
known to Zambian journalists but was not reported internally.  Although the Times 
exhibited relatively high degrees of independence by any standard during this 
period, it has been established from key informants and existing literature, that 
editors could not directly attack President Kaunda, but could criticise the party at 
will. This state-corporate control model carefully balanced professionalism with 
marketisation; allowing the state to appoint the editor-in-chief, while Lonrho 
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controlled the general manager and chief accountant. The interests of political 
elites and the multinational were hence carefully balanced, while the public and 
media scholars were left to revel in the ‘independence’ of the Times of Zambia in 
the post colonial era. Detailed submissions to the United Kingdom Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission by former employees of Lonrho-Times in 1976-79 
substantiate these assertions.  
 
These actions, the chapter argues further, might not have been possible under a 
more open system of governance. The dominant party structure of the first 
republic, and the one party state, coupled by person-based rule accentuated the 
practices. However, one party dominancy and its influences were again manifest 
under Frederick Chiluba’s Movement for Multiparty democracy (MMD), which 
ascended to power in 1991, after Kaunda, under pressure from activists and 
labour, sanctioned plural politics through constitutional changes in 1990.  Chiluba, 
exhibiting a housekeeping/charismatic leadership style, while commended for 
pushing for the institution of Article 20(2) on freedom of the media, was hostile 
toward state media privatisation once in office. Chiluba also used state power to 
intimidate the media and was accused of inducing favourable coverage from 
international correspondents through the use of presidential discretionary funds, 
underlining again the wealth/power/media nexus. His economic liberalisation 
policies have not only undermined private media growth through high taxation and 
economic censorships, they demonstrate that media development in Zambia has 
been deliberately shaped by the powerful, despite democracy. 
 
But if democratisation’s economic face has undermined private media growth and 
press freedom, what is its effect on labour? Chapter Five, responding to questions 
four and five, begins by first articulating the history of labour rights and the two 
principal theoretical approaches used to analyse labour relations: Employee Rights 
Theory (ERT), which is a liberal creature, and Labour Process Theory (LPT), 
inspired by Marxism. It is found that while democratisation brought unionism to 
Africans, it prompted nationalist governments to amend the Industrial Relations Act 
(1971) to consolidate labour movements into one controllable body, wary of the 
opposition to state power posed by workers.  
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The ‘one industry, one union’ principal meant that workers were coerced into 
sector-specific unions which might not have had any relevance to their ambitions.  
 
Journalists found themselves tethered to telecommunications and typographical 
workers’ unions neither of which showed any responsiveness to their needs. 
 
The action by the Kaunda government to consolidate all unions under one apex 
body bolstered the labour movement financially and organisationally. The ZCTU as 
a result became the most potent opposition to the one party state, inadvertently. 
The liberalisation of the labour market by Kaunda in 1990 was seen by his 
opponents more as a measure to trigger factionalisation in the ZCTU at a time 
when it formed the base of the then opposition MMD, than an act of benevolence, 
to distribute rights among various labour interests.  
 
From a liberal perspective, these actions were consistent with democratisation. It is 
hardly surprising therefore that Chiluba sustained a liberal labour market during his 
time, despite opposing Kaunda prior to the 1991 elections. Chiluba’s actions were 
also seen as a means to weaken the ZCTU which was strongly opposed to his 
liberalisation philosophy. The interventions by both Kaunda and Chiluba to 
maintain a liberalised labour market paradoxically nourished the growth of the 
ZUJ. Labour market liberalisation meant that journalists were now able to break 
away from sector specific arrangements and create a professional union. ZUJ, 
demonstrably, has changed conditions of service and etched a modicum of 
communicative space within the realms of the Times Newspapers and the Zambia 
Daily Mail. Ironically, in the broader economy, liberalisation and privatisation have 
weakened trade unions through state facilitated retrenchments, and the avoidance 
of unionisation by new investors. 
 
The chapter illustrates, first how ZUJ is a direct product of democratisation, then 
the manner in which the union, working with professional associations such as 
PAZA, has pursued, defended and championed the cause of worker rights and 
free speech. The MECOZ, it was found, had not materialised into any institution of 
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significance at the time of writing this thesis, therefore its contribution to the 
practice of journalism could not be assessed. In general, it is noted that the ZUJ 
and its professional associations have had their most success with media reform 
when the ruling party, the MMD, has been at its weakest in parliament. Working 
with opposition parties and civil society, important bills have been tabled for the 
first time in history which has led to modest changes to the corporate governance 
structures of the ZNBC through the establishment of an IBA. But it is emphasised 
that the union is prone to state influence as its leadership and members, ultimately 
depend on political elites for professional advancement within the organisational 
setting and beyond.  
 
It also has a weak intellectual and organisational capacity, accounting for its lack 
of expansion beyond the two daily state print media entities.  
 
The reluctance of private media investors to unionise workers, much the same as 
in the broader economy, portends ill for media unionism in the face of arbitrary 
privatisation, the thesis intimates. The chapter concludes by observing that while 
democratisation seems to have distributed macro level freedoms of association 
and expression, the media union has had gains and losses.  
 
Freedom of expression by journalists as individuals is constrained by state-driven 
pre-censorship frameworks. However, as a collective under ZUJ and professional 
associations, journalists are able to foster change in their welfare and are adept at 
criticising, using judicial leverage to challenge the state and form cross-sectoral 
partnership to influence legislative processes. The impact of democratisation on 
state media systems therefore, should not be judged through an examination of 
content or editorial timidity per se but also by examining freedom from the 
perspective of expanded group rights. 
 
Chapter Six addresses question six, essentially unmasking the complexities that 
liberalisation and privatisation have wrought on the Times Newspapers. The Times 
Newspapers have struggled to conform to a liberalised economy and have lost 
ground to the privately owned Post Newspapers and to other state media entities 
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in terms of advertising and readership. These trends are demonstrated empirically 
by analysing the findings of unpublished studies commissioned by the Times 
management and from the works of independent market researchers. From here, it 
is noted that while sales have plummeted drastically, advertising on the Times was 
on the upsurge between 2000 and 2007. However, through critically analysing the 
findings of independent market research, we find that the biggest investor in state 
media advertising is the state corporate sector, through among others, the 
ZAMTEL/CELL Z. By comparing ZAMTEL’s advertising preferences to those of its 
leading private competitor MTN, we find that the latter has an inclination for 
following circulation and media outreach to determine its choices. ZAMTEL prefers 
state media regardless of market trends. Hence, it is noted with interest, that not a 
single advert was placed in the Post in 2008, and overall, advertising by the state 
entity in the private daily has not exceeded 3%. Similar actions from government 
departments and entities are also noted. Follow up interviews with the managing 
director of the TimesPrintpak Limited by this researcher confirm that seven out of 
ten top spenders in the Times between 2009 and 2011 were government 
ministries or SOEs. ZAMTEL, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi Airways, ZESCO, ZRA, the 
Road Development Agency, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and 
ZANACO have been the biggest spenders on advertising in the Times during the 
period. Of these, only Airtel, MTN and Zambezi Airlines are privately owned. 
. 
Based on this, a conclusion is drawn that the Times’ advertising record is bolstered 
by loyal SOE support. By Times’ management own admission, the failure of the 
company to print in colour has caused it to lose business to local and foreign 
competitors. However, direct state assistance cannot always be counted on as it 
seems to come during elections or in extremely dire circumstances.  
 
Unless the Times’ 2009-2012 strategic plan which aims to technologically up-
grade the newspapers among other things, succeeds, it seems the newspapers 
will be unsustainable. 
 
Overall, it can be concluded that the state continues to deliberately shape media 
development in Zambia; sustaining high costs on newspaper inputs, determining 
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who obtains broadcast licences, influencing the pattern of advertising to suit 
supporters of its policy, while excluding its media critics from these resources.  
 
Because the administrative structure has not been strong enough to support a 
liberalised economy and because privatised firms have performed poorly, media 
cannot rely on advertising alone for sustainability. The media in Zambia is 
therefore polarised not only in political terms but in economic terms as well.   
 
The findings of this research and the following key impediments fore-grounded in 
section 7.2, under-score the importance of adopting holistic approaches to media 
studies. This is essentially because without the comprehensive understanding of 
how political and economic systems work, particularly in relation to media 
performance; and how they may facilitate or undermine change, it is highly unlikely 
that an informed analysis of media development might be achieved. Also, the 
importance of interrogating economic policy in relation to labour relations and 
institutional (media) performance, allows us to have an integrated understanding of 
what challenges lie in the way of the practice of journalism beyond the technical 
aspects of the profession. These impediments will provide a basis to determine the 
nature of media activism required to redress undemocratic situations. It will also 
assist with the alignment of the ambitions of journalists to those of other 
democratic actors seeking wider freedoms more generally. Historical perspectives 
augment the tenets of political economy in this regard by providing an empirical 
map of how political, business and social elites would have, over time, worked 
either in the interest of, or in this case, against the aspirations of freedom of 
expression and association. 
 
7.2 KEY IMPEDIMENTS TO MEDIA REFORM 
 
Cognisant of all these factors, this thesis suggests that there may be alternative 
options of balancing private interests with public interventions going forward. 
However, there are some key fundamental problems identified in this study which 
should be flagged upfront: 
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1. The Political System: It seems unlikely that any radical changes in reforming 
the state media will occur without a substantial change in the complexion of 
parliament: stronger opposition leverage has already delivered the first 
tangible transformations in state broadcasting for instance (though still to be 
implemented). Therefore the issue of representation and diversity in the 
legislature is paramount and is definitely the starting point of any such reform. 
This might require some comprehensive changes to the electoral model as 
well to ensure greater diversity in representative institutions. 
 
2. The labour law: The casualisation of labour is a problem in Zambia currently 
and will also affect the growth of the union of journalists. A movement toward 
stricter labour laws that compel employers to respect unionisation and avoid 
casualisation would bolster union formations as privatisation is entrenched. 
In South Africa for example, concerns about the informalisation of labour 
have led to the ruling party presenting legislative changes to the labour law. 
The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2010, aims to ‘prohibit certain 
abusive practices’ and ‘avoid the exploitation of workers’ (South Africa, 2010: 
sec 43: 26). 
 
3. Zambia’s leadership is cyclic: politicians have been recycled at all levels 
since independence. The current president of Zambia Rupiah Banda, among 
others in the administration, is a product of the first generation of nationalists 
from the Kaunda era. Thus far, he has not deviated from the path treaded by 
his predecessors. Unless there is a new generation of influential politicians at 
the helm; or unless pro-democracy activists succeed in changing mindsets of 
incumbents, it seems media privatisation or reform remains a protracted 
battle. 
 
4. Structuration: the way forward for SOE’s such as the Times appears partly 
to be a reformulation of modes of appointments to its governance structures. 
A more transparent and inclusive means of installation of a board of directors 
would help to restore some credibility. The position of labour in this structure 
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in relation to capital would be paramount. Diversity in the composition of the 
board and popular involvement in decision-making is lacking. The continued 
oversight of the Ministry of Information accentuates notions of control that 
undermine credibility of the newspapers and the people who work for them. It 
also ultimately impacts on readership levels, as evidenced by the 
Times/printmaker Readership Survey 2008 and the Afrobarometer studies 
(2005 & 2009). 
 
5.  Freedom and commodification: Aesthetically, the Times has not changed 
its appearance since its inception in 1965. Based on the dominant readership 
opinion, a business orientated transformation is needed. It seems certain 
from the findings of the TimesPrintpak Readership Survey (Tailoka et al, 
2008) and the AMV/OSISA survey in the same year, that a broader range of 
topics and specialist writings would improve public participation. However, 
the freedom to radically alter the newspapers in content and appearance 
does not rest with the editor. The fact that instructions arise from all manner 
of ministers, means one cannot possibly engender a professional 
presentation of news based on its value or the public good. 
 
The overall conclusion of this thesis is that there cannot be fundamental changes 
to the state media without significant changes to the political system and the 
political culture. There are three inter-linked steps which need to be explained 
further: 
 
1. Diversity in representation in legislative structures. 
2. A change in the culture of recycled leadership. 
3. Exploration of a communal media system. 
 
7.2.1 Representation and diversity in legislative structures 
 
It can be noted from the fore-going that institutional transformation, does not occur 
in a vacuum. It took cross-sectoral efforts to achieve the tabling and enactment of 
bills relating to ZNBC and the IBA. These alliances, as indicated in section 5.3.9 of 
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Chapter Five, involved opposition members of parliament and a cross section of 
media associations and unions. 
 
The passage of private members motions, it seems, depends also on the 
configurations of power within national parliament. An opposition without a two 
thirds majority will not have the leverage to execute change to these structures.  
 
On occasions when change has been attained, the ruling party has been at its 
weakest. The achievement of parity and representation in state media systems, it 
can be argued hence, is predicated on the presence of a working parliament, with 
a firm balance between ruling elites and alternative voices.  
 
The factors influencing these configurations are multifarious and may range from a 
more representative electoral system, integrity of the electoral process and of 
leadership, to the capacity of the electorate to make informed choices. Certainly, 
propositions for a Mixed Member Proportional System (MMP) which would 
combine Zambia’s current First-Past-the Post system (a constituency based 
model) with the Proportional Representation (PR) system have been quite 
pronounced lately.  Under PR systems, parties are allocated seats based on the 
proportion of votes gained in the entire country. In the FPTP system, electoral 
contests are located in constituencies with each contesting party presenting a 
candidate per voting district. The candidate with the most votes assumes the 
respective constituency seat in parliament. Parties with the largest number of 
constituency victories will hence have the most seats in the legislature. The idea 
behind these proposals is that combining the two systems enables the 
weaknesses of one system to be compensated for by the strengths of the other. 
Among other things, PR is credited for being inclusive of minority voices while 
FPTP is strong on accountability, because of the direct election of representatives 
(Chirambo, 2008: 6-12). 43 
 
                                                 
43
 It should be noted here that the weaknesses and strengths of electoral models are many and often 
contested by political scientists. This reference, highlights but the principle disparities. 
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While none of these institutional arrangements provides guarantees of radical 
media transformation, they may conceivably improve the chances of 
representation, diversity, responsiveness and accountability at many levels. 
Certainly, more equitable governance systems would provide the platform for 
consensus-based solutions to the nature of media systems that would respond 
more favourably to the expectations of the public. 
 
7.2.2 Recycled Leadership: Persistent post colonial mindsets about media power 
 
On the whole, the government’s disregard for the recommendations of the Media 
Reform Committee (MRC), the Mwanakatwe Constitution Review Commission of 
1995 and the Task Force on media reform of 1999, among others, are indicators 
that political elites, regardless of a change in administration, are convinced that 
maintaining control over media systems in a multiparty era ensures political 
leverage. This notion can be reinforced by observing the periods at which the 
Times Newspapers (and other state entities) receive state support. According to 
the findings of this thesis, state support is virtually guaranteed during elections. 
Since 1991, Zambia has held five competitive general and presidential elections to 
which state media coverage has been fully utilised.  
 
Therefore, state media would have the capacity to reach every inch of Zambia’s 
vastness either by using vehicles purchased by the state or accessing air and 
ground transportation from political leaders on campaign. A political 
metamorphosis of the Times Newspapers would likely entail a wholesale re-
conditioning of a new generation of politicians about the benefits of a media 
system that has the leeway to determine its editorial course based on consumer 
demands or a general public good. Such an undertaking would require joint efforts 
by journalists, communication scientists, business experts, human rights activists, 
lawyers and willing allies within the state, to critically consider ways in which 
political elites could conceivably be dissuaded from a longstanding belief in the 
‘effects tradition’ of media power. 
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An understanding of what factors influence voter choices, and which channels 
inform those choices, may be a starting point for arguing for a more professional 
and public inclined media. For there is no correlation between where the Times of 
Zambia, and other state media apparatus concentrate their messages, and where 
the MMD hold power.  
 
Despite the Times of Zambia having its strongest presence on the Copperbelt for 
example, the province was largely won by the opposition Patriotic Front (PF) in the 
2006 parliamentary elections (ECZ, 2006).  
 
An examination of other urbanised areas and provinces within the reach of 
newspaper circulation and national broadcaster such as the Northern, Luapula and 
Southern Provinces, shows that none of these were swept by the ruling party. 
Instead the PF impressed in the North and in Luapula, while the South fell 
overwhelmingly to the United Party for National Development (UPND). Similar 
trends are notable from the 2001 election results (ECZ, 2001). While only further 
study can substantiate this particular statement, it does on the surface provide a 
basis for us to debunk the notion that state media are a major variable in electoral 
politics. 
 
 
7.2.3 The efficacy of a communal media model 
 
The third point to be noted is the crafting of a communal, as opposed to state 
owned model of the media that would attempt to balance public and state 
interests. It is McQuail (1996: 70)(and as formulated similarly in later editions of 
this seminal source) who underscores the point that any social order, regardless 
of whether it is anchored by freedom and equality, can only be maintained over 
time through processes of public communication.  
 
He argues that for fundamental rights to be realised, there must be access to 
channels of communication and opportunities to receive a diversity of information. 
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McQuail experiments with a normative framework which would constitute mass 
media in the public interest. He crafts three models based on the three basic 
values for communication in society, freedom, justice/equality; order/solidarity. 
 
Freedom as a public communication value is tethered to the watchdog model and 
emphasises openness to a wide range of demands and offering a variety of 
voices. Originality, the exercise of public vigilance with the propensity to offend 
the powerful when the need arises, is underscored here. This value overlaps with 
the concept of equality. 
 
Equality as a public communication value; does not extend special favours to the 
powerful. Instead it opens itself up to all contestants, deviant voices and claims. It 
treats all legitimate advertisers in the same way, applying normal market 
principles. This principle calls for non discrimination, equal or equitable access, 
and diversity. Diversity would include accounting for language, ethnic and cultural 
identity. However, Mcquail himself admits that constraints of space are just some 
of the impediments, the equality principle would face. 
 
Finally, the notion of Order as a public communication value, projects media as 
both potentially disruptive of normal order and sometimes, indispensable to its 
maintenance. The centrifugal and centripetal, differentiating and uniting effect of 
mass media hence is well known.  
 
Mcquail however defines order in an elastic sense: implying symbolic cultural 
orders such as religion, art and customs among others.  
 
This approach assumes a tendency to appreciate the mutually reinforcing nature 
of shared cultures and solidaristic experiences. A unitary perspective of 
consensual good order panders to group interests but is challenged by conflicting 
cultural and social factors. In the end, he admits that the coherence and 
symmetry of the three principles of media performance is illusory. 
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“All claims about what is in the public interest have to be specific, based on 
evidence and argued out in some relevant public forum” (McQuail, 1996: 
79). 
 
On the evidence of this thesis, this researcher notes that government, advertisers 
and proprietors have sophisticated means by which to control communications 
regardless of the model. The vectors of control are diverse and complex.  
 
They would range from economic censorship of privately owned newspapers by 
investors allied to the state to the exclusion from privileged events such as press 
conferences by the state, which could undermine a newspaper’s newsworthiness. 
It is noted for example that Lonrho and the presidency found a way to achieve 
both their interests while sustaining a fairly respectable image for the Times in the 
First and parts of the Second Republics. The discussions in Chapter Three also 
extensively present ways in which both alternative and traditional media may fall 
under indirect influences of the market and politics. The question of objectivity or 
impartiality of the media is therefore untenable under the many conceivable 
scenarios. To simply demand equal representation is not to resolve this problem 
either: the state can influence elections in media unions and professional bodies 
and ensure that the diverse group that materialises on the board of directors 
empathises with its ambitions. The proposition being presented is therefore of a 
discursive nature. It does not claim to be immune to political and economic forces 
but rather to minimise their dual influences. 
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7.3 PROPOSED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR THE STATE PRINT 
MEDIA 
 
Diversification and professionalisation of corporate governance structures: It has 
been intimated in this thesis, that the Times Newspapers lack customer and 
market focus, editorial policy and strategy.  
 
The company experiences low customer satisfaction and poor resources and 
information management capacities. The over-riding factors are unrestrained 
macro level influences from the country’s political system which impact negatively 
on public perception of the newspapers. Therefore any business model, regardless 
of its excellence, will not prevail unless it addresses the political fundamentals that 
shape state media systems in Zambia.  
 
This suggested re-engineering of the governance structure of the Times, hence, 
assumes that progress will only occur upon the re-configuration of power in the 
decision making structures of the state, such as parliament and the executive; and 
the subsequent fostering of a popular consensus on media change. 
 
In terms of the governance structure of the Times, lessons may be drawn from the 
construction of the Zambia Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM) which 
was transformed from a government entity into a public trust in 1991.  
Superintendence of the ZAMCOM is done by the Council, which consists of 
representatives of print and electronic media, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 
journalism training institutes, publishing houses, PAZA and an appointee of the 
minister of information of broadcasting who must have private enterprise 
management experience. The relative strength of the structure is in its diversity, 
combining donor, activist and state interests, potentially minimising government 
control. The financial and other provisions of ZAMCOM may be allocated by 
parliament in addition to loans and donations from internal and external sources 
(Zambia, 1991: sec 17. 1).  
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The weakness of the ZAMCOM Council lies in its prescribed chairmanship and 
mode of appointment of members of the Council. Section 2 of the ZAMCOM Act of 
1991 states that members of the council shall be nominated by their respective 
organisations or associations but shall be appointed by the minister (Zambia, 
1991:sec 6.1). Without ministerial consent therefore, a nominee to the board from 
other interest groups could be rejected by the state at the minister’s discretion. 
Secondly, the Council is chaired by the permanent secretary of the ministry of 
information and is consequently very much shaped by ruling party interests.  
 
 
 Figure 16: Proposed governance structure for state print media 
 
Source: Constructed by author. 
 
 
Stakeholders/Interest groups 
 
Parliament Council 
Electorate/Stakeholders 
Chair 
Registrar 
Appointments Committee 
Board of Directors 
Senior Management 
Professional Staff 
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To escape these subtle controls, it is perhaps important to draw further lessons 
from the constitution of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) which 
became law in December 2002 and was formalised as a body corporate.  
 
The IBA, the result of sustained media and democracy activism, is not, in 
principle, subject to the direction of any individual or authority. Its board is made 
up of nine part time members appointed by the Minister on the recommendation 
of the Appointments Committee and subject to ratification by parliament (Matibini, 
2006: 80-89). 
 
The appointments committee consists of a representative from each of the 
following: 
 
 The Law Association of Zambia. 
 Non governmental organisations. 
 One member from a media support group. 
 One member nominated by religious organisations. 
 One member from the Ministry of information and broadcasting.  
 
The functions of the committee are to invite applications from suitably qualified 
individuals for appointment to the Board; to interview, select and recommend 
candidates to the Minister for appointment. Office bearers of political parties, 
members of parliament or local authority, non citizens and residents of Zambia or 
persons with vested interest in broadcast industry may not be eligible for 
appointment.  
 
Government manipulation of this process has been well documented (Matibini, 
2006: 89) and again speaks succinctly to the role assigned to the minister, who is 
in pole position to reject a candidate. While the composition of the Board is 
somewhat diverse, it could be broadened to strengthen the presence of media 
professionals and workers. Therefore to ensure that a proposed model for the 
print media minimises state interference, two key elements should underpin 
restructured state media systems: 
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 Workers as investors: Editors, Journalists and general workers on the 
Times, should be share holders or investors in the organisation. This 
would likely improve their capacity to exercise their fundamental rights and 
particularly, their communicative rights; to demand improvements in the 
product in order to obtain dividends in the ultimate. 
 
 Public participation and accountability: low cost shares should be availed 
to the general public to increase the company’s capitalisation. Poor 
capitalisation has been recognised by the government in its 1996 Media 
policy (Zambia, 1996: 14), as one of the fundamental problems facing all 
the print media. The institution would not only increase its working capital 
but also empathise with the wider public. Conversely, this would not only 
contribute to accountability of state media systems to the tax payer, it 
would transform the public from a passive consumer of news to an active 
participant in its production. Further, it is recommended that the 
governance structure of the Times Newspapers and the Zambia Daily Mail 
embrace representatives from diverse interests.   
 
The corporate governance model being proposed is three-tier, constituting a 
Council composed of public interest actors, a Non Executive Board appointed by 
the Council, and Senior Management (Figure 6). The proposal seeks to improve 
on the ZAMCOM TRUST and the IBA models, by allowing media workers and the 
public to be direct share holders in the state media and therefore in a position to 
nominate members of the board, indirectly influencing the substance and conduct 
of management.  
 
The Council, created through an Act of parliament, should be led by a Steering or 
Appointments Committee with representatives of labour (the Zambia Union of 
Journalists), the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), the Media Institute of 
Southern Africa (MISA) Zambia Chapter, the Zambia Council of Churches, the 
Zambia Chamber of Commerce, the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ) the 
Law Association of Zambia(LAZ), the umbrella body of non governmental 
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organisations in Zambia, and the permanent secretary of the ministry of 
information and broadcasting.  The Steering/Appointments Committee would be 
convened by a Registrar appointed by Parliament to administer its operations. 
The Council should however elect its own chair of the Steering Committee and 
such a chair may not be in the employ of government or its agencies or a 
member of a political party.  The professional chair of the committee should be 
elected from amongst the Committee Members, the latter having been appointed 
to the Steering Committee by the general Council meeting. The role of the 
Council’s Steering/Appointments Committee would be the following: 
 
 To consult with media workers and stakeholders annually on the 
strategic direction of state media systems. 
 To develop criteria for candidates to the Board of Directors in 
consultation with shareholders, stakeholders. 
 To invite applications from potential candidates to the Board of 
Directors. 
 To interview applicants and nominees and submit recommendations 
to a bi-partisan select committee of the National Assembly. 
 
The board may include the permanent secretary of the ministry of information as 
a member, not as chair. The chair of the Board of Directors should be nominated 
by the interests represented on the board based on business credentials and 
knowledge of the media and should emanate from the non state actors. The 
Minister may have no role in this process as he/she would fall under the category 
of active party member. The proposed governance structure of the Times can 
hence be unpacked as follows: 
 
1) The Council: Constituted by an Act of parliament, it would constitute 
workers as share holders, media unions, associations, non 
governmental bodies, the clergy, the ministry of information, business, 
and the Law Association. It is led by a professional 
steering/appointments committee which facilitates the appointment of a 
professional board of directors.  
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2) Board of Directors: to be nominated by Council: interviewed, selected 
and recommended through open and transparent interview process. 
Nominees will need to meet set criteria that may include, experience in 
the management of a private enterprise, media, law etc. Office tenure 
should not exceed two, three - year terms. 
 
3) Senior Management: the Managing Director, Deputy Managing 
Director, Managing Editor/Editor-in-Chief, Operations Manager, Chief 
Accountant and Company Secretary should be appointed by the board 
upon a public, transparent system of interviewing and assessment 
based on higher level academic credentials and experience of managing 
a private enterprise. 
 
The model attempts to minimise the influence of any one interest group or actor 
and therefore operates off bi-directional vectors of power. In this model the 
council would include not just sectoral actors but also workers as investors or 
share holders in the company. The Council should convene twice yearly to 
participate in a broad review of the company operations and the performance of 
management editorially and commercially.  The model emphasises sound and 
inclusive leadership as a means by which improved results may be obtained. The 
board of directors should include persons with proven business pedigree, legal 
know-how and at least a representative of labour unions.  
 
The involvement of a bi-partisan parliamentary committee 44is critical in terms of 
public exposure and discussion of financial commitments by the state and the 
regular evaluation of power relations and resource utilisation within the structures. 
The parliamentary committee should have a member each from each political 
party represented in parliament.  The model would attempt to focus its leadership 
on the business interest and viability of the company rather than to appease any 
                                                 
44
 It is through this bi-partisan committee that political parties will be seen to participate in this media 
model. Restricting the participation of political parties to only the agencies represented in parliament is 
logical given that registered organisations have numbered over 100 since the initiation of multiparty 
politics and yet less than six have survived beyond one electoral cycle. Secondly, limiting this participation 
to parliamentary political parties speaks to the notion of legitimacy, as the actors so represented will have 
had, at least in principle, a mandate from the electorate to act on their behalf. 
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single actor, let alone the state. More specifically, the following benefits might 
accrue to the state-sector media industry: 
 
1. Financial support from the state to the state/public media should be 
determined and evaluated by a bi-partisan select committee of the 
national assembly. Since the notion of state ownership would have fallen 
away, any public financing that is appropriated by state media should be 
sanctioned by a legitimate bi-partisan body. 
 
2. Public access; should not be the preserve of electoral contestants. A 
news agenda that represents the diverse interests of the groups 
participating in the Times would begin to serve much wider concerns 
than simply those of political elites. With Zambia’s investment portfolio 
improving by the day, sectoral interests would attach much greater value 
to subscriptions and sponsored supplements. The Post and its 
sponsored small business supplement is a good example. Suggestions 
from the Times Printpak Readership Survey in this regard, substantiate 
this proposal. Interactive exchanges with audiences within Zambia and in 
the diaspora via the internet for example, would continually impress the 
need for improvement or indeed encourage a substantial increase in 
public discussion. 
3. Technically qualified leadership: The process improves the possibilities 
of appointing highly qualified persons to top leadership positions in the 
media, with the potential to exploit technological and business 
opportunities; and with greater focus on the public good. Beginning with 
the Council and the Board, the presence of professional bodies outside 
of the media associations and the ministry of information and 
broadcasting, increases the probability of this happening. 
4. Localising newsprint production: Newsprint, one of the key inputs 
affecting the print media viability is closely controlled by political 
interests. The cost of newsprint affects all media. Low tariffs on the input 
would assist the struggling industry to revive itself. The high cost of 
imported newsprint necessitates the exploration of new possibilities: that 
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is, localising its production. Such an intervention might need deliberate 
state/parliamentary intervention. However, dominant party politics still 
encourage a lack of commitment which might render the whole 
proposition untenable, unless oppositional influences prevail. Ideally, this 
should be a private initiative. Realistically, external state liaisons with the 
Chinese for example, might kick start the process.  
 
In conclusion, from a theoretical perspective, it can be demonstrated that this 
model attempts to respond to McQuail’s concerns about public consensus by 
drawing on the precedence set in Zambia since the early 1990s. ZAMCOM was 
born out of a discursive and consultative process, and more recently the IBA was 
advanced by a robust collective of actors which included opposition members of 
parliament, compelling the state to move ahead with a compromise agenda. The 
hope for change can therefore rest on improving on the results of the past: that 
Zambia has evolved, over time, a culture of peaceful resolution of conflict and of 
public discussion.  Ultimately, what history teaches us is that none of these steps 
will occur without struggle. This researcher argues therefore, that until there is a 
greater opposition leverage - and changed mindsets in sections of the state - to 
drive a more aggressive and sustainable consensus on reforms; and unless there 
is constituted, electoral mechanisms and practices that allow for greater diversity 
in the National Assembly, the implementation of proposals such as these will be 
protracted if not frustrated for a long time to come. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ends 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
QUESTIONAIRES 
 
 
The key aim of this area of inquiry was to glean an understanding of the experiences of 
democratisation by three generations of editors, representing the First, Second and 
Third Republics. The section is divided into two segments, one representing structured 
questionnaires administered by email and another related section constituting face-to-
face interviews. The key areas addressed include comparative perspectives of media 
controls during periods of political change, the response of the Times to the challenges 
of liberalisation and the changing state and media relations over the past 45 years. The 
unstructured interviews, in addition, attempt to capture the insider experiences of state 
controls and of foreign ownership and the effect of this on worker welfare. In general, all 
questions sought to capture the key elements of the research questions: 
 
 Democratisation and its influence on media development in Zambia 
 Political change and oversight frameworks on the Times Newspapers? 
 Public participation in state media systems (and in particular, the Times 
Newspapers?) 
 The influence of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) on the conditions 
of service and job security of journalists on the Times Newspapers? 
 The impact of the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) on the Times 
Newspapers? 
  The impact of liberalisation and privatisation policies affected the Times 
Newspapers? 
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There were slight modifications to the questions to suit the experience and expertise of 
each respective respondent, that is: the foci of questions for interviewees who had 
experienced journalism under all three periods of change: the First, Second and Third 
Republics would be inclined toward extrapolating historical perspectives and 
comparisons with contemporary situations. The line of inquiry for legally inclined 
respondents concentrated more on the macro level constitutional frameworks and their 
influence on micro level organisational situations in the media. 
 
 
 
RESPONSES TO THE EMAIL QUESTIONAIRES: 
 
 
 
 
1. Simuchoba, A. 2009.[Former Acting Managing Editor, TimesPrintpak Zambia 
Limited, 1973- 1995]. 
 
 
Q. In what ways has the democratisation process in Zambia impacted on state 
media systems specifically; and on the media sector generally? (Democratisation 
here is defined by political change during the period between 1964 when Zambia 
became independent to date) 
 
A. The main impact of democratisation at independence in 1964 was to make the media 
more inclusive. Prior to independence the media was segmented and tended to serve 
the interests of the settler community more than that of the natives. Coverage was 
mainly of events that were of interest to the settler community and news about the 
majority community was largely ignored or covered only in passing partly because the 
white reporters who ran the media and especially the print media did not understand the 
significance of events within the black community. Radio was however slightly different. 
It more or less from the outset embraced the black community with broadcasts in the 
vernaculars. But again these were targeted at influencing the black community to see 
issues the way the settler population did. 
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The period after independence also saw the entry of Government for the first time as a 
player in the commercial media. Government took a stake in the Zambia Daily Mail. 
Previously government was involved with only its publications under the Department of 
Information later the Ministry. The effect was reduced credibility for the Daily Mail which 
was derisively referred to as the “Government Gazette.” In time, this involvement 
accelerated into the acquisition of the country’s only independent newspaper The Times 
of Zambia by the party. Again the consequence was reduced credibility for the 
newspaper. In the end, these acquisitions ended the era of the independent media in 
Zambia. Radio, television and the print media came to be under government control and 
all had to “toe the government line.” The result was reduced public credibility for the 
media all round. Some cynics for instance now referred to the Times of Zambia as 
Pravda. 
The return of multi-party politics at the beginning of the 1990s saw the re-launch of 
“independent” journalism. It was a lot more vigorous and questioning of government 
actions and decisions to the extent that was not possible on the government-owned 
newspapers without consequences. This period eventually saw to the near wholesale 
migration of readership and advertising away from the government papers to the new 
independent media and reduced further the credibility of “public media” controlled by 
government. The independent media practiced and still does essentially tabloid 
journalism based on scandal and allegations and purveying of personal agendas. The 
up-shoot is that today Zambian journalism is hardly the most ethical or accurate and on 
both sides for that matter as the government media also strives to off-set the effect of 
the “independent” media and the latter will observe no ethic to get at individuals in 
government especially those that it has personal issues with. Now, the media is at the 
point where statutory regulation is under consideration and seems a real prospect 
largely because of the excesses of the independent media. 
 
In summary- democratisation saw to an inclusive media in the first instance. Then, the 
tentative entry of government as a media player, the accentuation of that trend in later 
years and finally the re-emergence of the independent media without ethics and 
standards and now there is the prospect of statutory control.   
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Q. What specific benefits has the democratisation process brought to the state 
owned media during the First, Second and Third Republics: 
 
A. In the first and second republic there are no known benefits. If anything they merely 
led to the reduced credibility of the media. However the formation of the National Media 
Corporation (NAMECO) in the 1980s led to the adoption of ZIMCO conditions of service 
by the group and salaries and some conditions of service improved subsequently to 
catch up with what ZIMCO was paying. 
 
In the third republic, government paid off some debts and has at times, few and far 
between, invested money in plant and machinery for the newspapers. In 1992, the 
government for instance paid off the large newsprint debt that The Times of Zambia had 
contracted through the many newspapers it attempted to launch. Subsequently, in 2001 
it released money for the purchase of vehicles although this facility was mismanaged 
through the purchase of poor second-hand cars from South Africa which were of little 
use to the newspapers as they did not last. But government at least attempted to help 
out the media whether that was the best help it could give is something else. Again 
some donations to the government in the form of vehicles from China have been passed 
on to the newspapers. The Times of Zambia also received a printing press from China 
though it doesn’t seem fit for purpose. The point to note is that this generosity has been 
more pronounced near election time mainly. However, government has not been able to 
act freely in this respect given that its main financial partners the western governments, 
the IMF and World Bank are against subsidies and have long supported privatisation of 
the media in Zambia to avoid having to subsidize. So, government does so mindful or 
rather fearful of the possible reaction from them. There is also circumstantial evidence 
that in the payment of taxes, excise duty on imports etc, the Zambia Revenue Authority 
(ZRA) treats the state media kindly. 
 
Q. What negative aspects-if any- has democratisation wrought on the state media 
in Zambia (and on the Times Newspapers in particular)? 
Reduced credibility. The Times has lost prestige and seen largely as a government rag.  
It is no longer the leading newspaper and its content is dismissed as propaganda. Sales 
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have plummeted drastically. Until recently, it still sold reasonably well because of 
advertising especially job adverts but now even that has changed because most of the 
advertisers tend to be private companies and international NGOs that would rather 
advertise in the private media. It is limping badly and were it not for the government 
interest it would have been declared bankrupt by now. It is seen as a purveyor of 
government propaganda and the top reporters are those with good connections in 
government circles and the assent recently has been to counteract the Post and the only 
way to do that is to follow the Post and it is an extremely unethical newspaper that can’t 
possibly be the standard. But in the kingdom of the blind, a one eyed man is king! 
 
Q. How would you compare the Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited under Lonrho 
(1964-1982) ownership on the one hand; and under state ownership (Zambia 
National Holdings, National Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting) on the other, in terms of  the following: Editorial policy, 
employment policy, structure of the board, economic determination and 
performance, and  public participation:- 
 
A. Editorial Independence: Under LONRHO there was a great deal of editorial 
independence hence the running battles with the authorities. In fact the newspaper 
enjoyed complete editorial independence depending largely on the attitude of the editor 
and most editors of the era were brilliant and well educated and trained men, influential 
also able to hold their own. Under government ownership that was the first casualty 
because basically government acquired the newspaper so that it would be supported by 
it and therefore frowned and did not expect criticism or a serious expressions of 
independence. 
 
Editorial policy: Under LONRHO the newspaper’s editorial policy was based on 
objectivity, the truth as the newspaper saw it which is how even ordinary people saw 
things. Government ownership does not allow that especially where objectivity means 
strong and correct criticism or dissent from government positions.  
 
Employment Policy: Under LONRHO, the policy was kind of elitist in that it sought to 
recruit the best on the market or mould its reporters to be among the best. Thus The 
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Times of Zambia had a galaxy of talented reporters over the years. Government is not 
so much interested in that. It seeks and is comfortable with conformists and the 
mediocre.  
 
Structure of Board of Directors (representation by non-state actors): Under LONRHO 
the board of directors was far removed from the operation itself (newspaper); it was 
basically made up of largely anonymous LONRHO executives. Under government both 
UNIP and MMD the boards have been made up of political appointees and under the 
MMD increasingly of MMD loyalists being rewarded for their support. As an instrument 
of management, the board of directors today is quite useless made up of mainly people 
who know nothing about newspaper operations or operations of a business for that 
matter, only eager for the sitting allowances and an opportunity to supply stationery to 
the company and other such benefits.  
 
Economic determination (autonomy over commercial decisions): Under LONRHO 
commercial interests were paramount and LONRHO always appointed the General 
Manager of the Times whose responsibility was to see to the commercial interest. It is 
instructive that the Editor-in Chief and the General Manager were nearly always at odds 
as when the former would order withholding of adverts to create more room for news. 
The GM was never amused. Neither was he by a “big” libel file. The autonomy was 
tenuous in that sense-while the EIC could write pretty much what he thought fit 
LONRHO had to make its money. 
 
Economic performance; Economic performance under LONRHO was excellent. There 
was always the 13th cheque for staff at the end of the financial year, a sign that more 
than was anticipated was realized. It deteriorated under government control due to 
reduced credibility and the unwillingness of government to allow space for commercial 
profitability which is what “toeing the line” means at the end of the day.  Most of the new 
economic players are private sector people ready to support only the private sector and 
anxious to see the government out of business. 
 
Public Participation (provision for public input in editorial pages of the newspapers): It 
was better by far under LONRHO. Letters to the Editor were many and varied and there 
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was always some in any edition. One of the strengths of the Sunday Times for instance 
was the Sunday Forum. They have become very dangerous under government. Many 
times there are none and only those supporting government are published very rarely 
for that matter! This is the reality today. There are simply no letters to the editor and 
they have become a very occasional column not the regular one that it always was. 
 
 
Q. How would you compare the Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited under Lonrho 
(1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National 
Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the 
following: 
 
A. Relations with the state: Under Lonrho relations with the state were poor and tense. 
But this was largely because of the fear in government circles that it would bring down 
the government. Under party and government control, this fear was removed but the 
newspaper still displeased the authorities. Today, relations are still complicated largely 
because of the belief that the newspaper is not doing enough to shield or counteract the 
criticism of the independent media. There is a clear; push to make them even more 
unprofessional the more government comes under attack. 
 
Support from the state (subsidies, state advertising etc): These are periodic and tied to 
elections mainly otherwise government has little opportunity to subsidise the media 
because subsidies under the current financial regime are frowned upon and are mainly 
unacceptable and government is not ready to displease its financial partners. There 
appears to have been a tacit agreement in fact when government decided to hold on to 
the media that it would be on the basis of not subsidising it because that was the 
underlying argument in favour of privatizing. The real reason that the public media 
survives in the face of poor sales and advertising is simply that they are owned by the 
government otherwise bailiffs would have moved in to recover debts. 
 
Public perception of the Times Newspapers: It is perceived as a purveyor of government 
propaganda and an unreliable source of information, therefore. It is far from the fearless 
and independent voice that it was known to be in previous years. 
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Q. In your opinion, in what ways has the advent of democratisation  affected the 
conditions of service for media workers and journalists in the state sector more 
specifically:   
 
A. It has been a mixed picture but where salaries and conditions of service are 
concerned it has been positive to a large extent. What has happened is that it is no 
longer possible to pay journalists below government levels or deny them fringe benefits 
that apply in the public service. In recent years too, government has began to pay 
professionals in its service very competitively and pays generally well. So the knock-on 
effect on salaries in the media and conditions of service generally has been good. Many 
reporters are now able to at least drive through loans. But more important, they now 
have a union which can negotiate with management and reach agreement in terms of 
the ability to pay. The first is the result of the alignment to government and the second of 
democratisation. Previously journalists could not have a union because of the one 
industry one union rule.  
 
Q. In your opinion, how important has the introduction of the Zambia Union of 
Journalists (ZUJ) been in regard to the following: 
 
A. Representation of workers: Reasonably good. The trouble is mob mentality which 
does not recognise real constraints on the ground like ability of the company to pay for 
instance. Many times superficial arguments are advanced to back pay rises followed by 
work stoppages which newspapers can ill-afford.    
 Improving job security: Reasonably good at least there is a counter voice to 
management and management considers the attitude of the union before making 
major decisions. 
 Conflict resolution between workers and employers; Not helpful at all. Unions use 
the mob to get their way and what they seek is not always possible or desirable. 
 Expansion of communicative space for journalists: Quite good though the 
communications is not always of the informed type. 
 professionalisation of journalism: ZUJ has plays a very limited  role in this and is 
not supposed to by definition as it is reserved for the professional associations: 
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MISA and PAZA and has itself showed little interest and has in fact  been 
negative in that it is ready to defend members who do not act professionally. The 
actions of ZUJ reflect the calibre of its leadership. At the outset ZUJ was 
reasonably well led but that is not longer the case. Today it more a stepping 
stone for higher things –to be noticed by government for a position as press 
attaché for instance.  
 
(Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or 
champion specific causes or worker situations) 
 
 
Q. In what ways did the nationalisation of the economy in the First Republic affect 
the Times Newspapers in terms of the following: 
 
 
A. Advertising: The effect was positive because of the standing of the newspaper then. 
The new parastatals used it as the primary conduit for advertising and the newspaper 
was positioned to take advantage of that. Both the first and second republics were the 
golden era for advertising for the Times and it made a lot of money, a hell lot of money 
in fact as it had well developed advertising pages and policy.  
  Commercialisation; Again positively generally because it was run as a fully-fledged 
commercial newspaper that survived on the basis of what it made. 
  Circulation: Circulation figures were the highest then especially for the Sunday 
Times which was threatening 100,000 a Sunday. Today circulation cannot be more 
than 25,000 copies. 
 
Q. By all indications, the circulation of the Times Newspapers has been in decline 
since the First Republic? To what factors would you ascribe this decline in 
readership? 
 
There was no real decline in circulation during both the first and second republics. 
There was greater demand than was satisfied.  But readership was at a level where the 
newspaper was profitable through advertising at those readership levels which were the 
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highest at the time. Policy tended to address the advertising and not circulation level 
since money did not come from circulation at all as a commercial newspaper, it is the 
commercial people who had the largest say in the direction of the paper (LONRHO). If 
the journalists had a stronger say circulation would have risen more than the levels it 
did. But at the level at which it was, the owners made more than they budgeted for 
annually hence the ex-gratia payments in March/April. It was never was LONRHO 
policy to run a large-circulation paper if they could make money without that and that is 
what happened. Pages were added to accommodate advertising but circulation was not 
increased. Complaints about the Times tended to be that it sometimes carried more 
advertising than news. 
 
The decline in circulation occurred in 1990-1992 which was the period of the push for 
multi-party democracy. The Times backed the status-quo with the late Bwendo 
Mulengela as the Editor. The people were not interested in that message and sales 
declined drastically, very drastically to about 25,000 a day from around 70,000. After the 
elections in 1991and departure of Mulengela sales improved rapidly and had built up to 
55,000 and were rising rapidly until the beginning of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) of the IMF that led to wholesale job losses and circulation declined. 
Political interference which saw the newspaper as a government mouthpiece ate into its 
credibility and led to reduced sales. They have never improved. The decline first started 
with the pro-Kaunda editorial line in the 1990s, then SAP and now the reduced credibility 
due to political affilliation. The stagnation of circulation under LONRHO was not due to 
lack of demand but simply that good money could still be made from good 
advertisement flow without increasing circulation. It had a monopoly on advertising had 
there been a competitor perhaps that would have introduced a new dynamic. 
 
A. In what ways has the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 affected the 
state media in general  and the Times Newspapers in particular (in editorial, 
political or economic terms):  
 
The main effect is reduced credibility and appeal in the face of competition from the 
independent media. The newspaper is seen as a purveyor of government propaganda 
even when this is not so. It is discredited and is no longer daring in its coverage lest it 
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displeases the authorities. Editors who displease the government are sacked and unlike 
in the past are forgotten-it is pretty frightening! 
 
Q. Briefly describe the impact of liberalisation on state media systems in general 
and the Times Newspapers in particular:  
 
A. Reduced earnings as a result of low credibility. Liberalisation has allowed the 
emergence of “independent” media with a populist agenda and this has ensured that 
government media has been pushed to the margins though the product of the 
independent media is not anything to write home about. But people are more prepared 
to believe what they publish even blatant lies!  
 
Q. How have the Times Newspapers responded to the competitive environment 
born of liberalisation? 
 
A. The newspaper itself is not in a position to respond without government say so. Its 
response has been largely to get closer to the government for whatever it is worth and 
that perhaps is the only response in the circumstances. 
 
Q. Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that 
new democracies may need to have communal institutions (such as state or 
public media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. 
Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as detrimental 
to democracy or nation building. In your opinion, ideally, what should the role of 
government be in regard to the following:- 
 
A. A communal set up is clearly desirable i.e. in which government is involved. It is 
desirable because it can ensure longevity of the media houses. Many times 
independent media fizzles out for lack of financial wherewithal especially in Zambia but 
with government involvement that is unlikely to happen. However government has gone 
in as an investor without any other agenda. The trouble is government invests in order 
to obtain unquestioning support which kills the goose that lays the egg. It is not clear 
whether government is actually in a position to invest without this demand. But if it is 
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able to –invest and allow the media to operate without caveats that would be fine and 
would be the best. Broadly speaking it should be possible. Government’s real interest is 
served by an informed citizenry not one misled by propaganda.    
 Media ownership: It can be a part owner or even majority shareholder but 
through perhaps an independent media investment company like NAMECO 
without a political agenda. 
 Media policy: Let be determined by demands on the ground in order to 
ensure viability of the newspaper. If that is allowed government won’t have to 
subsidize. Again, after all governments have a duty to ensure that citizens are 
informed in an unbiased way that also is a responsibility of government even 
though it is rarely acknowledged. 
 Privatisation: This is basically surrender to commercial interests. The danger 
here is that privatisation could lead to closure of media houses when 
commercial returns are not too attractive and in the newspaper industry they 
rarely are. Government should return a stake to guard against media 
disappearing because of ’unattractive business climate.” Some kind of joint 
ventures with government as minority shareholder should be considered. 
 
Q. How important is it for emerging democracies to retain communal media 
institutions? (Conversely, given the context of diversity and often fragility of state 
systems in Africa, would you recommend a continued state involvement in the 
media sector?) 
 
A. Definitely I would but with a hands off approach. Take the Times of Zambia for 
instance. It was 100% privately owned but the Editor was appointed by the President-it 
was an interesting model.  When government begins to define editorial policy because 
of its stake that is when things go wrong because the playing field is no longer even. 
Government-owned press then find that they can’t tackle certain stories even though 
they are of the type that have the most public appeal. Thus they lose credibility but also 
revenue through reduced sales. 
 
Q. Some scholars argue that complete liberalisation and privatisation of the media 
sector would disadvantage citizens. This is because most citizens would not have the 
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economic means to finance modern media systems on a national scale. This could open 
up the market to trans-national companies which are viewed in some ways as having 
negative effects on freedom and justice as do some state systems. How do you react to 
this?  
 
A. I do not support complete liberalisation and privatisation because there are inherit 
dangers especially in Zambia for instance. The market is small and the revenue may not 
be worthwhile for an out and out commercial investor. Government involvement would 
be necessary to ensure survival of the media. But governments apparently do not go 
into the media business with “clean hands” so to speak. But they would be a stabilizing 
factor if they did and would at the level of the board ensure justice. The problem to me 
seems to be the attitude of governments towards the media if they could change accept 
media acting without government direction  as a fact of modern life and invest with a 
hands off attitude, they could play a significant role. Take the BBC for instance. It is an 
interesting model though of course one notes certain friction at times as over the Iraq 
war but that is ok- differences can be there. It is better than the policy of he who pays 
the piper calls the tune. 
 
Q. To what degree-if at all- have the leadership styles of past and present 
republican presidents affected state media behaviour?(specific examples 
recommended) 
 
A. There’s no general answer. All except perhaps Levy Mwanawasa believed to some 
extent at least in freedom of the press. Mwanawasa not so clearly because even as 
early as 1992 when there were recommendations by the media reform committee for 
partial privatisation Mwanawasa publicly opposed that saying the media should remain 
in government hands. Kaunda laid the foundation for the destruction of the public print 
media at least with his pseudo-socialist ideas yet he was the most tolerant of the press 
and even when he went overboard he had the knack to reverse himself in time. Chiluba 
started off well and bailed out the Times over its newsprint debt at his personal initiative. 
But he progressively became more suspicious of the media the longer he stayed in 
office. Rupiah Banda has had the worst treatment by the independent press but apart 
from seeking accurate reporting of what he has said has been the most tolerant since 
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coverage has included personal, very personal abuse of him and his wife. Their 
attitudes have differed from time to time depending on the pressures they have been 
under and they present a mixed picture.  
 
Q. If it will endure, what should public communication in Zambia look like in the 
next 20 years, given the challenges of liberalisation and privatisation in the last 
45 years? 
 
A. It should definitely be a mix with government hands off investment in the media 
continuing to ensure stability.  
 
 
2. Phiri, J.2009. [Times/Printpak Zambia limited, 1987- to date] 
 
Q. In what ways has the democratisation process in Zambia impacted on state media 
systems specifically; and on the media sector generally? (Democratisation here is 
defined by political change during the period between 1964 when Zambia became 
independent to date) 
 
A. Democratisation process has resulted in state media seeking ways to enhance their 
credibility and seek new ways of sustainability. For the media sector in general, 
democratisation has opened up the field to increasing numbers of players. 
 
Q. What specific benefits has the democratisation process brought to the state 
owned media during the following periods of political change: 
 the First Republic 
 the Second Republic 
 the Third Republic 
A. During the Second Republic, democratisation removed the restrictive grip the State 
commanded over media content. During the Third Republic, there was a realisation that 
public media had to begin transforming themselves into sustainable entities, as 
significant levels of State support were no longer guaranteed. 
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Q. What negative aspects-if any- has democratisation wrought on the state media 
in Zambia (and on the Times Newspapers in particular)? 
 
 A. Greater competition can be negative if institution does not transform itself to face 
new reality. 
 
Q.  How would you compare the Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited under Lohnro 
(1964-1982) ownership on the one hand; and under state ownership (Zambia 
National Holdings, National Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting) on the other, in terms of editorial policy, employment policy, 
structure of the board, economic determination and performance, and  public 
participation:- 
 
A. Editorial independence – Under Lonrho overriding interests were the promotion and 
protection of continental business interests of the owner Tiny Rowland. Under State 
control the interests of the State evolved from merely ensuring absence of content 
critical of the party and its government, to outright superintending of the editorial 
direction of the newspapers. 
 Editorial policy: In both eras it remained unwritten and was enforced by force of 
personalities of the principal actors – the President of the Republic on one hand, and 
the editors he appointed, on the other. 
 Employment policy – Employment policies under Lonrho appear to have favoured 
made light of academic qualifications and favoured the copy-boy-to-reporter system, 
partly as a way of restricting expenditure on staff which increased with the demand 
to compensate graduate staffers. 
 Structure of Board of Directors (representation by non-state actors) – Lonrho used 
board members largely drawn from the business community, whereas under State 
ownership, party, government operatives have always outnumbered business 
community representatives. 
 Economic determination (autonomy over commercial decisions) – Commercial 
considerations were paramount under Lonrho, whereas with State ownership came 
growing political considerations. 
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 Economic performance – The company made profit under Lonrho, and during the 
early years under Zambia National Holdings because structure was largely 
maintained. Since then it has continued making losses. 
 public Participation (provision for public input in editorial pages of the newspapers) 
 
Q. How would you compare the Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited under Lohnro 
(1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media 
Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the 
following? 
 
A. Relations with the state – Under Lonrho the relationship was managed between 
Rowland and the President of the Republic, while under State ownership there are many 
more players representing every imaginable state interest, the paramount one of course 
being the Presidency. 
 
 Support from the state (subsidies, state advertising etc) – state support largely 
takes the form of grants given as and when the State sees fit and has funds to 
support particular media activities. 
 
 Public perception of the Times Newspapers – Perception is predominantly of a 
government mouthpiece. This came out clearly in readership Survey conducted 
for Times by Copperbelt University. 
 
Q. In your opinion, in what ways has the advent of democratisation affected the 
conditions of service for media workers and journalists in the state sector more 
specifically? 
 
A. The process resulted in formation of Zambia Union of Journalists which has over the 
years continuously bargained for improvement in conditions of service for media 
workers. 
 
Q. In your opinion, how important has the introduction of the Zambia Union of 
Journalists (ZUJ) been in regard to the following: 
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 Representation of workers – In this area it has been very important. 
 Improving job security – Here too there is more protection as a result of the work 
of ZUJ. 
 Conflict resolution between workers and employers – There is now improved 
dialogue when conflicts arise. 
 Expansion of communicative space for journalists – Has made it possible for 
journalist to be taken as serious stakeholder all round. 
 Professionalisation of journalism – Not much impact as this is left largely to the 
Press Association of Zambia. 
 
Q. Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or 
champion specific causes or worker situations 
 
A. ZUJ has been quick to react to the increasing number of incidents of party cadres 
beating up journalists. One case is currently in court where hooligans are being 
prosecuted for beating up reporters recently. 
 
Q. In what ways did the nationalisation of the economy in the First Republic affect 
the Times Newspapers in terms of the following: 
 
A.  Advertising  - Not significantly 
  Commercialisation – Weakened the company’s resolve to make profit since state 
support was assured. 
  Circulation – Was the beginning of dwindling circulation because under-performing 
economy started affecting negatively the advertising volumes, and also reduced 
consumers’ buying power. 
 
Q. By all indications, the circulation of the Times Newspapers has been in decline 
since the First Republic? To what factors would you ascribe this decline in 
readership? 
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A. The major factor is the general decline arising from failure of the government’s 
economic policies.  
 
  Q. In what ways has the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 affected 
the state media in general  and the Times Newspapers in particular (in editorial, 
political or economic terms) 
 
A. It brought a shift in public expectations: from simply being dismissed as a 
government mouthpiece, the public started to demand that state media operate more as 
PUBLIC media, by taking aboard the public’s interests in news content. 
 
Q. Briefly describe the impact of liberalisation on state media systems in general 
and the Times Newspapers in particular 
 
A. Major impact of liberalisation has been increased competition from new privately 
owned newspapers. 
 
Q. How have the Times Newspapers responded to the competitive environment 
born of liberalisation? 
 
A. Times newspapers has responded by commissioning a Readership Survey and, 
arising out of the reading of its recommendations, fashioning a three-year strategic plan 
aimed attaining sustainability and later making a profit. 
 
Plan also supported by acquisition of new printing equipment from Taiwan. Contract for 
supply of the equipment was signed end of October. Value is $2.3 million. 
 
Q. Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that 
new democracies may need to have communal institutions (such as state or 
public media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. 
Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as detrimental 
to democracy or nation building. In your opinion, ideally, what should the role of 
government be in regard to the following:- 
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A. Media ownership – Government still needs to be a player as the majority of the public 
lacks the sophistication to evaluate skewered content especially from the private media. 
 media policy – providing a framework for deepening of the sector 
 privatisation 
 
Q. How important is it for emerging democracies to retain communal media 
institutions? (Conversely, given the context of diversity and often fragility of state 
systems in Africa, would you recommend a continued state involvement in the 
media sector?) 
 
A. State involvement still desirable to foster national unity, where private media shows 
itself susceptible to strong commercial, ethnic or other dubious interests. 
 
Q. Some scholars argue that complete liberalisation and privatisation of the 
media sector would disadvantage citizens. This is because most citizens would 
not have the economic means to finance modern media systems on a national 
scale. This could open up the market to trans-national companies which are 
viewed in some ways as having negative effects on freedom and justice as do 
some state systems. How do you react to this? 
 
A. The threat of this is currently mitigated by the growth of community media that are 
feisty in defend local interests and the fact that it is now relatively cheaper to start a 
community radio or private newspaper. 
Q. To what degree-if at all- have the leadership styles of past and present 
republican presidents affected state media behaviour?(specific examples 
recommended) 
 
     A. Kaunda maintained tight control on the media and on the political    machinery. 
Chiluba was more open and was not averse to engage in media discussions    even at 
personal level. He allowed greater freedom for media to operate. Levy Mwanawasa 
shifted from merely controlling state media to “aligning” himself with powerful private 
media to get ideas through. 
 434 
 
  Q. If it will endure, what should public communication in Zambia look like in the 
next 20 years, given the challenges of liberalisation and privatisation in the last 
45 years? 
 
Note: follow up text message from Phiri[2011] 
 
Q. John, hope u well. Just one thing: who is the Times of Zambia’s top five or ten 
biggest advertisers (percentage wise)? 
 
A. Zamtel, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi Airways, ZESCO, ZRA, Road Development Agency, 
Health Ministry, Education Ministry. 
 
Q. Is zamtel your biggest spender? And is it possible to give percentages for 2008 
to 2010 for at least the top five? 
 
A. Yes. In that order past 3 yrs. 
 
3. Kapata, D [Times Newspapers, Zambia Limited, 1973 - 1987] 
 
Q.In what ways has democratisation in Zambia impacted on state media systems 
specifically; and on the media sector generally? (Democratisation here is defined 
by the period when Zambia became independent (1964) to date) 
 
A. Before Zambia’s independence, media systems were skewed to serve settler 
interests in all respects and aspects. After independence, the trend changed with media 
systems becoming a little liberal and extended coverage to (African) Zambian interests 
but ostensibly still dominated by white interests. However, democratisation has opened 
up the media industry to private players and to some extent liberalised state media 
systems. 
 
Q.What specific benefits has the democratisation process brought to the state 
owned media during the following periods of political change: 
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 the First Republic 
  
A. Under the First Republic, in essence it was only the government of the day which 
benefited from state-owned media systems in that they were used as propaganda tools 
to advance the one-party rule of founding President Kenneth Kaunda and his 
philosophy of Humanism. During this period as in the Second Republic, state-owned 
media got more advertising revenue as authority shunned the private media as a way of 
punishing them for their divergent opinions.  
 
 the Second Republic 
In the Second Republic after a democratically elected government of Frederick Chiluba 
was ushered, it brought in increased media freedoms and the country for the first time 
benefited from a diversity of media platform – both print and electronic. However private 
media systems faced intolerance from the government and did not operate freely while 
state-owned media operated under the influence of the government. 
 the Third Republic 
The Third Republic of President Levy Mwanawasa saw a proliferation of media systems 
and more media freedom. Under the Third Republic, state-owned media systems 
continued to toe the line of the government and enjoyed more advertisement from 
government and quasi-government institutions.  
 
Q.What negative aspects-if any- has democratisation wrought on the state media 
in Zambia (and on the Times Newspapers in particular)? 
 
A. Circulation of the paper has dwindled and its revenue base has hit low bottom levels. 
It is perceived as a government mouth piece and true to tag, the Times Newspapers has 
lost readership appeal. 
 
Q. How would you compare the Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited under Lonrho 
(1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National 
Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the 
following:- 
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A. Editorial Independence 
Under Lonrho (1964-1982), the Times of Zambia/Printpak Limited enjoyed  Editorial 
Independence with its editors always in constant conflict with the authorities. During this 
period the publication enjoyed massive circulation and was the preferred choice for 
advertisers. 
 
 Editorial policy 
During the Lonrho days, Editorial Policy of the Times of Zambia was based on journalist 
principles and ethics. 
 Employment Policy 
 
Under Lonrho, Employment Policy was based on merit and professionalism. Staff 
were awarded on their competence. As result of its employment policy, the paper 
attracted the cream of Zambian and expatriate journalists.   
 Structure of Board of Directors (representation by non-state actors) 
 
The Structure of the Board of Directors was based professionalism and integrity of 
individuals. 
 Economic determination (autonomy over commercial decisions) 
Economic determination  - only capable and competent people were appointed to run 
the paper. The paper was a thriving business enterprise. 
 
 Economic performance 
 
The paper operated commercially and was profitable. This was part of the reason why 
the ruling National Independence Party (UNIP) took it over.   
 Public Participation (provision for public input in editorial pages of the 
newspapers) 
There was no provision for public participation or public input in the editorial pages of the 
Times of Zambia under Lonrho. Editorial content was determined by the editorial staff. 
Q. How would you compare the Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited under Lonrho 
(1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media 
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Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the 
following: 
 relations with the state 
A. Under Zambia National Holdings, National Media Corporation and the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting Services, the Times of Zambia lost its independence. 
Editors were appointed by the government. Although seasoned journalists, they had no 
commercial background and submitted to the whims of the appointing authority. 
 support from the state (subsidies, state advertising etc) 
The paper received government subsidies and state advertising support – but these 
were not enough to sustain the operations of the paper. 
 public perception of the Times Newspapers 
Public perception of the Times Newspapers became very poor because not only did it 
carry half-baked articles but was seen and indeed was a propagandist for the state. 
Q.In your opinion, in what ways has the advent of democratisation  affected the 
conditions of service for media workers and journalists in the state sector more 
specifically (NAMECO, compared to Zambia National Holdings) 
 
A. The conditions of services for workers and journalists in the state sector are no 
longer attractive. Firstly state media organisations are longer run commercially. The 
bloated staff levels have made it impossible for workers and journalists to be adequately 
remunerated. As a result of this state of affairs, lassitude has descended on workers 
and journalists in state-owned media institutions and are not only creative but downright 
unenthusiastic.  
 
Q. In your opinion, how important has the introduction of the Zambia Union of 
Journalists(ZUJ) been in regard to the following: 
 
 representation of workers  
A. In terms of negotiating for improved conditions of service, it has a voice – but how do 
you extent something out of a financially struggling  employer who is also heavily 
dependent on subsidies. 
 Improving job security 
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It has no teeth. It has no influence at all. (A case in point - recently a member of ZUJ 
who was also a senior member of staff with Times of Zambia was retired at a very young 
age for being critical of the government – ZUJ failed to have him reinstated). 
 conflict resolution between workers and employers 
Even in this respect, ZUJ’s allegiance is with the employers for fear of victimisation.  
 expansion of communicative space for journalists 
It has no capacity to agitate for more communicative space for journalists because of the 
moribund structure and for fear of risking ZUJ executive members’ jobs. 
 professionalisation of journalism 
ZUJ cannot in its present form advance professionalism in journalism – some of its 
executive members are not journalists although they work for media organisations. ZUJ 
has failed to attract high calibre journalists because it is perceived as a mere talk shop. 
It could only do so if it had any influence or say in the training of journalists. 
 
Q. (Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or 
champion specific causes or worker situations) 
 
A. I can’t recall of any instance where ZUJ acted to defend causes of its members. Right 
now in Zambia, there is a fierce debate going on regarding statutory and constitutional 
provisions for several aspects of media industry, ZUJ has not come out clearly on which 
side it is. ZUJ has not supported independent media which is calling for self regulation of 
the media other than statutory regulation as propagated by the authorities. 
 
Q.  In what ways did the nationalisation of the economy in the First Republic affect 
the Times Newspapers in terms of the following: 
  Advertising  
 
A. The paper’s revenue from advertising went down even if government gave it more 
business than the private media.  
 
  Commercialisation 
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The paper’s attempts at commercialisation completely failed. The paper tried to 
introduce  morning/evening papers - these lamentably failed. Introduction of a courier 
service only served to drain its meagre resources. Commercial printing at its Printpak 
plant also failed to succeed. 
 
 
 Circulation 
 
Circulation of the Times of Zambia has fallen to unimaginable levels. Whilst the daily 
print-run during its peak years  with Lonrho run was almost hitting 100,000 - nowadays 
has it has drastically gone down to less than 20,000. 
 
Q.By all indications, the circulation of the Times Newspapers has been in decline 
since the First Republic? To what factors would you ascribe this decline in 
readership? 
 
A. Zambians have lost confidence in the paper. Its editorial content is low grade. It has 
lost appeal of the readers. The quality of the paper itself is of very standard with 
smudges all over. Its attempt to run colour adverts has completely failed. 
 
Q.In what ways has the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 affected the 
state media in general  and the Times Newspapers in particular (in editorial, 
political or economic terms) 
 
A. Since the advent of multiparty democracy in 1991, state media and the Times of 
Zambia in particular have aligned themselves with the authorities. They have literally 
become praise singers of the government. Killing and non publication of articles critical 
of the authorities and only thriving on editorials and articles which are pleasing to the 
appointing authority– no matter how absurd they are to the people. 
 
Q. Briefly describe the impact of liberalisation on state media systems in general 
and the Times Newspapers in particular 
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A. Liberalisation of state media systems in general and Times Newspapers in general 
have had no impact in the commercial running of the institutions. Rather than make run 
independently editorially and profitably – things have simply come in reverse and sorely 
independent on government coffers. Their deficits have become unbearable. They are 
heavily indebted to institutions such as Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and Pensions 
institutions. They don’t remit their dues ZRA and statutory contributions of their workers 
Pensions Authorities. 
 
Q. How have the Times Newspapers responded to the competitive 
environment born of liberalisation? 
 
The Times Newspapers has failed to operate in a competitive liberalisation environment 
due to state interference in is editorial policy and because of being run by incompetent 
managers. 
 
A.Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that new 
democracies may need to have communal institutions (such as state or public 
media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. 
Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as detrimental 
to democracy or nation building. In your opinion, ideally, what should the role of 
government be in regard to the following:- 
 
 Media ownership 
 
Government in a way survives on state media. State media is critical to the credibility of 
the state although people are suspicious of the view. So it wouldn’t be a bad idea for the 
state to take control media ownership but as long they let the institutions run 
independently and commercially viable. 
 
 Media policy 
 
It is important for government to put in place a media policy which does not infringe on 
press freedom and which allows freedom of expression. 
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 Privatisation 
2. How important is it for emerging democracies to retain communal media 
institutions? (Conversely, given the context of diversity and often fragility of state 
systems in Africa, would you recommend a continued state involvement in the 
media sector?) 
 
The continued state involvement in the media sector is crucial for its existence and 
survival on account that if there are no checks and balances such as a press council – 
government would be a mercy of the private media. 
 
 
Q.Some scholars argue that complete liberalisation and privatisation of the media 
sector would disadvantage citizens. This is because most citizens would not have 
the economic means to finance modern media systems on a national scale. This 
could open up the market to trans-national companies which are viewed in some 
ways as having negative effects on freedom and justice as some state systems. 
How do you react to this? 
 
A. Complete liberalisation and privatisation of the media although good in terms of 
running thriving and profitable enterprises can disadvantage the majority of people in the 
country in that access to them would out of reach. This of course can bring in trans-
national investors whose prime aim would be profit. So in a way, it is important for 
government to hold a fraction of media control. 
 
Q.What should public communication in Zambia look like in the next 20 years, 
given the challenges of liberalisation and privatisation in the last 45 years? 
 
A. Eventually government will loose grip of the media, especially when  
democracy takes strong and deep root and economic sense prevails. Loss making 
institutions at the expediency of government media control will not make economic 
sense in future. 
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4. Miti.[Times Newspapers, Zambia Limited (1995-2008)] 
 
Q. How would you compare the Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited under Lonrho 
(1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media 
Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the 
following: 
 relations with the state 
 support from the state (subsidies, state advertising etc) 
 public perception of the Times Newspapers 
 
A. Under Lonrho (1964-1982) the paper’s editorial independence was not as   restricted 
or tightly controlled as it was under state ownership. In other words, the  paper was 
more critical of government than it was under state ownership.  The same applies to the 
paper’s editorial policy, which was premised on free and fair reporting. This is unlike 
when the paper was under state  ownership.  Under state ownership, the paper’s 
editorial policy entailed it to toe government line or back policies of the government of 
the day.  
            
Relations with the state: Under Lonrho, the paper’s could be said to be off and on 
in the sense that there were times when UNIP stalwarts demanded that the paper be 
banned because it was too critical of government or when it published stories or 
pictures which were deemed to be in bad taste. For example when the paper 
published pictures of a naked woman. Under state ownership, one would say the 
paper enjoyed good relations with the government as it had a say on what to and not 
to publish by appointing people aligned to the party and government to the position 
of editor-in-chief. This way news could be censored. 
 
Support from state: Under Lonrho, there was little support or none at all in terms of 
funding, except in form of advertising. Being one of the major papers in the country 
at that time, with the Zambia Daily Mail, government didn’t have much of a choice 
after all. They had to put their adverts in the same paper which they claimed was 
biting the finger that was feeding it. This is why threats surfaced that if the paper 
continued being critical of government, it would not receive any advertising from 
government. Under state ownership, however, the paper started receiving grants or 
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funding. As erratic as it might have been, but the paper got the support. 
 
Public Perception: Because the paper took it upon itself to criticise the government, 
people viewed the paper in the positive light as it had gained their trust. In other 
words, the paper was playing its watchdog role on their behalf. However, under the 
state ownership, the paper was viewed negatively especially by those non UNIP 
members. To them, the paper was merely a government mouth piece, whose interest 
was to serve the interests of its master – the government. 
 
Q. In your opinion, in what ways has the advent of democratisation  affected 
the conditions of service for media workers and journalists in the state 
sector more specifically (NAMECO, compared to Zambia National Holdings) 
 
 
A. In my opinion, nothing much has changed in as far as the conditions of service are 
concerned. Apart from introducing professional allowance, for graduates (for TOZ) 
the conditions of service are still much the same. With the merger of ZIS and Zana, 
into one body, there have been some changes in the salaries, but not much with the 
conditions of service. 
 
Q. In your opinion, how important has the introduction of the Zambia Union of 
Journalists(ZUJ) been in regard to the following: 
 
 representation of workers  
 Improving job security 
 conflict resolution between workers and employers 
 expansion of communicative space for journalists 
 professionalisation of journalism 
 
(Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or 
champion specific causes or worker situations) 
 
 
 A. The introduction of ZUJ has helped to strengthen representation of  
Journalists. Yes it has also helped to improve job security. 
The union has also in some instances ably mediated in disciplinary cases with    
management involving erring workers. Where such workers should have been fired   the 
union has helped to negotiated for a lesser punishment. ZUJ has also enabled 
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journalists to network and fight for their common interest. As for professionalism, I feel 
ZUJ still has to do more on this, especially on training. A good example could be when 
ZUJ fought for fixed overtime for sub-editors. 
 
Q.By all indications, the circulation of the Times Newspapers has been in decline 
since the First Republic? To what factors would you ascribe this decline in 
readership? 
 
A. The decline in readership could be attributed to government interference in the 
newspaper’s editorial decisions and censorship. For example, most of the stories  
carried in the paper are biased towards government – people say it’s like a government  
gazette.  As a result, people have a negative perception of the paper. Further, they have 
lost trust and interest in the paper because they tend to think, it serves government 
interest. 
 
Q.In what ways has the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 affected the 
state media in general  and the Times Newspapers in particular (in editorial, 
political or economic terms) 
 
A. The introduction of multiparty politics saw the birth of the private media – the post.  
And other newspapers were born. This meant that the state-owned media no longer 
enjoyed the monopoly of news. This forced the TOZ and other state owned media to  try 
and relax their tightly controlled editorial policies and to bring in some  impartiality in 
covering opposition political parties. Parties which were previously were not covered 
were now at least given some coverage, knowing that even if they didn’t cover them, the 
private media would. The paper had to do this or lose out on advertising to the private 
sector newspapers. The decline in readership resulted in the paper’s loss of revenue as 
advertising also  
declined. 
 
Q.Briefly describe the impact of liberalisation on state media systems in general 
and the Times Newspapers in particular 
 
A.  Liberalisation brought competition both for news as well as for revenue, which comes 
in through advertising. So with other newspapers on the scene, this TOZ losing out on 
revenue.  
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Q. How have the Times Newspapers responded to the competitive environment 
born of liberalisation? 
 
A. The paper had to come up with other ways to rise its dwindling revenue, i.e.  
the paper merged with the printing company Printpak and hence TimesPrintpak. The 
company also had to consolidate its courier service to bring in  more money 
 
 
Q. Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that 
new democracies may need to have communal institutions (such as state or 
public media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. 
Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as 
detrimental to democracy or nation building. In your opinion, ideally, what 
should the role of government be in regard to the following:- 
a. Media ownership 
b. Media policy 
c. Privatisation 
 
A. Media ownership:  There is no way the government will own a newspaper and have 
no say in what goes in that paper. As they say He who pays the piper calls the tune. So 
while there is nothing wrong with government owned media, it becomes dangerous in 
situation where only state media are in existence. For the sake of fair coverage and 
balance, I would rather we have both owned and stated-owned newspaper in a 
democracy as this will help people make decisions objectively having read both 
privately-owned papers and state-owned papers. I mean just having the privately-owned 
uncalled for criticism of the government even where it had done well in terms of service 
delivery. 
 
Media policy: This is a thorn in the flesh of many governments because governments 
appear to hate criticism. However, where media have been privatized in a democracy, 
media policy should be left to the media itself to decide or regulate itself. Except for 
state-owned media, there is no way government will not have a say in this matter. They 
own the paper and pay the salaries, how can they not have a role to play directly or 
indirectly in the media policy? Otherwise generally media policy should be left to the 
media alone. Privatisation:  
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Q. How important is it for emerging democracies to retain communal media 
institutions? (Conversely, given the context of diversity and often fragility of state 
systems in Africa, would you recommend a continued state involvement in the 
media sector?) 
  
 
 
 
 A. The media is the watchdog and pillar of democracy. I believe that in a democracy it is 
healthy to have both state and privately-owned media. They both have an important role 
to play in as far as informing, educating and entertaining the citizens is concerned. As I 
said earlier, it help to bring about news balance. Hence I would only recommend  state 
involvement in media, if and only if  media freedom is guaranteed and the private media 
is allowed to thrive and operate without being muzzled. 
 
Q. Some scholars argue that complete liberalisation and privatisation of the media 
sector would disadvantage citizens. This is because most citizens would not have 
the economic means to finance modern media systems on a national scale. This 
could open up the market to trans-national companies which are viewed in some 
ways as having negative effects on freedom and justice as some state systems. 
How do you react to this? 
 
 
A. Liberalisation and privatisation have brought about changes in communication in the 
media. With the availability of modern  technology, the work of the media has been 
made relatively easier. It has become easier and quicker reporters to communicate and 
to get to their sources through cell phones and Internet. Given this background, one 
would say in the next 20 years communication would have been strengthened. People 
will not always have to rely on newspapers as they can go the any Internet Cafe to read 
the news online. This means that newspapers have to change with times to catch with 
the quick pace of communication to achieve their goal of informing the public. With wider 
communication options available, people will not want to wait for stale news.  
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5. Mwanyanda.2011[Lawyer, former Journalist, Post Newspapers Zambia Limited] 
 
Q.      In what ways has democratisation in Zambia impacted on state media 
systems specifically; and on the media sector generally? (Democratisation 
here is defined by the parting with the colonial regime, that is, 1964 to date) 
  
A. There  are constitutional provisions on freedom of expression enshrined in part three 
of the Constitution. However, there has been no enabling legislation to ensure this. In 
fact there are archaic pieces of legislation that continue to claw back on the media. 
  
Q. What specific benefits (in legal terms) has the democratisation process 
brought to the media (specifically state owned media) during the following 
periods of political change: 
 
A. I don’t think anything has changed in legal terms. We still have repressive laws. 
Politically though, space has been opened for pluralistic media. 
 
Q.      What are the key impediments, if any, in the present legal and constitutional 
framework in regard to freedom of expression, freedom of the press and 
freedom of association and assembly (and how specifically, do they affect 
Journalists). 
A. There is no enabling legislation on freedom of expression; It is a constitutional 
provision which has no real/practical enforcement mechanism in subordinate legislation. 
Legislation around sedition, official secrets etc not democratic.  Lack of a freedom of 
info law is a real impediment. 
 
Q.   Briefly describe the significance of freedom of expression, freedom of the 
press and freedom of assembly and association as currently stipulated in the 
Constitution’s Article 20(1), Article 20(2) and Article 21(1). 
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A. Democracy is premised on this.  
8.      What key instruments need to change in Zambia to facilitate more open 
debates, freedom of ownership, freedom of the press, freedom of association 
and assembly? 
 
      Remove repressive laws and promulgate a FOI law. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
 
The interviews in this section were semi-structured. The aim of this exercise was to 
construct an insider historical perspective on the workings of the Times in both editorial 
and commercial terms. The key informants were Ridgeway Liwena, one of the first black 
journalists to be employed by the Times of Zambia in 1966. His explanations of the 
dichotomy between African and white counterparts working for the Lonrho owned Times; 
the editorial positioning of the first African editor-in-chief in relation the state and the 
multinational, provided additional substance to the understanding the challenges and 
experiences of the first generation of journalists in Zambia. As one of the few survivors 
of this generation, his reflective accounts shored up the construction of follow up, more 
structured questionnaires in appendix one. The second key informant is John Phiri, the 
current managing director of the TimesPrintpak Zambia Limited. His insights into the 
everyday experiences of working under one party and multiparty regimes; and the 
impact of liberal philosophy on commercialisation serve to inform this discourse. 
 
 6. Liwena R.2008.[Society of Senior Zambian Journalists/former Sunday Times 
Editor, 1966-1995] 
 
 
Q. You were among the first Africans to Join the Times of Zambia, could you 
briefly describe to me the power relations between the board, the editor-in-chief 
and white and black employees? 
    
A. I joined the Times in 1966. At the time, the Board was Foreign based. We had just 
obtained independence and the political influence at the time was such that all foreign 
dominated companies should have had Zambians in their institutions. Fackson Nkandu 
was the first Zambian (black) News editor, John Mwansa was Managing editor 
appointed by Lonrho. There was a General Manager who was looking after the interest 
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of Lonrho. We were satisfied not so much with the salaries, but with the knowledge that 
now we are taking over. 
 
 
Q. What were conditions of service like at the time of joining the Times? 
 
One of the local conditions was that local workers (Zambians) should accommodate 
themselves. I was one of those who fought that. Local workers were in townships: I lived 
with my uncle. Lonrho said they could only provide accommodation for people from 
outside the country. Though we were black, we all could not be expected to 
accommodate ourselves.  
 
1. Were white employees paid differently from their black counterparts? 
 
 
Whites were paid expatriate salaries while blacks were on local conditions. We also 
considered ourselves expatriates since we came from different parts of the country. 
Eventually, the policy changed in the 1970s. With black management (under Dunstan 
Kamana), all the archaic policies gave into a more realitstic Zambianisation policy. 
Dunstan Kamana changed the complexion of the paper and black people benefited. 
 
Q. How would you describe the editorial independence and political relations 
between the Times and the government at the time? 
 
A. Political controls started with Dunstan Kamana. His focus became more on 
indigenous issues. For me he was the best editor. He never directly criticised the 
president (Kenneth Kaunda). But, he would attack any other minister. He was fearless 
and he protected his staff. I do not recall a moment when a reporter was called to 
answer to outsiders. During his time, the Times of Zambia was burnt twice by UNIP 
cadres and Zimbabwean Freedom Fighters. There were so many demonstrations by 
UNIP youths (against the Times): these were vicious youths. We were called Times of 
liars”. There were inter-party clashes between UNIP and ANC and with the coming of 
UPP. We saw the tribal parties come in. 
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Q.At what point did you begin to discern state interference in editorial matters on 
the Times? 
 
A. Editorially, state intervention began to be felt around 1968. The General Manager did 
not attend editorial meetings. Lonrho maintained control of the general manager, chief 
accountant and advertising manager. 
 
Q. What were the criteria for employment or reporters and editors?  
 
Employment was always advertised and jobs were very competitive. I started as a letter 
writer to the Times. I completed my journalism certificate from Mindolo (The Africa 
literature Centre’s journalism school) before I was engaged. One had to undergo an 
aptitude test to pass for employment. That is why we had better editorial staff. The Daily 
Mail was more localised than the Times. The British, Australian and New Zealanders 
who were our editors demanded very high standards. 
 
Q.At the time, what was the circulation of the Times Newspapers? 
 
A. Under Kamana, the Times of Zambia circulated between 60,000 and 65,000 copies 
daily. The Sunday Times circulated up to 70,000 copies. These figures were audited by 
the Audit Bureau of circulation.  Things began to change in 1980 when the Zambia 
National Holdings (UNIP owned conglomerate) acquired major share holding in the 
Times. 
 
 
7.Phiri, J.2008.[TimesPrintpak Zambia limited] 
                        
 
Q. How would you describe the economic relations between the Times 
Newspapers and the state? 
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A. “Informal”. The belief is that these companies could generate their own funds. I could 
say there a link but it depends too much on who is the Permanent Secretary (at any 
given time). Right now we are getting the best support from government, especially 
during elections when they come up with motor vehicles: we received 8 vehicles prior to 
the 2006 elections. The government also instructed the Zambia National Wholesale 
Corporation through the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) to sell their building to the 
Times. The government made a down payment of k70, 000 Zambian Kwacha. The 
Times of Zambia paid the remaining K200 million.  It is difficult to get finances from the 
ministry of finance if its not justified.  
 
 
Q. Could you contextualise the financial situation on the Times of Zambia? 
 
A. For then first time, we are serious about bringing a printing press worth K9billion. 
There was a subvention of K1billion in January, 2008. The Times of Zambia saved 
k2billion and we want to use it to make a down payment and borrow from the bank. The 
government does not give adequate funding, that as I said, depends on who is the 
Permanent Secretary. Currently, the Times of Zambia owes a lot in taxes to the Zambia 
Revenue Authority and the National Pensions Board. 
 
Q. How is the company’s performance commercially? 
 
A. We get 80% of our revenue from advertising. Very little comes from circulation. Our 
circulation is 10,000 copies daily. 
 
Q. How can you explain the drastic drop in circulation? 
 
A. New, independent newspapers, affordability. Also, we lost the Cell Tel account 
because we cannot print in colour. In the past, institutional subscriptions accounted for 
most of our sales.  Nowadays, many people read the paper from the office. One paper 
covers 100 people. The other aspect is the distribution line. Solwezi is just about the 
only rural area that gets the paper. Vans are less than 10. We need up to 20 to cover 
the country adequately. In the past we had even introduced a courier service. 
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Q. Has the advent of technology helped? 
 
A. With computer technologies, things can be eased. ZANIS (Zambia National 
Information Services) are putting printing presses in every province. If that works out, we 
can exploit it. Only two printing presses are set up. We are particularly interested in 
Chipata (in the eastern province). 
 
Q. What measures need to be taken to improve the performance of the company? 
 
A. We should strengthen board oversight in terms of economic governance. We need a 
chair with a business pedigree than politics.  The General Manager position was phased 
out and that of Managing Director created. But the editor-in-chief is weak in business 
terms and that is the difficulty. The board recognises that. But perhaps we need to 
create a position of Business Development Manager. The company still has a base: it 
controls 70% to 80% of the advertising market.  But we have problems with auditing; the 
last audit was done three years ago. There has been a backlog and records are not up 
to date. The Post Newspapers are well run. The Times of Zambia could not borrow from 
the bank because of no audited records. 
 
Q. Are the unions and civil society represented on the board? 
 
A. There is no trade union or civil society representation. The people who have served 
are political operatives. 
 
Q. What is the political relationship between the Times and the state? 
 
A. Currently, the arrangements are disorganised. Previously all the state needed to do 
was appoint the editor-in-chief. The relationship was a bit more remote. But with the 
change of government, the relationship has become more obtrusive: anyone in the party 
or government can come in and give instructions. In the past it had to be the minister of 
information. Now there is a lot of indiscipline. And previously, there was no call from a 
deputy minister. There is a need for guidelines. In Tanzania for example, there is a 
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charter. You may not criticise individuals in government over policy matters but you can 
criticise the policy. Here, there is no guideline. 
 
Q. How would you compare state-times relations under the multiparty system and 
the one party state? 
 
Democratisation brings indiscipline. Under the one party state, it was easier to define 
what the state’s political interest was. Nowadays, it is difficult to know what the president 
thinks. There are so many individual interests at play. In the one party state, when KK 
(President Kenneth Kaunda) made a statement, you knew what you could do and not do 
– now it is difficult. 
 
 
 
Q. Are the staff politicised?  
 
A. I found that there was no discipline. Reporters were in a habit of writing dossiers to 
State House (official residence of the republican president). Somebody wrote a dossier 
saying that I was funded by plunderers. A reporter submitted a list of who supports who. 
These things determine higher level promotions. It is now a pattern. The incentives are 
greater job security for people directly related to the state. There is an incentive to be 
posted to the diplomatic service/ and government positions.  
 
Q. What are the criteria for promotion on the Times of Zambia? Is there any 
political imperative to it? 
 
A. Job evaluation. But promotion has not always been based on serious evaluation. I 
have made suggestions that would allow heads of departments to scrutinise 
recommendations, critic them before notches are awarded. 
 
Q. How has the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) performed under the 
circumstances? 
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A. PAZA is failing because of low intellectual capacity. People are voted in based on 
friendships; most senior people do not attend PAZA. The highest ranking officer is a 
news editor. Yet when PAZA was formed, it was headed by an editor-in-chief. These 
days’ students are bussed in from private colleges for contenders to win votes.  
 
Q. How would you describe the effect of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) 
on media freedom and on the welfare of journalists? 
 
A. ZUJ has similar problems. One of the problems is simple lack of understanding of 
issues. We have what I would call ‘uninformed militancy’. The first committee of ZUJ in 
1991 had exposure and experience and was therefore better. At the time ZUJ was 
registered ‘illegally’ because we had the ‘one industry one union policy’. Journalists 
were aligned to the Typographical Workers Union. But people in the registration office 
wanted change and allowed us to register. When registering, we could not come up with 
100 names. We then got employees from ZNBC, ZIS etc, just to make the numbers. 
Broadcasting workers still belonged to the National Union of Communication Workers.  
 
Generally, conditions of service have improved since ZUJ was formed. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
 
The overall aim of this line if inquiry was to establish the impact of market and labour 
liberalisation on unionisation and professionalisation of Journalism.  The two key 
informants in this section are the President of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) and 
the President of the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA).The broad areas of in inquiry 
were: 
 
 Conditions that led to the formation of the organisations 
 The impact of democratisation on state media systems 
 The role of organised labour in influencing worker welfare 
 The impact of labour and market liberalisation on unionisation 
 
The notable feature of this section is the the President of ZUJ responded to questions 
mainly by providing official documents, constitutions, statements, collective agreements 
and memos, which have informed the analysis in Chapter Five. The written responses 
were there brief and delivered against this background. 
 
 
8. Sakala, A. 2010.[Press Association of Zambia] 
 
Q. When and why was the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) formed? 
 
A. The Paza began as a small gathering of journalists in the 1960s and these were 
mostly based in Lusaka. Later in the 1970s, the gathering transformed itself into Lusaka 
press club with the main objective of promoting professionalism and protecting and 
advancing the cause of journalists. The other objective was to provide a forum where 
decision makers would interact with the public by way of holding Talk shows. 
 
In the 1980s, members of the Lusaka press club decided to form a national 
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association for journalists and called the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) with the 
main objectives of promoting professional journalisms, advocate for media freedom, 
good governance and accountability in public office. 
It is run by an elected board and has a secretariat head by an executive secretary. 
 
Q. What is the membership portfolio of the PAZA (please indicate trends; 
whether membership has grown since formation and the types of institutions 
which the union represents?) 
 
A. The membership of paza is from both private and public media institutions as well as 
public relations practitioners. This includes both individual and institutional membership. 
The composition includes state run news papers, national broadcaster, news agency, 
community radio stations and some free lance journalists. 
 
Q.What is the proportion of private media membership compared to state media 
membership in the PAZA? 
 
A. About 40 percent of the members are from the private media and this because this 
category of journalists is split with MISA (ZAMBIA). 
 
Q. How many PAZA members are there in the Times/Printpak? 
 
A. Times/Printpak has about 70 members. 
 
Q. By what means is the PAZA funded? (membership subscriptions, institutional 
support, etc) 
 
A. Paza receives funds from member’s subscriptions from both individual and 
institutional members. It also receives support from donors and institutions that from 
time to time support paza programmes and projects. 
 
Q. In what ways has the democratisation process in Zambia influenced the 
formation of the PAZA, if at all? (Democratisation here is defined by political 
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change during the period between 1964 when Zambia became independent to 
the present day) 
 
A. The democratisation has helped a lot of ways in that it has in a way encouraged 
journalists to demand for greater media freedom and recognition of the role that the 
media plays in development of a country. 
 
This has been especially so after Zambia’s return to Multi-party politics in 1990 as Paza 
has in partnership with other media associations been lobbying for reforming of media 
laws by way of either amending or repealing the current pieces of legislation that affect 
media operations. Paza has also been calling for amendment of the constitutional 
provisions on the media. 
 
Q. What were the major differences in relation to the working circumstances of 
journalists before PAZA was formed and after its formation, in terms of the 
following: 
 Representation by professional bodies 
 Legal support from professional bodies 
 Professional practice by journalists 
 Relations with the state 
 
A. Before Paza was formed and after it became active, the journalists now have 
professional representation and government and institutions now regularly consult Paza. 
For example government has invited Paza to sit on the constitution review bodies. The 
Anti-corruption commission also solicited Paza’s view when a national anticorruption 
policy was being formulated. There has been legal support from the Legal resources 
foundation, which is a body 
which offers free legal services.  
 
This was especially done when we carried out a 
campaign for media law reforms like at a time paza was calling for the amendment of 
ZNBC act, enactment of the Independent broadcasting authority (IBA) act. In terms of 
professional practice by journalists has raised awareness and promoted ethical and 
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professional journalism. For example in 2006, paza undertook a country wide 
awareness and sensitisation programme on the electoral code of conduct which 
contained sections of how the media are expected to conduct elections coverage.2 As 
for the relations with the state, there has been a significant improvement as earlier 
stated although sometimes this depends on issues at hand and positions taken by Paza 
but generally I can safely say that paza is the first media body that the state consults on 
many matters. 
 
 
Q. What would you say is PAZA’s biggest achievement in addressing matters of 
press freedom, media independence and professional practice in the state 
owned media? (Particularly, relating to the Times Newspapers and the Zambia 
Daily Mail) 
 
A. Honestly, this is a difficult one because situation change according to circumstances. 
For instance when we raised the need for balanced coverage during elections, there 
was some level adherence to the electoral code of conduct but with time and pressure 
from shareholders, this is slowly being ignored. However, the importance of balancing 
stories i.e. getting both or all sides of a story seems to catch on very well. 
 
Q. Describe in quantitative terms, how many legal interventions PAZA has 
deployed in defence of journalists in the state owned media and their outcomes? 
 
A. In 1991 Paza obtained an injunction to restrain media heads of the Times of Zambia, 
Zambia Daily Mail and Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) for alleged 
biased coverage. This allowed the three institutions to give balanced coverage in 
competing parties in 1991 elections although it was only for a short period. 
 
In 1997, Paza went to court and successfully petitioned high court to rule that it 
Would be a violation of media freedoms if the state imposed statutory regulation.  
This caused the state to with shelf plans to introduce a media council bill. 
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Paza together with other media bodies in 2005 challenged the state on whether the 
minister of information and broadcasting had power to veto nominees to sit on an adhoc 
selection committee meant to choose board members at IBA and ZNBC. 
 
Initially the High court ruled in favour of Paza that the minister did not have such 
authority. However the decision was later overturned by the Supreme Court. 
 
Q. Does PAZA have a code of ethics, if so, describe its key elements? 
 
A. Yes it does and the key elements are impartiality, objectivity, accuracy, truthfulness, 
honesty, no free gifts from news sources, corruption free, balanced and unbiased 
reporting, transparency and equal treatment of news sources regardless of sex, race or 
status in society 
 
Q. Describe the impact of PAZA’s code of ethics on journalistic practices in the 
state 
owned media? 
 
 
A. The impact had been limited and this largely due to influence from shareholders 
exerted on the heads of state run media. 
 
Q. What are the major impediments-if any-to the implementation of PAZA’s code 
of ethics and practice in the state owned media? 
 
A. First is the insecurity faced by heads of these media institutions. The appointment of 
these functionaries are largely political and can be removed at any time. It appears that 
appointing authority expects that the institutions to toe the line of the party in power and 
therefore give them favourable coverage by promoting party interests. This in a way 
hinders the practice of ethical journalism and professionalism is sometime ignored to 
please the powers that be. 
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The other aspect is that some journalists are just ill-trained and in recent years, the 
employment system has not totally been on merit as some journalists are imposed on 
these media institutions by external forces. 
 
Q.Does PAZA participate in decision making structures of the state owned media 
or privately owned media (membership on the boards of directors, consultative 
forums in the development of institutional policies and procedures) 
 
A.Paza only participates at consultative level especially for community media although 
at one time, an executive secretary of Paza was a board member at one of the sate 
dailies. 
 
Q.In what ways, if at all, has the PAZA influenced government media policies and 
what, in your view, was their impact on the state owned print media? 
 
A. Paza participated in the formulation of the media policy which has since expired. The 
association has also on several occasions made submissions to parliamentary select 
committees on media but quite honestly it is difficult o measure the impact on state 
owned media. 
 
Q.What is the PAZA’s position on the privatisation of state media systems in 
Zambia? (Should they or should they not be privatised? If not, what alternative 
media models does the PAZA suggest in regard to a restructured media system 
in Zambia) 
 
A. The association supports the privatisation of the state media because it has proved 
difficult to have state media that will truly serve public interest. At the moment the state 
media always get trapped into serving partisan political interests. Privatisation with 
different owners will add diversity and plurality to the media landscape and since private 
owners have to compete, they will be forced to engage in more professional and 
competitive journalism and this may benefit the public 
i.  
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Q.In your view, how would PAZA and its membership be affected by the total 
privatisation of state media systems 
 
 
A.Paza’s membership may not be affected adversely in terms of losing membership and 
hopefully the association’s aspirations may be enhanced as the private sector seems to 
be more receptive to PAZA’s objectives. 
 
Q.Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that new 
democracies may need to have communal institutions (such as state or public 
media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. 
Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as detrimental 
to democracy or nation building. How do you react to this? 
 
A. This idea seems good on paper but given the experience and practice in Zambia, this 
may just be a continuation of the status quo. The problem is there is generally a lack of 
integrity and presumption of good faith in management of public affairs. The temptation 
to advantage and gain undue benefit seems to have polluted the whole public service 
and is especially worse in the political arena, unfortunately, politicians in this context 
always have the last and final say. 
In our situation this has stagnated rather than moved the democratic process. 
Thank you 
 
9. Chonya, M.2010.[Zambia Union of Journalists] 
 
Q. When and why was the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) formed? 
 
A. It was formed in 1992 to represent the interests of journalists 
 
Q. What is the membership portfolio of the ZUJ (please indicate trends; whether 
membership has grown since formation and the types of institutions which the 
union represents? 
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A. 15-100-300. The membership has grown since its inception 
 
 
Q. What is the proportion of private media membership compared to state media 
membership in the ZUJ? 
 
A. ZUJ does not have private media membership 
 
Q. By what means are the ZUJ funded? (membership subscriptions, institutional 
support, etc) 
 
A.  Membership subscriptions 
 
Q. In what ways has the democratisation process in Zambia influenced the 
formation of the Zambia Union of Journalists, if at all? (Democratisation here is 
defined by political change during the period between 1964 when Zambia became 
independent to date) 
 
A. It had been influenced in that democracy was introduced in 1991 
 
Q. Before the formation of the ZUJ, some media workers belonged to the National 
Union of Communication Workers. How would you compare the representation of 
journalists before the formation of the ZUJ and in the present day (under the 
ambit of ZUJ) 
 
A. The representation before was poor and with the formation of ZUJ had tremendously 
improved 
 
 
Q. Describe the impact of collective agreements on the status of workers on state 
media systems in terms of the following: 
 
a. conditions of service 
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b. job security 
c. Promotion of freedom of expression(Please cite any useful examples 
of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or champion specific 
causes of workers, including editors’ in chief) 
d. Labour rights (Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has 
acted to protect, defend or champion specific causes of worker 
situations, including editors’ in chief) 
e. promotion of ethics and codes of practice 
 
 
A. Job security is there. Promotion of freedom of expression is there though the state 
media is controlled by government. It is there and ZUJ has acted wherever workers had 
gone on strike to express their displeasure on certain issues and management had 
threatened to fire them 
 
Q. Does the ZUJ participate in decision making structures of the state owned 
media or privately owned media (membership on the boards of directors, 
consultative forums in the development of institutional policies and procedures) 
 
A. No ways 
 
 
Q. In your view, are the economic conditions in Zambia conducive to the growth 
of privately owned media?   
 
  A. No. 
 
Q. In what ways, would the growth of privately owned media or lack of it, affect 
the ZUJ? 
 
A. It would be affected in that private media do not allow their workers to belong to a 
union. This would result in the loss of members for ZUJ. 
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Chonya M.2010.[Zambia Union of Journalists][Follow up interview by telephone]  
 
Q. In our earlier discussion you indicated that private media owner do not allow 
their workers to participate in the union. How do you explain the lack of 
membership in ZUJ by public service workers? 
 
A. The government and the public service unions undermine our efforts to recruit civil 
servants. This is because they see us as competitors. Lately we have been in talks with 
Broadcasting media workers. They have been discussing the formation of the Zambia 
Union of Broadcasters and Information Disseminators (ZUBID). ZUJ has been 
discussing with ZUBID about collaboration and a possible merger. 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
 
This section represents the follow on conversations with respondents, mainly to seek 
clarity on interviews already held (presented in appendix one). The key feature of this 
appendix is the communication from Mwaba Phiri, a former editor of the Z Magazine 
published by the then Zambia Information Services (ZIS). Currently Phiri is Executive 
Producer at the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). A follow up discussion 
with Arthur Simuchoba on the circumstances that led to his dismissal as managing 
editor of the Times of Zambia is also included. 
 
 
E-MAILS 
 
I was supported by the ZUJ who paid the legal costs. No reason was 
given for the termination and under the contract they were not obliged 
to give any reasons 
 
On 9/1/10, Kondwani Chirambo <kchirambo@idasa.org.za> wrote: 
> Greetings Mr Simuchoba, 
> 
> I need to establish something about the case involving your suspension 
> from the Times back in 1994/5: 
> 1. Were you supported by PAZA/ZUJ or by one or the other (if so in what 
> ways) 
> 2. who financed the legal costs 
> 3. On what grounds was your contract terminate in the end (if it is not 
> too personal). 
> 
> Regards 
> 
> -- 
> Kondwani Chirambo 
> Director 
> Governance and AIDS Programme 
> Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
> tel: 27-12-3920556 
> cell: 072171 
 
 
 
 
Ok, the contract was terminated after the the court had reinstated me. In order words 
they used the discretionary clause in the contract to terminate it without reference to the 
court action. The court action could prevent them from doing so. I never worked with 
Nyirenda. He came after me. There was no managing Director in my time. Sorry for 
delay. My internet was down though I saw the query earlier 
Keep well 
Arthur Simuchoba 
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On Wed, Sep 22, 2010 at 3:21 AM, Kondwani Chirambo <kchirambo@idasa.org.za> 
wrote: 
 Hi, 
 
Sorry another point of clarification; you won your case through the help of ZUJ, and 
were re-instated.  Were you then retired or your contract was again terminated? 
Lastly, as managing editor, was the managing director (Nyirenda) your immediate 
supervisor or was his job simply to deal with commercial matters-at that point?  
 
 
On 2010/09/03 10:19 AM, Arthur simuchoba wrote: 
I was supported by the ZUJ who paid the legal costs. No reason was 
given for the termination and under the contract they were not obliged 
to give any reasons 
 
On 9/1/10, Kondwani Chirambo<kchirambo@idasa.org.za>  wrote: 
Greetings Mr Simuchoba, 
 
I need to establish something about the case involving your suspension 
from the Times back in 1994/5: 
1. Were you supported by PAZA/ZUJ or by one or the other (if so in what 
ways) 
2. who financed the legal costs 
3. On what grounds was your contract terminate in the end (if it is not 
too personal). 
 
Regards 
 
-- 
Kondwani Chirambo 
Director 
Governance and AIDS Programme 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
tel: 27-12-3920556 
cell: 072171 
 
 
 
No bother KC. ZIS had no policy along the lines of professional qualifications. If there 
was one it was not enforced. ZIS employed school-leavers (Form two or Form Five) who 
usually made their way up the ranks via long service. Long service in fact played a 
stronger role in one's promotion than mere qualification. Some of our Directors rose in 
this manner having bettered their academic qualifications with an Evelyn Hone College 
diploma while at work. 
So you usually expected some kind of promotion after your diploma but it was your 
service (and how savvy you were the the bosses) that counted. 
Remember I was the first one to obtain a degree in the department. I wasn't given any 
promotion until three years later when I became Publications Editor/Manager. The dept 
just didn't know how to treat the 
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degree holders.  
Since I worked next to the Ministry of agriculture in Ndola I noticed 
that there was a more defined policy regarding qualifications and ranks 
in that ministry as they had had a lot of staff with professional 
qualifications from Diplomas and degrees. 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Kondwani Chirambo [mailto:kchirambo@idasa.org.za]  
Sent: 20 September 2010 10:09 PM 
To: Mwaba Phiri 
Subject: some help 
 
 
  Mwaba, hope you well. Could you give me some help: 
-I need to know how the government classified journalists in terms of  
scales in your time at ZIS: 
1) those with degrees 
2) those with diplomas and certificates 
3) those without any formal qualifications 
 
Sorry for the bother. 
 
 
Personal communication to John Phiri, 2011.[Managing Director Times Printpak Zambia 
Limited] [SMS]: 
 
Q. Is Zamtel your biggest spender? And is it possible to give percentages for 2008-2010 
for at least the top five? 
 
A. Zamtel, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi Airways, Zesco, ZRA, Road Development Agency, 
Healthy Ministry, Education Ministry, Zanaco. In that order past 3 yrs. 
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KEY INFORMANTS 
Name of 
respondent 
Organisation 
(current or 
previous)  
Position Contact 
John Phiri TimesPrintpak 
Zambia Limited 
Managing 
Director 
Cell: 00260955882813 
Phiriwaz@yahooo.com 
Office: 260-211-
229076/226949/221695 
Arthur Simuchoba Executive 
Issues, 
(Times 
Newspapers) 
Editor 
(and former  
managing 
editor, 
TimesPrintpak) 
00260977820626 
asimuchoba@gmail.com 
Ridgeway Liwena Society of Senior 
Zambian 
Journalists 
(Formerly, 
Sunday Times of 
Zambia) 
President (and  
former editor, 
Sunday Times 
of Zambia) 
E-mail: rliwena.lippuho@zamwa 
Tel: 00260966755698 
Andrew Sakala Press 
Association of 
Zambia (News 
editor, Times of 
Zambia) 
President Cell: 00260966980392 
ndabasakala@yahoo.com 
 
Morgan Chonya Zambia Union of 
Journalists 
(Zambia Daily 
Mail) 
President ZUJ  Cell: 00260977833259 
Office; 00260-211-227793/5 
Telefax: 0211 -227795 
Andrew Miti The Sowetan 
(Times of Zambia) 
Sub editor 
(former sub 
editor, Times of 
Zambia) 
Cell: 002783933269 
Office: 0027112803235 
dalinkomiti@gmail.com 
Dennis Kapata Formerly Times of 
Zambia 
Former news 
editor 
Office: 00260211257151 
Cell: 00260977821668 
Muleya 
Mwananyanda 
Formerly, Post 
Newspapers, 
Zambia 
Legal expert 
and former 
journalist, Post 
Newspapers 
Cell: 0027767865926 or 
0027798888451 
muleya@campaignforeducation.org 
or muleya@gmail.com 
 
